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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis researches the nature and extent of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. It is empirically based, with the relationship being 
investigated by way of a critical realist informed case study of a multinational retail 
organisation. To unpack the relationship and drill down further into the issues 
involved, the research addresses four questions: How do managers understand the 
short, medium, and long term? How do inter-temporal decisions manifest? What is 
the nature of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism? 
What is the extent of the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism?  
 
Utilising a combination of semi-structured interviews, non-participant observation, 
and company documents, the thesis argues that the concepts of short, medium, and 
long term are empirically messy due to heterogenous meanings. By linking managers’ 
views about their time horizons to their involvement in different inter-temporal 
decisions, the thesis proposes that any future definition of short-termism should not 
just emphasise the inter-temporal trade-off involved in actions, but also the intention 
that underpins those actions. The thesis reshapes the financial/non-financial 
dichotomy to illustrate that quantitative (financial and non-financial) measures can 
lead to short-termism. Nevertheless, between-person differences in inter-temporal 
responses to how performance measurement information is used to evaluate and 
reward managers complicates this relationship. Thus, over the course of this thesis, a 
contingency-based framework is developed; the framework provides individual-level 
explanations about when, how, and why short-termism occurs.  
 
The thesis contributes to the behavioural accounting literature, particularly the 
empirical literature, which examines the behavioural effects of financial measures by 
advancing the conceptualisation of short-termism, and provides a nuanced 
understanding of how short-termism manifests. It also contributes to this literature by 
synthesising the conceptual landscape in order to build an integrated framework of 
the nature and extent of the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism. 
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1  INTRODUCTION: ISSUES AND INTENTIONS  
  
“The second specific task of managers is to harmonize in every decision and 
action the requirements of the immediate and long-range future. Managers 
cannot sacrifice either without endangering the enterprise. They must, so to 
speak, keep their noses to the grindstone while lifting their eyes to the hills—
which is quite an acrobatic feat.” (Drucker, 2013: 54)  
 
Managers, particularly middle-level managers, have a duty to approach the future in 
terms of day-to-day decisions and actions that consider both the short and the longer 
term (Frow et al., 2005). As Drucker (2013) forewarns, managers who are unable to 
balance the demands of both time periods may endanger the organisation. This 
forewarning is particularly pertinent when tension between the striving for short-term 
results and the pursuit of longer-term success prevails. In this context, trade-offs 
between the short and longer term may occur. Short-termism—behaviour that focuses 
on securing short-term results that precludes longer-term achievement (Laverty, 1996; 
Marginson and McAulay, 2008; Irving, 2009; Marginson et al., 2010)—denotes one 
such trade-off. This study aims to illuminate managers’ inter-temporal decision-
making processes by exploring the nature and extent of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. Performance measures, which form part of 
an organisation’s management control system, define the dimensions upon which 
results are desired (Malmi and Brown, 2008; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). 
Hybrid forms of performance measurement, such as the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), 
contain both financial and non-financial performance measures. The present study 
adopts a contingency approach to researching the time horizons of, and inter-temporal 
trade-off decisions made by, middle-level managers in a multinational retail 
organisation which operates a BSC.  
The remainder of the chapter contains four sections. The first section provides 
background information on the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism to orient the discussion. The section emphasises the adverse consequences of 
short-termism and draws attention to the BSC as one potential way to mitigate the 
likelihood of its occurrence through the use of causally linked financial and non-
financial measures. The second section presents the key concepts and arguments that 
will be used and referred to throughout the remainder of the study. The arguments 
lead to the following suggestions: (1) there is a need to explore the nuances and 
possible complexities of short-termism; (2) there is a need to unpick the general 
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categories of financial versus non-financial measures; and (3) there is a need to 
explore the contingencies that may complicate the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. The third section delineates the research agenda, both 
graphically and in narrative form, and outlines the envisioned contributions to be 
made by this research. The final section provides an overview of the forthcoming 
chapters.  
 
1.1  Management Control Systems and Short-termism  
 
Management control is the process by which organisations attempt to ensure, using 
information-based systems, routines, and procedures, that the behaviours and 
decisions of managers are consistent with organisational aims and objectives 
(Marginson, 2012; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). Financial measures, such as 
profit and return on capital employed, are integral to the management control process 
(Hansen et al., 2003; Kennerley and Neely, 2003; Malmi and Brown, 2008). Financial 
measures provide relatively accurate, timely, and objective information which 
supports the process of planning, monitoring, measuring, and evaluating (Hopwood, 
1972; Merchant, 2006). Traditionally, most organisations have relied, in part, upon 
financial measures when exercising management control and, importantly, financial 
measures continue to be widely used by organisations (see e.g., Ekholm and Wallin, 
2000; van der Stede et al., 2006; Libby and Lindsay, 2010). 
However, within the post-1980s accounting literature, dissatisfaction with 
financial measures started to emerge (see Kaplan, 1984; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). 
The dissatisfaction relates, in part, to the fact that financial measures focus on the past; 
they are derived from measurement rules that are often conservatively biased; and 
they provide incomplete signals of managerial effort (see Merchant, 2006; van 
Rinsum and Hartmann, 2007; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). Nørreklit (2000) 
draws attention to these imperfections: 
  
“Accounting figures do not emphasize the elements which will lead to good 
or poor future financial results. One of the problems with accounting figures 
is that the financial consequences of the uncompleted chains of action extend 
beyond the time of measurement. For instance, the performance measures of 
accounting systems ignore the financial value of a company’s intangible assets 
such as research in progress, human resources and the goodwill as well as the 
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bad-will which the company has built. The problem may even be aggravated 
if the company is in a situation in which it feels forced to pursue short-term 
financial results rather than the organization’s long-term goals.” (Nørreklit, 
2000: 65-66) 
 
The above excerpt alludes to the often-cited axiom ‘what gets measured gets 
done’. This implies that, as financial measures assess the short term, managers will 
focus on the short term. As suggested at the outset, an excessive focus on the short 
term can be problematic when tension between managers’ inter-temporal activities 
and responsibilities prevails. In this context, trade-off decisions in favour of the short 
term may occur. It is argued that short-termism can stifle creativity and 
competitiveness, cause operative inefficiencies and discourage investment in 
research, new capabilities and training (Merchant, 1990; Laverty, 1996; Thompson, 
2007). Such behaviour can not only damage the long-term value-adding capability of 
the organisation (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980; Kaplan, 1984; Merchant, 1990), but 
also cause economic harm to the country in which the organisation operates (Jacobs, 
1991; Porter, 1992; Laverty, 2004). Sir George Cox’s independent review, which was 
commissioned by the Labour party in 2012, provides a vivid account of the adverse 
consequences of short-termism:  
 
“Short-termism curtails ambition, inhibits long-term thinking and provides a 
disincentive to invest in research, new capabilities, products, training, 
recruitment and skills. It results in drastic cost-cutting and staff-shedding 
whenever revenue growth fails to keep up with expectation…Its most 
important consequence is that it militates against the development of the 
internationally competitive businesses and industries that are essential to the 
UK’s future economic prosperity.” (Cox, 2013: 6)   
 
Considering the above, analogies to an ‘illness’, ‘disease’, or ‘virus to 
corporate thinking’ are often made to highlight the severity of short-termism and the 
difficulties of treating this behavioural phenomenon (Rappaport, 2005; Gallery and 
Gallery, 2009). Whilst several remedies have been proposed (see Merchant and van 
der Stede, 2012), perhaps the most recognised is Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) BSC 
approach to performance measurement and management control. The BSC is 
supposed to translate an organisation’s vision and strategy into four areas of 
performance: learning and growth, internal business processes, customers, and 
financial (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). The BSC thus supplements financial measures 
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with non-financial measures, such as employee satisfaction, product quality, and 
customer retention. Non-financial measures are believed to emphasise the longer 
term, and so the BSC is assumed to balance managers’ time horizons by ensuring that 
they consider the long term as well as the short term (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a; 
Merchant, 2006; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012).  
The key feature that distinguishes the BSC from a more ad hoc collection of 
financial and non-financial measures is the presumed causal linkages between the four 
measurement areas (Nørreklit, 2000; Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007; Nørreklit et al., 
2008).1 According to Kaplan and Norton (1996a), the causal chain begins with the 
measures of learning and growth, thereafter continuing through the internal business 
processes and the customer perspective, and culminating with improved financial 
performance. The series of cause-and-effect relationships is supposed to describe a 
strategic trajectory of “how investments in employee re-skilling, information 
technology, and innovative products and services would dramatically improve future 
financial performance” (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: ix). In sum, the mix of financial 
and non-financial measures and their causal linkages is considered to help address the 
problem of short-termism.  
Since Kaplan and Norton outlined the BSC in their well-known 1992 Harvard 
Business Review paper, it has engendered substantial interest: 26% of German 
organisations (Speckbacher et al., 2003), 46% of American organisations (Neely et 
al., 2004), and 57% of British organisations (Atkinson, 2006) have reportedly 
implemented the BSC approach to performance measurement and management 
control. Practitioner surveys (see e.g., Silk, 1998; Marr, 2001; Rigby, 2001; Williams, 
2001) also frequently document the popularity of the BSC in a range of industries and 
countries. Understanding the effect that performance measures have on managers’ 
inter-temporal decisions, specifically in the context of the BSC, which is a hybrid 
form of performance measurement, may therefore be regarded as important. Yet, 
knowledge pertaining to the nature and extent of this relationship is empirically 
limited. The present study aims to address this lacuna. Motivated by both theoretical 
and practical considerations, the research issue addressed in this study can thus be 
stated as follows:  
 
                                                          
1 The notion of causal linkages was introduced in the 1996 version of the BSC (compare 
Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 1996a). 
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What is the nature and extent of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism? 
 
In addressing this research issue, the study draws on the substantive topic area 
of performance measurement as a ‘domain theory’, and employs different ‘method 
theories’ imported from economics and psychology as a meta-level conceptual system 
for exploring various contingencies that may complicate the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism (see Chenhall, 2003; Lukka and Vinnari, 
2014).2 It is empirically based, with the relationship being investigated by way of a 
critical realist informed study of a purposefully selected information-rich case. 
Critical realism is a philosophical approach that not only endorses the case study 
method, but also provides helpful implications for both the research process and 
theoretical developments (see Easton, 2010). The key concepts and arguments that 
will be used and referred to throughout the remainder of the study are presented below. 
The next section thus serves as a preliminary to problematizing the assumption that 
financial measures encourage short-termism, whilst non-financial measures engender 
a longer-term focus.  
 
1.2  Key Concepts and Arguments  
 
As the above has alluded to, and Chapter 2 will demonstrate, it has long been argued 
that financial measures encourage short-termism (see e.g., Hayes and Abernathy, 
1980; Hayes and Garvin, 1982; Kaplan, 1984; Ittner et al., 2003b; Merchant and van 
der Stede, 2012). Empirical evidence, however, is inconclusive at best, with several 
studies unsupportive of the literature’s conceptual arguments (see e.g., Marginson and 
McAulay, 2008; Marginson et al., 2010). Within the accounting literature, using non-
financial measures is advocated as a way of mitigating the potential for financial 
measures to cause short-termism (see e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998a; Sliwka, 2002; Ittner et al., 2003a; Ittner et al., 2003b; Merchant, 
2006). Again, however, the limited empirical evidence available thus far tends to 
                                                          
2 A domain theory refers to the substantive topic area that the study examines (e.g., 
performance measurement), whilst a method theory offers a lens for analysing the issue(s) of 
the domain theory (e.g., agency theory, social comparison theory, etc.). For a useful 
discussion about the roles of theories in management accounting research, see Lukka and 
Vinnari (2014).  
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contradict conceptual argument (see e.g., Moers, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010). The 
differences between argument and evidence suggest the need for further research to 
better understand the nature and extent of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. Importantly, as a better understanding may likely derive 
from drilling down further into the issues involved, the study explores, through 
qualitative methods, the nuances of both short-termism and performance 
measurement.  
Regarding short-termism, the study investigates the following two 
assumptions and uses these as a platform for exploring the nuances and possible 
complexities of short-termism in more detail. The assumptions are: (1) the short term 
is a standardised period not exceeding one year (e.g., van der Stede, 2000; Marginson 
et al., 2010), and (2) that short-termism can be viewed as a relatively 
uncomplicated/un-nuanced, if undesired behaviour (e.g., Merchant, 1990; Abernethy 
et al., 2013). These assumptions tend to underpin conceptual argument, but their 
appropriateness has yet to be examined empirically. Therefore, exploring managers’ 
understanding of their time horizons, and broadening the consideration of how and to 
what effect managers make inter-temporal trade-off decisions, constitutes the first 
conceptual and empirical step which this study takes.  
As noted in the previous section, existing research has yet to fully investigate 
how the use of a systematic or formalised arrangement of performance measures, as 
in the form of a BSC, may affect managers’ short-termist behaviour. The second step 
thus involves examining whether and, if so, how, why, and in what ways a systematic 
combination of financial and non-financial measures might relate to managerial time 
horizons; specifically, the tendency for managers to engage in short-termist 
behaviour. In doing so, the study unpicks the general categories of financial versus 
non-financial measures in order to offer a more nuanced analysis of individual 
performance measures and their possible associations with short-termism. Apart from 
differentiating between financial and non-financial measures, researchers tend not to 
further differentiate in terms of performance measures and their relationship with 
short-termist behaviour. Recent studies suggest that considering performance 
measures at only an aggregate level may obscure relationships at the disaggregate 
level (see Marginson et al., 2010; Chakhovich, 2013). That is, individual performance 
measures may encourage or discourage short-termism in certain circumstances. 
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In the tradition of a contingency approach to management accounting research 
(for a review article, see Chenhall, 2003), and in a further attempt to reconcile the 
contradictory findings in the management accounting literature, the study considers 
aspects of the organisational setting that may complicate the relationship in question. 
Broader discussions about short-termism that rely on economic-based and 
psychology-based theories focus on how relative performance measurement 
information is disseminated (see e.g., Frederickson, 1992; Hannan et al., 2008; 
Tafkov, 2013); how different rewards are allocated (see e.g., Hoskisson et al., 1993; 
Wallace, 1997; Laverty, 2004); how managers’ employment horizons are shaped (see 
e.g., Narayanan, 1985; Campbell and Marino, 1994; Barker and Mueller, 2002); and 
how individual managers respond differently to a performance measurement system 
(see e.g., Kabanoff and Keegan, 2009; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2011). Emphasis 
is placed here on exploring, in a more holistic and processual manner, contingency 
relationships within the scope of management control—that is, the design of the 
performance measurement and reward systems (elements of results controls and 
cultural controls), as well as personal factors (which can be influenced by elements of 
personnel controls).3,4,5 Thus, the scope of the study extends beyond the interplay 
between financial and non-financial measures to include relevant contingencies that 
may determine the extent of their relationship with short-termist behaviour. The 
research issue addressed in this study is mapped onto a research agenda outlined in 
the next section.  
  
                                                          
3 Merchant and van der Stede (2012) state that results control involves rewarding employees 
for producing satisfactory results. Implementing results control involves defining the 
dimension(s) on which results are desired, measuring performance on the dimension(s), 
setting performance targets for employees to strive for, and providing rewards to encourage 
the behaviours that will lead to the desired results (cf. Malmi and Brown, 2008).  
4 Cultural controls are designed to encourage mutual monitoring and are built on shared 
traditions, norms, beliefs, values, ideologies, attitudes, and ways of behaving (Merchant and 
van der Stede, 2012). Group rewards and intra-organisational transfers are among the methods 
of shaping culture, and thus effecting cultural controls.  
5 Merchant and van der Stede (2012) note that personnel controls build on employees’ natural 
tendencies to control and/or motivate themselves. The purposes of personnel controls are to 
clarify expectations, ensure that each employee has the capabilities and resources to perform 
their job and increase the likelihood that each employee will engage in self-monitoring. 
Personnel controls may include selection and placement, training and job design, and the 
provision of necessary resources (cf. Malmi and Brown, 2008).  
8 
 
1.3  Research Agenda 
 
Figure 1.1 depicts the conceptual framework for the present study.  
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
   BROADER CONTEXT             
 (a) 
Performance 
Measurement 
System 
 
 
  
(b) 
Black Box of 
Contingencies 
 
 
 
(c) 
Managerial 
Short-
termism 
 
 
 
      
 
As the aim is to unpack the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism to drill down further into the issues involved, the framework can be 
unbundled into four research questions: 
 
1. How do managers understand the short, medium, and long term?  
 
2. How do inter-temporal decisions manifest? 
 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
4. What is the extent of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
Through the research questions identified above, this study seeks to contribute 
not just to the behavioural accounting literature, but also to the management 
accounting literature in general. In theoretical terms, the study contributes to the 
behavioural accounting literature, particularly the empirical literature, which 
examines the behavioural effects of financial measures. Its point of departure is 
twofold: (1) in exploring the nature of relationship between individual financial and 
non-financial measures and managers’ inter-temporal trade-offs; and (2) in drilling 
down to provide a micro-level analysis of the extent of the relationship between 
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performance measures and short-termist behaviour. An additional point of departure 
is the intention to explore how managers view their time horizons and the issue of 
short-termism. In so doing, the study builds a contingency-based framework which 
provides individual-level explanations about when, how, and why managers engage 
in short-termism. The conclusions that can be drawn from this study call into question 
the appropriateness of assumptions that tend to underpin conceptual arguments.  
 This thesis is also significant in relation to its methodological contribution. 
There remains little published work discussing how critical realism can be utilised to 
conceptualise and conduct management accounting research (for exceptions, see 
Brown and Brignall, 2007; Llewellyn, 2007; Modell, 2009; 2017). In discussing the 
possibilities and practicalities of a critical realist research project, the study intends to 
add to this emerging area of interest. However, it should be noted at the outset that 
critical realism is largely deployed as an explanatory and linguistic device in this 
thesis rather than a meta-theory that informs theorising the empirical material. The 
qualitative approach to generating data also overcomes a limitation of prior research 
in this area, which has largely been conducted by way of questionnaire surveys (see 
e.g., van der Stede, 2000; Laverty, 2004; Marginson et al., 2010; Abernethy et al., 
2013) and experiments (see e.g., van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2007). Qualitative 
studies are necessary where processes, such as the interplay between performance 
measures and managers’ inter-temporal decisions, are involved which do not lend 
themselves easily to quantitative measurement (Yin, 2003). The next section provides 
an overview of each chapter in the thesis. 
  
1.4  Outline of the Study  
 
The following two chapters review the literature that informs this study, with the next 
focusing on the conceptualisation of short-termism. The chapter defines short-
termism and sets this against myopia to highlight the definitional inconsistency and 
conceptual ambiguity in the literature (compare e.g., Coates et al., 1995; Samuel, 
2000; Chakhovich et al., 2010; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2011). The chapter then 
explores the extent to which definitional inconsistency has led to varying 
operationalisation endeavours (compare e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Merchant, 
1990; Marginson and McAulay, 2008). The remainder of Chapter 2 considers 
performance measurement systems and the claims that have been made for their effect 
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on short-termism, citing management accounting research which looks at the use of 
financial measures (e.g., van der Stede, 2000), non-financial measures (e.g., 
Marginson et al., 2010), and hybrid systems (e.g., Abernethy et al., 2013). Chapter 2 
concludes with an appraisal of how this study understands short-termism and sets out 
the specific conflicts and gaps in the literature that will be addressed.  
Given the conflicting findings evident in management accounting research, 
Chapter 3 draws upon a broader literature for which there are established empirical 
bases for exploring short-termism within an organisational setting. The chapter 
examines the accounting, economic, and psychology literatures, highlighting that the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism may be complicated 
by interactive and complex factors such as how performance measurement 
information is disseminated (e.g., Hannan et al., 2013); how different rewards are 
allocated (e.g., Mergenthaler et al., 2012); how managers’ employment horizons are 
shaped (e.g., Nicholson and West, 1988); and how individual managers respond to a 
performance measurement system (e.g., van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2011). The 
chapter ends by suggesting that the evidence relating to these factors is lacking, 
unclear, or conflicting and establishes the issues that will be addressed in this study.  
Chapter 4 describes the research strategy that was deployed, emphasising the 
linkages between this study’s research questions, ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology. The chapter begins by discussing this study’s critical realist ontological 
and constructionist epistemological commitments, making detailed references to the 
methodological possibilities and implications of these philosophical commitments for 
the case study approach adopted. Assessments about the strengths and weaknesses of 
the investigatory tools utilised, and the ethical and procedural issues tackled, are also 
discussed. An account of the mode of analysis adopted and the criteria used to judge 
research within the critical realist paradigm concludes the chapter.  
Chapter 5 is the first of the three empirical chapters, offering a detailed 
overview of the external and internal case study context. Attention is given to 
describing aspects of the internal context that influence managers’ inter-temporal 
decisions, namely the organisation’s hierarchical structure and decentralised control 
architecture and the formal and informal management control systems in operation. 
Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) framework for describing the structure and operation of 
performance measurement systems provides a partial roadmap for the chapter.  
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Chapter 6 describes, analyses, and explains the research findings pertaining to 
the first and second research questions. The chapter begins by examining managers’ 
perceptions of their time horizons in relation to the context in which inter-temporal 
tasks are performed. This discussion is then taken further by exploring four types of 
inter-temporal decisions observed. These are: (1) focusing on the short term (myopia); 
(2) focusing on the long term (hypermetropia); (3) sacrificing the short term for the 
long term (long-termism); and (4) sacrificing the long term for the short term (short-
termism). Attention is given to describing and problematizing the inter-temporal 
decision of sacrificing the long term for the short term to flesh out the notion of short-
termism used in the literature. In relating the data presented to the studies cited in 
Chapter 2, the chapter closes by highlighting the complexity of short-termism and 
discussing what it means to engage in such behaviour.  
Chapter 7 describes, analyses, and explains the research findings pertaining to 
the third and fourth research questions. The chapter explains managers’ short-termist 
decisions in relation to financial measures, non-financial measures, and the BSC. The 
remainder of the chapter considers several factors that, based on the evidence 
obtained, appear particularly active in complicating the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. These are: relative performance 
information; the performance evaluation system; the reward/penalty system; intra-
organisational mobility; and personal time preferences. By considering how the 
findings relate back to the literature cited in Chapters 2 and 3, the chapter concludes 
by outlining the nature (i.e., the structure and operation of individual performance 
measures) and extent (i.e., individual-level contingency factors that play key roles) of 
the relationship between performance measures and short-termism.  
Chapter 8 concludes the study by summarising the contributions that have 
been made to the management accounting literature. An assessment of the practical 
implications of the study is also made. Moreover, the chapter reflects on the research 
process; considering its limitations and what could have been done differently. The 
chapter finishes by outlining the future research opportunities that could be pursued 
in light of this study. 
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2  SHORT-TERMISM: WHAT, HOW, AND WHY?  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the management accounting literature on short-termism. 
Considerable attention has been given by accounting researchers to documenting 
short-termism (see e.g., Henderson and Dearden, 1966; Dearden, 1969; Hopwood, 
1972; Merchant, 1990; Marginson et al., 2010), with arguments often premised on the 
assumption that the short term is a standardised period not exceeding one year (e.g., 
van der Stede, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010) and relatively un-nuanced proxies such 
as time allocation used for short-termist behaviour (e.g., Merchant, 1990; Abernethy 
et al., 2013). The focus of this academic domain has been the effect that an 
organisation’s performance measurement system has on short-termism (see e.g., 
Merchant, 1990; Marginson et al., 2010). The interplay between financial and non-
financial measures is frequently drawn upon to categorise measures that may cause or 
overcome such behaviour. Financial measures are claimed to encourage short-
termism (see e.g., Hayes and Abernathy, 1980; Hayes and Garvin, 1982; Kaplan, 
1984), whilst non-financial measures are usually described as leading indicators of 
future financial performance that can counteract short-termism (see e.g., Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998a; Banker et al., 2000; Said et al., 2003; Nagar and Rajan, 2005; Banker 
and Chen, 2006; Farrel et al., 2008). However, despite these assertions, empirical 
evidence regarding the effects of financial measures (compare Merchant, 1990; van 
der Stede, 2000) and non-financial measures (compare Moers, 2000; van Rinsum and 
Hartmann, 2007) on short-termism has been mixed. In line with the framework 
outlined in the previous chapter (see Figure 1.1), this review scrutinises the concept 
of short-termism and, insofar as it is possible, clarifies the nature of the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism.    
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section defines short-termism and 
sets this against myopia to highlight the definitional inconsistency and conceptual 
ambiguity in the literature. The second section explores the extent to which this 
definitional inconsistency has led to varying operationalisation endeavours, and 
unpicks the assumptions associated with the measurement instruments used in short-
termism research. The assumptions are: (1) the short term is a standardised period not 
exceeding one year (e.g., van der Stede, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010); and (2) that 
short-termism can be viewed as a relatively uncomplicated/un-nuanced, if undesired 
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behaviour (e.g., Merchant, 1990; Abernethy et al., 2013). These assumptions tend to 
underpin conceptual arguments, but their appropriateness has yet to be examined. The 
conclusions reached in the first two sections place caveats around the claims outlined 
in the third. The third section considers performance measurement systems and the 
claims that have been made for their effect on short-termism. The section focuses on 
three control systems that have been identified in management accounting research as 
impacting on the occurrence of short-termism: financial measurement systems, non-
financial measurement systems, and hybrid measurement systems that contain both 
financial and non-financial measures. In doing so, the section disentangles the 
assumption that financial measures encourage short-termism, whilst non-financial 
measures engender a longer-term focus that can counteract short-termism. The final 
section provides a summary of this chapter’s review and sets out the specific conflicts 
and gaps in the literature that will be addressed by the present study. 
 
2.1  Short-termism: What Is It?  
 
Decisions that have consequences in multiple time periods are inter-temporal 
decisions (Loewenstein, 1988). The spectrum of inter-temporal decisions includes 
myopia, short-termism, hypermetropia, and long-termism. Short-termism can be 
viewed as behaviour that focuses on securing short-term results that precludes longer-
term achievement (Laverty, 1996; Marginson and McAulay, 2008; Irving, 2009; 
Marginson et al., 2010). Based on the notion of sacrificing the future, short-termism 
thus involves a trade-off decision, and it is this situation that is detrimental to the 
organisation. Behaviour that focuses on the long term to the detriment of the short 
term, or long-termism, is also suboptimal to the organisation according to this 
definition (see Marginson and McAulay, 2008). Considerably less attention has been 
given to researching long-termism, even though long-termism is the mirror image of 
short-termism. These trade-off situations necessitate a degree of tension or conflict 
between managers’ inter-temporal activities and responsibilities, and become 
manifest when managers are unable to balance the demands of multiple time periods. 
Merchant and van der Stede (2012) characterise trade-offs that favour the short term 
as either investing or operating. The former refers to a situation wherein managers 
reduce or postpone worthwhile investments in order to secure short-term results, such 
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as investments in research and development, product and market development, and 
employee training. The latter involves managers securing short-term results by 
destroying the goodwill that has been established with employees, customers, and/or 
suppliers. For example, managers can impose mandatory overtime on employees at 
the end of a measurement period to complete production so that products can be 
dispatched and revenues recognised. However, this can be detrimental to product 
quality, customer satisfaction, and employee morale. Trade-offs that favour the short 
term may also manifest through strategic information manipulation which occurs ex-
post the actual performance of outcome-focused actions (e.g., filtering, smoothing, 
and the falsification of information) or specific gaming practices such as slack 
creation, wherein managers modify their behaviour ex-ante performance 
measurement (see Birnberg et al., 1983; Jaworski and Young, 1992). Striving for 
short-term results thus relates to target achievement, whilst the operation of longer-
term consequences is theoretically manifold.   
Making a sacrifice denotes the knowing act of giving up something valued for 
the sake of something else regarded as more important. Therefore, implicit in the 
above definition of short-termism is the implication that the behaviour is knowledge-
based and so purposive or intentional. This means that managers are broadly aware of 
and/or able to evaluate the expected longer-term consequences of their short-term 
actions. Drawing on the notion of intentional decision-making provides one way to 
distinguish between short-termism and myopia that has yet to be fully incorporated 
into research on short-termism. Myopia, often known as being short-sighted, can be 
viewed as behaviour that focuses on securing short-term results (Marginson and 
McAulay, 2008; Marginson et al., 2010). One interpretation of being short-sighted is 
that managers are generally unware of and/or unable to evaluate the expected longer-
term consequences of their short-term actions. This interpretation is broadly in line 
with van der Stede’s (2013) suggestion that myopia may result from ignorance, that 
is, where managers do not know or are not made to know the longer-term implications 
of their short-term actions. From this standpoint, myopia does not involve an 
intentional trade-off between short-term results and longer-term achievement. This 
nuance is potentially important for clarifying the link between performance measures 
and specific inter-temporal decisions, which is an issue that is discussed at the end of 
this section.   
15 
 
There remains, however, the possibility that managers’ short-term actions 
extrapolate into optimal long-term consequences (Marginson and McAulay, 2008). In 
other words, if short-term performance is adequately managed, long-term success may 
materialise almost automatically. Therefore, in this case, management myopia is not 
detrimental to the organisation. Noticeably, these myopic inter-temporal decisions are 
underpinned by a present-based rationality. Chakhovich (2013) finds that this is the 
rationality promoted by company executives of a publicly-quoted company, according 
to whom efficient and effective present actions lead to future success. Behaviour that 
focuses on the long term, or hypermetropia, may also be unproblematic according to 
this argument. Namely, hypermetropic behaviour need not necessarily result in a loss 
of concentration on short-term results. Hypermetropia aligns itself with a future-based 
rationality which denotes that the future is first planned, and only then are present 
actions implemented (Chakhovich, 2013). Both scenarios suggest that accordance 
underpins managers’ inter-temporal activities and responsibilities, that is, the long 
term is an aggregation of short terms (Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015).  
In the main, prior studies of short-termism are problematic insofar as the terms 
short-termism and myopia are used interchangeably. That is, myopia is used to 
indicate managerial (intentional and unintentional) inter-temporal trade-offs (see e.g., 
Samuel, 2000; Chakhovich et al., 2010; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2011), and short-
termism is used to indicate difficulties of foresight (see e.g., Marsh, 1990; Coates et 
al., 1995). Due, perhaps partly, to the blurred conceptual boundary between short-
termism and myopia, researchers are occasionally not explicit about how they are 
applying the terms (see e.g., Abernethy et al., 2013; Gigler et al., 2014). The 
definitional inconsistency and conceptual ambiguity in extant literature has left the 
field open to criticism and generated uncertainty as to the adequacy of the claims 
surrounding short-termism. For example, Marginson (2009: 41) poses the following 
question: are financial controls being accused of encouraging short-termism, or 
myopia, or both? The extent to which these definitional problems have led to varying 
operationalisation endeavours is considered in the next section. However, for the 
purposes of this study, short-termism is defined as managers’ intentional and 
organisationally suboptimal behaviour which focuses on securing short-term results 
that precludes longer-term achievement; whilst myopia is defined as managers’ 
limitations in the ability to foresee the future, which may not necessarily entail a 
suboptimal inter-temporal trade-off. To empirically observe the nuances of short-
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termism, it may be necessary to emplace this behavioural phenomenon within the 
spectrum of inter-temporal decisions to determine its properties and boundaries.  
  
2.2  Short-termism: How Is It Measured?   
 
Management accounting research employing survey-based methods has 
operationalised short-termism in three main ways: (1) devoting more time to activities 
that influence the firm’s annual profit position; (2) reducing discretionary 
expenditure; and (3) favouring predictable goal achievement. Each measurement 
approach is considered, together with its underpinning assumptions, in turn below. It 
is the purpose of this section to thus consider the assumptions that underlie existing 
operationalisations of short-termism.  
Short-termism has traditionally been used as a proxy for the dysfunctional 
effects of budgeting within the behavioural accounting literature. This research stream 
has used Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) instrument to measure short-termism, which 
asks managers to indicate the percentage of their time that is devoted to working on 
matters that will become evident in the profit and loss statement within one month or 
less, one month to one quarter, one quarter to one year, and one year to five years. 
This instrument has been used by Otley (1978), Merchant (1990), Moers (2000), van 
der Stede (2000), van Rinsum and Hartmann (2007; 2011), Chakhovich et al. (2010), 
Abernethy et al. (2013), and Aguiar et al. (2014). Except for Abernethy et al. (2013) 
and Aguiar et al. (2014), accounting researchers equate items that refer to a period of 
one year or less to short-termist behaviour. Moreover, the instrument requires 
managers to choose between the short term and the long term. The starting premise is 
thus that there is tension between managers’ inter-temporal activities and 
responsibilities. The instrument, however, does not appear to be helpful in capturing 
inter-temporal trade-offs, as represented by investing or operating.  
More recently the level of discretionary expenditure has been used as a proxy 
measurement of short-termism. This approach assumes that such outlays impose a 
short-term cost but enhance firm value months or years later. Reductions in 
discretionary expenditure are thus taken to be indicative of short-termist behaviour. 
This perhaps offers an improvement over the Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) instrument 
that uses time allocation as the sole indicator of short-termism. For example, 
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Merchant’s (1990) instrument asks managers to assess the effect of financial controls 
on new ideas for a range of expenditures, such as new product development, 
advertising, and employee development. This instrument has been used by Chow et 
al. (1996). Noticeably, the instrument starts with the premise that there is a tension 
between producing short-term results and investing for the future. Here there are close 
parallels with Merchant and van der Stede’s (2012) characterisation of investing inter-
temporal trade-off decisions.  
In view of the above, neither the time allocation nor reduction in discretionary 
expenditure measurement approach represent the concept of short-termism when 
defined as an intentional and organisationally suboptimal inter-temporal trade-off. It 
is not possible to infer from these approaches whether the pursuit of short-term 
success is to the detriment of longer-term performance and, if so, whether managers 
were aware of the trade-off.6  In this regard, the Marginson and McAulay (2008) and 
Marginson et al. (2010) instruments attempt to capture short-termism as an intentional 
managerial inter-temporal trade-off by means of its association with predictable goal 
achievement. These instruments ask managers to disclose the extent to which they are 
prepared to sacrifice long-term benefits to achieve short-term results. Nevertheless, 
like the two other measures of short-termism outlined above, this measurement 
approach bases empirical analyses upon the normally construed cuts of the horizon 
scale. Namely, one year is used to distinguish the short term from the medium or long 
term. van der Stede (2013) notes that, if the medium term is used, it is usually done to 
provide a further cut of the long-term horizon scale. 
A one-year reference point is consistent with the annual budgeting process 
(van der Stede, 2000; Marginson and McAulay, 2008). There is thus a tacit 
assumption in extant literature that the annual budget or, more broadly, one specific 
temporal structure of an organisation’s performance measurement practice, shapes 
managers’ short-term time horizons.7  However, this construal of the short term is 
perhaps crude because managers’ time horizons may be influenced by different, and 
often competing, temporal cycles that exist simultaneously within organisations 
                                                          
6 For example, Laverty (1993) finds a negative or non-existent relationship between research 
and development expenditure and a firm’s long-term value. Moreover, van der Stede (2000) 
notes that scrapping developmental projects with little promise can help both short-term and 
long-term results simultaneously. 
7 It is recognised that this is a simplifying assumption used for developing constructs in 
research employing survey-based methods. 
18 
 
(Becker and Messner, 2013). Temporal cycles may be defined by the organisation’s 
operating environment (Brochet et al., 2015), other management controls (Becker and 
Messner, 2013), and/or internal architecture (Jaques, 1990). The literature provides 
some important clues about this tripartite conceptualisation.  
Organisations operating in different industries may have different temporal 
structures. The banking industry, for example, is likely to have a different temporal 
structure vis-à-vis the pharmaceutical industry, wherein managers are likely to work 
to a more protracted horizon scale (see Brochet et al., 2012; 2015). This is because, 
as Brochet et al. (2015) observe, organisations in industries where performance is 
driven by innovation have longer planning horizons compared to organisations in 
industries where performance is driven by efficiency of execution. Consequently, 
industry affiliation is sometimes controlled in the analysis of short-termism (see e.g., 
van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2007; 2011; Abernethy et al., 2013). However, how an 
organisation chooses to compete in its industry will also likely have some bearing on 
managers’ time horizons. For example, an organisation adopting a prospector business 
strategy possibly requires managers to adopt a longer time horizon than an 
organisation adopting a defender strategy (see van der Stede, 2000; Chenhall and 
Moers, 2007).8,9 At the same time, factors such as environmental uncertainty and 
organisational performance may influence managers’ time horizons. Namely, 
organisations operating in volatile environments (Chakhovich et al., 2010), or those 
facing financial adversity (van der Stede, 2000), may have shorter planning horizons 
as managers’ short-term actions may be necessary to ensure organisational survival. 
Thus, managers’ time horizons may be shaped by the situation within which an 
organisation’s performance measurement system operates.  
As implied above, organisations often match the temporal structuring of their 
performance measurement practices to those of their situational context to become 
more effective and efficient (Becker and Messner, 2013). While banking 
organisations and defenders are likely to be concerned with short-term outcomes, such 
                                                          
8 A defender strategy involves the offering of a narrow product range, the pursuit of cost 
reduction, little product or market development, exploiting economies of scale, and the 
establishment of a standardised task environment (Miles and Snow, 1978; see also Merchant 
and van der Stede, 2012).  
9 A prospector strategy involves actively engaging in market and product development in 
order to create a product or service that is perceived by customers as unique in terms of 
quality, functionality, and so on (Miles and Snow, 1978; see also Merchant and van der Stede, 
2012). 
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as quarterly earnings forecasts, pharmaceutical organisations and prospectors are 
likely to be concerned with measures, such as product development, that may be 
measured over a longer period. Interestingly, Becker and Messner (2013) illustrate 
how these temporal structures shape managers’ time horizons in more specific ways. 
Among the examples that Becker and Messner (2013) provide, are the timing of 
budgetary forecasts: forecasts that are established and discussed only for the next 
quarter will likely create quarterly time horizons among managers. The way in which 
these, and other specific temporal structures inherent in an organisation’s management 
control system, such as when and how often performance is evaluated and rewarded, 
shape managers’ understanding of their time horizons has yet to be incorporated into 
short-termism research. This topic is significant, in that management control is related 
to issues of time, which serves to complicate the task of operationalising a time-
motivated behaviour.  
Managers’ time horizons may also be influenced by the responsibility time 
span of their role, which is defined as the time required to complete the longest task, 
project, or programme assigned to the role (Jaques, 1990). Jaques (1990: 130) 
provides an array of examples to illustrate this point. A production supervisor whose 
principal job is to plan tomorrow’s production assignments and next week’s work 
schedule, but who also has ongoing responsibility for uninterrupted production 
supplies for the month ahead, has a responsibility time span of one month, whilst an 
advertising vice president who stays late every night working on next week’s layouts, 
but who also has to begin making contingency plans for the expected launch of two 
new local advertising media campaigns in three years, has a responsibility time span 
of three years. The general implication is that senior managers may need to exhibit 
longer time horizons than more junior managers. Some researchers, such as 
Marginson et al. (2010), thus treat hierarchical level as a control variable in the 
analysis of short-termism. However, doing so overlooks the possibility that there may 
be within hierarchy variation in responsibility time spans.  
Given the above potential differences in relevant reference points, managers’ 
may have different understandings of the categories of short, medium, and long term. 
Complexities such as time horizons serve to emphasise the point that short-termism 
has thus far been assumed to be a relatively uncomplicated/un-nuanced behaviour. By 
not examining managers’ perceptions of their time horizons, or accounting for the 
context in which inter-temporal decisions are made, the instruments may overlook 
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managers’ propensity to take short-termist actions. In this regard, short-termism may 
need to be defined and operationalised more tightly in terms of inter-temporal 
behaviour that is intended (by the manager) and suboptimal (to the organisation). In 
view of this, the instruments outlined above are narrow in their consideration of how 
and to what effect inter-temporal decisions are made, as they do not capture the variety 
in the ways in which trade-offs may manifest. This is particularly the case for 
operating trade-offs, which are likely more pervasive in organisations given that the 
ability to make such decisions are not confined to managers with investment decision-
making responsibilities. Overall, the definitional and operationalisation difficulties 
can, at times, impede meaningful comparisons and may partly account for the often-
contradictory results of management accounting studies that research short-termism. 
As a result, these caveats should be kept in mind during the forthcoming discussion. 
However, to avoid confusion, it will be assumed that short-termism was meant 
whenever and wherever the literature refers to myopia. 
 
2.3  Short-termism: Why Does It Occur?   
 
Normative and empirical accounting research into the origins of short-termism has 
mainly considered economic factors. From this vantage point, most of the attention, 
to date, has been directed towards capital market pressures and performance 
measurement systems.10 The present study foregrounds the role of an organisation’s 
                                                          
10 Although this study does not directly consider capital market pressures as a potential source 
of short-termism, research that examines this linkage is voluminous (see, for reviews, Marsh, 
1990; Jacobs, 1991; Laverty, 1996; Drew, 2009; Fusso, 2013). It has been argued that pressure 
from capital markets to achieve short-term earnings results may cause a reduction in 
intangible investments (see Jacobs, 1991; Porter, 1992; Drew, 2009). Although, some 
researchers—for example, Rappaport (1992) and Marginson (2009)–recognise that, even if 
markets are not myopic, short-termism may persist if managers believe that capital markets 
will react vigorously to short-term earnings results (cf. Marginson and McAulay, 2008). This 
argument has found empirical support (see Stein, 1989; Black and Fraser, 2002; Graham et 
al., 2005), although often for only certain segments of the market (see Bushee, 1998; David 
et al., 2001). On the other hand, some studies have documented that capital markets pursue 
long-term value as announcements relating to research and development are often 
accompanied by increases in share price (see McConnell and Muscarella, 1985; Woolridge, 
1988; Woolridge and Snow, 1990; Chaney et al., 1991; see, for a critique of this work, Miles, 
1993). Nonetheless, in a recent study by Brochet et al. (2012; 2015), stock market myopia and 
managerial short-termism were found to be self-reinforcing phenomena. That is, organisations 
that employ managers with a short-term focus attract transient investors who also have a short-
term focus.  
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performance measurement system. The remainder of this section thus considers 
performance measurement systems and the claims that have been made for their effect 
on short-termism. The section will mainly review behavioural accounting studies that 
investigate short-termism in relation to financial measurement systems, non-financial 
measurement systems, and hybrid measurement systems that contain both financial 
and non-financial measures. In the empirical studies cited, data has largely been 
collected via surveys or in the artificial setting of the laboratory, which does not 
facilitate active engagement with managers in their workplace setting and so may give 
only a very superficial view of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism. Nonetheless, the major conclusion that can be drawn is that the nature 
of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism may depend on 
the structure and operation of individual performance measures in certain 
circumstances. Regarding this latter point of certain circumstances, the next chapter 
considers a broader set of factors that may complicate (i.e., reinforce or weaken) the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism.  
The behavioural accounting literature generally suggests that short-termism is 
an undesirable side-effect of the use of financial measures and frames discussions 
around the financial/non-financial dichotomy (see e.g., Merchant, 1990; van der 
Stede, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010). The phrase ‘financial measures’ is often used 
interchangeably with ‘accounting measures’, without acknowledgment of either the 
subcategories of accounting measures (i.e., return or residual measures) or the second 
type of financial measures, namely, market measures. Likewise, the behavioural 
accounting literature on short-termism usually does not distinguish between non-
financial measures that are quantitative or qualitative in nature. For example, a 
customer satisfaction survey is a quantitative non-financial measure whilst a 
developmental progress report is a qualitative non-financial measure (see Abernethy 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, financial measures are generally treated as lagging 
indicators (performance outcomes) and non-financial measures are generally treated 
as leading indicators (drivers of performance outcomes). However, as will be shown 
later, this characterisation is not always appropriate (see e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 
1996a). Table 2.1 contains the definition of each type of performance measure and 
illustrative examples. The next sub-section will consider the impact that financial 
measurement systems have on short-termism.  
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Table 2.1: Categorisation of Performance Measures 
Note: The information in this table was acquired from Nørreklit (2000), Chow and van der Stede (2006), Merchant (2006), van Rinsum (2006), Merchant and 
van der Stede (2012), and Abernethy et al. (2013).    
PERFORMANCE MEASURE DEFINITION ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
1. FINANCIAL 
 
Performance measures that are either denominated in 
currency, expressed as a ratio of financial numbers, or as 
a change in financial numbers 
Sales growth, return on investment (ROI), net income after 
taxes, market-to-book value ratio 
1.1 ACCOUNTING 
 
Financial measures that are transaction-oriented and 
derived from the standards set for external financial 
reporting purposes 
Sales revenue, profit margin, residual income (RI), return 
on assets (ROA), average variable costs 
1.1.1 RETURN Accounting performance measures that are expressed in 
ratio form 
Return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), return on 
capital employed (ROCE) 
1.1.2 RESIDUAL 
 
Accounting performance measures that are profit-based 
 
Net income after taxes, operating profit, residual income 
(RI), economic value added (EVA™) 
1.2 MARKET 
 
Financial measures that reflect changes in stock price or 
shareholder returns  
Security market return, market-to-book value ratio, 
Tobin’s Q, earnings per share (EPS) 
2. NON-FINANCIAL 
 
Performance measures that are not denominated in 
currency 
Service error rate, delivery time, new product 
development, subjective assessment of leadership skills  
2.1 QUANTITATIVE 
 
Non-financial measures that are numerically based and 
objectively measured 
Employee satisfaction, absenteeism, customer retention, 
production volume, inventory levels 
2.2 QUALITATIVE 
 
Non-financial measures that are qualitative in nature and 
derived from subjective judgement 
Developmental progress reports, loyalty towards the 
organisation, employee morale in the department 
3. LEADING 
 
Performance measures that are at the beginning or middle 
of the causal chain of business processes and can be 
financial or non-financial in nature  
Customer satisfaction (non-financial), revenue mix 
(financial) 
4. LAGGING 
 
Performance measures that are at the end of the causal 
chain of business processes and can be financial or non-
financial in nature 
Customer retention (non-financial), revenue growth 
(financial)  
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2.3.1 Financial Measurement Systems 
  
Financial measurement systems that comprise accounting measures of performance 
are believed to encourage short-termism. This belief is based on the following 
arguments: accounting measures focus on the past, are derived from measurement 
rules that are often conservatively biased, and provide incomplete signals of 
managerial effort (Merchant, 2006; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). Put simply, 
accounting measures assess the short term so managers will at least focus on the short 
term. This is suggestive of the management axiom ‘what gets measured gets done’. 
Anecdotes that encapsulate this belief can be found in the normative 
accounting literature. For example, Henderson and Dearden (1966) tell of a manager 
who postponed all investment projects that did not yield an immediate return to 
improve short-term accounting results, even though this was contrary to the 
company’s long-term interests. As another example, Hayes and Abernathy (1980) 
refer to a manager who forwent the in-house development of specialised machinery 
to improve short-term profit, even though this was likely to damage the long-term 
technological competitiveness of the company. In accordance with accounting 
standards, investments to enhance the capability of employees, systems, and 
organisational processes are treated as expenses of the period in which they are 
incurred. This means that managers can reduce their current period expenses by 
cutting expenditure on such investments without suffering lost revenue until future 
periods (Kaplan and Norton, 1996a; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). The 
normative accounting literature suggests that even-worse behavioural problems ensue 
when accounting measures are expressed as ratios as opposed to a residual form (see 
Table 2.1). This is because managers may increase the numerator (accounting profit) 
and reduce the denominator (e.g., equity, assets, or invested capital) to maximise 
short-term results (see Henderson and Dearden, 1966; Dearden, 1969; Murphy and 
Jensen, 2011).  
Empirical research that examines the relationship between accounting 
measures and short-termism highlight several influencing factors: (1) the pressure to 
meet accounting measures for performance evaluation purposes (see e.g., Hopwood, 
1972); (2) the difficulty in achieving accounting targets (see e.g., Moers, 2000); (3) 
the performance evaluation period length (see e.g., van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2007); 
and (4) the cultural origin of the manager (see e.g., Coates et al., 1995). Whilst 
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representing a critical nexus in control activities, the area of performance evaluation 
pervades these studies. Thus, there has been a tendency to focus only on specific 
aspects of financial measurement systems, as opposed to adopting a more holistic 
approach (see Ferreira and Otley, 2009). The implications of this are discussed in 
Chapter 3.   
Regarding accounting measures and the pressure to meet them for 
performance evaluation purposes, these studies originate from the Reliance on 
Accounting Performance Measures (RAPM) research stream and largely rely on role-
theoretic reasoning to account for dysfunctional behaviour.11 In Hopwood’s (1972) 
case study, the sole reliance on budgetary information in the context of performance 
evaluation was observed to cause managers to “ignore the more long-term 
implications and the elements of cost which are not reflected in the accounting 
system” (Hopwood, 1972: 171).  Otley’s (1978) case study shows that profit centre 
managers who are subject to a mixed style of evaluation, which balances budget and 
efficiency criteria, tend to spend a significantly greater proportion of their time on 
long-term planning. Together, the Hopwood and Otley studies indicate that the alleged 
short-termism associated with using accounting measures in a subordinate’s 
performance evaluation can be reinforced or weakened by the manner in which the 
information is perceived as being used. More recently, Merchant (1990) finds a 
positive correlation between the perceived pressure to meet accounting measures and 
managerial short-termism. Similarly, van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) report a direct 
positive relationship between emphasis on accounting measures in performance 
evaluation and short-termism. However, van der Stede’s (2000) findings are not 
entirely consistent with the findings reported by others; he fails to find evidence of a 
direct positive relationship between a rigid budgetary control style and short-termism. 
As indicated above, one of the limitations of RAPM research is, however, that 
                                                          
11 Role theory outlines the dysfunctions that result from contravening the principles of 
classical organisation theory. Rizzo et al. (1970) explain that violation of the chain-of-
command principle or the unity-of-command principle leads to role conflict. Role theory 
proceeds to explain that role ambiguity results from violating the principle that calls for all 
organisational members in the corporate hierarchy to receive clear, complete, and specific 
information about their roles and responsibilities, as well as the criteria that will be used to 
evaluate their performance. According to role theory, role conflict and role ambiguity will 
cause the role incumbent tension, stress, and dissatisfaction. This tension, stress, and 
dissatisfaction will lead the role incumbent to engage in coping behaviours, such as those that 
aim to distort the reality of the situation (see Rizzo et al., 1970). 
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performance evaluation is treated as a somewhat standalone activity that is 
disconnected from other aspects of managers’ work (Jordan and Messner, 2012). 
Several studies extend the focus of the RAPM literature. Namely, Moers 
(2000) finds that the difficulty in achieving accounting targets is positively associated 
with short-termism. This is perhaps because, as Merchant and van der Stede (2012: 
446-447) state, “targets that are more highly achievable create some room for 
managers to be preoccupied by longer-term initiatives.” In this regard, van der Stede 
(2000) finds an indirect relationship between a rigid budgetary control style and short-
termism (cf. above), where poor past performance results in the use of more rigid 
controls and so reduced budgetary slack, which encourages short-termism. 
There is also limited evidence to suggest that the relationship between 
accounting measures and short-termism may be moderated by the evaluation period 
length, which is defined as the period that is taken into consideration in financial-
based performance evaluations. van Rinsum and Hartmann (2007) find that evaluation 
period length is positively associated with managers adopting a longer-term focus. 
This is because, as the performance evaluation period length is extended, accounting 
performance approaches economic performance, which supposedly reduces a 
manager’s tendency to engage in short-termist behaviour. More specifically, 
lengthening the performance evaluation period length addresses the conservatism of 
accounting measurement practices because all results from an investment are realised 
and recognised in accounting performance (Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). 
Research that tests the capital market pressure hypothesis provides tangential 
evidence that is consistent with van Rinsum and Hartmann’s (2007) finding. For 
example, Bhojraj and Libby (2005) find that, in conditions of market pressure, more 
frequent disclosure of earnings to the market causes managers to make more myopic 
investment decisions. Likewise, Gigler et al.’s (2014) analytical model shows that, 
when an organisation’s shareholders are sufficiently impatient, the price pressure 
associated with increasing the frequency of financial reporting results in myopic 
investment decisions.  
Earlier it was suggested that the relationship between accounting measures and 
short-termism is perhaps contingent on the cultural origin of the manager. Hofstede’s 
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(1980) dimensions of culture often underpin this line of argumentation.12 Adopting a 
cross-case comparison approach, Coates et al. (1995) find that British and American 
managers are more short-termist than their German counterparts. Chow et al. (1996) 
report that, when faced with the same level of control tightness, American managers 
exhibit more short-termism than their Japanese counterparts. More generally, many 
management theorists—for example, Hayes and Abernathy (1980), Porter (1992), and 
Drucker (1993)—argue that British and American managers lack foresight with 
respect to making investments that are expected to enhance firm value in the long 
term. Further support for this moderating factor can be found in RAPM research, 
where a high reliance on accounting measures in the context of performance 
evaluation is more likely to be associated with dysfunctional behaviour in some 
cultures than in others (see Harrison, 1993).  
Other research has failed to find evidence of a significant relationship between 
the use of accounting measures and short-termism. For example, Moers (2000) fails 
to find a direct relationship between using accounting measures of performance for 
incentive purposes and short-termism.13 As another example, Marginson and 
McAulay (2008) find no evidence to suggest that the importance that is attached to 
accounting measures is associated with managerial short-termism. In a case study that 
raises questions about the alternative roles that performance measures may play within 
an organisation, Marginson et al. (2010) find no evidence to suggest that using 
financial measures diagnostically or interactively is related to short-termism.14 
Marginson et al.’s (2010) paper is particularly noteworthy given that most research 
that deals with the issue of short-termism assumes that financial measures serve a 
‘diagnostic’ role. Noticeably, however, Marginson et al. (2010) do not differentiate 
                                                          
12 Although reviewing Hofstede’s work is not part of this thesis’ remit, it is perhaps necessary 
to acknowledge that his approach to culture has been, at times strongly, critiqued (see, for 
example, McSweeney, 2002; Baskerville, 2003; Chenhall, 2003; Harrison and McKinnon, 
2007). 
13 Moer’s (2000) ‘use of financial measures for incentive purposes’ construct contains eight 
items relating to the use of financial measures for performance evaluation purposes, allocating 
monetary rewards and allocating non-monetary rewards. The paper thus conflates different 
aspects of the management control system package (see Malmi and Brown, 2008).  
14 The diagnostic use of performance measures facilitates single-loop learning (i.e., to monitor 
performance against a predetermined target) and can be contrasted with interactive use that 
facilitates double-loop learning (i.e., to stimulate the development of new ideas and encourage 
dialogue about strategic uncertainties). For further discussion, see Argyris and Schön (1978), 
Roberts (1991), Simons (1995), Henri (2006) and Marginson et al. (2010; 2014). 
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between accounting measures and market measures—the limitations of this are noted 
below.  
Some studies, in fact, suggest that financial measures support a longer-term 
focus. For example, Bhimani and Langfield-Smith (2007) find that financial measures 
support strategic activities, such as strategy development and implementation. 
Strategic activities can be conceived as lying at the opposite extreme to short-termism 
on the spectrum of inter-temporal activities and responsibilities. Abernethy et al. 
(2013) find that the weight placed on accounting-return measures in a manager’s 
annual performance evaluation is associated with a long-term focus. Abernethy et al. 
(2013) suggest that the inclusion of the cost of capital in accounting-return measures 
provides information which directs managers’ attention to the long term (for a critique 
of this paper, see van der Stede, 2013). It is also notable that Chakhovich (2013) finds 
that managers perceive share price to be long term due to linguistic, functional, and 
morality-related processes.15 In this case, Chakhovich (2013) focuses her analysis on 
a market measure of performance, which is argued to be long term in nature as it is 
formed based on the discounted future cash flows that the organisation is expected to 
generate.16  
To summarise this sub-section, two tentative observations can be made: (1) 
the impact that financial measures have on short-termism may depend on their 
structure (e.g., target level difficulty) and operation (e.g., diagnostic use). Future 
research may benefit from disentangling performance measures that are in use within 
organisations from performance evaluation activities; and (2) the contradictory 
findings imply that the nature of this relationship has yet to be fully established. These 
contradictory findings can, in addition to the operationalisation difficulties outlined in 
the previous section, perhaps be traced to the fact that most studies use the all-
encompassing category of ‘financial measures’ or sub-category ‘accounting 
measures’ when researching the issue of short-termism. Consequently, it is generally 
not possible to discern the individual measures that are included in the analyses. This 
                                                          
15 Interestingly, Chakhovich (2013) employs a social constructionist approach to analyse 
interview and archival data drawn from a case study operating in the financial services 
industry.  
16 This contrasts with the arguments presented earlier which implied that share price may be 
short-term oriented due to its links to short-termism in financial markets, which emphasise 
quarterly earnings and continuous visibility (see footnote 10).  
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is potentially problematic given that individual financial measures may have different 
effects on managers’ inter-temporal decisions. For example, some researchers argue 
that sales measures encourage short-termism because they focus on the past 
(Chakhovich et al., 2010). However, others—for example, Hauser and Katz (1998) 
and Baghai et al. (1999)—suggest that sales measures are useful in some contexts for 
encouraging a future and strategic focus, because they can be used to improve the 
market position of the organisation. Moreover, Economic Value Added (EVA™), 
which is measured as modified net operating profit after taxes minus the cost of 
capital, should arguably alleviate investing inter-temporal trade-offs because the 
measure capitalises and amortises expenditures on research and development, 
employee training, and so on, which managers may cut if they are pressured for short-
term results (see Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). Therefore, it may be necessary 
to include the role of individual financial measures within a model of the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism. The following sub-section will 
consider the effect that non-financial measurement systems have on short-termism.  
  
2.3.2 Non-Financial Measurement Systems 
 
Non-financial measures are usually described as leading indicators of future financial 
performance (e.g., Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; Banker et al., 2000; Said et al., 2003; 
Nagar and Rajan, 2005; Banker and Chen, 2006; Farrel et al., 2008). Such measures 
are thus supposed to prompt actions and decisions that have beneficial longer-term 
consequences. van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) illustrate this process with the 
example of customer satisfaction: improving customer satisfaction through employee 
training may require an immediate monetary outlay in terms of employee training, but 
can be expected to increase revenues in the longer term. Thus, emphasising customer 
satisfaction should reduce the pressure for managers to engage in short-termist 
behaviour to optimise financial results. Noticeably, however, van Rinsum and 
Hartmann’s (2011) example implies that non-financial measures may not just provide 
signals about what is likely in the future, but also encourage long-termism, which 
itself is deemed a behavioural problem. It is worth noting that the inter-temporal 
decision-making effects of using multiple performance measures are considered in the 
next section. 
Research that examines the effects of contingency factors as antecedents of 
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the design of a performance measurement system provides indirect evidence that non-
financial measures support a long-term focus. Research by Ittner et al. (1997), Said et 
al. (2003), and HassabElnaby et al. (2005) reveals that organisations that adopt long-
term innovation-orientated strategies utilise more non-financial measures. Said et al. 
(2003) and HassabElnaby et al. (2005) also document that organisations that have 
longer product development cycles tend to use more non-financial measures, whereas 
organisations that are facing financial adversity tend to abandon the use of non-
financial measures. These contingent factors influence the relative importance of non-
financial measures in different organisational settings, and are consistent with the time 
horizon that is theoretically required for optimal results (see Section 2.2).  
Some research provides direct empirical insight about the extent to which a 
superior’s reliance on non-financial measures in performance evaluations is 
associated with subordinates’ inter-temporal decisions. Like before, there has thus 
been a tendency to focus only on specific aspects of non-financial measurement 
systems, as opposed to adopting a more holistic approach (see Ferreira and Otley, 
2009). Moers (2000) fails to find evidence to support his hypothesis that evaluations 
based on non-financial measures are negatively associated with short-termism. In 
contrast, van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) report a direct negative relationship 
between emphasis on non-financial measures in performance evaluations and short-
termism. One explanation for the different results is that Moers (2000) restricts his 
non-financial category to measures of market share, market growth, and customer 
satisfaction, whilst van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) take a more aggregate view. In 
this regard, Abernethy et al. (2013) do not find a significant relationship between non-
financial measures and the long/short ratio (i.e., the time spent on long-term activities 
relative to short-term activities). However, when non-financial measures are 
categorised into efficiency, quality, and project measures, efficiency measures (e.g., 
percentage of waste reduction, productivity growth, etc.) were found to have a 
significant relationship with the long/short ratio.  
A distinct group of RAPM studies refine the above-cited findings. In Hirst’s 
(1983) and Hirst and Yetton’s (1984) study, RAPM is measured using a five-item 
scale. These researchers state that the five items measure: 
 
“The extent to which the receipt of rewards is contingent on a manager 
performing satisfactorily in terms of quantitative performance criteria; and 
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whether the circumstances surrounding a manager’s evaluative situation are 
conducive to a high reliance on APM [Accounting Performance Measures].” 
(Hirst, 1983: 598; Hirst and Yetton, 1984: 55) 
 
As Otley and Fakiolas (2000) and Noeverman et al. (2005) emphasise, the 
abovementioned instrument focuses on the extent to which quantitative information 
is used to evaluate a subordinate’s performance, which may be financial and/or non-
financial in nature (see Table 2.1). Hirst (1983) finds that higher levels of job-related 
tension are associated with situations that involve both high (low) task and 
environmental uncertainty and high (low) RAPM. This may suggest that 
dysfunctional behaviour follows from the extent to which quantitative non-financial 
measures are used for evaluating the performance of subordinates in certain contexts. 
Support for this line of reasoning is provided by Chow and van der Stede (2006), who 
find that subjective (qualitative) non-financial measures are more effective than 
objective (quantitative) non-financial measures in curtailing managers’ short-term 
focus and inclination to engage in gamesmanship. Indirect support is also provided by 
Marginson et al. (2010), who find that using non-financial measures diagnostically 
leads managers to make inter-temporal trade-off decisions that prioritise the short term 
to the detriment of the long term (see also Kaplan and Norton, 1996a). Diagnostic 
control can only be applied to quantitative performance measures, as this permits the 
monitoring of performance against pre-set standards (Simons, 1995).  
 Yet another layer of argument is put forward by van Rinsum and Hartmann 
(2007), who find that managerial evaluations that are based on non-financial measures 
with a longer lead-time (i.e., the time taken for a change in a non-financial measure 
to affect financial results) are associated with managers adopting a long-term focus. 
In other words, lead-time affects managers’ time horizons but the precise influence 
may depend on the amount of lead-time which will vary between measures. Baiman 
and Baldenius (2009: 302) state that “the observed lead times can be quite short with 
the revenue effects of NFMs [Non-Financial Measures] often materializing in less 
than one year” (e.g., Banker et al., 2000; Nagar and Rajan, 2005; Dikolli et al., 2007). 
According to Abernethy et al. (2013), as the lead-time of non-financial measures 
shortens, the ability of non-financial measures to direct managers’ attention to the 
long term reduces.    
To summarise this sub-section, two tentative observations can be made: (1) 
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the impact that non-financial measures have on managers’ inter-temporal decisions 
may depend on how (some, perhaps quantitative) non-financial measures are 
structured (e.g., lead times) and operated (e.g., diagnostic use). Available research has 
mainly focused on the area of performance evaluation; and (2) the limited and 
conflicting empirical evidence suggests that there is still much to be learned about the 
nature of the relationship between non-financial measures and short-termism. It was 
suggested that the conflicting empirical evidence may be partly attributable to 
different measures comprising the non-financial measures category. The broad 
category of non-financial measures may contain measures with different properties 
which may have different effects on managers’ inter-temporal decisions. Therefore, 
to reconcile these differences it may be necessary to include the role of individual 
non-financial measures within a model of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. Attention now turns to the effect that hybrid 
measurement systems, which contain both financial and non-financial performance 
measures, have on short-termism.  
 
2.3.3 Hybrid Measurement Systems 
 
Some accounting researchers recommend the hybrid approach to alleviating short-
termism (see e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 1992; Ittner and Larcker, 1998b; Sliwka, 2002; 
Ittner et al., 2003a; Ittner et al., 2003b). Specifically, Merchant (2006) suggests that 
the introduction of additional non-financial measures can help to ensure that managers 
do not pursue short-term financial measures to the possible detriment of long-term 
performance. The thinking that underpins this recommendation is as follows: non-
financial measures can provide signals about the future, so their use as leading 
indicators of future financial performance will encourage a long-term focus and this 
will counterbalance the short-term focus caused by the sole use of financial measures. 
Noticeably, the usefulness of this recommendation rests upon the assumption that all 
‘financial measures’ encourage short-termism, whilst all ‘non-financial measures’ 
engender a longer-term focus. Indicated by the preceding discussions, it is not clear 
whether this is the case. The BSC, which is considered a comprehensive hybrid 
system, has become quite dominant in recent years. The BSC is considered in the next 
sub-section.  
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2.3.3.1 The Balanced Scorecard17 
 
Hall (2008) defines a comprehensive performance measurement system as one that 
includes a more diverse set of performance measures, which are linked to the strategy 
of the organisation and provide information about parts of the value chain. With this 
in mind, the BSC seeks to translate an organisation’s vision and strategy into four 
areas of performance: learning and growth (can we continue to improve and create 
value?); internal business processes (what must we excel at?); customer (how do 
customers see us?); and financial (how do we look to our shareholders?) (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992; 1993; 1996b). The strategic linkages are supposed to enable the 
measures in the four areas to be tied together in a series of cause-and-effect 
relationships (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b). The key feature that thus distinguishes the 
BSC from a more ad hoc collection of financial and non-financial measures is the 
presumed causal linkages between the four measurement areas (Nørreklit, 2000; 
Nørreklit and Mitchell, 2007; Nørreklit et al., 2008). Kaplan and Norton (1996a) 
suggest that the casual chain begins with the measures of learning and growth, 
thereafter continuing through the internal business processes and the customer 
perspective, and culminating with improved financial performance. Incidentally, Lipe 
and Salterio (2002) find that the arrangement of performance measures into the four 
measurement areas conveys decision relevant information to evaluators. Specifically, 
the findings show that performance evaluations are affected by organising the 
measures into the measurement areas when multiple below/above-target measures are 
contained within an area but evaluations are not affected when the below/above-target 
measures are distributed across the four measurement areas (Lipe and Salterio, 2002). 
Each of the measurement areas should also combine lagging measures with 
leading measures (see Table 2.1). For example, regarding the customer perspective, 
customer retention is a lag measure whilst customer satisfaction is a lead measure (see 
Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 155). Regarding the financial perspective, revenue growth 
                                                          
17 It should be noted that reviewing the transformation of the BSC from a performance 
measurement system (see Kaplan and Norton, 1992), to a strategic management control 
system (see Kaplan and Norton, 1996b), to, of late, a mapping system, which links intangible 
assets (viz., strategic human capital, information capital and organisational capital) to the 
value proposition (see Kaplan and Norton, 2004), is not part of this thesis’ remit. For 
information relating to this topic, Kaplan (2009) and Hoque (2014) provide a detailed and 
chronological overview. 
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is a lag measure whilst revenue mix is a lead measure (see Kaplan and Norton, 1996a: 
155). Thus, as noted earlier, characterising all financial measures as lagging indicators 
(performance outcomes) is not always appropriate, as some can possess a degree of 
lead which may influence their inter-temporal decision-making effects. Malina and 
Selto (2001) note that effectively communicating the links between lagging and 
leading measures may be crucial to strategy implementation. Effective 
communication may also alleviate the myopia that results from ignorance (see Section 
2.1), as managers are made to know the longer-term implications of their short-term 
actions. However, managers understanding of the relevant reference points may 
depend upon the strategy that is being implemented (see Section 2.2).  
In view of the above, a BSC should have two directional causal chains: (1) 
causal chains within each of the measurement areas; and (2) causal chains between 
each of the measurement areas (Nørreklit, 2000). The notion that the causal linkages 
enable the performance measures in the three non-financial areas (learning and 
growth, internal business processes, and customer) to be used as predictors of future 
financial performance is fundamental to the claim that the BSC can alleviate short-
termism. This is because, if managers’ actions to improve a performance measure at 
the beginning or middle of the causal chain do not entail a corresponding decline in 
the financial measures at the end of the causal chain, they need not make decisions 
which trade off performance measures that have temporally spaced outcomes (Banker 
et al., 2004). However, even if the causal relationships exist (see below), non-financial 
measures may be inadequate to counterbalance the alleged short-termism caused by 
financial measures if they are accorded insufficient weighting for evaluative purposes 
(Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). In a study of a large financial services firm, Ittner 
et al. (2003a) find that, even after implementing a BSC, most superiors continue to 
use financial measures as the primary determinant of bonuses (see also, Perrin, 1996). 
According to Nørreklit (2000), the cause-and-effect model upon which the 
BSC is based is problematic and misleading.18  Nørreklit (2000) provides a threefold 
assessment:  
                                                          
18 The three criteria for cause-and-effect relations include: (1) independence, such that events 
X (the cause) and Y (the effect) are logically independent; (2) time precedence, which means 
that X precedes Y in time and that the two events can be observed close to each other in time 
and space; and, (3) predictive ability, which means that event X necessarily implies the 
subsequent observation of the other event Y (see Malina et al., 2007: 937).  
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(1) The BSC does not have a time dimension insofar as no reference is made 
to time lags (cf. Bukh and Malmi, 2005). This is problematic as the 
measurement areas may have different timescales, with some causal chains 
creating value enhancing end-results almost immediately. In this situation, 
the BSC becomes less relevant as a short-termism avoidance strategy 
because shortening lead-times has been argued to reduce managers’ ability 
to direct their attention to the long term (see sub-section 2.3.2).   
(2) The causal linkages between the measurement areas either do not hold (see 
e.g., Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; Ittner and Larcker, 1998b; Bernhardt et al., 
2000) or are inappropriate because the payoff relationships are non-linear 
with an inflection point that is difficult to determine (see Nørreklit et al., 
2008; Merchant and van der Stede, 2012). Bukh and Malmi (2005) 
highlight several contingent factors (strategic, organisational, 
communicational, and environmental) that may render the use of cause-
and-effect relationships inappropriate.  
(3) The relationship between most (if not all) of the performance measures is 
characterised by interdependence, rather than causality (see, for examples, 
Nørreklit, 2000). Merchant and van der Stede (2012) suggest that 
interdependence will lead to trade-off decisions between performance 
measures which may be temporally suboptimal.  
 
Nørreklit (2000) concludes that the BSC perhaps contains logical and finality 
relationships rather than causal relationships.19 Therefore, it appears that the evidence 
relating to the assumptions underlying the BSC are mixed, with factors such as the 
‘correct’ weighting influencing its effectiveness.20 If the causal linkages do not hold, 
                                                          
19 Logical relationships exist by human construction or definition and cannot be verified or 
determined empirically. Finality relationships occur when human actions, wishes, and views 
are related to each other such that a given action is believed to be a means to an end and the 
end and the view cause the action (see Nørreklit, 2000: 76; Malina et al., 2007).  
20 There are many other factors that are alleged to influence the operation and effectiveness 
of the BSC, which are not explicitly considered in this thesis. These include: the ‘correct’ 
number of measures to define performance (see Norton, 2000, wherein it is suggested that 
twenty-four performance measures is the ideal number); the appropriate method to measure 
qualitative concepts such as customer satisfaction (e.g., through a survey or mystery shopper; 
see Merchant and van der Stede, 2012); the manner in which to incorporate additional 
perspectives, such as community, into the BSC (see Nørreklit, 2000); and the hierarchical top-
down approach to the BSC (see Nørreklit et al., 2008).  
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or if non-financial measures are accorded insufficient weighting for evaluative 
purposes, then the BSC may be an ineffective remedy to short-termism. However, 
Malina et al. (2007) note that statistically valid causal linkages may not be necessary 
to achieve desired control effectiveness, namely goal congruence and desirable 
management behaviours. Overall, the way managers may modify their inter-temporal 
decisions in response to a hybrid system is a relatively neglected research topic. No 
more than four studies engage with this issue (see next sub-section), and none confirm 
that the BSC is being studied. As a result, we know little about the process through 
which a BSC, which provides the structure within which individual performance 
measures operate, influence managers’ inter-temporal trade-off decisions.  
 
2.3.3.2 Ad Hoc Combinations of Performance Measures 
 
In a study that deploys an inter-temporal choice framework, Marginson et al. (2010) 
fail to find evidence that different combinations of diagnostic and/or interactive use 
of both financial and non-financial measures are related to short-termism. Abernethy 
et al. (2013) argue that non-financial measures can suffer from incongruence, non-
linearity, non-verifiability, and relatively short lead-times. Abernethy et al. (2013: 
933) postulate that these properties make it unlikely that non-financial measures can 
“balance out any myopic proclivities associated with profit measures as well as 
accounting return measures.” In this sense, it is notable that Abernethy et al. (2013) 
find that managers’ inter-temporal decisions are more sensitive to accounting 
measures than non-financial measures. However, Aguiar et al. (2014) fail to replicate 
this result, though the different findings may be partly explained by the aggregation 
of different measures in the performance measurement categories being studied. 
Namely, Abernethy et al. (2013) include return and residual measures in the 
accounting measure category, whereas Aguiar et al. (2014) include only residual 
measures.21 This highlights the value of the suggestion made by some researchers 
(e.g., Marginson et al., 2010), as well as the theme pervading the previous two sub-
sections, that there is a need for closer analysis of such broad categories. 
Research that lends support to this viewpoint is also provided by van Rinsum 
                                                          
21 The validity of Aguiar et al.’s finding is perhaps questionable because included within the 
non-financial category is a measure of sales volume, which is ordinarily classified as a 
disaggregated accounting measure (see Abernethy et al., 2013).  
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and Hartmann (2007). These researchers examine the interaction between two 
properties of performance measures—lead-time and evaluation period length—on 
managers’ time horizons. They find that the positive effect that a longer lead-time has 
on managers’ time horizons (see sub-section 2.3.2) is stronger when the period taken 
into consideration in financial-based performance evaluations is extended. van 
Rinsum and Hartmann (2007) explain that, if a manager’s financial performance is 
assessed during the lead time, the non-financial measure may become relatively less 
salient and this may negate the positive temporal effect of lead time. Nonetheless, as 
van Rinsum and Hartmann (2007) remark, not all non-financial measures are lead 
indicators (see previous sub-section).  
To summarise this sub-section, two tentative observations can be made: (1) 
the proposition that non-financial measures can offset the alleged short-termism 
caused by financial measures has received limited empirical attention. The research 
that is available suggests that the recommendation to combine financial and non-
financial measures is contentious; and (2) a BSC that entails causal linkages may, 
however, help to offset the alleged tendencies for financial measures to cause short-
termism. However, so far, we know little about how a BSC may influence managers’ 
inter-temporal decisions.  
 
2.4  Summary and Conclusions  
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the management accounting literature on short-termism. The 
chapter highlighted the inconsistency and ambiguity in the literature about defining 
short-termism and explained how this has led to alternative operationalisation 
endeavours. Consequently, it was suggested that short-termism can be viewed as 
managers’ intentional and organisationally suboptimal behaviour, which focuses on 
securing short-term results that precludes longer-term achievement. Viewing short-
termism in this way means that decisions are knowledge-based insofar as managers 
are aware of and/or able to evaluate the expected longer-term consequences of their 
short-term actions. Table 2.2 provides an overview of this discussion, highlighting the 
key observations that were made, the specific gaps in the literature that will be 
addressed, and the consequent research questions. 
 
37 
 
Table 2.2: Properties of Short-termism 
 
Summary Statement Gap*  
Research 
Question 
Temporal 
Scale 
Short-termism explicates 
that there is a time-based 
motive for management 
behaviour. By implication, 
the normally construed cuts 
of the horizon scale are 
often accepted. In general, 
one year is used to 
distinguish the short term 
from the medium or long 
term. 
Managers’ 
understanding 
of their time 
horizons  
How do 
managers 
understand the 
short, medium, 
and long term? 
Manifestation 
of Short-
termism 
Short-termism is depicted 
as devoting more time to 
activities that influence the 
firm’s annual profit 
position, reducing 
discretionary expenditure or 
favouring predictable goal 
achievement. 
How and to 
what effect 
managers make 
inter-temporal 
trade-off 
decisions 
How do inter-
temporal 
decisions 
manifest? 
 
* In the behavioural accounting literature; particularly the empirical literature which examines 
the behavioural effects of financial measures.   
 
Because short-termism explicates that there is a time-based motive for 
management behaviour, the normally construed cuts of the horizon scale are often 
accepted. In general, one year is used to distinguish the short term from the medium 
or long term (Merchant, 1990; van der Stede, 2000; 2013). However, it was noted that 
this reference point can be arbitrary (see Section 2.2). There is thus a need to examine 
managers’ understanding of their time horizons to untangle what constitutes the short, 
medium and long term. This leads to the first research question: how do managers 
understand the short, medium, and long term? At present, short-termism is depicted 
as relatively uncomplicated/un-nuanced behaviour where managers take steps to 
improve short-term results that are detrimental to longer-term performance. Such 
steps include devoting more time to activities that influence the firm’s annual profit 
position (see e.g., van der Stede, 2000; Chakhovich et al., 2010; Abernethy et al., 
2013), reducing discretionary expenditure (see e.g., Merchant, 1990; Chow et al., 
1996), or favouring predictable goal achievement (see e.g., Marginson and McAulay, 
2008; Marginson et al., 2010). Existing research on short-termism may not be broad 
enough in its consideration of how and to what effect managers make inter-temporal 
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trade-off decisions. It was suggested that, to empirically observe the nuances of short-
termism, it may be necessary to emplace this behavioural phenomenon within the 
spectrum of inter-temporal decisions in order to determine its properties and 
boundaries. This leads to the second research question: how do inter-temporal 
decisions manifest? Exploring managers’ understanding of the temporal scale, as well 
as the nuances and subtleties of managerial actions and decisions that entail an inter-
temporal trade-off, is part of this study’s potential contribution. The study aims to 
move from cognition (what managers think, as per research question one) to behaviour 
(what managers do, as per research question two), and therefore traverse the 
cognitive-behavioural link to highlight the complexity of short-termism and outline 
what it means to engage in this behaviour.  
The remainder of the chapter examined the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. Attempts were made to clarify the nature of this 
relationship by reviewing behavioural accounting literature that investigates short-
termism in relation to financial measurement systems, non-financial measurement 
systems, and hybrid measurement systems that contain both financial and non-
financial measures. It was noted that the mainly quantitative-based research was often 
based on simplified and partial settings (see Ferreira and Otley, 2009), with the 
empirical evidence lacking or conflicting. Table 2.3 provides an overview of this 
discussion, highlighting the key observations that were made, the specific conflicts 
and gaps in the literature that will be addressed, and the consequent research question.  
The relationship between financial measures and short-termism continues to 
capture the attention of accounting researchers. Whilst financial measures are claimed 
to encourage short-termism, empirical evidence concerning this relationship is 
inconclusive. The inconclusiveness may derive, at least in part, from loose usage of 
the term ‘financial measures’. The term is used interchangeably with ‘accounting 
measures’, without appreciation of either the subcategories of accounting measures 
(i.e., return or residual measures) or the second type of financial measures, namely, 
market measures (see Table 2.1). Moreover, financial measures are often 
characterised as lagging indicators without recognition that some can possess a degree 
of lead. It follows from this that there is a need for closer analysis of this broad 
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Table 2.3: Performance Measurement System and Short-termism 
* In the behavioural accounting literature; particularly the empirical literature which examines the behavioural effects of financial measures.   
 
 
 
 
Summary Statement Gap* 
Research 
Question 
Financial 
Measurement 
Systems 
Financial measures, of themselves, appear to have little influence on 
managers’ inter-temporal trade-off decisions; rather, short-termism seems 
to be shaped, at least in part, by several influencing factors. The 
contradictory findings imply that the nature of the relationship between 
financial measures and short-termism has yet to be fully established. 
Role played by 
individual 
financial 
measures in the 
short-termism 
debate 
What is the nature 
of the relationship 
between 
performance 
measures and 
short-termism? 
Non-financial 
Measurement 
Systems 
Non-financial measures, of themselves, do not appear to influence 
managers’ inter-temporal decisions; rather managerial behaviour seems to 
be influenced by the extent to which (some, perhaps quantitative) non-
financial measures are used for performance evaluation purposes and the 
way non-financial measures are used. However, the lack of research 
suggests that there is much to be learned about the nature of the 
relationship between non-financial measures and short-termism. 
Role played by 
individual non-
financial 
measures in the 
short-termism 
debate 
Hybrid 
Measurement 
Systems 
The proposition that non-financial measures can offset the alleged short-
termism caused by financial measures has received limited empirical 
attention. The research that is available suggests that the recommendation 
to combine financial and non-financial measures is contentious. On the 
other hand, a BSC that entails causal linkages may help to offset the 
alleged tendencies for financial measures to cause short-termism. 
Role played by a 
BSC in the short-
termism debate  
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category to understand the saliency of individual financial measures in an 
organisational setting. This will bring to light matters such as the way measures are     
used, the level at which targets are set, and the frequency with which measures are 
monitored. There is a need to understand whether and, if so, how, why, and in what 
ways these issues influence the inter-temporal decisions that managers make.  
Non-financial measures are normally characterised as leading indicators of 
future financial performance, and so are claimed to encourage managers to undertake 
actions with longer-term consequences. Nevertheless, the limited evidence available 
does not entirely confirm this claim (see e.g., Moers, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010; 
Abernethy et al., 2013). This literature also generally does not account for the lower 
degree of lead that certain non-financial measures possess or distinguish between non-
financial measures that are quantitative or qualitative in nature (see Table 2.1). 
Departure from utilising the all-encompassing non-financial measures category will 
allow these complexities to surface. It will also reveal the perceived saliency of 
individual non-financial measures in an organisational setting and how this may 
influence the way the measures are used and the frequency with which the measures 
are monitored. Thus far, no study has considered the frequency of monitoring non-
financial measures as a possible factor in the short-termism debate. Overall, there is a 
need to develop an understanding of whether and, if so, how, why, and in what ways 
managers perceive these issues as important to their inter-temporal decisions.  
Four studies examine the relationship between a hybrid system and short-
termism. These are: van Rinsum and Hartmann (2007), Marginson et al. (2010), 
Abernethy et al. (2013), and Aguiar et al. (2014). In these studies, the claimed short-
termism avoidance strategy of combining financial and non-financial measures failed 
to find empirical support (see e.g., Marginson et al., 2010; Abernethy et al., 2013), 
perhaps because it may depend on the properties of the individual performance 
measures that comprise the measurement combinations (see e.g., van Rinsum and 
Hartmann, 2007). In the case of the BSC, averting short-termism may depend on 
appropriate causal linkages between the performance measures within and between 
the measurement areas. Little is known about how a BSC, which provides a structure 
within which performance measures operate, may influence managers’ inter-temporal 
decisions.  
The present study aims to contribute to the behavioural accounting literature 
on short-termism by examining the interplay between financial and non-financial 
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measures in a BSC. The study will go beyond the general categories of financial 
versus non-financial to offer nuanced information about the nature of the relationship 
between individual performance measures and short-termism. Whilst purposefully 
broad to convey the explorative dimension, the term ‘nature’ intends to capture the 
structure (e.g., relationships between performance measures, target level difficulty) 
and operation (e.g., frequency of measurement, prioritisation of performance 
measures) of individual performance measures. This aim translates into the study’s 
third research question: what is the nature of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism? The following chapter draws upon a broader literature, 
for which there are established empirical bases for exploring short-termism within an 
organisational setting to review the extent of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. 
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3 PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND SHORT-
TERMISM: LOOKING INSIDE THE BLACK BOX OF 
POTENTIAL CONTINGENCIES  
 
This study foregrounds the role of an organisation’s performance measurement 
system and suggests that performance measures may influence the occurrence of 
short-termism. The relationship between performance measures and short-termism 
may, however, be shaped by several interactive and complex factors. In line with the 
framework outlined in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1), Chapter 3 seeks to look inside the 
proverbial black box of contingent factors, to explore and explain the extent of the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism. Contingency-based 
research has its foundations in organisational theory, which considers contingent 
factors at the organisational level. Some of these contingent factors, such as 
environmental uncertainty and organisational strategy, were mentioned briefly in 
Chapter 2 as affecting the design of the performance measurement system which, in 
turn, may influence managers’ understandings of the categories of short, medium, and 
long term.  
Chapter 3 is concerned with factors that may complicate (i.e., reinforce or 
weaken) the relationship between performance measures and short-termism at the 
individual level.22 Noticeably, one contingency aspect explored in the behavioural 
accounting literature concerns performance measure emphasis by a superior in 
evaluating a subordinate (see Section 2.3). Chenhall (2003) suggests that advances in 
contingency-based management accounting research may derive from further 
integrating insights from theories in economics and psychology (see also Hall, 2016). 
Ferreira and Otley (2009) reference the compartmentalised nature of existing 
empirical management accounting research, noting that there has been a tendency to 
focus only on specific aspects of control systems. Chapter 3 thus draws upon a broader 
literature for which there are established empirical bases for exploring short-termism 
within an organisational setting. Specifically, this chapter engages with the 
accounting, economic, and psychology literatures to examine how performance 
information can be disseminated, how different rewards can be allocated, how 
                                                          
22 One justification for theory-building a contingency model at the level of the individual is 
that it is individuals who make decisions. 
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managers’ employment horizons can be shaped, and how individuals can respond 
differently to performance information. These factors follow a loose process: 
performance information that is disseminated amongst managers can feed into the 
performance evaluation and reward systems, with the reward system more generally 
helping to shape managers’ employment horizons, but the precise affect hinging upon 
individual preferences. In other words, this review critically examines factors 
(independently and with a processual approach) that have been considered in different 
streams of literature within an integrated framework of performance measures and 
short-termism. The review is hence thematically ordered, with the themes explored in 
this chapter highlighted in bold in Figure 3.1. The unifying matter is the design of the 
performance measurement and reward systems (elements of results controls and 
cultural controls), as well as personal factors (which can be influenced by elements of 
personnel controls) that affect managers’ inter-temporal reactions to a performance 
measurement system.  
 
Figure 3.1: Prior Research Classified by Theme  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 is structured as follows. By drawing on insights from social psychology 
(see e.g., Festinger, 1954; Stapel and Blanton, 2007), the first section explores the 
impact of relative performance information on managers’ inter-temporal behaviour. 
Recent research suggests that short-termism has a strong social dimension that is 
Performance 
Measurement 
System
Information 
Visibility
Performance 
Evaluation 
Reward Systems 
Employment 
Horizons 
Individual 
Preferences
Managerial Short-
termism
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worthy of further exploration (see Marginson and McAulay, 2008), which can be done 
through the nexus of information visibility. Relative performance information is 
coupled with non-monetary rewards and penalties, such as social pride and 
condemnation. Performance-based rewards are frequently discussed vis-à-vis short-
termism in the broader accounting literature, and so this issue is explored more fully 
in the second section. A related but distinct strand of research concerns managerial 
employment horizons (both internal employment horizons and external 
opportunities), which may influence managers’ interpretations of, and reactions to, 
performance information. Studies of managers’ employment horizons are critically 
examined in the third section. The fourth section considers individual preferences, 
namely an individual’s time perspective, which is theorised to complicate the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism. The final section 
integrates the topics that featured in the preceding four sections to demonstrate the 
fragmented discourse about managerial short-termism and sets out the issues that need 
further research attention.  
 
3.1  Relative Performance Information  
 
Social comparison theory examines the psychological phenomena initiated by the 
presence of at least one actual, implied, or imagined other (Stapel and Blanton, 2007). 
Facets of this theory have permeated into the accounting literature (see e.g., 
Frederickson, 1992; Hannan et al., 2008; Tafkov, 2013; see, for a review, Birnberg et 
al., 2007). However, outside of compensation research, social comparison processes 
remain largely neglected by accounting researchers. This is surprising for at least two 
reasons: (1) interpersonal comparison is a “pervasive social phenomenon” (Suls et al., 
2002: 159) that is “embedded deeply into the fabric of organisational life” (Greenberg 
et al., 2007: 23); and (2) the process has been found to influence many outcomes 
including an individual’s self-conscious and social emotions, level of aspiration, 
motivation, competitiveness, and adjustment (see e.g., Suls et al., 2002; Birnberg et 
al., 2007; Brown et al., 2007; Buunk and Gibbons, 2007; Garcia and Tor, 2007; 
Greenberg et al., 2007; Hannan et al., 2013). Relative performance information can 
be studied through the lens of social comparison theory, which addresses a limitation 
of extant behavioural accounting research that tends to view a manager’s short-termist 
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behaviour in isolation of other managers (for exceptions, see Laverty, 2004; 
Marginson and McAulay, 2008).23  
 The origins of social comparison theory can be traced back to the publication 
of Festinger’s (1954) seminal paper.24 Festinger’s (1954) theory of social comparison 
processes hypothesised that individuals make social comparisons with others to whom 
they are similar when they need an external benchmark against which to evaluate their 
opinions and abilities. The underlying motive that drives social comparison, he 
argued, is thus self-evaluation. Some researchers have expanded Festinger’s theory 
due to concern that “he had a limited view of the motives that drive social 
comparisons” (Stapel and Blanton, 2007: 13). Two additional motives that drive 
individuals to compare have been theorised and empirically tested by social 
psychologists (see Suls et al., 2002). These symbiotic motives include self-
improvement (i.e., a desire to enhance one’s status; e.g., Wood, 1989; Collins, 1996) 
and self-enhancement (i.e., a desire to feel better about oneself; e.g., Hakmiller, 1966; 
Wood et al., 1994). However, as Buunk et al. (1990) and Brown et al. (1992) point 
out, the extent to which the social comparison process serves these functions depends 
on whether the comparer assimilates (‘that person could be me’) or contrasts (‘that 
person is not me’) themselves relative to a superior or inferior other. Put simply, when 
social comparisons serve a self-enhancement function the comparer ordinarily 
contrasts with a downward target, whereas the comparer assimilates with an upward 
target when the interest is self-improvement (Buunk and Gibbons, 2007).  
Organisations nowadays commonly impose relative performance information 
onto managers via leader-boards (i.e., peer ranking, Manager A is 1, Manager B is 2, 
etc.; see, Silverman, 2011), which draw attention to the relevant domains and/or 
objects for comparison and make salient the individual(s) with whom to compare.25  
                                                          
23 One exception is Marginson and McAulay (2008) who draw on social influence theory to 
explore the extent to which a manager’s short-termist behaviour can be explained by the level 
of short-termism within a workgroup and at the broader social context of a functional area. 
Marginson and McAulay (2008) find a significant and positive association between a 
manager’s short-termist behaviour and the short-termism found within their workgroup; 
however, the association between managers’ short-termism and the customs located within 
their functional area is statistically insignificant.   
24 For a critical review of Festinger’s (1954) work and the impact that it had on the field of 
social psychology, see Stapel and Blanton (2007).  
25 A variant of this is a forced ranking system, wherein managers evaluate an employee’s 
performance relative to that of their peers and then assign that employee to a pre-set category 
(e.g., top 20%, vital 70% or bottom 10%) based on their performance, potential, and 
46 
 
Therefore, a social comparison can be induced if an organisation’s performance 
measurement system publicises performance differences between managers because 
this may stimulate the underlying motives that drive the social comparison process. 
Such a system stirs these underlying motives because it provides a situation wherein 
managers are faced with potentially threating information. In this regard, the social 
psychology literature reveals that threat stimulates the self-evaluation and self-
enhancement motives of social comparison. Socially comparing oneself to others is 
prevalent among individuals who, for example, face threat to their intellect (see Friend 
and Gilbert, 1973; Lane et al., 2002) and physical health (see DeVellis et al., 1991; 
van der Zee et al., 1996). Moreover, given that such a system emphasises performance 
differences between managers, this context is likely to prime differential thinking and 
induce contrastive social comparisons (see Stapel and Koomen, 2005).  
It is argued that making contrastive upward comparisons can be demoralising, 
prompting an unfavourable self-image, and engendering negative emotions such as 
shame, anger, and jealousy (Greenberg et al., 2007; Hannan et al., 2013; 2014). On 
the other hand, making contrastive downward comparisons can be liberating, 
enhancing one’s self-image, and engendering positive emotions, such as pride and 
arrogance (Greenberg et al., 2007; Hannan et al., 2013). In the workplace, social 
comparison theory indicates that managers will compete for non-monetary rewards—
for example, performance pride and self-esteem—by trying to outperform peers on 
mutually important performance dimensions, which may have a positive impact on 
effort exerted (see Tafkov, 2013). However, this emphasis on the self, and a desire for 
one’s abilities to be slightly better than others can, in certain circumstances, lead to 
deceptive behaviour, lower overall performance, and destroy firm value (see below).  
Drawing on records of all downloads of Social Science Research Network 
(SSRN) working papers between 2001 and 2007, Edelman and Larkin’s (2014) study 
reveals that ranking below one’s peers can lead to deceptive behaviour amongst 
academics, namely downloading one’s own working paper in the SSRN repository to 
increase the download count and make comparisons less unfavourable. Furthermore, 
Hannan et al. (2013) explore the effect of relative performance information on an 
individual’s performance and effort allocation in a multi-task environment. Hannan et 
                                                          
promotability (see, for a full description, Grote, 2005: 138-140). Such systems are used by 
companies such as General Electric.   
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al.’s (2013) experimental study reveals that when participants can depart from the 
firm-preferred 50:50 effort allocation between two tasks, participants distort their 
effort allocation more when relative performance information is public compared to 
private and private compared to no relative performance information. Actions 
symptomatic of inter-temporal trade-off decisions are implied in this study because 
effort distortion can be thought of as taking short-term actions to improve 
performance and relative standing on one task to the disadvantage of the second task. 
Hannan et al. (2013) show that prolongation of this trade-off causes overall 
performance to decline. Garcia et al. (2006) find that, as commensurate rivals 
competing on a mutually important dimension move closer to a meaningful 
standard—for example, companies ranked #2 versus #3 or #500 versus #501 on the 
Fortune 500—competition intensifies to the extent that the rivals become unwilling to 
engage in mutually beneficial collaborations and subsequently forgo maximising 
profitable joint gains.  
In view of the above, social comparison processes are perhaps relevant to 
furthering discussions about short-termism in the behavioural accounting literature. 
For example, if managers’ performance on the financial measure of expenses is 
publicised and ranked relative to peers, managers with low relative ranking may take 
actions to cut their expenses, such as cutting back on advertising, to improve their 
relative standing but this could be value decreasing in the longer term. Alternatively, 
if managers’ performance on the non-financial measure of delivery time is publicised 
and ranked relative to peers, managers with high relative ranking on delivery time 
may take actions to maintain their position, such as exerting pressure on staff, but this 
could be harmful to employee morale longer term. However, thus far we know little 
of whether a manager’s investing and operating inter-temporal trade-offs are affected 
by the presence of peers and, more specifically, the extent to which an organisation’s 
performance measurement system is entangled with the social comparison process.  
To summarise this section, two tentative statements can be made: (1) an 
organisation’s performance measurement system may induce social comparisons by 
imposing relative performance information onto managers. Because this information 
emphasises performance differentials, it is likely to lead to contrastive social 
comparisons; and (2) the behavioural corollaries of contrastive social comparisons 
may then manifest through those financial and non-financial measures because they 
are the valued dimensions for comparison. Preferring to improve one’s relative 
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standing on the valued performance dimension, to the detriment of the longer term, is 
indicative of short-termism. In this situation, short-termism may be the outcome of 
why, how, and to what effect the social comparison process unfolds within an 
organisation. The next section considers how performance-based rewards may 
complicate the relationship between performance measures and short-termism. 
Performance-based rewards are typically the outcome of informal indications of what 
is felt to be important (e.g., relative performance information) and formal performance 
evaluations (see Section 2.3).  
 
3.2  Performance-based Rewards  
 
Some researchers suggest that it is the (positive and negative) rewards that are 
attached to financial measures that provide the context for managers to rationalise a 
mind-set that perpetuates short-termism. Agency theory underpins this viewpoint (see 
Eisenhardt, 1989a).26 Agency theorists—for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Demski and Feltham (1978), and Baiman (1990)—assume that managers exhibit self-
interested as well as risk-adverse and work-averse behaviours. These assumptions 
help to justify why allocating rewards based on the attainment of financial measures 
should motivate managers to “pursue short-term results that serve their own interests 
at the expense of long-run results that would be optimal for their firms” (Laverty, 
1996: 832). Agency theory maintains that it is the existence of information 
asymmetries between managers and the organisation’s shareholders that facilitate this 
behaviour (see Laverty, 1996).27    
Hoskisson et al. (1993) find that allocating monetary rewards based on annual 
divisional financial performance has a negative and marginally significant 
relationship with research and development intensity. Wallace (1997) finds that 
managers increase firm residual income following the adoption of compensation 
                                                          
26 Agency theory addresses the work delegation between two types of actors, that is, the 
principle and the agent, by focusing on the contractual relationship between them (Eisenhardt, 
1989a).  
27 Information asymmetry between the principle and agent leads to the agency (moral hazard 
and adverse selection) contracting problem (see Eisenhardt, 1989a). To attempt to mitigate 
the agency contracting problem, the principal can devise a better reward system that aligns 
the agent’s preferences with those of the principle or improve the quality of the monitoring 
system to reveal the agent’s behaviour to the principle (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
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contracts that include residual income accounting measures. Wallace’s (1997) 
findings also reveal that following residual income adoption there is a decrease in net 
investments which could be value-decreasing if managers are rejecting worthwhile 
projects. Laverty (2004) documents a significant and positive association between 
financial rewards and an undervaluation of the long term. There is also some evidence 
to suggest that career penalties for underperformance may encourage short-termism. 
Souder and Bromiley (2012) explain that the threat of reprisal following poor financial 
performance is likely to motivate managers to trade off investments in assets with 
more delayed benefits to maintain short-term results. Research that examines the 
capital market pressure hypothesis supports this viewpoint. For example, 
Mergenthaler et al. (2012) report that missing external quarterly earnings benchmarks 
is associated with CEO and CFO career penalties, such as reduced bonuses, fewer 
equity grants, and an increased likelihood of forced dismissal.  
Researchers that investigate deviant workplace behaviour extend these 
arguments to non-financial measures. Litzky et al. (2006) suggest that a connection 
between customer satisfaction and monetary rewards may encourage workers to hand 
out free products without authorisation and/or grant preferential treatment. Research 
by Eddleston et al. (2002) confirms that bartenders, whose remuneration is tied to 
customer satisfaction because of gratuities, may, in the presence of a relational 
psychological contract with a customer, offer free beverages or serve that customer 
before other customers in the queue.28 These behaviours, which are characterised as 
property and political deviance respectively, may be costly to an organisation in the 
long term. In the accounting literature, Moers (2000) reports, contrary to his 
expectation, a positive (albeit not statistically significant) relationship between using 
non-financial measures for incentive purposes and short-termism.29  
Given the above, Coates et al. (1995: 129) suggest that, by detaching monetary 
                                                          
28 In the field of human resource management, a relational psychological contract involves 
personal and long-term commitments between two parties, and are largely trust based (Litzky 
et al., 2006).  
29 It was mentioned previously that Moers’ (2000) ‘use of performance measures for incentive 
purposes’ construct contains eight items relating to the use of performance measures for 
performance evaluation purposes, allocating monetary rewards and allocating non-monetary 
rewards. Using performance measures as a basis to allocate rewards and, more broadly, 
evaluate managerial performance, are thus entwined. As a result, it is not possible to ascertain 
whether both uses are related to managers’ time horizons in the same direction, and if so, 
whether to the same extent.  
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rewards from performance measures, a “long-termist culture” will be fashioned.30,31 
Such organisational actions are not unprecedented (see e.g., Marginson, 1999; 
Marginson and Ogden, 2005) and are consistent with agency theorists appeal to sever 
the link between financial measures and managers’ compensation (see e.g., Jensen, 
2001; 2003). Though, a less radical solution can be found in Palley’s (1997) analytical 
model. His model shows that managers’ time horizons may be lengthened by 
allocating higher rewards in later periods, which is consistent with tournament theory 
(see Lambert et al., 1993). Similarly, a compensation plan that includes ‘bonus banks’ 
(where all or a part of the bonus is deferred for longer than one year) is proposed to 
help mitigate short-termism (see Stern et al., 1995).  
However, others suggest that the impact that performance-based rewards have 
on short-termism may be dependent upon the type of (positive or negative) reward 
allocated. Larcker (1983) finds that firms adopting long-term compensation contracts 
experience substantial increases in capital investment relative to similar firms without 
such contracts. Long-term incentives typically comprise equity-based plans, and these 
are considered to evoke a longer time horizon because they reward managers for their 
role in creating long-term firm value (Palley, 1997; Merchant and van der Stede, 
2012). Dechow and Sloan (1991) report that research and development is less likely 
to be cut during a CEO’s final year in office if the CEO has a stock holding. 
Nonetheless, recent evidence raises doubts about the ability of equity-based plans to 
induce a longer-term focus. For example, Souder and Bromiley’s (2012) archival 
study indicates that equity-based plans are significantly and negatively related to 
investment in long-lived assets amongst manufacturing firms.   
From the foregoing, three tentative observations can be made: (1) monetary 
rewards attached to financial measures may provide the context for managers to 
rationalise their short-termist behaviour. But, as Mauboussin and Callahan (2015: 73) 
write, “a link between pay and short-termism is difficult to establish.” In other words, 
disentangling the relationship between financial measures, monetary rewards, and 
short-termism is not a trivial exercise. For the most part, it is not possible to ascertain 
from the studies cited whether it is the monetary rewards attached to financial 
                                                          
30 Coates et al.’s (1995) argument is slightly ambiguous because it is unclear whether the 
fashioning of a “long-termist culture” would be to the detriment of the short term (see Section 
2.1).  
31 The emphasis here is placed upon detaching formal rewards from performance measures. 
Detaching informal rewards (such as praise) may be more problematic.  
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measures that are encouraging short-termism, or whether it is the use of financial 
measures in the context of performance evaluation (see sub-section 2.3.1), or some 
combination of both; (2) compared with financial measures, the relationship between 
monetary rewards based on non-financial measures and short-termism has received 
little empirical attention; and (3) the extent to which penalties for underperformance, 
as opposed to rewards for good performance, relates to short-termism is a relatively 
neglected area. Relatedly, existing short-termism research views rewards narrowly, 
focusing mainly on formal monetary rewards. Other formal rewards, such as 
progression and promotion, and informal rewards, such as praise and recognition, may 
influence managers’ inter-temporal decisions.  
More broadly, the studies cited in this section predominately use samples 
consisting only of CEOs/CFOs (see e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Hoskisson et al., 
1993; Mergenthaler et al., 2012) or upper management (see e.g., Laverty, 2004). 
Whilst insightful, there is a lack of knowledge about the extent to which 
rewards/reprisals based on the attainment of performance measures influence middle 
and lower level managers’ inter-temporal decisions. To conclude this section, 
Merchant and van der Stede (2012) caution that, for performance-based rewards to 
have an impact on inter-temporal decisions, they must be valued by managers, which 
is another contingency. Performance-based rewards, such as progression and 
promotion, help to shape managers’ employment horizons. The following section 
considers how employment horizons more generally may complicate the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism.  
 
3.3  Employment Horizons   
 
A manager’s employment horizon is determined by his/her job mobility, which refers 
to “patterns of intra- and inter-organizational transitions over the course of a person’s 
work life” (Ng et al., 2007: 363). Mannix and Loewenstein (1994) explain that high 
levels of inter-organisational mobility will uncouple managers’ personal gains from 
the long-term performance of the organisation in which they are currently employed. 
This is because the manager will not benefit from the future profits associated with 
their past decisions. In the same way, a manager who leaves an organisation is unlikely 
to suffer the repercussions of any actions that they have taken in the short term that 
are detrimental in the longer term (Mannix and Loewenstein, 1994). Accordingly, 
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Mannix and Loewenstein’s (1993) simulation task reveals that managers working in 
a high-mobility environment have shorter time horizons, are more likely to deplete a 
firm’s resources, and are unwilling to invest for the future vis-à-vis managers working 
in a low-mobility environment.  
Drawing on agency theory assumptions (see Section 3.2), the accounting and 
economic literatures support a positive relationship between job mobility and short-
termism. For example, Narayanan’s (1985) analytical model shows that managerial 
incentive for short-term results is inversely related to the manager’s employment 
horizon when increasing short-term profit improves his/her reputation and value on 
the labour market. Campbell and Marino (1994) advance a similar model which 
illustrates that managers have an incentive to select myopic investments to convince 
the labour market that they have superior abilities. In terms of empirical evidence, 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that research and development expenditure is reduced 
during a CEO’s final year in office. Barker and Mueller (2002) find that CEO age has 
a strong negative association with research and development spending. This is 
because older CEOs with only a few years left to retirement focus on short-term results 
rather than on long-term investments as the pay-off from these projects may not 
benefit them in the form of higher short-term salary and/or bonuses (see also, 
Hambrick and Mason, 1984). van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) report a significant 
and positive association between managerial propensity to leave the organisation and 
short-termism. Additional support for this viewpoint can be found in the family firm 
literature, wherein it is suggested that the longer-term nature of family firm activities 
is attributable to longer CEO tenure (see Zellweger, 2007; Irving, 2009). More 
generally, high labour mobility is cited by British and American managers as a reason 
for their short-term focus (see Lefley and Sarkis, 1997). 
Ng et al.’s (2007) framework prescribes three determinants of job mobility: 
(1) structural factors, such as economic conditions; (2) individual differences, such as 
personality traits; and (3) decisional factors, such as readiness for change. These 
micro- and macro-level determinants of job mobility may influence the extent to 
which the construct affects managers’ short-term behavioural inclinations. For 
example, in recessionary periods, some organisations are likely to downsize their 
operations and so there may be a high probability of layoffs (Ng et al., 2007). In this 
situation, job mobility may not necessarily engender a short-term focus because there 
may be no external-lateral mobility options and managers may still demonstrate 
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corporate loyalty and so not disassociate themselves from the organisation’s long-
term prospects.  
Although this section’s opening paragraph mentioned that job mobility is 
defined as “patterns of intra- and inter-organizational transitions over the course of a 
person’s work life” (Ng et al., 2007: 363), research has mainly focused on the 
association between inter-organisational mobility and managers’ short-term focus. 
This is potentially limiting because job mobility is a multidimensional construct that 
includes facets relating not only to employer, but also function (same or changed) and 
status (upwards, lateral, or downwards) (see Nicholson and West, 1988). Suggestive 
evidence of a positive relationship between intra-organisational mobility and short-
termism is provided by Graham et al. (2005). In a study of more than four hundred 
executives, Graham et al. (2005) report that managers may exercise accounting 
discretion to achieve desirable earnings goals when repeatedly failing to meet targets 
inhibits their internal-upward mobility. Nicholson and West (1988) identify a further 
type of intra-organisational mobility: job rotation. Job rotation, which entails “lateral 
transfers of employees between jobs in an organization” (Campion et al., 1994: 1518; 
see also, Robbins and Judge, 2009: 252), appears to be relevant here. Campion et al. 
(1994) specify that job-rotation can be harmful insofar as it creates a short-term 
perspective with regards to problem solving by the rotated employee, as well as their 
peers and subordinates.  
As a conclusion to this section, three tentative observations can be made: (1) 
the shorter a manager’s employment horizon the more likely they may be to make 
short-termist decisions, such as reducing investment in research and development; (2) 
the determinants of job mobility are generally not accounted for. This omission is 
problematic given the variety of theorised determinants of job mobility and the 
proposition that these determinants may influence the extent to which job mobility 
affects managers’ decision-making over the short and long term; and (3) despite the 
multidimensionality of job mobility, researchers have tended to concentrate on inter-
organisational mobility. As a result, we know little about how intra-organisational 
mobility may influence managers’ inter-temporal decision-making. As an aside, van 
Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) note that the studies cited assume that it is managers’ 
expectation about the length of their employment horizon that influences the decision-
making process. In view of this, the appropriateness of using variables such as age 
(see e.g., Barker and Mueller, 2002) and temporary employment contracts (see e.g., 
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Dutta and Reichelstein, 2003) to proxy for managers’ employment horizon is 
somewhat questionable. This is because temporary employment contracts can be 
renewed (Kahn, 2012), and managers may expect this. In the same way, British, 
American and Canadian organisations do not, for the most part, impose a compulsory 
retirement age (Flynn, 2010), and so some managers may expect to continue working 
past the statutory default. The next section reviews literature that relates to individual 
differences in time perspective. This individual difference may affect managers’ inter-
temporal response to performance measures and thus may complicate the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism.   
 
3.4  Individual Time Perspective 
 
The individual difference time perspective framework has been utilised extensively 
in the psychology literature (see e.g., Strathman et al., 1994; Zimbardo and Boyd, 
1999; Holman and Silver, 1998; Boniwell and Zimbardo, 2004; Boniwell, 2011). 
Certain aspects of this framework may be usefully applied by management accounting 
researchers to help explain short-termism, namely the extent to which short-termism 
may result from a manager’s temporal preference.  
Time perspective may be defined as “an individual’s way of relating to the 
psychological concepts of past, present, and future” (Boniwell and Zimbardo, 2004: 
166). This overarching construct relates to the notion that individuals differ in their 
use of the three temporal frames: past, present, and future (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999; 
Waller et al., 2001). When an individual develops a tendency to overemphasise one 
of the three temporal frames to the exclusion or minimisation of the other two, a 
dysfunctional cognitive temporal bias prevails. This temporal bias has been termed 
temporal orientation (Shipp et al., 2009), which may be defined as an individual’s 
“cognitive involvement focused predominantly on one of the three time zones (i.e. 
past, present, or future)” (Holman and Silver, 1998: 1146). Even though temporal 
orientation is perhaps best described as one component of an individual’s time 
perspective, researchers often fail to conceptually separate the two (see e.g., 
Shmotkin, 1991; Waller et al., 2001; cf. Bowles, 2008; Shipp et al., 2009), or as Drake 
et al. (2008) observe, use the terms interchangeably (e.g., Harber et al., 2003; Fried 
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and Slowik, 2004). This conceptual ambiguity impedes meaningful comparison of 
studies and may result in different interpretations of research findings.  
Recently, a related, but perhaps more flexible concept of temporal focus has 
emerged, which may be defined as “the extent to which people devote their attention 
to the past, present, and future” (Shipp et al., 2009: 4). Unlike temporal orientation, 
temporal focus acknowledges that individuals can have multiple temporal foci. The 
concept recognises that individuals may focus exclusively on one time frame, but also 
allows for the possibility that individuals may focus on two time frames to the 
exclusion of the third, focus equally on all three time frames, or allocate varying 
degrees of attention across all time frames. While used less extensively by researchers 
that study an individual’s subjective experience of time, another concept is temporal 
balance. Temporal balance may be defined as “the state and ongoing process of being 
able to switch flexibly among these time frames as most appropriate to the demands 
of the current behavioural setting” (Boniwell and Zimbardo, 2004: 165). Again, to an 
extent, there is definitional and operational overlap between these subsumed concepts 
(Drake et al., 2008), namely, there is conceptual blurring between temporal balance 
and temporal focus. 
Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in how time perspective has been defined, 
there is a consensus that an individual’s time perspective influences his/her current 
attitudes, decisions, and behaviours (see, for a review, Karniol and Ross, 1996; Drake 
et al., 2008; Boniwell, 2011). Subject to its valence, a past time perspective has been 
shown to be related to different cognitive and emotional outcomes. For example, 
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) find that individuals with a past-negative time perspective, 
which embodies an aversive attitude towards the past, display low self-esteem and 
anxiety; however, individuals with a past-positive time perspective, which reflects a 
pleasurable view of the past, display high self-esteem and happiness, though a 
cautious disposition (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). These findings have been confirmed 
by others, such as Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993), Lyubomisky and Nolen-
Hoesksema (1995), and Bryant et al. (2005). More generally, a past time perspective, 
irrespective of its valence, is perhaps valuable given that the past can help individuals 
set goals and devise plans to achieve them when previous actions are evaluated to 
confirm behaviour or provide lessons for improvement (Karniol and Ross, 1996). 
Nonetheless, Specter and Ferrari (2000) find that when the focus on the past becomes 
excessive an individual is more likely to exhibit decisional procrastination. An 
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excessive focus on the past (i.e., a past time orientation) is assumed to lead to an 
individual being unduly cautious, risk-averse, and conservative, and can result in 
stagnation, where an individual resists change in order to maintain the status quo even 
when it is at odds with their best interest (Boniwell and Zimbardo, 2004; Kabanoff 
and Keegan, 2009).  
Individuals with a present time perspective tend to embrace the fundamental 
message of carpe diem—or seize the day. Accordingly, the present time perspective 
person has been found to engage in risk-seeking and impulsive activities (see 
Zimbardo et al., 1997), and have little regard for the future consequences of their 
actions (e.g., Strathman et al., 1994; Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). Furthermore, 
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999; 2008) find that individuals with a present time perspective 
have vaguely defined future goals since they believe that planning for the future is 
futile. For instance, Epel et al. (1999) find that individuals with a present-focused time 
frame engage in non-instrumental activities and avoidant procrastination strategies 
during times of acute crisis, which precludes improvement of the individual’s current 
situation. Thus, when enmeshed in a decision, individuals who are heavily influenced 
by proximal goals will attend to the relatively more certain and concrete reality of the 
immediate present, and will not typically consider possible future consequences or 
reflect on past actions. Whilst a present time perspective can be beneficial in that 
individuals immerse themselves in the current task (see Harber et al., 2003), which 
may foster creativity (see Mainemelis, 2002), an excessive focus on the present (i.e., 
a present time orientation) is assumed to lead to impulsivity, accidents, and addictions, 
as well as educational and professional failure (see Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999; 
Boniwell and Zimbardo, 2004; Mello and Worrell, 2006).  
Individuals with a future time perspective are committed to working towards 
distant goals and their associated rewards, often at the expense of immediate 
gratification, because they are better able to abstract mental representations of the 
implications of their current actions (see Bandura, 2001; Harber et al., 2003; Boniwell 
and Zimbardo, 2004). For example, Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) find that individuals 
with a future time perspective are highly ambitious and goal-orientated, and are more 
likely to have well-defined future goals and consider the distant outcomes of their 
present behaviour. Specter and Ferrari (2000) report a negative relationship between 
a future time perspective and avoidant and decisional procrastination. Similar results 
can be found in Epel et al.’s (1999) study, wherein individuals with a future-focused 
57 
 
time frame were found to use their time constructively. Therefore, given that long-
term goals are salient for them, individuals with a future time perspective are better 
able to resist immediate temptations (see Zimbardo et al., 1997) and are motivated to 
work harder in the present (see Waller et al., 2001; Fried and Slowick, 2004) to 
achieve future goals. Whilst these highly motivated, ambitious goal seekers are more 
likely to excel both educationally and professionally (see Bandura, 2001; Boniwell 
and Zimbardo, 2004; Mello and Worrell, 2006), an excessive focus on the future (i.e., 
a future time orientation) is assumed to lead to elevated stress levels, anxiety, and a 
dearth of social contact (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999).  
In the psychology literature, the balanced time perspective concept is in its 
infancy and so many facets relating to its structure remain largely unexplored. Despite 
this, it is generally maintained that a balanced time perspective is beneficial, given 
that an individual’s actions are influenced by a consideration of all three time zones, 
as opposed to a maladaptive dispositional bias towards one time zone (Zimbardo and 
Boyd, 1999; Boniwell and Zimbardo, 2004; Drake et al., 2008; Boniwell, 2011). 
Researchers from the field of positive psychology postulate that a balanced time 
perspective will lead to optimal functioning and well-being (see Boniwell and 
Zimbardo, 2004). Whilst few attempts have been made to operationalise a balanced 
time perspective, there is some evidence to support this proposition. For example, 
Drake et al. (2008) report that individuals with a balanced time perspective are 
significantly happier and more mindful vis-à-vis individuals with an ill-balanced time 
perspective profile. Similar results are reported by Zhang et al. (2013), who find that 
a balanced time perspective is associated with happiness, vitality, self-determination, 
and increased life satisfaction.  
Aspects of the time perspective framework have permeated into other research 
fields, namely the strategic management and organisational behaviour literatures. Das 
(1987; 1991) observes that managers with a present time perspective prefer 
significantly shorter planning horizons than those with a future time perspective. Bird 
(1992) postulates that an entrepreneur’s future time perspective is related to strategy 
formation, innovation, and opportunistic vision which, in turn, aid organisational 
development. Similarly, West and Meyer (1997) find that top management teams with 
a greater average future time orientation are more likely to undertake changes in 
strategic direction. Yadav et al. (2007) find that firms that have CEOs with a future 
time perspective are: (1) faster at identifying new technological opportunities; (2) 
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faster at developing products based on these new technologies; and (3) better at 
positioning the products, relative to firms that have CEOs with a present time 
perspective. In terms of goal-setting theory, Fried and Slowick (2004) suggest that 
individuals with a future time perspective vis-à-vis a present time perspective are 
more likely to pursue challenging and risky goals following a failure because they can 
view the failure in the context of ultimate success in the long term. Whilst little explicit 
reference to a balanced time perspective can be found in the strategic management 
and organisational behaviour literatures, Thoms and Pinto’s (1999) paper suggests 
that successful project managers use all three time frames and can vary their time 
perspective to match current demands. Wiberg et al. (2012) reiterate this belief by 
concluding that the balanced time perspective concept may be meaningful in 
recruiting individuals for positions that require them to operate in all three time zones, 
for example, executives and project managers.    
Regarding inter-temporal choice, Kabanoff and Keegan’s (2009) content 
analysis of firms’ annual reports reveals that a future time orientation has a positive 
association with innovation and capacity building, whereas a present or past time 
orientation has a negative association with innovation and capacity building. Soo et 
al. (2013) find that a future time orientation has a positive relationship with both 
radical and incremental innovation, while a present time orientation is not associated 
with either type of innovation. van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) find that a future 
time orientation has a significant and negative relationship with data manipulation. 
Stolarski et al. (2011) report that a past and present time perspective is associated with 
the discounting of delayed rewards, which the authors identified as indicative of an 
inability to delay gratification (see also, Wittmann and Paulus, 2007). Interestingly, 
Stolarski et al. (2011) also find that enhanced discounting tendencies are related to the 
degree of deviation from a balanced time perspective profile.  
As a conclusion to this section, two tentative observations can be made: (1) a 
manager who is cognitively involved with only the past and/or present may be more 
likely to make short-termist decisions vis-à-vis a manager who has a future time 
perspective; and (2) short-termism may be related to individual differences in 
temporal constructs and so may occur irrespective of the structure and operation of an 
organisation’s performance measurement system. However, this latter statement 
assumes that the way an individual’s time perspective shapes the decisions that they 
make for themselves does not differ from those they make within an organisation. To 
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date, we know little of whether a performance measurement system may reinforce or 
weaken a manager’s time perspective and so tendency to engage in short-termism.  
 
3.5  Summary and Conclusions  
 
Chapter 3 reviewed literature for which there are established empirical bases for 
exploring short-termism within an organisational setting. A speculative exploration of 
the factors that may complicate the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism within the scope of management control was undertaken. The factors 
considered include relative performance information, performance-based rewards, 
employment horizons, and an individual’s time perspective. The chapter thus looked 
inside the proverbial black box of contingent factors to explore and explain the extent 
of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism at the individual 
level. This is shown in Figure 3.2 below. However, it was noted that empirical 
evidence relating to these factors was often lacking, unclear, or conflicting. Table 3.1 
provides an overview of this broad discussion, highlighting the key observations that 
were made, the specific gaps in the literature that will be addressed, and the 
consequent research question. 
Figure 3.2: Black Box of Potential Contingencies  
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Table 3.1: Black Box of Potential Contingencies 
* In the behavioural accounting literature; particularly the empirical literature which examines the behavioural effects of financial measures.   
 
Summary Statement Gap* 
Research 
Question 
Relative 
Performance 
Information 
A performance measurement system may reinforce social comparisons by 
imposing relative performance information onto managers. Because this 
information emphasises performance differentials, it is likely to lead to 
contrastive social comparisons. The behavioural corollaries of contrastive 
social comparisons may then manifest through financial and non-financial 
measures because they are the valued dimensions for comparison. 
How a performance 
measurement system 
may reinforce social 
comparisons and so 
short-termism 
What is the extent 
of the relationship 
between 
performance 
measures and 
short-termism? 
 
Performance-
based 
Rewards 
Incentives attached to financial measures may explain dysfunctional 
behaviour. Compared with financial measures, the relationship between 
incentives based on non-financial measures and short-termism has received 
little empirical attention. Also, the extent to which the threat of reprisals for 
underperformance relates to short-termism is a relatively neglected area. 
How rewards and 
penalties attached to 
performance measures 
may complicate their 
relationship with short-
termism 
Employment 
Horizons 
The shorter a manager’s employment horizon, the more likely they seem to 
be to make short-termist decisions. However, the determinants of job 
mobility are generally not accounted for. Moreover, researchers have tended 
to concentrate on inter-organisational mobility. As a result, we know little 
about how intra-organisational mobility may influence managers’ short-
termist decisions. 
How intra-
organisational mobility 
may complicate the 
relationship between 
performance measures 
and short-termism 
Individual 
Time 
Perspective 
A manager who is cognitively involved with only the past and/or present 
may be more likely to make short-termist decisions. Short-termism may thus 
occur irrespective of an organisation’s performance measurement system. 
However, we know little of whether a performance measurement system 
may influence a manager’s temporal preference. 
How time perspective 
may complicate the 
relationship between 
performance measures 
and short-termism 
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Organisations nowadays commonly impose relative performance information 
onto managers, which may prompt social comparisons. Because social comparison 
theory delves into the underlying psychological mechanisms of an individual’s 
thoughts, feelings, and actions (Stapel and Blanton, 2007), it may unearth that short-
termism is the outcome of why, how, and to what effect managers socially compare. 
However, little is known about the link between social comparisons and short-termism 
in an organisational setting. Even less is known about how the design of an 
organisation’s performance measurement system may reinforce social comparisons, 
and how the behavioural consequences then manifest. 
The studies that investigate the inter-temporal decision-making consequences 
of attaching rewards to financial measures generally confirm the creation of a short-
term focus. However, it is difficult to untangle the joint influence of saliency of the 
measures and rewards on managers’ inter-temporal decisions. Evidence regarding the 
impact that reprisals have on managers’ inter-temporal decisions is limited to a single 
study in the accounting literature (i.e., Mergenthaler et al., 2012), which only 
considers the reprisals associated with missing external, not internal, benchmarks. 
With the partial exception of Moers (2000), accounting researchers have not 
investigated how rewards and/or reprisals attached to non-financial measures may 
influence managers’ inter-temporal decisions. Beyond the accounting literature, 
researchers suggest that attaching rewards to non-financial measures can engender 
behaviours consistent with self-interest and short-term thinking (see e.g., Eddleston et 
al., 2002; Litzky et al., 2006). Consequently, there is still much more to learn about 
how different (positive and negative) rewards may complicate the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism.  
There is a substantial number of studies that indicate either directly (see e.g., 
Mannix and Loewenstein, 1993) or indirectly via a proxy measure (see e.g., Barker 
and Mueller, 2002), that higher inter-organisational mobility encourages managers to 
make harmful decisions to improve short-term results. However, job mobility is a 
multidimensional construct with facets relating to employer, function, and status. In 
this regard, little is known about the extent to which intra-organisational mobility 
(both upward and lateral) may influence a manager’s propensity to make short-termist 
decisions in relation to performance measures.   
The individual difference time perspective construct has received considerable 
attention in the psychology literature, with research findings generally supporting the 
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notion that an individual’s time perspective influences their attitudes, decisions, and 
behaviours. Although there has been some cross-fertilisation between research 
streams, no more than four studies that deploy an inter-temporal choice framework 
were found to engage with this issue. These studies are Kabanoff and Keegan (2009), 
Stolarski et al. (2011), van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011) and Soo et al. (2013). To 
date, we know little of whether an organisation’s performance measurement system 
may reinforce or weaken a manager’s time perspective and tendency to engage in 
short-termism.   
A black box of contingent factors may thus complicate the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism. In drawing these strands of 
literature together, the present study aims to contribute to the behavioural accounting 
literature by exploring and explaining the extent of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. Whilst purposefully broad to convey the 
explorative dimension, the term ‘extent’ intends to capture individual-level factors 
that focus on how performance information is disseminated, evaluated, and rewarded 
and how individuals can respond differently to performance information. This aim 
translates into the study’s fourth and final research question: what is the extent of the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism? With the literatures 
on short-termism examined, the following chapter delineates the methodological 
strategy that was deployed. Emphasis is placed on constructing a logical chain of 
meta-theoretical commitments (ontology, epistemology, methodology), as well as 
highlighting the ethical and procedural issues tackled.  
63 
 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN: ONTOLOGY, 
EPISTEMOLOGY, AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Chapter 1 stated that the research issue addressed in this thesis is “What is the nature 
and extent of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism?” 
Chapters 2 and 3 unbundled this research issue into four research questions:  
 
1. How do managers understand the short, medium, and long term?  
 
2. How do inter-temporal decisions manifest? 
 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
4. What is the extent of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
This chapter describes and explains the methodological strategy that was 
deployed to address the study’s research questions. Identifying a methodological 
strategy requires the researcher to make their philosophical commitments explicit, and 
to reconcile these with decisions about the research design, including the selection 
and implementation of investigatory tools; the approach to data analysis; and the 
choice of evaluative criteria (Mason, 2002). A critical realist informed case study 
premised on qualitative methods was selected and utilised here. As will be discussed 
later, the strategy offers a medium to get beneath surface-level experiences and an 
opportunity to grasp the breadth, depth, and richness of the setting, making it the ideal 
approach for probing the nuances of both short-termism and performance 
measurement.  
Chapter 4 is structured as follows. The first section discusses this study’s critical 
realist ontological and constructionist epistemological commitments, highlighting 
them as the primary way in which this research is conceptualised and conducted. The 
second section considers the implications of these philosophical commitments for the 
case-based approach adopted. In so doing, the section outlines the defining features 
of a case study and relates these to the present study. The third section describes the 
implementation of the chosen investigatory tools, namely interviews, observation, and 
company documents. Interwoven into the discussions are assessments about the 
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strengths and weaknesses of the investigatory tools utilised, as well as reflections 
about the ethical and procedural issues tackled. A discussion about the mode of 
analysis adopted and the criteria used to judge research within the critical realist 
paradigm then follows. Taken as a whole, the purpose of each section’s discussion is 
to demonstrate the cyclical relationship between this study’s research questions, 
ontology, epistemology, and methodology.  
 
4.1  The Critical Realist Paradigm 
 
The present study operates within the paradigm of critical realism, which retains an 
ontological realism whilst accepting a form of epistemological constructionism.32 The 
next two sub-sections will detail these ontological and epistemological positions, 
while the third sub-section will highlight their relevance for this study.  
 
4.1.1 Ontology: The Mind-Independent Stratification of Reality 
 
Ontology concerns the enquiry into the nature of being. The traditional ontological 
distinction seems to be on the matter of realism versus idealism (see Lukka, 1990; 
Ryan et al., 2002; Berry and Otley, 2004). The realist ontology considers that reality 
consists of entities that exist independently of our knowledge of them, whilst the 
idealist ontology sees reality as the product of our perception and consciousness. The 
ontological content of realism can be divided into two main strands: empirical realism 
and critical realism (Fleetwood, 2003; 2005).  
Empirical realism maintains that reality is made up of the unique, unconnected 
(or atomistic) events of sense experience and their constant conjunctions. With the 
constant conjunctions of atomistic events, reality constitutes a closed system. As 
Downward (2003) explains, in closed systems, causes produce the same effects, and 
effects can always be uniquely understood in terms of the same causes. This 
conceptualisation of reality is associated with the epistemology and methodology of 
mainstream accounting research, particularly that which is based on analytical 
                                                          
32 Throughout this study, the term ‘critical realism’ is used in a broad sense to include those 
versions of realism that distinguish between ontology and epistemology without necessarily 
subscribing to all the developments in critical realist thought, particularly on critical realism 
as an emancipatory perspective (see Bhaskar, 1993; Modell, 2017).  
65 
 
modelling (Lukka, 2010). Many of the studies cited in Chapter 3 that draw on agency 
theory make use of analytical models when researching short-termism, for example, 
Narayanan (1985), Campbell and Marino (1994), and Palley (1997).  
These ontological commitments confine empirical realism to surface-level 
experiences and the events that they represent (Tsoukas, 2000; Fleetwood and 
Hesketh, 2010).33 Strictly speaking, the empirical domain (those aspects of reality that 
are directly or indirectly experienced) is presumed fused with the actual domain (those 
aspects of reality that occur, but may not necessarily be experienced). Consequently, 
the ontological matter of what there is to know is reduced to the epistemological issue 
of how we can know it (Ryan et al., 2002). Figure 4.1 illustrates this flat ontology.  
 
Figure 4.1: A Flat Ontology (Fleetwood, 2003: 30) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to the empirical realist ontology, critical realism has a stratified 
ontology. Specifically, Bhaskar (1978) differentiates between the real, the actual, and 
the empirical domains. Figure 4.2 illustrates this stratified ontology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 That said, the empirical realist does not deny the existence of non-observables. If non-
observable factors, such as mental phenomena, can be operationalised through proxy 
measures, the non-observable factors that give rise to the proxies become part of the empirical 
realist’s ontology. What ultimately results, then, is either neglecting non-observables that 
cannot be proxied or dealing with them in a variable-oriented framework (Fleetwood and 
Hesketh, 2010; Maxwell, 2012). 
Domain Entity 
Empirical Experiences, observations 
Actual Events, actions 
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Figure 4.2: A Stratified Ontology (based on Bhaskar, 1978: 13) 
 
 
  Empirical Realism 
 Critical Realism  
 Real Domain Actual Domain Empirical Domain 
Mechanisms ✓   
Events ✓ ✓  
Experiences ✓ ✓ ✓ 
    
    
 
Note: Checkmarks (✓) indicate the domain where mechanisms, events, and experiences 
reside, as well as the domains involved for such a residence to be possible. Put simply, 
experiences presuppose the occurrence of events in the actual domain and events presuppose 
the existence of mechanisms in the real domain (Tsoukas, 2000). 
 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the real is the domain of mechanisms which cause 
events to occur, the actual represents the domain where the events are activated and it 
is at the level of the empirical where the events are experienced (Easton, 2000; 2010). 
This stratification enables the reality of ‘deep’ generative mechanisms that may not 
always be observable to be acknowledged as belonging to the real domain. The three 
domains are, however, typically out of phase with one another. This means that it is 
not always the case that mechanisms will manifest themselves in actual events to be 
identified in experience (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Setterfield, 2003). 
Mechanisms, or rather their effects, can be blocked, disrupted, or redirected by the 
operation of other countervailing mechanisms. As a result, there can be no account of 
causality based upon constant conjunctions of events—that is, “whenever event x then 
event y” (Lawson, 2006: 19). Instead, “what are observable in the domain of empirical 
experiences are certain tendencies in the occurrence of events” (Modell, 2009: 212). 
Consequently, critical realism has an open-system ontology where effects may not 
always result from the same causes, and causes may not always have the same effects. 
As detailed below, these ontological assumptions have epistemological implications.  
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4.1.2 Epistemology: Our Knowledge Is Theory-Laden and Fallible     
 
Epistemology concerns our knowledge of being. Critical realists accept that there is 
no theory neutral observation, description, explanation, or interpretation (Fleetwood, 
2005). This epistemology approaches weak forms of constructionism, which 
emphasises the socially constructed nature of knowledge and the way in which 
knowledge often bears the marks of its origin (Sayer, 2000). But because realism 
retains a place for a mind-independent world, critical realism refutes that all 
descriptions and explanations are equally valid (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000). For 
the critical realist, a statement is true or false because of the way the world is.   
 An open-system ontology denotes that critical realists “can never justifiably 
claim to have discovered the absolute truth about matters of fact, or to have 
established some absolute foundation for our knowledge” (Sayer, 1992: 67). Instead, 
truth is a matter of practical adequacy. Sayer (1992: 70) explains knowledge that is 
practically-adequate to the world through an example to the effect that “we cannot 
walk on water” and “that we can.” The convention that “we cannot walk on water” is 
more practically adequate since it generates expectations that are realised. In other 
words, it is the nature of water which determines its possibilities for us, and therefore 
its practical adequacy (Sayer, 1992). The notion of practical adequacy has 
implications for the approach to data analysis, which is outlined in sub-section 4.4.3.  
 To say a statement has practical adequacy, is not to say it is infallible. A 
practically-adequate statement may be shown to be false, partial, or incomplete. For 
example, the theories that we construct fit today’s evidence but, as more evidence 
becomes available, those theories may need to be refined and/or replaced by different 
theories. Consequently, the merit of a theory lies in its explanatory power (Sayer, 
1992; Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Miller and Tsang, 2010). In this regard, 
explanation is conceived in terms of uncovering the metaphorical ‘deep’ underlying 
structures and their emergent mechanisms that govern events (Easton, 2000; Sayer, 
2000). This is elaborated in Figure 4.3 below. 
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Figure 4.3: Critical Realist View of Causation (based on Sayer, 1992: 109) 
 
 
Object Mechanisms (Causal Powers and               
Liabilities) 
Conditions (Other Objects with 
Causal Powers and Liabilities) 
Events 
    
 p1,     p2,      p3 c1  e1 
X  c2 e2 
 l1,     l2,      l3 c3 e3 
S  ck ek 
    
 
Object X, having  
structure S…………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
necessarily possessing   
causal powers (p) and  
liabilities (l) ………………………....…. 
 
 
 
 
 
under specific  
conditions (c)…………………....…. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
will: 
(c1) not be activated, hence 
producing no change of type e1 
 
(c2) produce change of type e2 
 
(c3) produce change of type e3, etc. 
 
                 = necessary relationship 
                 = contingent relationship 
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Events are what critical realists investigate. Events can be the visible 
behaviours of managers, performance measurement system implementation 
problems, or organisational downsizing. Mechanisms are “the ‘causal powers’ or 
‘liabilities’ of objects or relations, or more generally their ways-of-acting” (Sayer, 
1992: 105). Objects, which are the basic theoretical building blocks for the critical 
realist’s explanation, can be people, performance measurement systems, 
organisations, and so on. To illustrate, people possess causal powers of being able to 
speak and reason (Groff, 2004), but are susceptible to a range of causal liabilities, 
such as group pressure. Causal powers and liabilities, therefore, necessarily exist by 
virtue of the objects which possess them, and can exist whether or not they are 
activated (Sayer, 1992). Objects will usually be structured, which refers to “sets of 
internally related objects or practices” (Sayer, 1992: 92). For example, a performance 
measurement system presupposes the existence of an organisation. Mechanisms, 
however, are activated under certain conditions. The presence and configuration of 
these conditions is contingent, which is shown as a dashed line in Figure 4.3. 
Conditions take the form of other objects that have their own causal powers and 
liabilities (i.e., mechanisms). The critical realist approach to causal explanation thus 
seeks to answer the question “what caused that event to happen?”, which makes it 
relevant to this study.34 With this in mind, the next sub-section outlines the reasons 
for adopting a critical realist perspective to studying short-termism.  
   
4.1.3 Why Critical Realism? 
 
Critical realism re-legitimates asking ontological questions about the phenomenon 
under study, as distinct from epistemological questions (Maxwell, 2012). Section 2.1  
defined short-termism and set this against myopia to highlight the definitional 
inconsistency and conceptual ambiguity in the literature. Because critical realism 
treats concepts as ideally real (Fleetwood, 2005), it makes sense to probe the 
conceptualisation of short-termism. The critical realist perspective adopted in this 
study can thus facilitate such probing; namely, is the short term a period not exceeding 
                                                          
34 In simpler terms, the realist formula to unlocking explanations can be stated as follows: 
mechanism + context = event (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Pawson and Tilley (1997) use the 
term ‘outcome’ instead of ‘event’. In the critical realist literature, the terms ‘outcome’ and 
‘event’ are synonymous (e.g., Sayer, 2000) and so, for consistency, this chapter will use the 
term ‘event’.    
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one year and is short-termism a relatively uncomplicated behaviour (see Table 2.2)? 
This ontology also enables the study’s research questions to be framed in terms of 
unobservable (i.e., how do managers “understand”), rather than observable (i.e., how 
do managers “describe”), phenomena that may be involved in short-termism.  
The critical realist epistemology is amenable to, and philosophically justifies, 
this study’s third and fourth research questions. Epistemologically speaking, critical 
realism wants to “get beneath the surface to understand and explain why things are as 
they are” (Fraser, 2014: 58), in order to identify the structures and mechanisms that 
shape the observed events. This coheres with the research issue to explore the nature 
and extent of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism. 
Specifically, the critical realist view of causation depicted in Figure 4.3 can help to 
ensure that the emerging narrative is linked back to the four research questions set out 
at the start of this chapter, which focus on forms of inter-temporal decisions (events), 
and how the performance measures (object) of an organisation’s performance 
measurement system (structure) may influence (causal powers and liabilities) the 
occurrence of short-termism (specific event) taking into consideration other relevant 
contingencies (conditions). In other words, critical realism is deployed as a useful 
explanatory and linguistic device that allowed the analysis to be conducted in a more 
deliberate and rigorous way (see Section 4.4). Having outlined this study’s 
philosophical position, Section 4.2 specifies the research design that was developed 
in order to answer the research questions. 
  
4.2  The Case Study Method of Empirical Inquiry  
 
Given its potential to reveal the interplay between financial and non-financial 
measures and the extent of their association with short-termist behaviour in a given 
context, the case study has a practical fit with this study’s research questions, 
ontology, and epistemology. Moreover, as signposted in Chapter 2, using a case-based 
approach to examine the use of performance measures is not uncommon in the 
behavioural accounting literature (see e.g., Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Marginson 
and McAulay, 2008; Marginson et al., 2010). The next two sub-sections provide a 
broad overview of case study research, outlining its defining features and establishing 
the different types of case studies that are possible. The third sub-section considers 
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the extent to which critical realism endorses case-based research. The final sub-
section provides study-specific information about operationalising the case study 
method of empirical inquiry.   
  
4.2.1 Defining Features of Case Research  
  
The term ‘case research’ or ‘case study’ is loose because it does not prescribe a 
philosophical orientation (Berry and Otley, 2004), nor does it stipulate which methods 
should be used for collecting and analysing data. Consequently, different descriptions 
of what constitutes a case study can be found in the methodology literature. In most 
of them, however, some common elements emerge. For instance, Stake (1995: xi), 
working from a constructionist stance, defines a case study as “the study of the 
particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within 
important circumstances.” Yin (2003: 13-14), working from a positivist stance, notes 
that a case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”    
 According to both definitions, case studies focus on an individual unit. The 
individual unit may be an organisation, a person or a group of them, an event such as 
a merger, or a process such as an accounting system change. Alternatively, the unit of 
study may be a combination of these. Flyvbjerg (2011: 30) emphasises that “the 
decisive factor in defining a study as a case study is the choice of the individual unit 
of study and the setting of its boundaries.” Setting the unit’s boundaries determines 
what gets counted as the case and what becomes context to the case. Another defining 
feature of case-based research is highlighted by Stake’s (1995) and Yin’s (2003) 
definition: case studies focus on the involvement and importance of context. Cases 
are thus different from experiments, where a phenomenon is deliberately divorced 
from its context (i.e., the context is “controlled”). Implicit in both definitions outlined 
is the impression that case studies are demanding and comprise depth for the unit of 
study.  
Stake’s (1995) definition stresses the progressive nature of case studies— 
“coming to understand.” Cases often evolve as a sequence of events that occur at a 
certain time and in a certain place which, when seen as a whole, constitute the case 
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(Flyvbjerg, 2011). Because they can deal with these operational links that need to be 
traced over time, case studies are suited to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ framed questions 
(Yin, 2009). This particular framing distinguishes case research from surveys, which 
favour questions framed in terms of ‘how many’ and ‘how much’ (or their integrals— 
‘what’, ‘who’, and ‘where’). Yin (2003) provides the final important qualification 
when he notes that case studies investigate contemporary issues. This means that a 
case is typically restricted to contemporary situations, not to situations in the ‘dead’ 
past. In this respect, cases are different from histories, which usually deal with non-
contemporary events on account of there being no relevant living persons to recount 
what occurred.  
 Taken together, a case study can be conceptualised as an in-depth, progressive 
and contextually sensitive analysis of a contemporary set of events that make up an 
individual unit of study. These defining elements are a common denominator in all 
case-based research and should feature regardless of a study’s meta-theoretical 
commitments. Excluded from the definition are, of course, the ways in which the 
individual unit can be studied. This is because, as Flyvbjerg (2011) states, method 
choices are not decisive for determining whether a study is a case study or not. After 
all, method choices will be influenced by ontological and epistemological beliefs. This 
point will be returned to when the methods for generating data are considered in detail. 
The next sub-section considers the different types of case study.  
  
4.2.2 Type of Case Study: The Theory Linkages  
 
Keating (1995) offers a useful theory-based taxonomy of case studies in accounting 
research. Specifically, Keating (1995) uses the stage of theoretical development as the 
criterion for classifying case studies as discovery, illustration, specification or 
refutation cases. Table 4.1 summarises these types of case studies.  
The variations in case research that are shown in Table 4.1 have implications 
for case selection. The strategic selection of cases is termed theoretical sampling 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). In theory discovery, for instance, it may be preferable to select 
‘simple’ cases (Scapens, 2004), to avoid as far as possible complex issues. In contrast, 
a ‘paradigmatic’ or ‘deviant’ case may aid theory refinement (Cooper and Morgan, 
2008), by either illustrating the value of a new theory or specifying the extent to which 
an existing theory can be extended. In theory testing, it may be preferable to select a 
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‘critical’ case (Ryan et al., 2002), that will enable logical deductions about the 
falsification of a theory to be made based on least-likely or most-likely scenarios.35 
The next sub-section discusses the extent to which critical realism endorses case 
research.  
 
Table 4.1: Type of Case Study (based on Keating, 1995: 68-73) 
 
Theory Linkage Type of Study Description 
Theory 
Discovery 
Discovery Cases 
The objective is to map a novel, dynamic 
and/or complex phenomenon that has 
hitherto been ignored or inadequately 
explained. Cases are explorative and 
develop the building blocks for new 
categories and theoretical frameworks. 
Theory 
Refinement 
Illustration 
Cases 
The objective is to establish the 
plausibility of a theory by demonstrating 
its capacity in relation to a certain 
phenomenon. Cases become an illustration 
of the theory applied, showing that it 
works in some area of accounting. 
Specification 
Cases 
The objective is to revise existing theory 
based on new evidence. Cases refine a 
sparse and underspecified theory through 
making it clearer, introducing nuance or 
adding more details to it, and/or 
broadening its scope. 
Theory Testing Refutation Cases 
The objective is to test a hypothesis or 
proposition derived from prior theory. 
Hypothesis testing is possible because 
cases of this type are able to refute a well-
specified theory by means of one negative 
case. 
 
4.2.3 Critical Realism and Case Research 
 
Three of the defining features of case research—its in-depth, progressive, and context-
dependent nature—allow critical realists to develop a defensible epistemological base 
for using this approach. It was noted that case research involves an in-depth analysis 
                                                          
35 A case that is selected because it possesses the characteristics ‘most likely’ to fit the 
hypothesised relationships can provide disconfirmation if the findings of the case are contrary 
to those expected by the theory. In contrast, a case selected because it possesses the 
characteristics ‘least likely’ to fit the hypothesised relationships can provide corroboration if 
the findings of the case match those expected by the theory (see Keating, 1995).  
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of the individual unit of study. This notion of depth facilitates a detailed examination 
of the case as an internally stratified entity (Kessler and Bach, 2014), which allows 
the actual events that are experienced in the empirical domain to be traced back to the 
generative mechanisms in the real domain. To assign causality, the critical realist must 
identify the underlying generative mechanisms that operate to cause events to happen 
in the actual domain. Case studies allow these evolutionary processes to be captured 
because cases are, by necessity, examined over time (Harrison and Easton, 2004). 
Finally, it was noted that case studies have the distinctive capacity to investigate a 
phenomenon in context. This supports the realist position, which emphasises the 
context-dependence of causal explanations (Maxwell, 2012).  
 Critical realism also provides an epistemological justification for using one 
case, which can withstand some of the prejudicial assessments that this strategy 
receives.36 Flyvbjerg (2011: 304) highlights one misunderstanding: “One cannot 
generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot 
contribute to scientific development.” For critical realists, one case is sufficient 
because they do not seek to generalise to some wider population, but to the real world 
that has been uncovered (Easton, 2000). Yin (2009), despite not adopting a critical 
realist approach, uses the term analytical generalisation to denote the generalisation 
that takes place through expanding, refining, and developing concepts, arguments and 
theories. Realists maintain that explaining the reality of ‘deep’ causal powers and 
liabilities that underlie a set of events can contribute to theory. Thus, as Easton (2000) 
notes, theoretical generalisations are realisable to the extent that an individual case 
uncovers reality. What is more, from a practical standpoint, a single case that offers 
deep explanations across a narrow range of contexts is often preferable from a critical 
realist perspective (Harrison and Easton, 2004). This is because studying larger 
numbers of cases in the same amount of time, and with the same level of resources, 
essentially achieves shallower explanations across a wider range of contexts. In this 
situation, it may be possible to identify other contingent causal powers and liabilities, 
but it will likely be to the detriment of discovering how they operate in reality. This 
study’s operationalisation of case-based research forms the basis of the next sub-
section.  
                                                          
36 The epistemological logic associated with other paradigms, such as positivism and social 
constructionism, also endorse the single case study strategy (May, 2011).  
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4.2.4 The Present Study: Case Study of Grocer Plc 
 
Chapter 1 stated, and Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, that the purpose of this research 
is to build a comprehensive contingency-based framework that provides individual-
level explanations about when, how, and why managers engage in short-termism. 
Because the research is thus explorative, an information-rich case was sought. To 
cohere with the research questions, the unit of study is an organisation’s performance 
measurement system. Embedded within this unit of study are the individual managers, 
the level of analysis aligned with psychology theories, and groups of them, the unit of 
analysis aligned with social psychology theories. In this case, higher-level entities, 
such as the economic climate, become the context to the case.  
To identify the sorts of location that would be most appropriate for this study’s 
research questions, a potential research site was explored in a master’s dissertation on 
this topic. The case study company, hereafter referred to as Grocer plc, was drawn 
from the UK’s retail industry.37 For several pragmatic and research-driven reasons, 
this case was retained for the present study (see below). Access to Grocer was granted 
by a senior manager in January 2014, following several email exchanges and one face-
to-face meeting that dealt with the research proposal (an interest in performance 
measurement systems and, particularly, the impact that they may have on managers’ 
work time horizons); issues of confidentiality and anonymity; resource constraints; 
and potential feedback. The concept of ‘short-termism’ and the associated notions of 
‘inter-temporal trade-offs’ and ‘dysfunctional behaviour’ were not mentioned 
throughout the process of access negotiations. It was felt that to share specific details 
about this study’s research agenda would undermine the research process. 
Consequently, this study was renamed “Performance Measurement and Managers’ 
Work Time Horizons” on all written exchanges with the managers at Grocer.38  
Pragmatically, Grocer is characterised by hundreds of geographically separate 
retail stores, with many of these stores being within a close geographical proximity to 
the researcher’s base. This meant that the scale of travel costs and travelling time 
involved were kept reasonably low. Moreover, commercially sensitive documents had 
                                                          
37 Grocer is the pseudonym used to protect the organisation’s identity.  
38 See, for example, Appendix 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4. 
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been made readily available during the master’s dissertation, which indicated that 
managers were not overly guarded in response to being researched. Finally, and most 
importantly, initial contacts seemed open to the idea of being researched. Besides 
these pragmatic considerations, Grocer is a theoretically interesting case through 
which to study short-termism. Grocer is a large retailer with operations in multiple 
countries. The retail environment is fast-moving, competitive, and unpredictable. 
Second, Grocer operates a performance measurement system that comprises a range 
of financial and non-financial measures. Third, in recent times, Grocer has faced 
highly turbulent trading conditions because of falling revenues. Grocer’s performance 
measurement system has become a core part of the organisation’s approach to realign 
itself in the marketplace. Chapter 5 provides further information about Grocer. 
However, before that, the different ways in which data can be generated in case-based 
research is considered.  
   
4.3  Methods: Interviews, Observations, and Documents  
 
In this study, interviews, non-participant observation, and company documents are the 
sources from which data is generated. The motivation for using these methods to 
generate data stems from the limitation of prior research in this area that has been 
largely conducted by way of a questionnaire survey or a laboratory experiment. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, collecting data via surveys, or in the artificial setting of the 
laboratory, does not facilitate active engagement with managers in their workplace 
setting and so may give only a very superficial view of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. Importantly also, each of these methods is 
an epistemologically legitimate way to generate data in critical realist research, and 
has the potential to either provide insight into the causal mechanisms at play, or 
illuminate the context in which short-termism is enacted. In effect, each method has 
the potential to reveal slightly different facets of the same reality (Berg and Lune, 
2012), and so when combined increase the depth of understanding. Moreover, the 
practical adequacy of the data constructed from within and between methods can be 
more clearly understood when the different accounts are critically compared (Marks 
and O’Mahoney, 2014). This utilisation of three data sources is thus akin to a form of 
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triangulation.39 The next three sub-sections will discuss the issues and debates 
surrounding the use of interviews, non-participant observation, and company 
documents in a critical realist informed study. The ethics of these methods and study-
specific reflections on their implementation and operationalisation are examined in 
the final two sub-sections.  
 
4.3.1 Interviews: A Process of Knowledge Construction  
 
An interview can be defined as a “conversation that has a structure and a purpose” 
(Kvale, 1996: 6). The interview is one of the most important sources of case study 
information (Yin, 2003), but there are many ways to harness the flow of information 
that emerges from these dialogues. The critical realist approach to interviewing has 
much in common with the constructionist’s ‘active interview’, where the interview is 
an arena in which both the researcher and interviewee interact and collaborate in 
constructing meanings (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). However, as Pawson (1996) 
explains, the active interview presupposes that the subject matter of investigation is 
the interviewee’s thoughts and actions, as expressed through their verbal and non-
verbal communication. So, whilst the data emerges from the mutual construction of 
meanings, the researcher’s theoretical frame is never plainly on view to the 
interviewee. From a critical realist perspective, the subject matter of the interview is 
theory because:  
 
“People are always knowledgeable about the reason for their conduct but in a 
way which can never carry total awareness of the entire set of structural 
conditions which prompt an action, nor the full set of potential consequences 
of that action…In attempting to construct explanations for the patterning of 
social activity, the researcher is thus trying to develop an understanding which 
includes hypotheses about their subjects’ reasoning within a wider model of 
their causes and consequences.” (Pawson, 1996: 302) 
                                                          
39 However, this process causes some concern because “triangulation views reality as unified, 
readily observable, and objective, and hides important differences in situated meanings” 
(Marks and O’Mahoney, 2014: 82). Converging or diverging data originating from within and 
between methods could be concealing or reflecting the competing explanations that are 
inherent in a complex and stratified world (Modell, 2009). Consequently, in critical realist 
research, it is the task of abstract theorising to recognise the convergence of explanations and 
integrate apparently divergent accounts that arise because of such triangulation. This point is 
returned to in sub-section 4.4.3 when the process of data analysis is considered.  
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For interviews to yield insight into events and their underlying structures and 
generative mechanisms, communicative interaction should be informed by an 
appropriate theoretical framework which can guide questions, frame answers, and 
suggest directions for further discussion (Smith and Elger, 2014). Considering this, 
critical realism favours semi-structured interviewing. Legard et al. (2003) explain that 
semi-structured interviews are structured by an interview guide that sets out the key 
themes to be covered, but there is still latitude for further questioning to explore 
relevant issues in more depth and probe factors that underpin interviewees’ responses. 
This structure means that interviewees are generally asked the same questions in a 
fairly consistent order, permitting comparisons across interviews (May, 2011; Berg 
and Lune, 2012).  
Overall, interviews can capture the depth, nuance, complexity, and 
roundedness in interviewees’ situated accounts and/or experiences (Mason, 2002). It 
is possible to talk through specific events and situations that have taken place, as 
opposed to more abstract questioning about what someone ‘would do’ or has 
‘generally done’. Moreover, interviews often draw high levels of engagement because 
the method has the potential to provide interviewees with an interesting and 
empowering experience (see Marginson, 2004; Clark, 2010). Pragmatically, however, 
the success of an interview is at least partly contingent on the personal and 
professional attributes of the researcher.40 Moreover, interviews are time consuming 
to conduct, transcribe, and analyse (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). At an 
epistemological level, there are concerns about whether researchers can access the 
experiences and understandings that interviewees construct or reconstruct in the 
interview. This is because the interview method hinges upon an interviewee’s ability 
to communicate, interact, conceptualise, and recall events (Mason, 2002). Therefore, 
Smith and Elger (2014: 119) suggest that, in order to assess an interviews practical 
adequacy, “informants’ accounts need to be subjected to critical scrutiny not only in 
their own terms but also in relation to other sources, including observation, documents 
                                                          
40 To be a ‘good’ interviewer is sometimes described as an innate ability possessed only by 
certain individuals. For example, Legard et al. (2003) delineate what they see as the necessary 
intellectual attributes of a good interviewer: the ability to listen, retain information, think 
quickly, respond flexibly, articulate relevant questions, manage distractions, and establish a 
good rapport with the interviewee. But, whilst there is certainly an element of truth in this 
account, interviewing is also a technical skill that can be learnt (see Berg and Lune, 2012). 
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and other interviews.”  To remind the reader, study-specific information about the use 
of interviews is provided in sub-section 4.3.5. The next sub-section considers the 
method of observation.  
 
4.3.2 Observations: The Conceptually-Saturated Character of 
Seeing   
 
Observation involves “looking at what is going on—watching and listening” (Bennett, 
1991: 100). The process of observing entails the researcher immersing themselves in 
the participant’s social world (Mason, 2002) in order to experience first-hand the 
range of spatial, locational, and temporal dimensions in and of that world. Observation 
can also capture multidimensional data on naturally occurring phenomena, such as 
social activities, interactions, behaviours, and so on (Thomas, 2004). Essentially, the 
researcher observes due to an interest in the way in which social phenomena occur in 
the context of the observational setting, and/or a belief in the value of that setting’s 
physical or social makeup. But, like interviewing, a study’s epistemology will 
influence how this method is mobilised.  
 Constructionists argue that we have no direct access to reality because our 
“sense experience is mediated by both our perceptual equipment and the 
interpretations we place upon that experience” (Thomas, 2004: 176). Observations are 
thus said to be theory-laden, in that observing is a process of sense-making that takes 
place within some theoretical frame. Accordingly, observational data are understood 
as constructed meanings created through the interaction among actors (including the 
researcher) who are immersed in a world of interpretation (Emerson, 1981; Rees and 
Gatenby, 2014). For critical realists, because there is an external reality against which 
these subjective, situated, or constructed meanings can be assessed, clues about the 
character of generative mechanisms can be found by critically scrutinising their 
observable effects. As Ackroyd and Karlsson (2014) note: 
 
“Only following the sustained observation of behaviour and through noting 
particularly deviations from sanctioned beliefs and expected patterns of action, 
does recognition of the precise nature of the generative mechanisms begin to 
emerge, understanding of their nature begin to develop, and extent of their 
effects confirmed.” (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014: 30)  
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However, because a researcher cannot see and hear everything, observations 
must be selective and relevant to a study’s research questions. When deciding what to 
observe, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) suggest that researchers should include an 
adequate range of coverage by sampling along the dimension of time. These might 
include salient daily events such as changeovers between shifts, routine weekly 
meetings, seasonal or annual cycles, and special occasions such as rites of passage. 
How a researcher then observes these events will depend upon their position on the 
participant-observer and overt-covert continuums (see Thomas, 2004).  
In sum, observational methods can provide rich, rounded, local, and specific 
data (Bryman, 1984; Mason, 2002), which are usually constructed as substantive field 
notes. Because observing takes place in natural social settings, researchers can get 
closer to the phenomena of interest than other methods permit (Gerson and Horowitz, 
2002). In so doing, the researcher does not have to solely rely on self-reports that can 
be problematic due to, for instance, memory error (Thomas, 2004). Observation of 
events first hand can thus provide access to aspects of behaviour that are normally 
hidden, and can reveal patterns that participants themselves may not notice or 
understand. Nevertheless, as with interviewing, the researcher needs to listen, remain 
alert, and retain key pieces of information. Another problem associated with 
observational methods is that of reactivity, which denotes that the presence of the 
researcher can influence the activities that are being observed (Thomas, 2004; Berg 
and Lune, 2012). Study-specific information about the use of observational techniques 
is provided in sub-section 4.3.5. The next sub-section considers the use of company 
documents.  
 
4.3.3 Company Documents: A Topic of Research  
 
Documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study (Yin, 2003), and 
used mainly alongside several other methods of data generation. The company 
documents available to researchers are many and varied, with a distinction often made 
between those documents that are in the public domain (e.g., annual reports, mission 
statements, press releases, etc.) and those that are not (e.g., company newspapers, 
email exchanges, performance reports, etc.). Whilst public-domain documents are 
easily accessible, Thomas (2004) cautions that certain commercially sensitive 
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documents that are withheld from the public domain are likely to be closed to the 
researcher even after gaining access to an organisation. 
Documents can either be treated as a resource for research or a topic of 
research (Thomas, 2004), which reflects different epistemological orientations. When 
documents are treated as a topic, the document itself becomes the focus of analysis. 
The researcher believes that documents “need to be ‘read’ and interpreted in the 
context of, for example, how they are produced, used, what meanings they have, what 
they are seen to be or to represent” (Mason, 2002: 108). In other words, documents 
are ‘read’ in an interpretative manner and treated circumspectly because they were 
written with a distinctive purpose in mind which has shaped their content (e.g., the 
dissemination of fashionable rhetoric, self-presentation, etc.).  
Company documents are particularly valuable because they have a broad 
coverage—that is, they span long periods of time and cover many experiences (Yin, 
2003)—thus facilitating richer explanations. It is the detail introduced here that allows 
researchers to extend the temporal scale of their analyses and probe the more enduring 
features of an organisation. Mutch (2014: 240) notes: “Simply focusing on the 
immediate context can mean that we neglect more significant mechanisms that 
provide situational logics for action.” In other words, events may be triggered by 
historically conditioned notions and documents can help provide initial clues about 
these broader frameworks. Moreover, internal communication such as email 
exchanges or memoranda, can shed light on possible mechanisms and the conditions 
under which they operate in more direct ways.     
In general, company documents that are publicly available or less 
commercially sensitive are usually plentiful and cheap to obtain, as the researcher is 
typically already onsite (Thomas, 2004; Bryman and Bell, 2011). Moreover, as Mason 
(2002) highlights, the construction of documents does not necessitate extended social 
interaction, thus placing less demands on the researcher. Company documents are also 
regarded as non-reactive to the researcher’s presence (Berg and Lune, 2012), given 
that they have not been created specifically for the research. At the very least, 
documentation “can provide the researcher with valuable background information 
about the company” (Bryman and Bell, 2011: 550), which can be used to 
contextualise, clarify, and/or verify data derived from other methods. However, this 
method is prone to selectivity bias because the process of unearthing documents is 
often incomplete (Yin, 2003). Thomas (2004) warns that more mundane company 
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documents may be retained only for a brief period of time. This can be problematic 
because of the intertextuality of documents (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004)—that is, 
documents do not stand alone, but invariably refer to, or are made in response to, other 
documents. Study-specific information about the use of company documentation is 
provided in sub-section 4.3.5. Now that the issues and debates surrounding the method 
choices have been considered, the ethics of implementation will be discussed.   
 
4.3.4 Ethical Considerations in Qualitative Research 
 
Ethical considerations ordinarily concern informed consent which means “the 
knowing consent of individuals to participate as an exercise of their choice, free from 
any element of fraud, deceit, duress, or similar unfair inducement or manipulation” 
(Berg and Lune, 2012: 90). For an individual to consent to partake in the research 
process, Thomas (2004) suggests that they must first possess the mental capacity to 
make decisions. Once this has been established, comprehensive and accurate 
information about the study’s purpose, protocols, risks, and benefits should be 
provided to all participants so that they are able to consider whether they wish to 
participate. Encouraged by Research Ethics Committees, researchers now commonly 
seek written, rather than just verbal, consent from participants. For instance, it is not 
uncommon for participants to be asked to read an ‘information sheet’ and complete, 
date, and sign a ‘consent form’ before the research process begins.  
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) note that covert participant observation is 
an example of research that transgresses this ethical canon. Covert participant 
observation involves a researcher entering a setting without the participants being 
made aware that research is taking place. However, even when a researcher adopts an 
overt or announced role, implementing the canon of informed consent is perhaps 
‘easier said than done’ for at least three reasons. First, Thomas (2004) explains that 
the eliciting of free consent can become hazy when an organisation’s management 
actively encourage subordinates to partake in a research study. Second, Hammersley 
and Atkinson (2007) note that researchers rarely disclose every detail about their 
research because doing so may influence participants’ behaviour or answers to 
questions in ways that would undermine any conclusions (see sub-section 4.2.4, where 
it was noted that this study was renamed). Third, it can be difficult to ensure that 
everyone has had the opportunity for informed consent in observational methods. In 
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its place, implied consent is usually sought and is indicated by potential participants 
granting permission for the researcher to observe events. If any individual does not 
wish to take part, the researcher excludes the observational data that includes those 
individuals. What constitutes informed consent in this study is discussed in sub-
section 4.3.5. 
Discussions about ethical principles also cover the subject of potential harm 
which can arise during the process of doing research and/or through the publication 
of findings. For instance, being interviewed or observed might create embarrassment, 
anxiety, or stress for some participants (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). In the 
context of interviewing, some participants may believe that the researcher is 
evaluating their ‘performance’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), which is evident 
when interviewees ask, “did I answer that right?”41 Precautions to avoid causing harm 
to participants extend to maintaining the confidentiality of records and anonymity of 
accounts (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Whilst confidentiality involves removing from the 
researcher’s records any elements that may allude to the participants’ identities, 
anonymity means that the participants remain nameless in the publication of findings 
(Berg and Lune, 2012). As well as safeguarding individuals, this injunction covers 
organisations that are being researched (see e.g., sub-section 4.2.4). Study-specific 
information about adhering to the ethical notion of do no harm is provided in the next 
sub-section which focuses on the conduct of this study. 
 
4.3.5 The Present Study: Implementation of Methods and 
Reflections    
 
The study was granted full ethical approval by Cardiff University’s Research Ethics 
Committee in August 2014.42 Taking this into account, the present sub-section 
provides study-specific information about the implementation of the three methods 
outlined above, as well as a reflexive account of the research process.  
 
                                                          
41 Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) reassure that these affects will lesson by establishing 
rapport and trust with participants.  
42 See Appendix 10.1 for the stamped ethical approval form.  
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4.3.5.1 Interviews with Middle-Level Managers: Recruitment, 
Sample, and Questions  
  
The researcher was given access to talk to managers situated in the middle of the 
corporate hierarchy. This is one limitation of the present study (for further 
methodological limitations, see Section 8.3). Interviews with lower-level managers, 
as well as those situated at the apex of the organisation, would have allowed for more 
exploration of any similarities and differences regarding inter-temporal decisions 
across hierarchical levels. Moreover, interviews with top-level managers would have 
been helpful for validating or providing contrasting rationales for performance 
measurement system effects on middle-level managers’ inter-temporal decisions. 
Company documents were, however, used as a means of understanding the intended 
implementation, use, and effects of Grocer’s performance measurement system.   
This sample was particularly appropriate for addressing the study’s research 
questions for three reasons: (1) at Grocer, middle-level managers have to deal with 
the interplay between various performance measures; (2) at Grocer, middle-level 
managers are eligible to receive a range of performance-based rewards; and (3) as 
noted in Chapter 1, middle-level managers have, at least in principle, a duty to 
approach the future in terms of day-to-day decisions and actions that consider both 
the short and the longer term (Frow et al., 2005). Theoretical parameters included the 
length of time that a manager had been in their current role and membership of an 
identifiable workgroup to look at the effects (if any) of intra-organisational mobility 
and social comparisons on the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism, respectively (see Chapter 3). The initial sampling strategy was thus 
theoretically driven (Marshall, 1996). A snowball component was later introduced by 
asking those who had been interviewed for the contact details of other managers who 
they believed may possess similar or different characteristics to them to maximise the 
opportunity to uncover the causal powers of performance measures working under 
different conditions.  
All potential interviewees were invited to participate via a standardised email 
that stated the name and position of the researcher, the purpose of the research, the 
practicalities of participation, and the assurance that all data associated with the 
research would be treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity. A one-page 
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information sheet was also attached to this email.43 Overall, interviewee recruitment 
was successful: of the thirty-seven managers who were approached, thirty agreed to 
be interviewed as part of this study.44 Those who were willing to participate in an 
interview were also asked to read, sign, and date two copies of a consent form, and 
fill out a profile sheet about themselves prior to the commencement of the 
interview.45,46  
All interviews were conducted between August 2014 and November 2015. 
Interviews were arranged at a time, date, and location that was most convenient for 
the interviewee. Except for four, all interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s 
workplace. The interviews lasted ninety-one minutes on average (varying between 
fifty minutes and two hours), and were conducted face-to-face.  All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed to ensure a full record of the topics covered (Hayes and 
Mattimoe, 2004). Out of the thirty interviews conducted, the interview-transcriptions 
were made available to nine interviewees on request.  
These thirty interviewees spanned two hierarchical levels within two 
workgroups. A representative cross-section of Grocer’s middle-management structure 
was thus captured in this sample: twenty-three store managers (eleven from one 
workgroup and twelve from the other); two group loss managers; two group change 
coaches; one group online shopping manager; and two store directors.47 The 
interviewee sample also captured a range of career trajectories within Grocer: the 
length of service at Grocer ranged from nine to forty-two years; the length of time in 
a managerial position ranged from four to thirty-four years; the length of time that a 
manager had been at their current hierarchical level ranged from one to twenty-two 
years; and the length of time that a manager had been in their current role ranged from 
one month to just under five years. The sample of interviewees also comprised a mix 
                                                          
43 See Appendix 10.2 for the information sheet that was distributed. 
44 Most researchers sample until saturation has been reached. Data saturation denotes the point 
at which no new ideas, themes, or explanations emerge since the researcher observes 
phenomena seen before (Marshall, 1996). Whilst acknowledging that data are never truly 
saturated because the unexpected can always occur, this study’s sample size was adequate to 
sufficiently answer the research questions.  
45 See Appendix 10.3 for the consent form that was signed by interviewees. 
46 See Appendix 10.4 for the participant profile sheet. Regarding the profile sheet, 
interviewees were asked to provide both general (name and age) and specific (job title, length 
of time employed by Grocer plc, length of time in a managerial position, length of time in 
their current role, and number of employees in their area of responsibility) information about 
themselves. 
47 These roles are described in detail in sub-section 5.2.4.  
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of both genders (twenty-two males and eight females) of differing ages (from thirty 
years of age to sixty). Details about the location, duration, and so on, of each interview 
are provided in Appendix 10.5, with Appendix 10.6 outlining the biographical profile 
of each interviewee.   
Regarding the interview schedule, this study’s research questions were 
translated into three interview topics defined by the literature reviewed: (1) managers’ 
understanding of temporal reference points, including their awareness of inter-
temporal tensions and how these tensions were managed; (2) managers’ use of the 
organisation’s performance measurement system and the manner in which this shaped 
the inter-temporal decision-making process; and (3) the conditions under which the 
performance measurement system resulted in short-termism, such as the manner in 
which performance measurement information was disseminated, evaluated, and 
rewarded, as well as managers’ mobility within the organisation and personal time 
preferences. These topics were sub-subsequently mapped onto one or more interview 
questions.48 
Because of this mapping process, an interview schedule that comprised of 
nineteen questions was developed to guide the interviews and generate data of a semi-
standardised format. The schedule opened with a ‘warm up’ biographical question 
about the manager’s current role, before proceeding to the middle part of the interview 
where the three more potentially sensitive topics that are outlined above were 
explored. The interview schedule closed with an open-ended question to ascertain 
whether there was anything else relevant to the discussion that had not been covered 
in the interview. The sequencing of the middle part of the schedule and the phrasing 
of four interview questions were revised after a pilot interview in August 2014 with 
store manager B1. The final version of the interview schedule can be found in 
Appendix 10.7. 
 
 
  
                                                          
48 For personal time preferences, guidance was sought from available instruments when 
constructing the interview questions. Bergada’s (1990: 294) interview schedule that focuses 
on an individual’s temporal orientation and Joireman et al.’s (2012: 1284) Consideration of 
Future Consequences scale were used as a point of reference.   
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4.3.5.2 Observations of Management Meetings and Internal 
Company Documents 
 
The researcher identified four types of middle-level manager meetings as relevant for 
the purposes of this study: (1) the weekly ‘Store Meeting’, wherein store management 
review the store’s performance on all performance measures for the previous week 
and construct the current week’s agenda; (2) the weekly ‘Senior Meeting’, wherein 
senior store management review the store’s overall position and discuss broader 
company issues; (3) the ‘Daily Meeting’, wherein store management review 
yesterday’s (morning meeting) and the current day’s (afternoon meeting) performance 
on certain performance measures; and (4) the daily ‘Process Meeting’, wherein store 
management review the store’s daily performance on internal process measures. To 
the extent possible, the researcher sought to observe meetings that would differ in how 
and to what effect performance results were discussed (e.g., due to over or 
underperformance).   
Observation of ten management meetings took place (five ‘Store Meetings’, 
one ‘Senior Meeting’, three ‘Daily Meetings’, and one ‘Process Meeting’) between 
January 2015 and March 2015. Meetings were observed within five different stores 
located in two workgroups. Before the commencement of any meeting, the 
researcher’s position and role was verbally clarified to each person present. The 
researcher did not seek written informed consent off all those present. Instead, implied 
consent was sought, whereby all members of all meetings were taken to have 
consented since no objections to the researcher’s presence were raised.  
The meetings lasted between ten minutes and two hours and observations were 
manually recorded through jotted notes.  The jotted notes were of a semi-structured 
nature, insofar as each entry included details about the location, duration, and 
participants of the meeting, in addition to being oriented to the study’s agenda. The 
researcher looked for occurrences of inter-temporal decisions, as well as any verbal 
and non-verbal explanations for them. The researcher was able to capture relevant 
verbatim quotes (which were placed in quotation marks), paraphrase relevant 
conversations, and describe relevant non-verbal elements of the research setting. 
Details about the location, duration, number of participants, and so on, of each 
meeting are provided in Appendix 10.8.  
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Internal company documents were also collected during the research process. 
As well as opportunistically collecting ‘Company Newspapers’ and ‘Employee 
Satisfaction Success Stories’ left behind in the employee canteens (where the 
researcher typically spent some time before interviews and observations) and the 
‘Performance Results’ distributed in the meetings observed, at the end of every 
interview the researcher would ask for any documents that would complement the 
topics covered. This process led to the collection of nearly six-hundred pages of 
relevant internal company documents. The documents were arranged in an electronic 
file by type (e.g., company newspapers, store memoranda, email exchanges, etc.), that 
logged the author and intended audience. Appendix 10.9 details the database of these 
documents. Before the analysis of the data is discussed, a brief reflexive account of 
this research process is provided.     
 
4.3.5.3 Reflexivity: A Personal Disclosure  
 
A variety of social and historical factors may influence what researchers choose to 
investigate, how they carry out their research and how they interpret their findings 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). Reflexivity, which involves “reflecting on the way 
in which research is carried out and understanding how the process of doing research 
shapes its outcomes” (Hardy et al., 2001: 533-534), thus, has an important role to play 
in research. However, as Johnson and Duberley (2003) note, reflexivity is a product 
of the researcher’s ontological and epistemological commitments. In this regard, 
Johnson and Duberley (2003) outline three combinations of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that constitute three types of reflexivity. When a realist 
ontology is combined with a subjectivist epistemology (as in critical realism) the 
reflexivity deployed is termed ‘epistemic’ which encourages an explicit recognition 
of how the researcher’s socio-historical position has influenced the forms and 
outcomes of the research process.   
The researcher’s background in accounting and finance and curiosity about 
understanding why people behave the way they do motivated initial interest in the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism, guided the formation 
of the research questions, and subsequently influenced the choice of academic texts 
to be read. These factors prompted a growing interest in the social psychology of 
management control and, more generally, psychological processes. Other 
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demographic factors, such as the researcher being a young female with no experience 
of working in the retail industry, may have influenced participants’ interpretations of 
the situation and thus the data that was generated (although the researcher can only 
guess the content of those interpretations). A form of reflexivity has also been used 
when assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the method choices (see previous sub-
sections). The next section explains how the data generated in this study were 
analysed.  
 
4.4  Data Analysis: The ‘DREI’ Model in The Context of The 
Study’s Conceptual Framework 
 
This section makes explicit the process of analysis undertaken on the qualitative data 
emanating from the interviews, management meetings, and internal company 
documents. In a critical realist informed study, abstract theorising and empirical 
observations are brought together in the analyses using two modes of inference: 
retroduction and retrodiction.49 Retroduction involves the movement from the 
empirical observations of the phenomenon of interest to the mechanisms that might 
be responsible for this phenomenon through abstract theorising (Modell, 2017). In 
contrast, retrodiction involves using existing theories, observations, and knowledge 
about the operation of mechanisms to explain the empirical observations.  
Retroduction is a central feature in Bhaskar’s (2010) DREI(C) model for 
analysis, which he differentiates from his RRREI(C) model which involves 
retrodiction and abductive re-description. The idea of Bhaskar’s models is that 
retroduction and retrodiction should be understood as only one part of the data 
analysis process. Because both models appear to have been largely overlooked in the 
management accounting literature, it is worth briefly outlining them here. In the 
DREI(C) model: 
 
“D stands for the description of some pattern of events of phenomena, R for 
the retroduction of possible explanatory mechanisms or structures, involving 
a disjunctive plurality of alternatives, E for the elimination of these competing 
alternatives, I for the identification of the causally efficacious generative 
                                                          
49 However, as Walters and Young (2003) and Fleetwood and Hesketh (2010) point out, 
critical realism does not abandon deductive logic, which is needed to form coherent arguments 
and sentences. 
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mechanism or structure, and C for the iterative correction of earlier findings 
in the light of this identification.” (Bhaskar, 2014: vii)  
 
In the six-stage RRREI(C) model: 
 
“The first R stands for the resolution of the complex event or phenomenon 
into its components, the second R for the abductive redescription or 
recontextualization of these components in an explanatorily significant way, 
the third R for the retrodiction of these component causes to antecedently 
existing events or states of affaires, E for the elimination of alternative 
competing explanatory antecedents, I for the identification of the causally 
efficacious antecedent, and C for the iterative correction of earlier findings in 
the light of this (albeit provisionally) completed explanation or analysis.” 
(Bhaskar, 2014: vii-viii)  
 
Steinmetz (1998) argues that the RRREI(C) model is problematic because the 
open-systemic world implies that even if a researcher knows what the mechanisms 
are, they do not know—or, at least cannot be certain—of how they will operate within 
some new context. In other words, the task of discovering antecedent events is not 
straightforward, which complicates the third, fourth, and fifth stage in the RRREI(C) 
model. Consequently, the retrodiction of events needs to be intimately linked with 
moments of retroduction via multiple cycles of moving back and forth between 
empirical observations and abstract theorising (see Fleetwood and Hesketh, 2010; 
Modell, 2017). In view of this, Bhaskar (2014) recommends that these complementary 
modes of inference be combined through an amalgam of the DREI(C) and RRREI(C) 
models. In this study, the DREI model for analysis was used following a modest 
revision of the retroduction stage to include moments of retrodiction and abductive 
re-description. The implementation of this four-stage data analysis strategy is 
described below. It is worth mentioning at the outset that the interview schedule, 
which set out initial topics to explore, guided this process.   
  
4.4.1 ‘D’ for Description  
 
Description involved the coding of surface-level decisions as well as specifying the 
context in which these decisions took place. This stage of analysis formed part of the 
familiarisation process and first cycle of coding of the interview transcripts, 
observational field notes, and company documentation. Because coding in the 
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description stage remains at the level of the actual and empirical (see sub-section 
4.1.1), the coding methods were restricted to the following: (1) attribute coding which 
noted the demographics of the interviewee, the background of the meeting and the 
audience of the company document; (2) descriptive coding which assigned labels to 
different segments of the data to summarise the topic of the passage; (3) emotion 
coding which labelled the emotions experienced by the participant or inferred by the 
researcher about the participant; and (4) process coding which used gerunds to denote 
observable action in the data. When the participant’s own terms or phrases were used 
as the emotion or process code, these were In Vivo coded in quotation marks. 
Examples include: “Plastering over the crack” and “Fixing it forever”.50,51 Whilst 
some of these codes were predetermined because of the literature reviewed in Chapter 
2 (e.g., ‘short-term definition’), others emerged progressively during data collection 
(e.g., ‘cost efficiency’). These codes comprise coding group one termed ‘inter-
temporal decisions’ and coding group seven termed ‘broader context to inter-temporal 
decisions’, which are outlined fully in Appendix 10.10. 
  
4.4.2 ‘R’ for Retroduction and Retrodiction  
 
The stage of retroduction moved from the coded inter-temporal decisions to the causal 
mechanisms by asking “what must the world be like in order for these findings to be 
possible?” (Marks and O’Mahoney, 2014: 81). Consequently, all data were re-read in 
order to tease out the metaphorical ‘deep’ generative mechanisms and the influential 
contingencies that co-determined the actualisation of inter-temporal decisions. In the 
first instance, this required the identification of the network of objects associated with 
the events at play in the case study—the organisational structure, managerial roles, 
performance measurement system, and so on. This stage of analysis formed part of 
the second cycle of coding of the interview transcripts, observational field notes, and 
company documentation. The data were provisionally coded under the specific areas 
                                                          
50 Defined as instances of managers taking a shortcut to perform back in line with their 
financial and/or non-financial target(s). The action enables the manager to achieve their 
financial and/or non-financial target(s), but does not bring to light the reasons for the former 
underperformance and the current performance may not be sustainable in the longer term. 
51 Defined as instances of managers not taking a shortcut to perform back in line with their 
financial and/or non-financial target(s). The action enables the manager to achieve their 
financial and/or non-financial target(s), whilst understanding the reasons for the former 
underperformance so that the current performance can be maintained in the longer term. 
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deduced from the literature reviewed, such as ‘financial targets’, ‘non-financial 
targets’, ‘non-financial measures (qualitative)’, ‘frequency of measurement’, 
‘performance evaluation (process)’, and ‘reward allocation’. Nonetheless, at the same 
time, the researcher actively engaged in a search for other mechanisms and thus new 
and stand-alone codes were induced from the data, such as ‘informal performance 
evaluation’ and ‘limited controllability’. The coding methods used include: (1) values 
coding which labelled the participant’s values, attitudes, and beliefs; and (2) causation 
coding which extracted attributions from the data about why certain decisions came 
about.  
 The individual codes were then transformed into a smaller number of analytic 
units by means of ‘creative imagination’, ‘knowledge of the social world’, and 
‘reading of relevant literature’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Miles et al., 2013). 
Consequently, forty-nine sub-themes and five primary themes were derived, with 
candidate explanations preserved in an analytic memo. The five primary themes 
include: performance measurement system; reward/penalty system; social 
comparisons; intra-organisational mobility; and personal preferences. Each theme and 
associated sub-theme was recorded in tabular form in Microsoft Word, together with 
their operational definitions. These are outlined fully in Appendix 10.10. This stage 
of analysis was iterative, moving back and forth between previously identified 
mechanisms to explain the inter-temporal decisions at Grocer (retrodiction), and 
engaging in the search for new mechanisms to add to the initial conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter 1 (retroduction). At the same time, the researcher was exploring 
different explanations to find the best fit for the data (abduction).  
 
4.4.3 ‘E’ for Elaboration and Elimination 
 
Following the description, retroduction, and retrodiction stages, a critical analysis of 
the data collected was undertaken. This involved multiple readings of the data to 
identify any additional themes and associated sub-themes. After each transcript was 
read, a three-page critical summary was developed that detailed the sub-themes and 
themes identified, as well as any puzzles and/or contradictions within the transcript. 
This process was repeated for each set of field notes from the observed meetings and 
the company documents. These summaries were then triangulated to assess their 
convergence and disconnect in the decisions occurring in the actual domain and the 
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underlying mechanisms in the real domain. Consideration was continually given to 
the reasons for different accounts—were there other mechanisms at play influencing 
the triggering of a decision? Were the observed decisions embedded in a specific 
temporal context?   
Because critical realism retains a place for an objective social world, it was 
possible to judge the adequacy of alternative explanations by returning to the concrete 
empirical observations to ascertain if any of the abstracted mechanisms could be 
responsible for the inter-temporal decisions observed (Steinmetz, 1998). This 
procedure required the practice of counterfactual thinking to “distinguish between 
what can be the case and what must be the case, given certain preconditions” (Sayer, 
2000: 16). Danermark et al. (2002: 101) note that to think in terms of the 
counterfactual simply means to ask questions such as: “How would this be if not…? 
Could one imagine X without…? Could one imagine X including this, without X then 
becoming something different?”52 It was also at this stage in the analysis that 
alternative explanations were eliminated and those that offered the most accurate 
representation of the ‘real world’ were retained.53  
 
4.4.4 ‘I’ for Identification  
 
The final stage in the analysis involved constructing a logical chain of evidence. The 
process of constructing a research narrative involved drawing on the conceptual 
framework outlined in Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1) to unpack the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. That is, the empirical chapters that follow 
are structured by this framework. The case study context is described in Chapter 5, 
with the inter-temporal decisions and identified mechanisms explored in detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. Chapter 8 then summarises the nature (i.e., the 
structure and operation of individual performance measures) and extent (i.e., 
                                                          
52 For example, developing an argument that quantitative (financial and non-financial) 
measures encourage short-termism means developing an argument that short-termism would 
be less likely if quantitative (financial and non-financial) measures were not used.  
53 In line with Luft and Shields (2014: 553), alternative explanations were eliminated by 
specifying the preferred causal explanations narrowly so that fewer alternative explanations 
were plausible. For example, a narrow segment of the causal chain is specified (link between 
box a and box c in Figure 1.1) that focuses on the behavioural effects of performance measures 
and not on factors that affect performance measurement choices. Moreover, the level at which 
the explanations are intended focuses on the individual level and not on higher levels of 
analysis such as organisational and social levels.  
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individual-level contingency factors that play key roles) of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism, highlighting that the initial conceptual 
framework failed to capture the dynamic, fluid, and bidirectional relationships at play. 
The process of analysing data was facilitated by computer assisted qualitative data 
analysis software, which is discussed briefly in the next sub-section.  
 
4.4.5 Data Analysis and Software  
 
Discussions continue in the literature about the general benefits and drawbacks of 
using Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) (see e.g., 
Atherton and Elsmore, 2007). Compared with working with all data in hard copy, 
CAQDAS can enhance the speed, efficiency, rigour, and consistency of the analysis 
process (Stewart, 2012). The ability to consolidate moderate to large amounts of data 
(e.g., field notes, interviews, analytic memos, etc.) in one place can help researchers 
to “keep track of connections that might otherwise easily fall through the cracks” 
(Weitzman, 2000: 807). Arguably, CAQDAS packages can strengthen the 
transparency and reliability of research due to in-built features that allow choices and 
reflections to be easily recorded in memos and annotations as the analysis progresses. 
Nonetheless, these practical benefits will be overshadowed “if you spend enormous 
amounts of time trying to locate, learn how to use, and enter data into a computer 
program” (Berg and Lune, 2012: 380) and undermined if key word searches and auto-
coding “encourage the researcher to take shortcuts” (Weitzman, 2000: 808).  
The arguments against using CAQDAS suggest that the code-and-retrieve 
strategy accentuates the de-contextualisation and dis-assembly of data (Atherton and 
Elsmore, 2007), with the conceptual assumptions behind the chosen package often 
shaping the analysis (Weitzman, 2000). Regarding this latter point, CAQDAS 
packages are not neutral insofar as the tools privilege certain analytic strategies and 
inhibit others. For example, NVivo is underpinned by a hierarchical ordering method. 
CAQDAS packages may thus undermine a study’s epistemology if a researcher 
cannot code the way that their methodology requires. But, as Weitzman (2000) 
highlights, researchers need not be trapped by a software’s assumptions. 
In addition to the pragmatic benefits versus theoretical drawbacks debate, the 
decision about whether to use a CAQDAS package may come down to personal 
preference: does the researcher “enjoy finding the hidden ‘techie’ part of their self” 
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(Anderson-Gough, 2004: 384) or “need to ‘feel the paper’” (Stewart, 2012: 506)? For 
the researcher to identify their preferred working style and assess the appropriateness 
of using CAQDAS for this study, a three-day qualitative analysis software workshop 
was attended in January 2014. In comparison to the size of the datasets in other 
accounting studies (e.g., Townley et al., 2003), the data generated by this study was 
not beyond the scope of managing and analysing manually. Nevertheless, CAQDAS 
was found to be a valuable tool, as it could support greater transparency not only in 
the steps taken throughout the analysis, but also when reaching causal explanations. 
The researcher settled on using the NVivo package—a choice strongly influenced by 
what was available at the researcher’s institution—to code and retrieve data, represent 
relations among codes, and capture the researcher’s thinking using memos within the 
software. The researcher did not experience a loss of closeness to the data since the 
researcher could straightforwardly access the three sources of data, rapidly retrieve 
coded text, and look at these retrieved sections of text in their original context. Indeed, 
the facility to summarise results and model ideas provided the necessary distance for 
abstraction and allowed for movement into deeper ontological domains. NVivo’s 
‘coding tree’ architecture, which hinders process mapping, was managed by keeping 
track of process relationships in digitised memos and hand-drawn displays. Overall, 
incorporating this CAQDAS package into the researcher’s toolkit supported more 
ordered and rigorous research than what would have been achieved without it. The 
next section sets out the quality criteria for this study. 
 
4.5  Evaluating the Research  
 
“Because a paradigm is a world view, spanning ontology, epistemology and 
methodology, the quality of scientific research done within a paradigm has to 
be judged by its own paradigm's terms.” (Healy and Perry, 2000: 120-121) 
 
Healy and Perry (2000) establish six criteria to judge the quality of critical realist 
research that span the three elements of a philosophical paradigm—that is, ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology. The six criteria are shown in Table 4.2, where each 
criterion is linked to the appropriate philosophical element and the tactics used in this 
study to increase the likelihood of meeting the quality criteria are outlined.  
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Table 4.2: Quality Criteria (adapted from Healy and Perry, 2000: 122) 
 
 
Critical realist research must demonstrate ontological appropriateness. 
Ontological appropriateness entails differentiating between the real, the actual, and 
the empirical domains to facilitate getting below the surface experiences to understand 
and explain why things are as they are (Fraser, 2014). The critical realist technique is 
thus to ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ framed research questions, which also aligns with case-
based research (Healy and Perry, 2000; Yin, 2003). As outlined at the outset, this 
study’s research questions are generally framed in terms of ‘how’. Because of the 
open-systemic world that critical realism presupposes, mechanisms, or rather their 
effects, can be blocked, disrupted, or redirected by the operation of other 
countervailing mechanisms (Lipscomb, 2008). This means that causal impacts are not 
fixed but are contingent on their environment. Consequently, the second ontological 
Element 
Quality 
Criteria 
Tactics Used in This Research 
Ontology 
Ontological 
appropriateness 
• Ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ framed research 
questions 
Contingent 
validity 
• Return to the basic realist question “what 
caused that event to happen?”  
• In-depth interview questions to uncover 
potential mechanisms  
• Describe the context of the case 
Epistemology 
Multiple 
perceptions of 
participants and 
of peer 
researchers 
• Triangulation—within method triangulation 
and between method triangulation  
• Self-description and awareness of own 
values 
Methodology 
Methodological 
trustworthiness 
• Maintain thorough case study database 
• Describe data collection plans and 
protocols 
• Provide a clear audit trail 
• Liberal use of verbatim quotes  
Analytical 
generalisation 
• Conceptualise the context and events before 
data collection 
• Theorise about potential generative 
mechanisms before data collection 
Construct 
validity 
• Draw on existing literature to define 
constructs 
• Maintain thorough case study database  
• Triangulation—within method triangulation 
and between method triangulation  
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quality criterion is contingent validity, which refers to the legitimacy of the accounts 
provided about mechanisms and the context that makes them contingent. One tactic 
used in this study includes continually returning to the basic realist question “what 
caused that event to happen?” Other tactics deployed include using in-depth interview 
questions to uncover potential mechanisms (see sub-section 4.3.5.1) and describing 
the context of the case. The context of the case is described in the next chapter.  
Critical realists believe that there is an imperfectly apprehensible real world 
out there. For the critical realist, a participant's perception is a window to reality and 
this picture of reality can be triangulated with other perceptions (Healy and Perry, 
2000). Consequently, the multiple perceptions of participants and of peer researchers 
are drawn on to capture as much of reality as possible (Bisman, 2010). This study 
used within method triangulation and between method triangulation to offer the most 
accurate representation of the ‘real world’. It is at this point that researchers should 
also reflect on the role that they have played in the creation of knowledge. This is 
because, as Sayer (2000: 61) notes, “reflexivity is conducive—we can put it no more 
strongly—to objectivity in the sense of the developing of true or practically adequate 
accounts.” This tactic was deployed in sub-section 4.3.5.3. 
Methodological trustworthiness is another criterion used to assess the quality of 
critical realist research. Trustworthiness refers to the extent to which the research can 
be audited by a third party. The techniques used to enhance the trustworthiness of this 
study include maintaining a thorough case study database, carefully describing the 
data collection plans and protocols, providing a clear audit trail, and liberally using 
verbatim quotes in the research narrative (Healy and Perry, 2000; O’Dwyer, 2004). 
The criterion of analytical generalisation refers to the generalisation that takes place 
through expanding, refining, and developing theories. Realists maintain that 
explaining the reality of the ‘deep’ causal powers and liabilities that underlie a set of 
events can contribute to broader theory. Researchers are advised to conceptualise the 
context of the case and events before data collection, as well as theorise about 
potential generative mechanisms to incorporate these into data collection protocols. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the literature reviewed informed the study’s data 
collection plans and protocols. The final quality criterion is construct validity, which 
denotes how well information about the constructs in the narrative being built are 
captured in the research. To meet this criterion, this study used existing literature to 
define constructs, as demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3 (Abernethy et al., 1999), as 
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well as maintaining the case study database and triangulating different data sources to 
uncover convergent and divergent accounts of key constructs. 
 
4.6  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Chapter 4 outlined the research design of the study. The chapter has linked the 
researcher’s critical realist ontological and constructionist epistemological 
commitments to the application of the case study methodology, and explained how 
the data that were generated by asking questions, making observations, and using 
company documentation were analysed. A discussion about the criteria that should be 
used to judge research within the critical realist paradigm then followed. Interwoven 
into the discussions in this chapter were assessments about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the investigatory tools utilised, as well as reflections on the important 
ethical issues and procedural issues that were tackled. Taken as a whole, this chapter 
has endeavoured to provide the reader with an account of the creation of this study in 
which forming a logical chain of meta-theoretical commitments was deemed 
important.  
The next three chapters will detail the findings of implementing this 
methodological strategy. Chapter 5 will provide an overview of the case study, Grocer 
plc. Chapter 6 will consider the nature of short-termism and outline what it means to 
engage in this behaviour (research questions 1 and 2). Chapter 7 will explain short-
termism with reference to underlying mechanisms (research questions 3 and 4). 
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5 THE CASE STUDY OVERVIEW: GROCER PLC  
 
This is the first of three empirical chapters based on the methodological strategy 
outlined in Chapter 4. The organisation of the chapters is structured around the 
conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1.1: Chapter 5 outlines the broader context 
to the case, explores the nuances of Grocer’s performance measurement system, and 
provides a descriptive overview of the specific and fluid contingencies; Chapter 6 
focuses on the inter-temporal decisions observed and explores the nuances of short-
termism; and Chapter 7 unpacks the relationship between an organisation’s 
performance measurement system and managerial short-termism. For each chapter, 
the data presented were generated from interviews with middle-level managers, 
observation of management meetings, and the acquisition and perusal of internal 
company documents. 
 This first chapter draws on the study’s data to provide a detailed overview of 
the case organisation, with attention given to describing aspects of the internal 
situation that will be shown, in subsequent chapters, to influence the nature and extent 
of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism. One aim of 
Chapter 5 is thus to provide the context for the findings presented and discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. In line with the literature reviewed, the chapter describes the 
particularities of Grocer’s performance measurement system, performance evaluation 
systems, and reward/penalty systems, as well as managers’ remits, responsibilities, 
and mobility within the organisation. Table 5.1 presents a roadmap of the key issues 
that will be described and indicates where findings that relate to their impact on inter-
temporal decisions can be found, as a reference for the reader. The chapter draws 
substantially on Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) performance management systems 
framework for describing the design and operation of performance measurement 
systems.  
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Table 5.1: Roadmap of Key Issues 
   
 Issue Described Discussed 
Store Characteristics  ‘Online’ stores 
Delivery restrictions 
Lossmaking stores  
Store age 
Section 5.2 Section 6.1 
Section 6.2 
Section 7.2 
Middle-level Manager 
Roles 
Store managers 
Group support managers 
Store directors  
Section 5.2 Section 6.1 
Intra-organisational 
Mobility  
Secondments 
Internal-lateral mobility  
Frequency of mobility 
Section 5.2 Section 6.1 
Section 7.2 
Performance 
Measurement System 
Financial measures 
Non-financial measures 
Causal relationships 
Frequency of 
monitoring  
Section 5.3 Section 6.1 
Section 6.2 
Section 7.1 
Relative Performance 
Information 
Nature of information  
Frequency of 
dissemination  
Section 5.3 Section 7.2 
Performance 
Evaluations  
Formal performance 
evaluations 
Informal performance 
evaluations 
Section 5.3 Section 6.1 
Section 7.2 
Reward/Penalty 
System 
Formal reward/penalty 
system 
Informal reward/penalty 
system 
Section 5.3 Section 7.2 
 
The present chapter is structured as follows. The first section describes the 
background of the case organisation and outlines the organisation’s businesses, 
strategic priorities, and financial performance observed during the investigation. The 
next section considers the organisation’s hierarchical structure, decentralised control 
architecture, and policies on intra-organisational mobility. A discussion about the 
formal and informal management control systems in operation within the organisation 
then follows. Interwoven into the discussions in this chapter are verbatim quotes from 
the organisation’s middle-level managers. This enables the chapter to capture and 
compare the intended purpose, design, and use of Grocer’s policies and systems, 
which is obtained from company documentation with the actual implementation 
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described by middle-level managers. To satisfy the quality criterion of methodological 
trustworthiness (see Table 4.2), an audit trail for each section is provided.   
 
5.1  About Grocer  
 
This section will introduce Grocer plc, by describing the organisation’s domestic and 
international businesses, core values, strategic priorities, and external environment. 
The section will also outline Grocer’s approach to outperforming competitors and 
financial performance over recent years. The section thus describes the broader 
context to, and the static backdrop for, probing the relationship between performance 
measures and managers’ short-termist decisions.  
Grocer plc is a British multinational grocery and general merchandise retailer 
that supplies a variety of products and services to millions of customers online and in 
store each week. The company employs approximately 450,000 people worldwide 
and operates with six levels of management. At the time of the research, the company 
had a turnover in excess of £70 billion and held a leading position in most penetrated 
markets. The information presented in this section draws upon information from the 
public domain (annual reports, mission statements, and press releases) and the 
analysis of internal company documents (document groups 1, 2, 4, and 5; see 
Appendix 10.9), as well as interview data (interview questions 1, 17, and 17a with 
codes 5.2 and 8.3 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).   
 
5.1.1 Historical Background  
 
Founded in the early 1900s, Grocer started life as a UK-based grocery retailer but, 
over recent years, has diversified geographically and into areas such as financial 
services, telecoms, and the retailing of general merchandise. Until the early 1990s, 
Grocer was a high-volume, low-cost retailer that competed on a cost-leadership 
business strategy (see Porter, 1980). However, the nineties witnessed the arrival of 
euro-competition with several limited assortment stores that worked on low-cost 
logistic and operational systems. These stores offered customers significant price 
savings through retailing low-price, high-quality private label products. This change 
in the nature of the UK retail environment resulted in Grocer abandoning its 
downmarket image and broadening its appeal to different market segments by 
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retailing a variety of differentially priced own brand products and services. Grocer’s 
underlying strategy thus gradually moved towards a hybrid approach which sought to 
achieve branding differentiation and low costs through relative buying power. This 
broadening of its appeal was successful: Grocer’s UK store portfolio grew from five 
hundred stores in the mid-1990s to over three thousand twenty years later. The 
strategy provided sufficient margins for reinvestment to maintain and develop the 
bases of differentiation as well as pursue international ventures in Europe, Asia, and 
the US.54 The next sub-section delineates Grocer’s domestic and international 
businesses.  
 
5.1.2 The Businesses  
 
Grocer has retailing and associated activities in the UK, European, and Asian markets. 
Grocer operates in several international markets which account for approximately 
thirty percent of the company’s revenue and trading profit (Annual Report and 
Financial Statements 2014/15). This success in international markets is due, in part, 
to Grocer’s cultural awareness, gained by entering joint ventures with local partners 
and appointing a large proportion of local personnel into management positions. The 
local personnel are supported by managers from the domestic market.  
Grocer’s domestic operations are the largest of its businesses, with over three 
thousand multi-format retail stores throughout the UK. Because this business is a key 
driver of Grocer’s revenues and trading profit, strengthening the foundations of the 
UK store operation through ensuring competitive prices, improved quality, stronger 
ranges, and better service is a strategic priority (see sub-section 5.1.4). Since the late 
1990s, Grocer has also engaged in retail banking and insurance services in the UK. 
This business offers a range of personal banking products and services, including 
mortgages, credit cards, personal loans, savings accounts, and several types of 
insurance. The mainly online business constitutes approximately two percent and five 
percent of Grocer’s revenue and trading profit, respectively (Annual Report and 
Financial Statements 2014/15). Grocer plans to expand its financial service business 
to some international markets (Internal Company Documents, Group 1). Nonetheless, 
overall, retail stores are the most important aspect of Grocer, with the core of the 
                                                          
54 Grocer has of late discontinued its lossmaking store operations in the US.  
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business remaining in the UK. For this reason, the discussions from this point onwards 
will focus on Grocer’s UK store operations. The next sub-section considers Grocer’s 
core purpose and values.  
 
5.1.3 Core Purpose and Values  
 
Grocer’s core purpose is: “making what matters better, together” (Internal Company 
Documents, Group 5). The core purpose intends to signify that Grocer is about more 
than generating profit, which aligns with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984).55 
Specifically, senior management wants Grocer to always do the right thing, inspire, 
and earn trust and loyalty from shareholders, customers, employees, and local 
communities (Internal Company Documents, Group 5). Grocer’s core purpose is 
operationalised through three values, which are believed to support organisational 
growth and success. The three values are: (1) no one tries harder for customers; (2) 
we treat everyone how we like to be treated; and (3) we use our scale for good (Internal 
Company Documents, Group 2). The induction programmes for new employees 
includes a session dedicated to explaining these values. Managers also attempt to 
imbed the values into everyday work life. The values are commonly used and 
referenced in daily conversations and painted onto the walls of in-store training rooms. 
The values feed through all aspects of the business, such as role descriptions (see sub-
section 5.2.4) and formal performance evaluations (see sub-section 5.3.3.2). In basic 
terms, the three values are intended to guide the choices and decisions that employees 
make each day. Grocer’s core purpose and values underpin its vision and strategy. 
This is discussed in the next sub-section.   
 
5.1.4 Vision and Strategy  
 
As a general vision, Grocer seeks to be valued by the customers it serves, the 
communities in which it operates, its employees, and its shareholders. Five strands of 
this vision are identifiable: (1) to be wanted and needed around the world; (2) to be a 
growing business, full of opportunities; (3) to be modern, innovative and full of ideas; 
                                                          
55 This theory outlines a vision of managerial responsibility that goes beyond an organisation’s 
shareholders to embrace all stakeholders. In this regard, stakeholders are viewed as any group 
or individual who can affect or is affected by the organisation such as employees, customers, 
suppliers and the local community (Freeman, 1984).   
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(4) to be winners locally whilst applying skills globally; and (5) to be inspiring, 
earning trust and loyalty from customers, employees, and communities (Internal 
Company Documents, Group 4). Each of these components describes the sort of 
organisation Grocer aspires to be. This vision is thought possible only when 
employees internalise and champion Grocer’s values (see above).  
 The vision is translated into a multifaceted strategy to reflect the business 
priorities, which focus on the way customers’ needs are changing and the increasingly 
global nature of its businesses. The strategy is: (1) to restore growth to the UK 
business; (2) to strengthen the performance of international businesses; (3) to grow 
and diversify non-food offers; (4) to grow retail services, such as telecoms and 
financial services, in domestic and international markets; (5) to be a responsible 
corporate citizen; (6) to create highly valued brands; and (7) to build strong leadership 
teams across all businesses (Annual Report and Financial Statements 2014/15). The 
first strategic priority maps onto Grocer’s in-store performance measurement system, 
which is based around the performance philosophy that, if managers treat customers 
well and stores operate efficiently and effectively, then Grocer’s sales, profits, and 
returns will grow (for further details, see sub-section 5.3.1). The pretext for the first 
strategic priority is linked to Grocer’s external environment. The external 
environment is discussed below.     
 
5.1.5 The External Environment  
 
Grocer faces an increasingly competitive market, with pressure coming from the 
price-aggressive limited assortment stores (commonly referred to as the discounters) 
which have increased their store opening programmes in recent years. This is due, in 
part, to the financial crisis and subsequent economic recession in the late 2000s which 
ostensibly focused customers’ minds on value (Flatters and Willmott, 2009). The 
growth of the limited assortment stores has diluted the market share of established 
grocery retailers, including Grocer (Internal Company Documents, Group 1).  
The established retailers have retaliated by engaging in ‘price wars’ to try to 
entice more customers into visiting their stores and to spend more money on each 
store visit. However, customers’ discretionary thrift is coupled with changeable brand 
consumption (see Flatters and Willmott, 2009). That is, customers have brought their 
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increasingly erratic loyalty into the post-recession era—a notion conveyed in the 
quotation below.  
   
“Our customers have become more promiscuous. They don’t care about 
spending fuel, driving half way around [City] now just to go and get the best 
deals in lots of different places.” (Store Manager B6: 1667-1669) 56 
 
 As Grocer’s revenues began to fall, short-term corporate cost-cutting measures 
were pursued to retain a year-end profit margin of approximately five percent. 
Examples of cost-cutting measures taken by senior management include cancelling 
in-store stock takes, cutting in-store payroll budgets, and delaying payments to 
suppliers. In doing so, however, Grocer began to damage its brand and in-store service 
and operation: “we became so fixated on the middle section of our profit and loss 
report that it damaged our service that we offered” (Group Change Coach A: 303-
304).  This is evidenced by UK trading profits continuing to fall by an average of four 
percent each year between 2011 and 2014. Consequently, and during this study, 
Grocer took a series of steps to try to increase competitiveness in its UK business. The 
steps involved closing more than forty lossmaking stores, consolidating Head Office 
locations, reducing in-store management roles, and changing employees’ pension 
scheme (Internal Company Documents, Groups 1 and 5). Due to redundancy costs, 
restructuring expenses, and so on, the UK trading profit figure for 2014/15 was £0.5 
billion, which was a fall of eighty percent on the previous year. The future cost savings 
achieved from the new level of financial discipline and cost control are to be 
reinvested in the core customer proposition. That is, Grocer wants to provide 
competitive prices, improved quality, stronger ranges, and better service. It is worth 
noting that the issues raised here influence the financial target setting process, which 
is discussed later in this chapter (see sub-section 5.3.1).  
This section has presented background information about the case study, Grocer 
plc. It was intended as a static backdrop, against which the more specific and fluid 
internal organisational conditions that shape managers’ time horizons and inter-
temporal decisions are described in the remainder of this chapter. The following 
section thus provides more specific contextual information pertaining to this research.  
                                                          
56 Numbers in brackets reflect the lines of text referenced. For example, ‘(Store Manager B6: 
1667-1669)’ denotes the interview with Store Manager B6 with the quotation taken from lines 
1667 to 1669 in the transcript. 
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5.2  Contextual Information 
  
This section describes Grocer’s internal architecture, including its management 
structure, nature of decentralised decision-making, and policies on intra-
organisational mobility. The characteristics of the twenty-three stores visited and 
responsibilities of the thirty managers interviewed will also be considered to 
familiarise the reader with the organisation. As indicated in Table 5.1, many of these 
issues will be shown to influence managers’ time horizons and complicate the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termist decisions. 
Consequently, the issues raised in this section will be referred to when addressing the 
research questions in Chapters 6 and 7, and when relating the data presented to the 
studies cited in Chapters 2 and 3. The information presented in this section draws 
upon the analysis of internal company documents (document groups 1 and 5; see 
Appendix 10.9) and interview data (interview questions 1, 17, 17a, and 17b with codes 
5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 7.1, and 7.5 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).      
 
5.2.1 Management Structure 
 
Grocer has relatively few layers of management. The structure has six layers, with 
three of these comprising Grocer’s in-store management: departmental managers 
(management level six), deputy store managers (management level five), and store 
managers (management level four). The exception to this are the group support 
managers (management level four or five), who are situated externally to in-store 
management. Positioned above, and external to the store teams, are store directors 
(management level three), format directors (management level two), and the board of 
directors (management level one).           
As noted in Chapter 4, this study focuses on the middle of the corporate 
hierarchy, that is, management levels 3 and 4. The responsibilities and remits of these 
roles are explained fully towards the end of this section with the aid of an 
organisational chart (see sub-section 5.2.4). Having outlined the management 
structure of the organisation, sub-section 5.2.2 considers Grocer’s decentralised 
structure.  
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5.2.2 Store Formats   
 
Grocer’s UK store operations are organised into four formats—GroA, GroB, GroC, 
and GroD. The formats are differentiated by size and the range of products sold. For 
instance, GroA stores are the mainly out-of-town hypermarkets with a floor space 
averaging over six thousand square metres, stocking nearly all of Grocer’s product 
ranges (e.g., groceries and non-food items such as clothing, electrical appliances, 
furniture, etc.). These stores offer a ‘destination’ shopping experience as they house 
services such as cafés, restaurants, pharmacies, opticians, phone shops, beauticians, 
petrol filling stations, and so on. With a floor space averaging two thousand square 
metres, GroB stores are the supermarkets that stock groceries and a smaller non-food 
range. These stores offer some of GroA’s destination services, namely cafés, phone 
shops, and petrol filling stations. Thus, in many respects, “[GroB] and [GroA] are 
the same because they serve the same type of customer” (Store Manager B3: 1043).  
GroC stores are the town centre shops that have a floor space averaging one 
thousand square metres. In contrast to GroA and GroB stores, GroC stores offer a 
limited food and non-food range and have no destination services. GroD stores are 
located in residential areas and have a floor space averaging two hundred square 
metres. Similar to GroC stores, they stock a limited food and non-food range, but 
place more emphasis on high-margin products such as sweets, crisps, chocolate, 
biscuits, fizzy drinks, and processed food. Because they are both convenience stores, 
“[GroC] and [GroD] link together because they basically serve the same type of 
customer” (Store Manager B3: 1042).      
This study concentrates on the larger, more complex, formats, which are GroA 
and GroB comprising more than 200 and 400 UK stores respectively.57 The GroA and 
GroB formats are each divided into several workgroups. This is discussed in the 
following sub-section.  
 
5.2.3 Workgroups   
 
Formats are spilt into several geographically dispersed workgroups which comprise a 
maximum of twenty-five stores. For stores at the opposite ends of a workgroup, the 
                                                          
57 This is a consequence of the access that was negotiated.  
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geographical distance can cover some two hundred miles. Each store is assigned a 
store manager who makes decisions for that store. All store managers in a workgroup 
report to a store director who makes decisions that can affect each of the stores within 
the workgroup. Noticeably, the store director (superior) is not located at the same site 
as store managers (subordinates) and so superior-subordinate interaction takes place 
through store visits, telephone conversations, and/or email messages. Due, in part, to 
this geographical dispersion, store directors are supported by a number of group 
support managers. As noted, these roles are described in sub-section 5.2.4.  
This study focuses on two workgroups: one GroA workgroup and one GroB 
workgroup. For simplicity, the workgroups in question will be referred to as GroA 
and GroB. GroA comprises eighteen stores (eleven of which were visited) within a 
one-hundred-and-seventy-mile radius. GroB comprises twenty-three stores (twelve of 
which were visited), within a one-hundred-and-thirty-mile radius. Each of these 
stores, however, possess slightly different characteristics. The store characteristics 
observed are described below.  
 
5.2.3.1  Store Characteristics  
 
“This is my probably my sixth or seventh store and each one has been 
different.” (Store Manager A1: 518-519)  
 
“All our shops are different.” (Store Manager A2: 834)  
 
“There’s not one shop that’s the same.” (Group Loss Manager A: 1024-1025)  
 
 Within a workgroup, stores are categorised into bands. The criteria considered 
for categorisation include the store’s size, level of sales, and complexity of in-store 
operations (e.g., the capacity to fulfil online shopping orders, destination services). 
GroB stores are categorised as either ‘six’ or ‘seven’, whilst GroA stores are 
categorised as ‘seven’, ‘eight’, ‘nine’, or ‘ten’.58 An increase in band number denotes 
that the store has a larger shop floor space and thus a larger workforce, a higher level 
of sales, and more complex in-store operations. Less experienced store managers are 
usually placed in a store with a lower band number. Of the twenty-three store manager 
respondents, five manage band six stores, nine manage band seven stores, seven 
                                                          
58 Bands one to five encompass GroC and GroD stores only.  
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manage band eight stores, and two manage band nine stores. Note that this study does 
not capture a band ten GroA store.   
 For stores with the capacity and equipment to fulfil online shopping orders, 
between fifteen and thirty percent of the store’s sales per week originate from 
fulfilling and delivering orders placed by customers using Grocer’s online shopping 
system. These stores serve online customers within a set catchment area (usually a 
twenty-mile radius around the store’s postcode). Being an ‘online’ store entails a 
complex set of in-store operations (i.e., picking, packing and dispatching online 
orders) which, if not managed and resourced appropriately, can have a detrimental 
impact on the day-to-day functioning of the store: “it drains the store to try and get 
the pick finished. So, people that should be doing other things aren’t because they’re 
picking” (Store Manager A4: 1648-1650). Fourteen GroA stores have the capacity to 
fulfil online shopping orders (eight of which were visited), whilst two GroB stores 
have the capacity to fulfil online shopping orders (both of which were visited).  
 Some stores are subject to delivery curfew restrictions imposed by local 
authorities. These stores are typically within or near residential areas. A delivery 
restriction hinders in-store activities (e.g., the replenishment of groceries and non-
food items), as evidenced by the following quote.  
 
“We’re a delivery restricted store, which means that we can’t accept 
deliveries between midnight and six am. So, my fresh food predominantly, 
ninety percent of it arrives at six o’clock in the morning. That’s the same time 
we pick home shopping.” (Store Manager A6: 172-175) 
 
 Due to multiple uncontrollable factors that were previously discussed and are 
returned to later in this chapter, many Grocer stores have experienced falling sales in 
recent years. The sales figures no longer justify the operational costs of running some 
of these stores. This is evidenced by the closure of in excess of forty lossmaking stores 
during the first half of 2015 (see sub-section 5.1.5). Seven of the closed stores were 
from the GroB format. Regarding the stores visited during this study, three GroA 
stores and one GroB store are lossmaking. This status influences the managers’ budget 
plans, the product ranges available in-store, and the preservation of destination 
services.  
 Table 5.2 presents a concise overview of the store characteristics of the sample 
outlined above, as a reference for the reader.  
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Table 5.2: Store Characteristics of Sample 
    
 Band 6 Band 7 Band 8 Band 9 
Number of stores 5 GroB 
stores 
7 GroB 
stores 
2 GroA 
stores 
7 GroA 
stores 
2 GroA 
stores 
Store capacity to 
fulfil online 
shopping orders 
0 GroB 
stores  
2 GroB 
stores 
1 GroA 
store 
5 GroA 
stores 
2 GroA 
stores 
Delivery 
restrictions 
0 GroB 
stores 
0 GroB 
stores 
0 GroA 
stores 
1 GroA 
store 
0 GroA 
stores 
Lossmaking stores  1 GroB store 2 GroA 
stores 
1 GroA 
store 
0 GroA 
stores 
Level of store 
manager experience 
Less than 
two years on 
average  
Seven years 
on average 
Nine years 
on average 
More than 
fifteen years 
on average 
 
 The affluence of the area in which a store is located influences whether the 
retail offer is targeted at predominately upmarket, mid-market, or price-sensitive 
customers. Moreover, the ethnic composition of this target market differs in terms of 
rural-urban location. These, and other demographic (e.g., age), psychographic (e.g., 
lifestyle), and behavioural (e.g., loyalty status) trends, mean that it is necessary for 
each store to tailor localised food and non-food ranges to the needs of customers in 
their catchment area. For example:    
 
“We’ve just incorporated a larger Polish range because we’ve got a lot of 
Polish customers around here.” (Store Manager A9: 83-84) 
 
“It’s a little bit more midmarket which is why I’ve got to be careful and 
balance the range.” (Store Manager B5: 169-170)  
 
 Range decisions made by the store manager, in turn, influence the achievement 
of certain performance measures. This point is returned to in the next section.  
 Targets set for some of the performance measures are influenced by the age of 
a given store. Stores that have been open for less than three years are set more 
achievable financial targets than the best-guess forecast to protect managers against 
unforeseen circumstances. As the following quotation illustrates, substantial 
budgetary slack is introduced into targets for newly-opened stores but this slack is 
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gradually removed over a three-year period to a level that is consistent with a ‘tight, 
but attainable’ budgeting philosophy (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989).  
 
“A new store has quite healthy budgets. This store is coming into its third year 
so actually the budgets for the store were too much anyway. It happens with 
every store, they have bigger budgets because they’re getting used to 
customers, their colleagues, and all that. Gradually, they then get cut.” (Store 
Manager B1: 299-301)   
 
 Except for one GroA store and one GroB store, all stores visited during this 
research have been open for more than three years. As will be discussed later in the 
chapter, Grocer engages in acts of commensuration by comparing these stores 
according to common measures (Espeland and Stevens, 1998). The extent to which 
store characteristics influence the way managers perform their inter-temporal tasks 
permeates the discussions in Chapters 6 and 7. In the next sub-section, attention turns 
to the responsibilities and remits of Grocer’s middle-level managers.   
 
5.2.4 Roles: Responsibilities and Remits 
 
It was noted in sub-section 4.3.5 that a representative cross-section of Grocer’s 
middle-management structure was captured in the interviewee sample: twenty-three 
store managers (eleven from GroA and twelve from GroB); two group change 
coaches; two group loss managers; one group online shopping manager; and two store 
directors. Because managerial responsibilities are linked to target achievement, it is 
worth reiterating that Grocer operates a BSC approach to performance measurement 
and management control. Figure 5.1 shows the role and workgroup of each 
interviewee by way of an organisational chart. The responsibilities and remits of the 
outlined roles and their linkage to the BSC are described below. How these 
responsibilities and remits shape managers’ time horizons and inter-temporal 
activities is discussed in Section 6.1.  
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Figure 5.1: Organisational Chart of Sample 
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Store Manager A1 to Store Manager A11 Store Manager B1 to Store Manager B12 
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5.2.4.1  Store Managers  
 
Situated at management level 4, store managers are responsible for overseeing the 
day-to-day functioning of one store. Daily, store managers are required to: (1) play an 
active part in the community through, for example, charity work; (2) lead their store 
team to put customers’ needs first; (3) create a great place to work; (4) lead a highly 
effective store operation with excellent standards; and (5) manage costs and deliver 
profit (Internal Company Documents, Group 3). As will be shown in sub-section 
5.3.1, each of these five essential role functions map onto a quadrant of Grocer’s 
BSC—community, customer, people, operational, and financial. The catch-all job 
description (recited almost word-for-word by six store managers) is thus: “My direct 
role is to lead a team of senior managers, managers, and colleagues to deliver a great 
shopping trip at a cost to the business which still delivers a reasonable return” (Store 
Manager A8: 18-20). This aspect of the role necessitates a hands-on immersion in 
everyday decisions and actions. 
 Store managers are also required to contribute to the common good of the store 
and workgroup to which they belong. In this regard, broader responsibilities are 
threefold. First, store managers are required to translate pre-set workgroup and store-
specific strategies aimed at improving the business for customers into workable 
actions. Second, store managers are expected to participate in workgroup activities, 
such as designing training workshops or undertaking value-adding projects. Third, 
store managers are required to demonstrate values-led leadership (see sub-section 
5.1.4). The core leadership capabilities are collaboration, empathy, responsiveness, 
resilience, and innovation. In combination, then, “a store manager’s job is about three 
things: it’s about improving the business for customers, it’s about taking people with 
you, and it’s about living the values” (Store Director A: 1585-1587).    
 
5.2.4.2 Store Director  
 
At management level 3, store directors are responsible for guiding and monitoring the 
operation of up to a maximum of twenty-five stores within a geographically dispersed 
workgroup. First and foremost, the role entails setting a workgroup vision and strategy 
and then coaching and supporting store managers to translate that vision and strategy 
into workable actions. Store directors are also required to create store-specific 
114 
 
strategies that will align store managers with Grocer’s core purpose and/or exploit 
different store characteristics. To support this strategizing and quest for value-adding 
ideas, store directors are expected to have an appropriate network of internal and 
external professional contacts, and be able to detect ‘future talent’ for promotion. In 
this regard, the store director’s role is largely “defined as being more about the 
medium- and long-term strategy” (Store Director B: 492-493), than immersion in day-
to-day tasks. This differentiates the store director’s role from the role of a store 
manager.   
 The management of day-to-day tasks and performance issues is delegated to a 
number of group support managers. For the most part, each group support manager is 
assigned ownership of a particular BSC measure or BSC quadrant and given the 
responsibility of liaising on behalf of the store director with store managers (this point 
is elaborated below). In combination, then, “a director’s job is about setting the 
strategy and vision, it’s about being a connected leader, it’s about developing talent 
for the future, and it’s about delivering excellent results” (Store Director A: 1587-
1590). The quotation below indicates that the success of a store director as judged by 
others is, however, determined solely on the basis of this latter criterion—that is, 
delivering excellent results.  
  
“My measures of success are a collection of my store managers’ measures of 
success…I’m seen as doing a great job if my store managers’ [BSC] all add 
up together to make a good [BSC] for me.” (Store Director A: 1602-1610)  
 
5.2.4.3 Group Support Managers 
 
As noted, the store director is supported by a number of group support managers. 
These include, for instance, the group loss manager, the group change coach, and the 
group online shopping manager. These positions are usually filled by experienced 
store managers who have consistently exceeded performance expectations 
(management level 4), but are occasionally offered to deputy store managers who have 
been ‘talent-spotted’ by the store director (management level 5). In other words, group 
support managers are responsible for overseeing the day-to-day performance of store 
managers who are situated at the same or a higher work level to themselves. The group 
support roles involve coaching and advising some or all of the store managers within 
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a workgroup on a particular aspect their BSC performance. Whilst the group support 
roles are described here to orient the reader, Grocer’s BSC is considered in detail in 
sub-section 5.3.1.   
 The group loss manager is associated with the financial quadrant of Grocer’s 
BSC. The group loss manager is responsible for reducing the monetary overspend 
across all stores in his/her workgroup on two financial performance measures—
unknown product losses and product wastage. The group change coach is assigned 
ownership of the customer quadrant of the BSC, and is responsible for changing the 
customer service ethos across all stores in his/her workgroup from functional 
(unemotional and machinelike) to experiential (emotional and personalised). The 
group online shopping manager is responsible for improving the results of one 
operational performance measure—product availability. Because not all stores have 
the capacity to fulfil online shopping orders, the group online shopping manager 
usually oversees the performance of stores in two workgroups. The group support 
team are also required to participate in workgroup activities and demonstrate values-
led leadership, as per the broader responsibilities of store managers.  
 Having outlined Grocer’s middle-management roles, sub-section 5.2.5 
considers the nature and rate of intra-organisational mobility, which was theorised as 
a potential contingency in Chapter 3. Sub-section 5.2.5 outlines the intended and 
actual enactment of organisational policies about intra-organisational mobility, as 
well as managers’ interpretations of these policies, as a precursor to understanding the 
extent to which intra-organisational mobility is implicated in the inter-temporal 
decision-making process.   
 
5.2.5 Intra-organisational Mobility  
 
There is a high degree of intra-organisational mobility within Grocer. The main types 
of intra-organisational mobility are internal-lateral and internal-upward mobility 
(Nicholson and West, 1988). Internal-lateral mobility takes the form of secondments 
and job rotation. Secondments are used to cover temporary projects, placements, 
maternity leave, and so on, and are intended to last for a maximum of eighteen months. 
However, in exceptional circumstances, the secondment can be extended. At the end 
of the secondment, the manager either returns to their original role or transfers to 
another role. Secondment opportunities are offered to managers who consistently 
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exceed performance expectations in their quarter-end reviews (for a description of the 
formal reward system, see sub-section 5.3.4.1). A secondment supports the manager’s 
professional development and is a prerequisite for internal-upward mobility.  
The group loss and group change coach roles outlined above are secondments. 
Because of deteriorating corporate performance, the group loss role was established 
as part of a project to reduce the £130 million overspend which had accrued across all 
formats on unknown product losses and product wastage. The two group loss 
managers interviewed have held the role since its inception in April 2014 (i.e., roughly 
seven months).59 The group change coach role was established as part of a project to 
enhance the customer shopping experience across all formats. Group change coach A 
has held the role since its inception in January 2013, while group change coach B has 
held the role for roughly seven months. For both the group loss and group change 
coach roles, there is uncertainty surrounding the length of the secondment. The 
following quotations capture this uncertainty:  
 
“My role is a secondment role. There is uncertainty around the future of the 
role.” (Group Change Coach A: 763-764) 
 
“The truth is we don’t know how long this role is going to last.” (Group 
Change Coach B: 1036-1037) 
 
“I don’t know how long this role will continue.” (Group Loss Manager A: 
778) 
 
At Grocer, secondments are also known as placements. Placements provide an 
opportunity for the manager to gain the essential skills and experiences for internal-
upward mobility. They are intended to last for a minimum of twelve weeks and 
involve repositioning the manager into a different workplace setting. For instance, 
aspiring store managers are moved to a different store to the one in which they 
currently work as a deputy store manager for their placement. If the placement is 
deemed to have gone well, the manager is promoted into the role sought; this is nearly 
always the case because a rigorous selection process precedes the placement. In this 
instance, it is conventional for the manager to stay in the placement setting for a 
                                                          
59 The interview with group loss manager B took place in October 2014 and the interview 
with group loss manager A took place in November 2014 (see Appendix 10.5).  
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minimum for eighteen months. The following quotation illustrates the intention 
underpinning this process.  
 
“I wouldn’t want a placement store manager going into a store to do a 
placement. Ideally, if I’m going to place a store manager in a placement then 
it will be because they are going to stay in that shop.” (Store Director A: 1875-
1877) 
 
But, this intention is not always explained to the manager at the start of the 
placement: “I didn’t know I was going to stay in the store is the first thing, so I thought 
it was a short-term thing” (Store Manager A6: 980-981). The inter-temporal decision-
making implications of the use of secondments by Grocer are discussed in sub-section 
6.1.3 and sub-section 7.2.4.  
There are often internal-lateral transfers of store managers among stores 
within and between workgroups. Lateral transfers afford store managers an 
opportunity to learn new skills, try something different, and avoid complacency. As 
one store manager remarks: “You do have a code life as a store manager in any store” 
(Store Manager B9: 1919-1920). Company policy dictates that store managers remain 
in one store for a minimum of eighteen months so that like-for-like comparisons of 
the manager’s performance can be made in the second year. It is upheld that more 
frequent lateral transfers will threaten to destabilise the day-to-day functioning of 
stores. The following quotation thus outlines the minimum, maximum, and optimum 
timescale for internal-lateral transfers.  
 
“For store managers, eighteen months is the minimum amount of time that 
you can do in a shop before you have a move. And, we wouldn’t really allow 
you to stay in a store for longer than five years. The optimum time for store 
managers is about two and a half to four years.” (Store Director A: 1840-
1843)  
 
However, the guidelines for internal-lateral transfers are not always adhered 
to: “The lifespan of being in a shop is about eighteen months, which I’ve never got to 
do” (Store Manager A2: 1419-1420). As implied in the preceding discussion, store 
managers have prior knowledge about internal-lateral transfers and so often anticipate 
a move (illustrated in the first quotation below). In fact, career discussions about 
internal-lateral transfers are occasionally initiated by the store manager during their 
formal performance evaluation meeting (illustrated in the second quotation below).   
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“I’m literally just coming up to being here for three years, which is quite a 
long time for a store manager to stay in situ. So, it’s normally around two 
years and then the bell of change can ring at any point and up and off we go 
then onto the next setting.” (Store Manager B6: 43-46) 
  
“I got appointed into [GroB store] but I’d already been in the shop for six or 
seven months. And, I was told right, you’ve got to do two years in your shop 
now. And, I was like, I don’t want to do two years…So, in my review, one of 
my reviews, I said: look, I need to move.” (Group Loss Manager B: 2244-
2251)60 
 
Internal-lateral transfers often support the store manager’s career progression. 
If the store manager is performing notably well, relative to their colleagues, they will 
likely be moved to a store with a higher band number within the workgroup. This 
helps the manager to expand their repertoire of skills and is coupled with the chance 
to develop a reputation for consistently exceeding performance expectations. If the 
manager consistently exceeds performance expectations in their quarter-end reviews, 
they will likely be moved up the format scale—for instance, from the GroB format to 
the GroA format. Of course, the reverse scenario can also prevail but with the added 
possibility of dismissal. The next section elaborates Grocer’s reward/penalty system. 
Store directors face similar trends in intra-organisational mobility. 
Organisational policies suggest that the optimum amount of time for a store director 
to oversee a particular workgroup is two and a half to four years; reasons are 
analogous to those outlined above. But, again, these promulgated timescales are not 
always adhered to. For example, GroA’s store director changes frequently—“it’s even 
something as silly as eight in five years” (Store Director A: 1804). The frequent 
movement (of either oneself or one’s superior) influences time horizons and the 
prevalence of inter-temporal trade-off decisions, which is discussed in sub-section 
6.1.3 and sub-section 7.2.4 respectively. Having described a number of relevant 
contextual factors, attention now turns to the formal and informal management control 
systems in place at Grocer.  
 
                                                          
60 In this quotation, group loss manager B is speaking retrospectively about his experience as 
a store manager.  
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5.3 Formal and Informal Management Controls and Their 
Interactions 
 
This section unpicks Grocer’s formal and informal management controls, as well as 
managers’ interpretations of these controls. Understanding the different signals sent 
by Grocer’s management controls, and how managers receive and interpret these, is a 
precursor to understanding the inter-temporal decision-making process. The section 
first describes Grocer’s performance measurement system, including its purpose, 
design, and mechanics, as a precursor to outlining the nature of the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism in Chapter 7. The extent to which 
the performance information is made publicly available is then considered.61 To set 
the scene for further exploring the extent of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism, the section also describes Grocer’s old and new formal 
performance evaluation system, informal performance evaluation system, and the 
present-day tensions between them. The section concludes by outlining the formal and 
informal performance-based incentive systems in place. Together, the section 
provides a descriptive overview of the performance measurement system, and how 
the performance information is disseminated and used to evaluate and reward 
managers.  
The first sub-section draws upon the analysis of internal company documents 
(document groups 6, 10 and 11; see Appendix 10.9), observed meetings (meeting 
numbers 1 to 10; see Appendix 10.8), and interview data (interview questions 9, 13 
and 13a with codes 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.14 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 
10.10).   
 
5.3.1 Performance Measurement System 
 
Grocer implemented what they describe as a BSC in the late 1990s, with the intent of 
making managers aware of the various dimensions of their role and to encourage a 
‘balanced’ performance. Grocer’s BSC has five quadrants—community, customer, 
people, operational, and financial. The quadrants comprise performance measures that 
                                                          
61 In this thesis, ‘publicly available’ denotes that the performance information is available for 
a manager’s colleagues to view within the organisation.   
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are quantitative in nature. Grocer’s philosophy is that, if managers look after 
customers (community and customer quadrants) and stores operate efficiently and 
effectively (people and operational quadrants), then sales and profits will grow 
(financial quadrant). Figure 5.2 shows an outline of Grocer’s BSC and the weighting 
of performance measures (i.e., 20 performance measures that are each weighted 5%).   
 
Figure 5.2: Grocer’s BSC 
 
 
Number of 
Performance 
Measures 
Individual 
Performance 
Measure 
Weighting 
Quadrant 
Weighting 
Financial 
Sales, payroll, expenses, 
product wastage, unknown 
product losses 
5 5% 25% 
Operational 
Audits, product availability, 
pricing errors, stock record 
accuracy 
4 5% 20% 
People 
Employee satisfaction, 
training, absence, right hours 
in the right place 
4 5% 20% 
Customer  
Customer satisfaction 
(quality of products, 
customer service, product 
availability), queue length, 
loyalty 
5 5% 25% 
Community 
Charity collection, customer 
knowledge about charity 
involvement 
2 5% 10% 
Total 20 5% 100% 
  
Beneath this frontage, however, lay many more performance measures that 
contribute to the achievement of a particular ‘surface-level’ BSC measure. For 
example, the financial performance measure of expenses is a composite of items 
including, but not limited to, the amount spent on carrier bags, staff uniforms, and 
quality refunds. Another example is audits, which are itemised into cash audits, price 
integrity audits, stock audits, and safe and legal audits. Thus: “The [BSC] may well 
have twenty items on it but, beneath that, there’s another forty items. So, what are we 
measuring then? The forty or the twenty?” (Store Manager A4: 2001-2003). Eight of 
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the thirty respondents explicitly emphasise that Grocer is measuring too many things. 
The consequence of this is discussed in sub-section 7.1.3.  
Grocer’s Head Office determines the target for each performance measure, 
which is subsequently cascaded to Grocer’s management to achieve. There is a red, 
amber, green, and blue target zone for each measure of performance.62 Targets set for 
some of the performance measures are store specific and influenced by store size, age, 
and past performance (e.g., sales and product wastage), whilst others are generic (e.g., 
customer and employee satisfaction). This target setting process is non-participative. 
Grocer’s Head Office reviews the sales target for each store at least twice a year, with 
revisions having a proportional effect on cost targets. That is, as illustrated by the 
quotation below, each of the cost targets (payroll, expenses, product wastage, and 
unknown product losses) are calculated as a percentage of the budgeted sales 
performance.  
 
“If, for instance, you’re missing your sales budget, then it will be lowered, 
which thus lowers your payroll, your waste, your [unknown product losses], 
and your expenses… So, they stay the same percentage of sales, but if the sales 
budget is lowered, then the cost line budgets become lower as well.” (Store 
Manager B8: 926-949)   
 
  Actual sales results are compared against the budget and, if the variance is 
greater than or equal to three percent, a volume rule linked to payroll is triggered. If 
the manager over/under achieves their sales budget in one week by three percent or 
more, his/her payroll budget will increase/decrease by the sales variance multiplied 
by 3.75% in the following week.63 This volume rule is coupled with the sanctioned 
practice of offsetting cost targets. That is, managers can compensate for an overspend 
on one cost target (e.g., unknown product losses) by underspending on another (e.g., 
payroll, expenses, and/or product wastage) to sustain an acceptable profit margin. This 
“robbing Peter to pay Paul” (Group Change Coach B: 548) practice is implemented 
at either store-level or workgroup-level. An illustrative quotation of store-level 
                                                          
62 Red represents significant underperformance, amber represents marginal 
underperformance, green represents performance that should be maintained, and blue 
represents significant over performance.  
63 For example, if the sales budget is £1,000,000 for one week, but actual results are 
£1,040,000 there is a £40,000 favourable variance. Because this variance is four percent of 
budgeted sales, the volume rule is triggered. Therefore, £1,500 (£40,000 x 3.75%) is added to 
the payroll budget in the following week.  
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offsetting is given below. Different offsetting scenarios can prevail, but payroll is 
usually sacrificed. Payroll budgets comprise a store’s aggregate contracted hours and 
an overtime allowance, thus overtime requests to cover holidays and absenteeism can 
simply be refused to achieve below-target performance. 
 
“So, let’s just say that my store wasn’t operating within the budgets that were 
decided for waste, and I kind of knew that in a set period I was going to 
overspend by a certain amount of money, then I might think actually just to 
balance it when I go into my review with my boss I’d say actually I’m 
overspending waste by x amount and therefore going to underspend on 
another cost line by x amount just to balance my books.” (Store Manager B6: 
194-200)  
 
 Ten of the managers are critical of this practice, noting that it may cause more 
harm than good because the relationship between most of the performance measures 
is characterised by interdependence (see below). It is of note that the practice of 
offsetting cost targets, as well as the volume rule outlined above, were phased out 
during the latter stages of this investigation.64 At the same time as this phasing out, 
each store’s payroll, product wastage, and unknown product losses budgets were 
increased. As indicated in the quotation below, prior to the budgetary increase, the 
targets for payroll, product wastage, and unknown product losses were deemed too 
tight.  
 
“I’d liken it to a noose, really. It was to the point where it was choking us. 
That’s how it was. So, there was no movement, there was no manoeuvre, there 
was no freedom. Silly decisions were being made because you were under that 
much pressure.” (Store Director B: 1114-1117)  
 
 For illustrative purposes, during the last quarter of 2014/15, store director A’s 
waste budget was increased by approximately £300,000 for the twelve-week period. 
This was broken down into weekly amounts to be apportioned between the eighteen 
stores in the workgroup. The average amount received per week by each GroA store 
was £1,400. But, in keeping with the target setting process outlined above, the amount 
of money actually allocated to each store was based on store size and past 
                                                          
64 The practice of offsetting cost targets was stopped in December 2014 (after seventeen 
interviews were conducted) and the volume rule was removed in February 2015 (after twenty-
four interviews were conducted).  
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performance. The larger stores and/or stores that were repeatedly underperforming on 
product wastage in the workgroup received an above-average allocation, and vice-
versa. The same allocation procedure was used for increases in the unknown product 
losses budget.  
 Regarding payroll, however, the budgetary increase allocated to each store 
within a workgroup was based upon the store’s productivity index (measured by sales 
per labour hour worked). It was noted in sub-section 5.1.5 that, as soon as Grocer’s 
sales started falling, senior management begun cutting payroll budgets. This was to 
such an extent that “we’d cut so much fat out of the business and we were now cutting 
into the bone” (Group Change Coach A: 1144-1145). Consequently, most stores had 
a productivity index that was deemed too high (see second quotation below). Stores 
that had the highest productivity index received a larger share of the total amount of 
money to be apportioned between stores in a workgroup (see first quotation below). 
  
“My store had four hundred hours put back in, which is a substantial amount. 
It equates to three and a half thousand pounds worth of payroll a week. So, 
effectively, I was running my store three and a half thousand pounds worth of 
payroll short every week.” (Store Manager B8: 344-347)  
 
“The productivity index of stores was around about one hundred and sixteen 
when I joined this group, as an average. A good operating PI for a store of 
this size, to run efficiently on, is about one hundred and three, one hundred 
and four. And so, we’ve ran our business between one hundred six and one 
hundred and sixteen for the last five or six years.” (Store Director A: 669-673) 
 
 The budgetary increases were intended to support Grocer’s core purpose and 
strategy, provide managers the freedom and opportunity to perform the various 
dimensions of their role, and encourage performance that was consistent with the 
original purpose of the BSC (see below). How (and if at all) the extra budgetary funds 
were utilised in store was, however, at the discretion of the particular manager.65  
Except for unknown product losses and employee satisfaction, which are 
monitored on a six-monthly basis, all BSC performance measure results are available 
daily or weekly.66 For instance, queue length (monitored via thermal imaging 
cameras) is measured every fifteen minutes and summed into morning, afternoon, and 
                                                          
65 This issue shall be returned to in sub-section 6.2.1.  
66 The anomalies are stores that consistently miss the unknown product losses target and are 
thus measured on a twelve-weekly basis. 
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evening figures each day. Sales and product wastage are similarly updated throughout 
the day to produce a day-end result. In this regard, Grocer increased the reporting 
frequency on some of the performance measures during the investigation. 
Specifically, prior to November 2014, customer satisfaction (with quality of products, 
customer service, and product availability) and customer knowledge about charity 
involvement were measured via a questionnaire survey administered to one hundred 
customers in store once a month. Because this was deemed to capture only a snapshot 
view of a store’s service quality and performance, the system was changed so that 
managers can “get live information every single day” (Store Manager A1: 1150). 
Thus, from November 2014 onwards, all customers can complete a satisfaction 
questionnaire via the internet or telephone. The feedback is immediately available for 
the manager to review.  
Many of the managers hold a positive view about the frequency of 
measurement, so much so that two managers suggest that employee satisfaction 
should be measured more frequently: “I think we should do it every three months” 
(Group Loss Manager B: 1672-1673). More frequent monitoring “maintains the focus 
on them” and provides “information that I can then discuss with the team” (Store 
Manager A9: 966-986). Reference is continually made to the performance measure 
results in the ‘Daily Meeting’ and ‘Process Meeting’ each day and then in the ‘Store 
Meeting’ and ‘Senior Meeting’ each week (see Appendix 10.9). The quotation below 
suggests that these discussions support performance and the cumulative nature of 
achievement at Grocer.  
 
“That’s almost daily that you keep those on the agenda and are measured 
daily, report into the [BSC] weekly…It’s just an escalation: it’s weekly, then 
four weekly, and then we have a formal review after every quarter.” (Store 
Manager A8: 159-162) 
 
As noted at the beginning of this sub-section, the intended purpose of the BSC 
is to encourage a balanced performance. At Grocer, as summarised in the quotation 
below, a balanced performance has two dimensions. The first dimension concerns a 
balanced view across performance measures so that no one performance measure is 
considered more important than the others. Supporting this notion is the equal 
weighting assigned to each of the BSC measures (see Figure 5.2). The second 
dimension concerns a balanced performance on each BSC measure. That is, above-
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target performance is to be scrutinised in a manner similar to below-target 
performance.  
 
“The [BSC] was introduced with a view that we should take a very balanced 
view. No one measure was more important than the other was the original 
brief. And, a blue light was as bad as a red light.” (Store Director A: 1152-
1155)  
 
 The motivation for advocating this balanced approach to performance is to 
protect against trade-offs that can occur due to the various interdependencies between 
the measures within and between each of the BSC quadrants. For instance, the 
quotation below shows that the relationship between queue length and customer 
satisfaction (service) is moderated by the amount of payroll. The quotation below also 
exemplifies that managers are aware of this relationship and the possibility of trade-
offs, which is discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
“Our target for [queue length] is seven point five fail. You can get up to about 
ten percent fail and the customers don’t recognise any material difference in 
the service. As soon as you get above ten percent, the customers start to feel 
that the service is less good. So, I suppose, there’s no point delivering a five 
percent [queue length] costing yourself one hundred thousand pound a year 
and you know realistically you can spend that sort of money quite easily on 
that overachievement, when there’s no real benefit for the customer.” (Store 
Manager A8: 136-143)  
 
 In this regard, nearly all BSC measures have a non-linear payoff relationship 
with payroll. For instance, overspending payroll can improve product availability as 
more employees are available for shelf-stacking, but to a point that does not generate 
enough extra sales to improve Grocer’s financial performance. But, at the same time, 
and as the quotation below notes, an above-target sales performance can temporarily 
compromise the customer and employee quadrants because cost budgets are only 
realigned twice a year and there is a delay of one week for the payroll volume to take 
effect. The removal of the volume rule is disadvantageous in this instance.   
 
“If I’ve got sales going through the till of one point five million and I’m 
budgeted for one point two, then very quickly my frontend service is going to 
go off-kilter, my absence will potentially go off-kilter because colleagues are 
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under stress and I need some more payroll hours.” (Store Director A: 1172-
1176) 
 
 There are also potential inverse relationships between some of the 
performance measures. For example, “[Unknown product losses] is a measure of 
what you lose, what’s not recorded. Waste is a measure of what’s recorded. If you 
don’t record your waste, it becomes [unknown product losses]” (Store Manager B5: 
1024-1025). Here, inaccurate recording can affect the automated re-ordering system 
and thus product availability and sales. This example is returned to in sub-section 
6.2.2, when short-termism is explored in detail. For the group support managers, who 
are held accountable for only certain performance measures, these interdependencies 
are challenging. The extent to which both dimensions to having a balanced 
performance are (sometimes strongly) dissuaded at Grocer is addressed, with 
reference to the third research question, in Section 7.1.  
As indicated, adhering to the controllability principle—only factors under the 
manager’s control should be considered when his/her performance is evaluated 
(Choudhury, 1986)—is not unproblematic at Grocer. Control typically falls between 
the two extremes of the continuum (i.e., full control or no control), insofar as nearly 
all of the managers interviewed acknowledged having only partial control over the 
achievement of several BSC performance measures. For instance, sales are affected 
by multiple uncontrollable economic (e.g., customer demand) and competitive (e.g., 
proximity to other stores) factors. The two quotations below illustrate this latter point 
can relate to proximity to other Grocer stores as well as non-Grocer stores.  
 
“Two big [GroA stores] have opened within a three mile radius of this store—
[GroA store] and [GroA store]. So, the store which used to take about one 
point one million now takes probably on average about six twenty.” (Store 
Manager A5: 59-61) 
 
“We have [Competitor A] at the end of the road, [Competitor B] at the end of 
the road. You know, we have all these things that have kind of come into play—
[Competitor C] at the end of the road. All those things will affect our sales. 
I’ve got [Competitor D] opening now week fourteen next year, which will 
affect our sales.” (Store Manager B4: 1476-1480) 
 
 Further examples of performance measures that are affected by occurrences 
partly outside of the manager’s control include: (1) internal and external theft 
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affecting unknown product losses; (2) late deliveries affecting product availability and 
customer satisfaction; and (3) the delivery of damaged products or spoiled food 
affecting product wastage. A degree of product wastage also stems from Head Office 
interventions. Specifically, as the quotation below states, the commercial teams at 
Grocer’s Head Office often require store managers to sell particular food and drink 
ranges that are inappropriate for some stores.   
 
“A lot of our wastage issues come from fresh foods, which is generated by the 
commercial directors, the commercial teams, trying new things to sell 
products and making us range things that we know won’t sell. So, a lot of 
waste is out of our control in terms of the pound note because we are given 
stuff—I don’t ask for stuff, I’m sent it.” (Store Manager B3: 1758-1763)  
 
 But, managers can take actions to try to counter the impact that these partially 
uncontrollable factors have on the performance measures. To use a simple example, 
when sales start to fall, a manager is expected to authorise local promotions and tailor 
their product range to render their store more appealing for shopping. Along these 
lines, managers are buffered only from factors for which they have no control.67 The 
archetypal example of this is above-target absence caused by long-term health 
problems. In this instance, a manager is only held accountable for sporadic 
absenteeism. Having outlined Grocer’s performance measurement system, sub-
section 5.3.2 considers the extent to which this performance information is made 
publicly available. Relative performance information was theorised to complicate the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism, which is explored in 
Section 7.2. The information presented below draws upon the analysis of internal 
company documents (document group 11; see Appendix 10.9) and interview data 
(interview question 14 with codes 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 
10.10).   
 
5.3.2 Relative Performance Information 
  
Grocer provides relative performance information to managers via league tables, 
which draw attention to the relevant domains for comparison and make salient the 
                                                          
67 Respecting the controllability principle in this strict sense occurred from the summer of 
2013 onwards (see sub-section 5.3.3).    
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individuals with whom to compare. The league tables that are prepared and 
electronically disseminated show the manager’s relative performance rank versus 
other managers within their workgroup on each of the financial and non-financial 
measures in the BSC. Information about the manager’s absolute performance on each 
of the financial and non-financial measures is also provided. The diffusion of relative 
performance information is, to some extent, public (i.e., the manager’s relative 
performance is known by that manager and all workgroup colleagues) as opposed to 
private (i.e., the manager’s relative performance is known only by that manager and 
their superior). The release of this information largely concurs with the frequency with 
which each of the BSC measures are assessed.   
 The league tables are used to emphasise performance differences between 
workgroup members. This fosters a competitive workgroup environment and primes 
differential thinking. It is often the case that managers compete for informal 
rewards—for example, performance pride and social recognition—by trying to 
outperform their workgroup colleagues on these mutually important performance 
dimensions. Of course, this is a double-edged sword; outperformed managers incur 
the penalty of “public humiliation” (Store Director A: 159). Consequently, topping 
the league tables provides only a temporary reprieve: “It was like, you know, we’re 
the top now. We can’t drop below the top” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 1720). 
These pleasant and unpleasant social experiences are exacerbated by the common 
practice of judging a workgroup member’s capability by their relative performance 
rank (see quotations below). This is due, in part, to the lack of shared information 
about how each manager’s financial and non-financial results are influenced by store 
characteristics and/or uncontrollable factors. The store director and his/her group 
support team are privy to such information.  
 
“When I first became a store manager, you judged a shop on its lights. Now, 
I don’t because you don’t know what’s happening within that shop unless 
you’re in it. So, doing a group role, and spending some time in each shop, you 
have empathy for why they’re offline.” (Group Change Coach B: 1251-1254)  
 
“I don’t think there’s one store manager on the group that doesn’t check 
everybody’s shop out because those green lights and red lights are still what 
we judge ourselves on.” (Group Loss Manager B: 677-679) 
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 The peer competition induced by the dissemination of relative performance 
information is believed to be motivational and have a positive impact on effort 
exerted, as suggested by the following two quotations. 
 
“There is a little bit of purposeful injection of competition there. Everybody 
wants to be number one. Nobody wants to be number sixteen, seventeen, or 
eighteen.” (Group Change Coach A: 927-929)  
 
“Sometimes you need it to give a bit of competition because if somebody’s 
really red, or just amber and nearly green, and they see that their mate down 
the road is better it gives them a bit of motivation to try a bit harder.” (Group 
Online Shopping Manager: 1508-1510)  
  
 Several managers note the informational benefits of relative performance 
information. For the store director and his/her group support team, the league tables 
help them to determine where to direct their attention. In the first instance, this 
involves identifying the store managers with weak relative performance (see second 
quotation below). Weak relative performance is synonymous with being in the lower 
quartile of a particular league table. Managers positioned in the lower quartile receive 
appropriate remedial support and/or are subject to the continual review of progress 
through regular and informal discussions (see first quotation below; see also sub-
section 5.3.3.3). The purpose of this is to cause performance to converge so that total 
workgroup performance is on-target or above-target. Because of raising the 
workgroup’s average performance, the store director and his/her group support team 
will, in turn, improve their absolute and relative performance.  
 
“If you were in that bottom quartile, you’d be receiving more attention than if 
you were in the middle or at the top.” (Store Manager A10: 1774-1776) 
 
“I can show you a leader board now on service and it helps me certainly go: 
right, where is everyone at? How do you rank? How do you fair against the 
others?” (Store Director B: 422-424) 
 
   Store managers are provided with similar management control benefits. 
Relative performance information helps store managers decide how to direct their in-
store efforts. Weak relative performance on one or more financial and/or non-financial 
measure indicates the need for improvement in that area, even if absolute performance 
is on-target or above-target. Regarding below-target performance, the league tables 
130 
 
also highlight whether underperformance is a store-specific issue or a broader 
workgroup problem. Because of this, relative performance information forms the 
basis of discussions in management meetings. Reference is made to relative 
performance information in each of the management meetings observed (see 
Appendix 10.8 for the meetings observed).  
 To a degree, all the managers interviewed use the relative performance 
information for self-evaluation purposes. The information is used by the manager as 
an external benchmark against which to evaluate their abilities and performance. This 
is consistent with the social psychology literature, which suggests that the underlying 
motive that drives individuals to socially compare with others is self-evaluation (see 
Festinger, 1954). It should be noted that the inclusion of relative performance 
information in the formal performance evaluation system (see sub-section 5.3.3.2) and 
its association with the formal reward/penalty system (see sub-section 5.3.4.1), 
substantiates the manager’s inclination to self-evaluate and perceive their abilities and 
performance as better (and not worse) than others. Some of the managers specifically 
compare themselves to a workgroup colleague who is performing better on a financial 
and/or non-financial BSC measure. As indicated in the quotation below, here the 
manager assimilates (‘that person could be me’) with an upward target to try to 
enhance their current performance. This behaviour is also consistent with the social 
psychology literature, which suggests that social comparisons can serve a self-
improvement function (see Wood, 1989; Collins, 1996).  
 
“You look at their [BSC] and you go: how have they only got one red light? 
So, you would go: I need to be better.” (Group Loss Manager B: 1830-1831) 
 
 Nine of the twenty-three store managers are explicitly critical of the 
dissemination of relative performance information. This is discussed in sub-section 
7.2.1 but, in essence, the league tables are seen to encourage uncooperative and 
impulsive behaviour that influences inter-temporal decision-making. In the next sub-
section, attention turns to Grocer’s performance evaluation systems.  
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5.3.3 Performance Evaluations 
 
Organisational policy of senior managers at Grocer dictates that superiors (store 
directors) conduct formal performance evaluations of their subordinates (store 
managers and group support managers) at the end of each quarter. Of late, the content 
of the formal performance evaluations has changed from a retrospective review, based 
solely on BSC performance, to a review that encompasses broader sources of 
information regarding the subordinate’s overall performance over the evaluation 
period and projections about future performance. But, as will be described below, 
reviews based solely on BSC performance have not entirely been dispelled. Informal 
reviews of a subordinate’s BSC performance still take place as and when the superior 
deems it necessary. It is of note that the mechanics of Grocer’s informal performance 
evaluation system often conflict with, rather than complement, the formalised system. 
Grocer’s old and new formal performance evaluation system, informal performance 
evaluation system, and the present-day tensions between them are described in the 
remainder of this sub-section. The inter-temporal decision-making implications of the 
performance evaluation systems in place are discussed in sub-section 7.2.2. The 
information presented in this sub-section draws upon the analysis of internal company 
documents (document groups 2, 3, and 5; see Appendix 10.9) and interview data 
(interview questions 15 and 15a with codes 2.16, 2.17, 2.18, and 2.20 used; see 
Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).   
 
5.3.3.1 Formal Performance Evaluations: Only BSC Measures  
 
Prior to the summer of 2013, the superior appraised the subordinate’s performance 
solely in relation to results-oriented information. The superior used the results-
oriented information as a device for undertaking a recriminatory post-mortem of the 
subordinate’s performance during the period in question. These formal discussions 
were supposed to be carried out at the end of each quarter but, due to resource 
constraints, normally occurred semi-annually. The subordinate was deemed to be 
performing below-target or above-target as per the red, amber, green, and blue target 
zone for each measure of performance (see sub-section 5.3.1). Discussions about 
below-target performance were often framed in an accusatory manner by the superior, 
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and the subordinate was not usually afforded an opportunity to provide explanatory 
performance-related information in defence of his/her underperformance. One 
subordinate metaphorically described it as: “It was all about either your [BSC] was 
right or not and that was reflective of how well you did your job regardless of 
whatever get out of jail free card you might have had within that [BSC]” (Store 
Manager B6: 1425-1427). Regarding below-target performance, the superior and 
subordinate would jointly discuss possible remedial actions for the subordinate to 
pursue during the forthcoming three- to six-month period. Above-target performance 
was congratulated and accepted at face value. These points are illustrated in the 
quotations below.  
 
“We’ve always been previously: There’s your [BSC]. Why are you red on 
that? Well done for that. You know, it was always around the [BSC].” (Store 
Manager B2: 1955-1957)  
 
“All reviews used to be based on the [BSC]. So, you’d come and meet your 
store director with your [BSC] and you’d go around the [BSC] and he’d write, 
I don’t know, how well you’re doing, pick out some good stuff, pick out some 
bad stuff, some next steps to go away and do and that would be your review.” 
(Group Loss Manager B: 621-625) 
 
The mechanics of this system were that the ‘traffic lights’ mapped onto a four-
point scale: a red scored one point, an amber scored two points, a green scored three 
points, and a blue scored four points. The points that the subordinate accumulated for 
each performance measure within a BSC quadrant were totalled to give an overall 
quadrant score and associated ‘traffic light’ colour. The score for each of the five 
quadrants were then appropriately weighted (see Figure 5.2) to give the subordinate’s 
total BSC score and ‘traffic light’ colour for the period in question. As implied by the 
following quotations, this total BSC performance was the sole basis upon which the 
subordinate was appraised.  
  
“You already knew what you were coming out with before you went in 
regardless of what you felt about it.” (Store Manager B6: 1881-1882) 
 
“You’d come in, ten minutes, if you’re a green [BSC], no problem, you had a 
ten-minute chat with him about your [BSC] and you’d go away with a green 
light.” (Group Change Coach B: 1794-1796)  
 
133 
 
 Several respondents note the consequence of this performance evaluation 
system: “The [BSC] just became everything, achieving the measures became 
everything” (Store Manager A11: 1079-1080). Because neither store characteristics 
nor uncontrollable factors were considered as reasons for above-target or below-target 
performance, evaluation-based inequities also prevailed. These consequences and 
concerns led to the view that the organisation should take a broader perspective on 
evaluating subordinate’s performance. That is, senior management acknowledged that 
qualitative issues, such as leadership skills and personal development, which were not 
entirely amenable to quantification, were equally as important to Grocer’s longevity. 
Consequently, the ‘Only BSC Measures’ performance evaluation system was 
supplanted by ‘Inspirational Performers’.  
 
5.3.3.2 Formal Performance Evaluations: Inspirational 
Performers   
 
In the summer of 2013, Grocer introduced an evaluative process termed ‘Inspirational 
Performers’ with the aim of “inspiring each and every one of us to play our part and 
to make what matters better, together” (Internal Company Documents, Group 2).68 
Inspirational Performers entails a five-stage framework, which is designed to cohere 
with Grocer’s core purpose and help the particular subordinate enact their part in 
driving the business forward. The framework is organised around three introspective 
stages which, in turn, link to an outcome stage and then a developmental stage. The 
introspective stages include: (1) the ‘why?’ stage, wherein the subordinate is required 
to understand the role that they play in delivering Grocer’s core purpose and strategy; 
(2) the ‘what?’ stage, wherein the subordinate is required to be familiar with the 
various performance dimensions and expectations associated with the role that they 
hold within Grocer; and (3) the ‘how?’ stage, wherein the subordinate is required to 
understand and utilise the appropriate leadership and/or operational skills to meet 
those performance expectations. When the particular subordinate understands ‘why’ 
they are performing a specific task or making a specific decision, ‘what’ they need to 
achieve, and ‘how’ they can achieve the best results, the fourth performance stage of 
                                                          
68 Whilst ‘Inspirational Performers’ is a pseudonym, it is in keeping with Grocer’s intended 
theme.   
134 
 
‘measurement success’ is believed to follow. The final stage of Inspirational 
Performers is termed ‘grow’, wherein the subordinate outlines what they need to do 
to keep learning and improving both personally and professionally.   
 Superimposing the performance evaluation system with this five-stage 
framework means that the agenda for the appraisal of subordinates is reframed insofar 
as the superior focuses not only on what the subordinate has achieved during the 
period in question, but also how s/he has achieved it. As store director B notes: “It 
explores more about how you go about your job, why you do what you do, rather than 
just a set of numbers” (Store Director B: 1221-1223). In this regard, a subordinate’s 
BSC performance is now judged alongside their ability to implement business plans, 
maintain store standards, and demonstrate values-led leadership.  
 Subordinates are provided with an eighteen-page ‘Inspirational Performers: 
Performance and Development Pack’ at the beginning of each financial year and are 
required to prepare a retrospective narrative on ‘what’ they have achieved, ‘how’ they 
have utilised the appropriate leadership and/or operational skills to achieve those 
results, and any performance ‘concerns’ experienced during the period in question. 
Company policy prescribes that the ‘what’ (elements of performance that can be 
quantified) and the ‘how’ (elements of performance that are not entirely amenable to 
quantification) should be assigned equal weighting. By assigning an equal weight, 
Grocer aims to rectify the performance-based inequities (see first quotation below) 
and counterproductive behaviour (see second quotation below) associated with the 
‘Only BSC Measures’ performance evaluation system.  
 
“What I think that they recognised is some stores are harder than others and 
actually it’s easier to achieve a green [BSC] in some stores than others. And 
so, the whole point of the pack is to prove, well, what are you bringing to the 
party? So, you’ve got to prove why you’re doing a good job.” (Store Manager 
B9: 1459-1463) 
 
“It gives you the opportunity to talk now at your review, to say, look, I know 
my [queue length] figure is not green on the [BSC] but we’ve moved from X 
to Y to Z, and this is the prediction moving forward into the new financial year 
and it’s sustainable. It’s not an ‘I’ve thrown three thousand pounds a week at 
it to fix the number’. So, we’ve got the opportunity to show the leadership 
element as well as the number.” (Group Change Coach A: 1438-1443) 
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 Based on this retrospective account, the subordinate is asked to ‘objectively 
conclude’ how they feel they have performed during the period and rate the level of 
their performance using a traffic-light system.69 By combining this account with 
information from all possible sources, the superior conducts a 360-degree appraisal of 
the subordinate’s overall performance during the period in question. The sources of 
information can include relative performance information, feedback from 
subordinates, colleagues, and managers, as well as feedback from external sources, 
such as customers. The superior rates the subordinate’s level of performance using the 
same traffic-light system. This rating, in turn, influences the rewards ‘earned’ or 
penalties ‘incurred’ by the subordinate, which is discussed in sub-section 5.3.4.  
The final part of Inspirational Performers requires the subordinate to prepare 
a prospective narrative that outlines clear objectives and appropriate action plans on 
each of the performance dimensions (i.e., BSC performance, business plans, store 
standards, and leadership skills) as well as personal goals. All retrospective 
performance ‘concerns’ are set as an objective to pursue. The subordinate has to 
delineate how they will go about achieving these objectives, estimate when the 
objectives will be achieved (usually within a nine-month period), and outline how 
they can confirm the objectives have been achieved. In conjunction with their 
superior, the subordinate also prepares a Personal Development Plan that specifies up 
to three issues that they want to work on that will allow them to move closer to 
realising their personal and professional objectives. Incidentally, this is at odds with 
the broader management literature that suggests that conflicts arise when the 
performance evaluation system is used both to evaluate and develop subordinates (see 
Murphy and Cleveland, 1995). As Redman and Wilkinson (2009: 179) note, 
“recording the past and influencing future performance is difficult to achieve in a 
single process.” This mirrors the inter-temporal tensions documented in sub-section 
7.2.2. 
As implied, the ‘Inspirational Performers: Performance and Development 
Pack’ is completed by the subordinate prior to the formal discussion. The discussion 
is to be, essentially, an open, honest, and meaningful conversation between the 
superior and subordinate about past performance and projections about future 
                                                          
69 Blue is exceptional performance, green is great performance, amber is an opportunity to 
improve performance, and red is performance that is a priority to address.  
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performance. Formal performance evaluations occur at the end of each quarter, but 
are supported by the continual review of progress through regular and informal 
evaluations. This is discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
5.3.3.3 Informal Performance Evaluations  
 
It was noted that reviews based solely on BSC performance have not entirely been 
dispelled at Grocer. Informal reviews of a subordinate’s BSC performance still take 
place as and when the superior deems it necessary (sometimes daily). As suggested in 
the following two quotations, more often than not, these reviews occur only when 
there is below-target performance and/or weak relative performance. It is of note that 
elements of the subordinate’s performance that are not entirely amenable to 
quantification, such as leadership skills and personal development, do not form part 
of this informal review. The interaction takes place through face-to-face meetings, 
telephone conversations, and/or email messages.  
 
“You wouldn’t want to be on a report of not delivering something for more 
than two or three weeks. You’d want to get yourself into a position where 
you’re delivering—whether that be one of the twenty measures basically—
because otherwise you’d get reminders, you’d get prods and pokes, and you’d 
get questioned.” (Store Manager B2: 151-156)  
 
“Most of the calls you get aren’t to pat you on the back and say: you know 
what [Store Manager B9], I just want to congratulate you on what a fantastic 
job you’re doing with your charity collections which are blue for the year and, 
by the way, why have you overspent waste for the last four weeks and cost me 
whatever thousand? Very much the calls you get are all about: why is this off-
track? And most of the emails you get are: why are you struggling with this? 
What’s going wrong with that?” (Store Manager B9: 1411-1417) 
 
 Several respondents remark that this micromanagement is a form of 
“relentless harassment” (Store Manager A1: 800). The objective and content of these 
informal reviews is at odds with that promulgated in the Inspirational Performers pack 
(i.e., the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ are equally important). Thus: “I think there’s much 
more focus on the [BSC] even though it’s about inspiring performance…I know store 
managers will say ‘well, I don’t even get reviewed on my [BSC]’—yeah, they do 
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because [Store Director B] knows what their [BSC] looks like” (Group Loss Manager 
B: 1643-1646). Sub-section 5.3.4 considers Grocer’s reward/penalty system.  
 
5.3.4 Reward/Penalty System  
 
Regarding Grocer, the performance-based incentive system in place affords managers 
the opportunity to ‘earn’ a number of formal and informal rewards for meeting or 
exceeding performance expectations. The rewards available are of a monetary (e.g., 
salary increases and bonuses) and non-monetary (e.g., recognition and job security) 
nature. The incentive system is also designed to bestow negative rewards for 
underperformance, hereafter referred to as formal and informal penalties. Whilst the 
penalties can manifest themselves through an absence of monetary (e.g., not receiving 
salary increases and bonuses) and non-monetary (e.g., lack of autonomy, 
chastisement, loss of job) rewards, overt penalties include the public humiliation 
associated with underperforming relative to one’s colleagues. Grocer’s formal and 
informal reward/penalty systems are described in the remainder of this sub-section. 
The inter-temporal decision-making implications of the reward/penalty systems in 
place are discussed in sub-section 7.2.3. The information presented in this sub-section 
draws upon information from the public domain (annual reports) and the analysis of 
interview data (interview questions 16, 16a, and 16b with codes 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4 used; 
see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).   
 
5.3.4.1 Formal Reward/Penalty System 
  
The pay structure at Grocer closely reflects seniority. For instance, the base salary of 
level 4 managers ranges from £50,000 to £90,000 and the average salary of level 3 
managers exceeds £100,000 (2015 figures). Whilst this base salary is an entitlement, 
the annual cost-of-living adjustment is performance-based. As elucidated by the 
following quotation, the percent increase in salary awarded is based on the 
performance rating that the manager receives in his/her year-end evaluation. Note that 
the baseline cost-of-living adjustment is typically set at two percent of a manager’s 
salary. 
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“If you get a blue you get double the annual pay rise whatever the company 
decide to give. So, you know, if they give two percent and you’re blue you get 
four. Green, would be you get the company pay rise. Amber would be you get 
half the company pay rise and red would be you get no pay rise.” (Store 
Manager B2: 2128-2131) 
 
 At Grocer, annual bonuses have historically been a significant component of 
the remuneration package offered to middle-level management. With a monetary 
value equivalent to approximately forty percent of a manager’s base salary, the 
bonuses “became almost life changing” (Group Change Coach A: 1197). The bonuses 
were paid partly in cash and partly in shares deferred for three years and were based 
on the achievement of corporate targets. That is, whether the bonus was paid was 
contingent upon Grocer’s financial and non-financial performance over a one-year 
period. Specifically, three bonus scenarios could prevail: (1) no bonus pay-out due to 
below-target corporate performance; (2) fifty percent bonus pay-out due to on-target 
corporate performance; or (3) one-hundred percent bonus pay-out due to above-target 
corporate performance. Because of the deteriorating corporate performance, Grocer 
has paid modest or no performance-based bonuses for at least five years (as 
highlighted in the quotation below). Consequently, those who have been positioned 
at work level four for less than six years have seen no bonus payment since being in 
their role. The interviewee sample captures seventeen such managers.   
 
“The bonus scheme stayed the same for my first seven or eight years. And then, 
as company performance struggled they realised that actually the bonus 
scheme we were on was becoming meaningless because we were never ever 
achieving any targets to get a bonus...So, I don’t think we’ve had a bonus for 
three, four, maybe, yeah, five years I think was the last time we had a bonus.” 
(Store Manager B9: 1869-1882)  
 
The felt impact of this monetary loss was tapered for the seventeen newly 
appointed middle-level managers: “So, for me, I haven’t had it so I haven’t lost 
anything yet” (Store Manager A3: 1785). Nonetheless, in the absence of bonus 
payments, many of these middle-level managers were disengaged and aggrieved. This 
sentiment was even more apparent when the manager’s personal performance was on-
target or above-target: “I’ve always been a green performer and there should be some 
sort of recognition for that” (Store Manager B8: 116). To incentivise managers to 
deliver business goals, acknowledge individual contribution and performance, and 
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continue to attract and retain the ‘right sort’ of managers, Grocer changed the way in 
which bonuses were to be assigned towards the end of 2014. Bonuses are now 
awarded on the basis of personal performance and corporate performance so that “the 
company can still perform poorly but if you’ve done well you can still get a bonus” 
(Store Manager A4: 1842-1843). Grocer’s financial and non-financial performance 
makes up eighty percent of the maximum bonus available (i.e., forty percent of a 
manager’s base salary), with the remaining twenty percent being based on the 
performance rating that the manager receives in his/her year-end evaluation. The form 
of the bonus payment, the mechanics of the system, and the three bonus scenarios 
remain as outlined above. Whilst these points are discussed more fully in sub-section 
7.2.3, it is worth noting here that some managers considered the size of the likely 
bonus award to be inconsequential and/or the bonus award would be entirely revoked 
for 2014/15.70 This latter point is evidenced by the quotations below.  
 
“I’ve never had a bonus since I’ve been a store manager because it’s always 
been debunked and I’m guessing this year’s will be as well.” (Store Manager 
A7: 1423-1425) 
 
“It wouldn’t surprise me if there’s some way they say well actually we just 
haven’t made the money, you can’t have the bonus that you were entitled to.” 
(Store Manager B9: 1880-1882)   
 
Besides monetary rewards, Grocer offers several formal non-monetary 
rewards for meeting or exceeding performance expectations. One of the most valued 
non-monetary reward is the prospect of career progression (albeit normally also linked 
to a base salary increase). GroA store managers are viewed as the most successful 
level 4 managers, who have a proven legacy and reputation for excellent results. Many 
GroB store managers aspire to move to the GroA format, but this move is only 
possible if the manager consistently exceeds performance expectations in his/her 
quarter-end reviews. Besides this, level 4 managers who are performing notably well 
relative to their colleagues are also often moved to the ‘broken’ (see quotation below) 
and/or ‘complex’ stores or offered group team roles.  
 
                                                          
70 If Grocer has below-target performance and the manager has on-target performance the 
bonus payment to level 4 managers would range from £2,000 to £3,600 and the average bonus 
payment to level 3 managers would be £4,000.  
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“I can remember when I came here most of my [BSC] was red, which wasn’t 
a nice place to be obviously coming from the best [BSC] in the group to the 
worst [BSC]. But, I suppose, that was what I was put in here for—you know, 
because I’d proved I could do it in my last store for two years.” (Store 
Manager A3: 361-364) 
 
These sideway career moves are seen to support the manager’s professional 
development and are a prerequisite for promotion. Regarding penalties, a formal 
process termed ‘Supporting Your Performance’ (Internal Company Documents, 
Group 5) is triggered when there is underperformance at the quarter-end review. The 
three-stage process is designed to operate as follows: (1) within five days of the 
superior rating the subordinate as an amber or red, as per Inspirational Performers, a 
meeting will take place wherein remedial actions for the subordinate to pursue during 
the forthcoming four-week period are agreed. Progress against these agreed 
performance objectives are reviewed weekly; (2) after the four-week period, the 
subordinate’s performance is measured and evaluated again, as per Inspirational 
Performers. Here, subordinates rated green leave the process, subordinates rated 
amber repeat stage one of the process, and subordinates rated red are invited to a 
disciplinary hearing; and (3) after another four-week period, the amber subordinate’s 
performance is measured and evaluated for the final time, as per Inspirational 
Performers. The subordinate is either rated green with no further action taken or rated 
red and is invited to a disciplinary hearing. Demotions or dismissals are common 
outcomes of disciplinary cases.  
 At Grocer, the performance-based incentive system also affords managers the 
opportunity to earn informal rewards for meeting or exceeding performance 
expectations, as well as incur informal penalties for underperformance. The informal 
reward/penalty system is described below. 
 
5.3.4.2 Informal Reward/Penalty System  
 
Middle-level managers who meet or exceed performance expectations are afforded 
more autonomy. For example, these managers are able to carry out the various 
performance dimensions and expectations associated with their role in a manner that 
they deem appropriate, without intervention from their superior and his/her group 
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support team. This is most evident through the exclusion from ongoing and informal 
reviews of BSC performance, as highlighted in the following quotation: 
   
“Using [GroB store] as a really good example: they deliver their waste 
budget, they’ve delivered their [unknown product losses] budget. So, I will go 
to [GroB store] once every six weeks or so just to catch up with the store 
manager, have a walk of their shop and, you know, say well done and get out 
of there really.” (Group Loss Manager B: 167-171)  
 
 As indicated in the above quotation, middle-level managers are praised for 
good performance. Providing praise and recognition to colleagues or subordinates 
coheres with Grocer’s ethos: “Take time to acknowledge and celebrate success when 
you see it—genuine appreciation and noticing achievement is the simplest way to 
motivate” (Internal Company Documents, Group 3). Acknowledging exceptional 
performance can range from a spontaneous and private ‘well done’ up to a publicised 
certificate presented to the manager at a workgroup or format meeting. Here relative 
performance information is tightly coupled to positive (and negative) social 
recognition. The following quotation suggests that the dissemination of this 
information means that managers with above-target performance earn so-called 
‘bragging rights’, while managers with below-target performance incur public 
humiliation.  
 
“Everybody sees this red, or green, or blue, or whatever it is, a colourful 
[BSC]. And, if you’re green and blue, you’re amazing. If you’re red, then 
everybody sees that you’re a poor performing manager.” (Group Online 
Shopping Manager: 1452-1455)   
 
In this event (as will be discussed in sub-section 7.2.1 and sub-section 7.2.3), 
managers consider social recognition and condemnation to be as important as the 
formal rewards and penalties in inducing and directing their inter-temporal efforts.      
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Chapter 5 focused on describing the particularities of Grocer’s context, including 
unpicking the purpose, design, and mechanics of the management controls in place 
and managers’ interpretations of these controls. First, the chapter described the 
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background of the case organisation and outlined the organisation’s businesses, 
strategic priorities, and financial performance observed during the research. An 
overview of the organisation’s hierarchical structure, decentralised control 
architecture, and policies on intra-organisational mobility then followed. To complete 
this orientation phase, a description of the organisation’s performance measurement 
system, performance evaluation systems, and reward/penalty systems was provided. 
The chapter thus proffered contextual information and an underpinning analysis 
which will inform the subsequent answering of the research questions.  
The next two chapters build upon this evidence by presenting and discussing 
the findings with reference to the study’s four research questions. Chapter 6 will 
consider managers’ time horizons (research question 1) and the nature of inter-
temporal decisions (research question 2). Chapter 7 will explain inter-temporal 
decisions that sacrifice the long term for the short term with reference to underlying 
mechanisms (research questions 3 and 4). 
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6 INTER-TEMPORAL DECISION-MAKING  
 
This study aims to answer four research questions. The first research question explores 
managers’ time horizons (and specifically what constitutes the short, medium, and 
long term and why, as a precursor to considering short-termism). The second research 
question considers the manifestation of inter-temporal decisions (to emplace short-
termism within the spectrum of inter-temporal decisions). The third research question 
aims to identify the linkages between an organisation’s performance measurement 
system and short-termist decisions. The fourth research question asks whether there 
are factors that complicate this relationship. In short, the research is concerned with 
the nature and extent of the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism. The purpose of the present chapter is to describe, analyse, and explain the 
research findings pertaining to the first and second research questions, namely:  
  
1. How do managers understand the short, medium, and long term? 
 
2. How do inter-temporal decisions manifest? 
 
In line with the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1, the present chapter 
thus investigates the nuances and possible complexities of managerial short-termism 
(box c in Figure 1.1). While much of the data utilised in this chapter are drawn from 
middle-level managers’ responses to interview questions, the quotations illustrate   
themes confirmed by observational field notes and company documentation, and so 
may be treated as exemplary. Empirical observations of managers’ time horizons are 
primarily derived from question two on the interview schedule (see Appendix 10.7), 
with codes 1.1 through to 1.6 used (see Appendix 10.10). Examples of inter-temporal 
decisions are gathered from questions three and ten on the interview schedule (see 
Appendix 10.7), with codes 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 used 
(see Appendix 10.10). Whilst some of these codes were predetermined because of the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2, others emerged progressively during data 
collection.71  
                                                          
71 An example of a deductive code used in this chapter is ‘gaming’ (code 2.9); whereas an 
example of an inductive code is ‘offsetting financial targets’ (code 2.8). 
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The findings in this chapter are presented in two sections that move from 
cognition (what managers think, as per research question one) in Section 6.1 to 
behaviour (what managers do, as per research question two) in Section 6.2. The 
research is thus able to traverse the cognitive-behavioural link to highlight the 
complexity of short-termism and what it means to engage in this behaviour. To 
conclude each section, the findings are discussed in relation to the published work that 
was reviewed in Chapter 2, particularly those cited in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section examines managers’ 
perceptions of their time horizons in relation to the context in which inter-temporal 
tasks are performed. This discussion is then taken further in the next section by 
exploring four types of inter-temporal decisions observed at Grocer (myopic, 
hypermetropic, short-termist, and long-termist). Attention is given to describing and 
problematizing the inter-temporal decision of sacrificing the long term for the short 
term. Through probing this inter-temporal decision, the chapter also begins to address 
the third and fourth research questions by moving from the observation of surface 
experiences to the mechanisms that govern those experiences. This forms the basis of 
further analysis in Chapter 7. The chapter closes by making general comments about 
the importance of this data and the identified decisions.    
 
6.1  Managers’ Perceptions of the Temporal Scale: Short, Medium, 
and Long Term 
 
This section explores managers’ perceptions of their time horizons in relation to the 
context in which inter-temporal tasks are performed. This is done by highlighting how 
and why the organisation’s operating environment (Brochet et al., 2015), internal 
architecture (Jaques, 1990), and management control practices (Becker and Messner, 
2013) shape managers’ understanding of time by shaping time horizons and inter-
temporal activities and responsibilities. The initial tripartite consideration corresponds 
with the issues detailed in Section 2.2 that may influence managers’ perceptions of 
the temporal scale. Establishing managers’ time horizons is the first stage of analysis 
because inter-temporal decisions imply that there is a time-based motive for 
management behaviour. Definitions of what constitute the temporal scale also 
influence the manifestation of inter-temporal decisions, as will be demonstrated in 
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Section 6.2. This section is divided into four parts. Different cuts of the temporal scale 
(short, medium, and long) are explored in the first three sub-sections below.72,73 The 
fourth presents an aggregate analysis as a conclusion to this section. Taken together, 
the section addresses the first research question: how do managers understand the 
short, medium, and long term? By demonstrating that the concepts of short, medium, 
and long term are empirically messy due to heterogeneous meanings, the present study 
calls into question the assumption that the short term is a standardised one-year period 
(see e.g., van der Stede, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010). This conclusion has 
implications for the conceptualisation and operationalisation of short-termism in the 
behavioural accounting literature.  
 
6.1.1  Short-term Time Horizons  
 
“The [BSC] tells you what you’ve got to deliver over a year but if you take 
payroll, for example, we get quarterly budgets on payroll. But, you can’t come 
up with a plan that says I’ll underspend my payroll in quarter one so that I 
can save a bit of money to put into quarter two. Every quarter gets chalked off 
and then you start afresh again…And, because we get reviewed quarterly, you 
are conscious on a daily basis as to what you’re doing well at, what’s not 
going so well, and what you need to do more with and what you need to focus 
on.” (Store Manager B9: 198-232) 
   
All middle-level managers interviewed conceive the short term as pertaining 
to three months (one quarter) or less. As stated by store manager B9 in the opening 
quotation, time is portioned into quarters due to the technicalities of the BSC and the 
three-monthly Inspirational Performers evaluations. At the broadest level, managers’ 
time horizons are thus shaped by the quarterly practices that relate to the annual 
reporting cycle. However, further cuts to this short-term horizon scale are revealed by 
examining the time span related to role-specific responsibilities and the frequency of 
performance measure monitoring. As per Table 6.1, sixteen managers conceive the 
short term as daily, eight managers conceive the short term as weekly, five managers 
conceive the short term as monthly, and one manager conceives the short term as 
                                                          
72 Participants’ thinking in terms of the short, medium, and long term is largely an interview 
artefact (see Appendix 10.7).  
73 Cuts of the temporal scale denote the point at which the short term is separated from the 
medium term and the medium term from the long term. For example, if the short term is 
annual and the long term is beyond three years then the medium term is one to three years.  
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quarterly. Despite this, there is little variation in managers’ descriptions of the type 
and purpose of the tasks that fall within the short term. This is, perhaps, because “the 
short term is about delivering something that has already been decided” (Store 
Director A: 108-109), which is the target for each performance measure. Table 6.1 
provides an overview of managers’ understanding about the short term, including 
different temporal reference points and illustrations of the inter-temporal tasks 
performed therein. Aspects of this table are discussed in detail below. 
 The previous chapter outlined that store managers are responsible for 
overseeing the day-to-day functioning of their store; this necessitates a hands-on 
immersion in everyday decisions and actions. For fourteen of the twenty-three store 
managers interviewed, performing this role function in and of itself shapes their 
temporal perception and helps to define their point of reference as daily. A typical 
comment is that the “short term is to just literally lead and manage the day-to-day 
activities within the store” (Store Manager B6: 67-68). Daily activities, such as 
delivering excellent store standards and performing timely store routines, are linked 
to the achievement of performance measures. Without exception, store managers’ 
short-term activities and responsibilities are related to ‘reviewing’ and/or ‘delivering’ 
BSC measures. As also outlined in the previous chapter, nearly all the BSC 
performance measure results are available daily or weekly. The quotations below 
indicate that the frequency with which the performance measures are monitored 
shapes the period over which short-term tasks are performed. For example, as store 
manager B11 explains, waste routines are carried out each day to ensure that the day-
end product wastage target is delivered. In this regard, as indicated in Table 6.1, a 
further eight store managers define their point of reference as weekly. In general, then, 
store managers’ understanding of the short term is disproportionately shaped by 
shorter reporting intervals for performance measures.  
 
“I don’t need to plan what service needs to look like in six months’ time 
because that’s something I need to be concentrating on daily and weekly. I 
don’t need to concentrate on what the standards in my shop are going to look 
like in six months’ time because that’s something I look at daily and weekly. I 
don’t need to concentrate on what waste will look like in six months’ time 
because I get reports daily and weekly.” (Store Manager A1: 643-648) 
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Table 6.1: Managers’ Understanding of the Short Term 
 
Temporal 
Reference Point 
Role Illustrative Quotes 
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Day 
14 Store 
Managers 
 
1 Group 
Support 
Manager 
 
1 Store 
Director 
“The [BSC] and technology drives daily challenge really. So, delivering [queue length] is critical every day. 
Trying to deliver [product availability] as painlessly as possible is critical every day as well.” (Store 
Manager A4: 277-279) 
 
“Short term is the day-to-day management of KPIs…Very [BSC] focused because everything is tracked 
and we tend to get a report that lets us know how a particular measure on the [BSC] is actually tracking on 
a daily basis.” (Store Manager A5: 272-277) 
 
“Maintaining the focus of the store around the customer shopping trip—delivering a great shopping trip to 
support a strong sales line within the right cost lines.” (Store Manager A8: 78-80) 
 
“I would be aware of the key performance indicators on a daily basis.” (Store Manager A10: 132-133) 
 
“Anything that goes wrong, really. So, any operational issues that come up with the stores which need 
fixing…For instance, if I had to get drivers from one store to another. So, you’ve only got a certain amount 
of drivers and they have to be assessed and that sort of thing. So, there’s only certain people who can take 
the vans out. So, if a store couldn’t get drivers, I’d have to get them from another store, get them into that 
area to take out the runs. If that didn’t happen, it would affect the delivery on time, it would affect the 
customer measure.” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 38-81)  
 
“To be on hand really for the store managers as somebody to go to, to inform, and to consult with over 
decisions they might or might not be confident to make. So, in the very short term, on a daily basis, I guess 
that’s what I’m there for. And, I have a structure of the team around me that helps me deal with that.” (Store 
Director B: 89-93) 
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Week 
8 Store 
Managers 
“Short term, I suppose, would be managing the business from week-to-week in terms of short-term 
priorities…Every week I’d review the store’s KPI performance. That’s then shared in a weekly [Store 
Meeting] with the line managers.” (Store Manager A6: 95-117) 
 
“To support my guys to deliver the company’s expectations around the customer shopping trip. So, some 
things are very measured, where we have a commitment to the customer around [queue length] and also we 
have some challenges around the amount of availability.” (Store Manager A11: 50-53) 
 
“My short-term tasks would be week-to-week…So, we’d discuss every day how we’re doing with waste 
this week, how we’re doing with [unknown product losses] this week, how we’re doing with [queue length] 
this week.” (Store Manager B5: 189-192) 
 
“I’d be looking at things like, how can we improve standards? How can we improve the offer that we give 
to the customer? When you look at it in that way, it’s customer experience. And, customer experience should 
always be short term because, if we’re delivering something for the customer, it should never be a long-
term task. Absolutely, reviewing the numbers…The numbers I would look at on a weekly basis.” (Store 
Manager B11: 225-238)  
 
Month 
1 Store 
Manager 
 
4 Group 
Support 
Managers 
“To deliver the company business plan. To ensure that we’re changing the culture in the shop in terms of 
the staff and how we work.” (Store Manager B7: 62-63) 
 
“Short-term goal is to ensure my support is out there and it’s available to everyone. That they are clear 
around what my vision is around what I believe service could be in [GroB].” (Group Change Coach B: 178-
180)  
 
“Coaching and building their awareness of lockdown and [unknown product losses] …So, the other side of 
it is waste. And again, short term is to reduce the amount of stuff that we’re having to reduce because it 
costs us money…So, the short-term stuff is probably four to six weeks.” (Group Loss Manager B: 67-98)  
 
Quarter 
1 Store 
Director 
“Probably the short-term delivery of numbers. The delivery of performance objectives. By short term, I’m 
talking probably up to sort of four to twelve weeks.” (Store Director A: 38-40) 
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“On a daily basis, I’d look at the routines that were underneath that. So, 
what’s causing it? What’s driving it? Are there issues with out-of-codes? Are 
there issues with damages?” (Store Manager B11: 244-246) 
  
Store manager B7 is the sole exception to the above observation. He refers to 
translating predetermined strategies into meaningful actions within a short-term 
planning horizon. Nearly all of the other store managers interviewed perform this role 
function over a longer period of time (see Table 6.2 and Table 6.3). The specific 
strategy discussed aims to change the everyday customer service ethos from 
functional (unemotional and machinelike) to experiential (emotional and 
personalised) in line with the advice given by GroB’s group change coach. This 
account may be related to the fact that store manager B7 “had probably one of the 
worst [BSCs] on the group” and “was probably on the verge of leaving [Grocer] 
because he couldn’t see the wood for the trees” (Group Change Coach B: 106-116). 
Consistent with Grocer’s performance philosophy, store manager B7’s short-term 
activities were aimed at improving the performance measures at the beginning of the 
causal chain (i.e., the customer quadrant; see Figure 5.2). At the time of the interview, 
customer satisfaction (with quality of products, customer service and product 
availability) was measured monthly. The frequency with which customer satisfaction 
targets were monitored appeared to provide guidance as to understanding time 
horizons.  
Store directors delegate the management of day-to-day tasks and performance 
issues to group support managers. Except for the group online shopping manager, all 
group support managers describe their short-term activities with reference to the 
performance measures that fall within their remit of responsibility. These roles 
involve coaching and advising a number of store managers on performance issues, 
rather than immersion in everyday store activities. This, coupled with the time-bound 
assignments associated with the group loss and group change coach roles, appears to 
lead these managers to view the short term as a period of one month or less. It was 
previously noted that the group loss and group change coach roles were temporary 
secondments designed to support Grocer’s strategy of restoring growth to the UK 
business through stricter cost control and improved customer service. Time-bound 
assignments are thus used to convey the sense of urgency around needing “to stop the 
rot” (Group Loss Manager A: 47-48) and wanting “to put the emotional service back 
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into [Grocer]” (Group Change Coach A: 207-208). Relatedly, “the retail business 
moves at such a pace” (Store Manager B6: 562) that time-bound assignments evolve 
to match the circumstances and conditions defined by the environment. 
 For the group online shopping manager, the short term consists of dealing with 
unforeseen events on a daily basis. This is because “it’s usually a disaster and I have 
to fix it” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 750-751). As indicated in Table 6.1, the 
archetypal examples are delivery driver shortages and system glitches. Whilst these 
unforeseen events influence the achievement of the assigned performance measure of 
product availability, the concern here is with superficially ‘fixing’ the problem.74 The 
group online shopping manager must successfully resolve these day-to-day issues 
otherwise online orders will be capped or cancelled by Grocer’s Head Office. This 
would likely have an immediate and detrimental impact on online customers and 
financial performance.75 Like the group online shopping manager, store managers also 
have to manage unforeseen day-to-day events. Examples include unexpected 
absenteeism creating gaps in schedule requirements, late deliveries impeding store 
routines, and power outages affecting perishable products. Effectively managing these 
events allows the manager to demonstrate the core leadership capability of 
responsiveness. However, these events sometimes prompt myopic decisions. 
Paradoxically, depending on the decision-making context, these events can also 
prompt long-termist decisions. Both situations will be illustrated in the next section. 
 At one level higher in the corporate hierarchy, store directors are situated 
external to in-store management and are judged on the workgroup’s average 
performance across all BSC measures. Table 6.1 and the following quotations indicate 
that, daily, store directors liaise with the group support managers to guide store 
managers’ decisions and informally evaluate those who have weak relative 
performance. 
 
“What will be highlighted is the bottom five on each group and what I would 
then do is pick up a daily conversation with the bottom five and say: How’s it 
                                                          
74 For ‘online’ stores, the operational performance measure of product availability is a 
composite of pure product availability in store, missing items, product quality, and late 
deliveries to customers. 
75 Between fifteen and thirty percent of a store’s sales per week originate from orders placed 
by online customers. If sales budgets are missed due to capped and/or cancelled online orders 
then each of the cost targets will be lowered. Also, prior to February 2015, the volume rule 
would be triggered (see, for full details, sub-section 5.3.1).  
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going? What’s your plan? How can I help? How can I support? How can I 
coach? How can I guide?” (Store Director A: 329-332)  
 
“Very short term, on a daily basis, would be to be on hand really for the store 
managers as somebody to go to, to inform, and to consult with over decisions 
they might or might not be confident to make. So, in the very short term, on a 
daily basis, I guess that’s what I’m there for. And, I have a structure of the 
team around me that helps me deal with that.” (Store Director B: 68-72) 
 
 Store directors’ short-term horizons can, however, cover a longer period of 
time. Specifically, cumulative results for the workgroup are compiled on a quarterly 
basis and this is seen as the relevant short-term reference point for GroA’s store 
director. To summarise this sub-section, the short term is perceived as one quarter or 
less with three temporal reference points therein (one day, one week, and one month) 
linked to role-specific responsibilities and the frequency of performance measure 
monitoring. As illustrated in Figure 6.1, there is a notable difference between store 
managers’, group support managers’ and store directors’ understanding of the short 
term. Specifically: (1) almost all the store managers interviewed understand the short 
term to be one week or less due to ‘reviewing’ and/or ‘delivering’ daily and weekly 
BSC measures; (2) all the group support managers interviewed understand the short 
term to be one month or less due to set monthly assignments; and (3) all the store 
directors interviewed understand the short term to be one quarter or less due to the 
three-monthly compilation of workgroup BSC results.  
  
Figure 6.1: Cuts of the Short-Term Horizon Scale as Defined by Role Holders 
 
 
Store Manager 
Group Support 
Manager 
Store Director Total 
Day 14 1 1 16 
Week 8 0 0 8 
Month 1 4 0 5 
Quarter 0 0 1 1 
Total 23 5 2 30 
 
Sub-section 6.1.2 now turns attention to managers’ understanding of the 
medium term.  
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6.1.2  Medium-term Time Horizons 
 
Fifteen of the thirty middle-level managers interviewed conceptualise and practice a 
medium-term horizon. In doing so, a further cut of the long-term temporal scale is 
made. The remaining fifteen interviewees understand the relevant reference points as 
pertaining only to the temporal categories of short term and long term.76 For those 
managers who conceptualise a medium term, the time period over which inter-
temporal activities and responsibilities are performed pertains to one year or less (but 
greater than their recounted short-term time horizon). However, nuances of the 
medium-term horizon scale are revealed by examining the frequency of performance 
measure monitoring and the timing and contents of Inspirational Performers. That is, 
as per Table 6.2, one manager conceives the medium term as monthly, eleven 
managers conceive the medium term as quarterly, two managers conceive the medium 
term as six monthly, and one manager conceives the medium term as yearly. Because 
of the type and purpose of the tasks that fall within this time period, the narratives 
associated with the BSC gradually begin to change from a preoccupation with 
‘reviewing’ and/or ‘delivering’ to ‘maintaining’ and/or ‘improving’. Table 6.2 
provides an overview of managers’ understanding about the medium term, including 
different temporal reference points and illustrations of the inter-temporal tasks 
performed therein. Aspects of this table are discussed in detail below.  
At the broadest level, Grocer’s performance measurement practices continue 
to shape middle-level managers’ understanding of their time horizons. The store 
manager activity of ‘reviewing’ and/or ‘delivering’ BSC measures prevails in this 
time period, albeit to a lesser extent than in the short term, because of the frequency 
with which certain measures of performance are monitored. Table 6.2 indicates that, 
for store manager B1, customer satisfaction (with quality of products, customer 
service, and product availability) and customer knowledge about charity involvement 
are seen as medium-term performance measures. As with store manager B7 (see 
previous sub-section), at the time of the interview these measures were 
operationalised via a questionnaire survey administered to one hundred customers in  
                                                          
76 These managers found the dividing line between the medium term and long term unclear. 
For example, when asked to differentiate between their medium- and long-term activities and 
responsibilities, a typical comment was that: “I think they’re a bit of the same thing to be 
honest” (Group Change Coach A: 134).  
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Table 6.2: Managers’ Understanding of the Medium Term
 Temporal 
Reference Point 
Role Illustrative Quotes 
M
E
D
IU
M
 T
E
R
M
 
Month 
1 Store 
Manager 
“A [customer satisfaction] plan, which we get measured on per period, which we work on and then it is 
more like a four week, like a mid-term, kind of plan.” (Store Manager B1: 138-140) 
  
Quarter 
7 Store 
Managers 
 
3 Group 
Support 
Managers 
 
1 Store 
Director 
“The [BSC] highlights where our opportunities are in the medium term.” (Store Manager A1: 475-476) 
 
“Once the period is out of the way we know what are we going to be working on this period? What are 
we going to celebrate? What are we going to work on for the next period or the next two periods?” (Store 
Manager A5: 332-334) 
 
“That we grow towards that eighty percent and how I help and support the focus shops to become green 
without allowing the superstars to slip into mediocre.” (Group Change Coach B: 190-192) 
 
“I would look more at the [BSC] then. So, it would be coaching, planning for things like Christmas, 
Easter, seasonal events, extra vans that might be coming in. So, I’ll have projects that come down from 
the Office.” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 106-109)  
 
“What are the themes in retail? What are the themes in [Grocer]? Whether it’s about new launches, such 
as the [project] we’ve launched this autumn, such as planning for Christmas or seasonal events.” (Store 
Director B: 99-101)  
 
Six Months 
2 Store 
Managers 
“Working on changing the culture, the behaviour, any operational issues you’ve got, any people issues 
you’ve got. You’d want to be able to change those within the six months.” (Store Manager B2: 99-102) 
 
Year 
1 Store 
Director 
“The more strategic delivery of those. So, how to land and sustain change through others so that my day-
to-day stuff and the short-term tasks become less and less. So, building capability.” (Store Director A: 
63-66)  
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store once a month. Even though the activities that are linked to the achievement of 
these performance measures are carried out daily, such as handling products with care, 
the targets could only be monitored monthly for control purposes. One explanation 
for the difference between store manager B7 and store manager B1 temporally 
positioning the work task content as short and medium term, respectively, is that 
customer satisfaction is store manager B7’s core reference point for improvement. 
The impact of changing the temporal dynamics of management control practices (i.e., 
shortening the measurement period for customer satisfaction and customer knowledge 
about charity involvement from monthly to daily) on managers’ perceptions of their 
time horizons will be explored in the discussion sub-section.  
The process of managers seemingly matching their time horizon to the timing 
of performance measurement practices is also evident for the measures of unknown 
product losses and employee satisfaction. As noted in sub-section 5.3.1, unknown 
product losses and employee satisfaction are monitored on a six-monthly basis. 
Because in-store meetings and discussions about achieving these targets concern only 
a six-month period, managers focus on decisions and actions that influence this time 
window. In this regard, two store managers approach these measures with a medium-
term horizon of six months (see Table 6.2). Whilst the remaining twenty-three store 
managers interviewed view unknown product losses and employee satisfaction as 
long-term measures of performance (see Table 6.3), this horizon scale is still semi-
annual. Illustrative quotations of this are given below.  
 
“My more medium to long term would be, you know, our [employee 
satisfaction] surveys to the year end and [unknown product losses] because 
we only measure [unknown product losses] twice-yearly.” (Store Manager B5: 
193-196) 
 
“And [employee satisfaction] because there’s sometimes a bit of a dash for 
the line when people are filling in the [employee satisfaction] and then 
suddenly the store manager is saying hello to everybody the day before. But, 
those are definitely long-term measures, things that are always on the 
backburner but you need to be aware of. What timescale is on these long-
term tasks? When the measure comes—so, every six months.” (Store Manager 
A4: 447-457)    
 
Particularly evident in the above quotations is the linguistic 
compartmentalisation of performance measures as longer term due to their monitoring 
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frequencies. Store manager A4’s reference to the ‘backburner’ is discussed in relation 
to the interplay between performance measures with different monitoring frequencies 
in sub-section 7.1.3.   
The medium term consists of ‘maintaining’ performance on each BSC 
measure. Striving to maintain BSC performance tangentially relates to Grocer’s 
external operating environment and the contents of Inspirational Performers. The 
Inspirational Performers evaluative process entails judging a manager’s BSC 
performance alongside, among other things, their ability to implement business plans. 
Business plans outline the activities that the manager should perform to prepare for 
new technology initiatives (e.g., applications linked to relevant local charities to 
distribute surplus food from stores), seasonal events (e.g., Christmas) and price and 
promotion changes (e.g., different multi-buy offers). The business plan links elements 
of Grocer’s annual strategy (e.g., to be a responsible corporate citizen) and the present-
day conditions defined by its operating environment (e.g., public pressure to reduce 
unsold food waste) to all levels of the corporate hierarchy. Business plans are 
disseminated quarterly and specify the managerial activities that should be carried out 
in each of the three months. The excerpt below is taken from the business plan for 
November 2014, which outlines the seasonal activities to be performed.    
 
“Period 8 Core Activities: (1) prepare the [online shopping] departments for 
the festive season; (2) implement the stock reduction plan to minimise stock 
holding before Christmas; (3) implement the Q3 severe weather preparation 
plan to keep our carparks and walkways safe and accessible for customers 
and colleagues.” (Internal Company Documents, Group 5) 
 
 Eight of the fifteen managers who conceptualise a medium term consider that 
business plan activities, such as those outlined above, sit most comfortably within a 
time horizon of one quarter (see also Table 6.3 where store manager A10 views this 
as a long-term task that is performed each quarter). Store managers are responsible 
for adapting and implementing the business plans while maintaining the same level of 
short-term BSC performance. Store directors attempt to ensure a degree of 
standardisation in the enactment of business plan activities across all stores in the 
workgroup.  
Eleven of the fifteen managers also see ‘improving’ BSC performance as a 
medium-term activity. This is due, in part, to the final part of the Inspirational 
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Performers evaluative process, which requires the manager to make sense of their past 
performance and prepare a narrative that outlines steps to improve their future BSC 
performance. The objectives set attend not only to below-target performance, but also 
to moving on-target performance to above-target performance. This is one example 
of not adhering to the balanced performance principle.77 Because the manager 
delineates how they will go about achieving these objectives, medium-term plans are 
devised. The following quotation, taken from an interview with store manager B3, 
exemplifies the narratives associated with ‘improving’.   
 
“Medium term is trying to build towards KPIs we’re off track on. So, waste is 
astray at the minute. It has been for quite some time. But, in terms of fixing 
that or putting processes in place to make that perform better, it’s not 
something you can do in a day. And, when I say medium term, it means we 
would put plans in place and then review them weekly, monthly, and so forth.” 
(Store Manager B3: 173-179) 
 
Whilst these plans can be implemented over a nine-month period, the four 
completed copies of the Inspirational Performers evaluation pack (Internal Company 
Documents, Group 3) and the illustrative quotes in Table 6.2 indicate that managers 
prefer achieving the objectives within three months. In so doing, the manager is able 
to demonstrate an improvement by the next formal evaluation of performance. The 
exceptions to this are those objectives that concern unknown product losses and 
employee satisfaction, as the measurement point to confirm achievement is six-
monthly.78  
 Store director A’s medium-term horizon extends from one quarter to one year 
(see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). This cut of the temporal scale covers the longest period 
of time vis-à-vis the other fourteen middle-level managers who conceptualise and 
practice a medium term, including store director B. This is, perhaps, because store 
director A perceives the activities and responsibilities that fall within this time period 
to relate to the tactical building of store managers’ capability and spotting talent in 
order to more easily meet short-term performance requirements. 
                                                          
77 Recall that one aspect of this principle concerns a balanced performance on each BSC 
measure. That is, above-target performance is to be scrutinised in a manner similar to below-
target performance.  
78 But, as noted in sub-section 5.3.1, if a manager has previously missed the unknown product 
losses target the measure is monitored on a twelve-weekly basis. 
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To summarise this sub-section, the medium term is perceived as one year or 
less (but greater than the manager’s recounted short-term time horizon) with three 
temporal reference points therein (six months, three months, and one month) linked 
to the frequency of performance measure monitoring and the timing and content of 
Inspirational Performers. As illustrated in Figure 6.2, most managers who 
conceptualise and practice a medium term understand the time period to be three-
monthly due to the quarterly process of ‘maintaining’ and/or ‘improving’ BSC 
measures. Grocer’s performance measurement practices, however, continue to add 
nuance by shaping one-monthly or six-monthly medium-term horizons.  
 
Figure 6.2: Cuts of the Medium-Term Horizon Scale as Defined by Role Holders 
 
 
Store Manager 
Group 
Support 
Manager 
Store Director Total 
Month 1 0 0 1 
Quarter 7 3 1 11 
Six Months 2 0 0 2 
Year 0 0 1 1 
Total 10 3 2 15 
 
 In the next sub-section, managers’ understanding of the long term is 
considered. 
 
6.1.3 Long-term Time Horizons 
 
Twenty-seven of the thirty middle-level managers interviewed for this research 
conceive the long term as the maximum temporal reference point to which they can 
extrapolate into the future. The farthest these managers indicate that they can 
extrapolate into the future is four years. However, further cuts to this long-term 
horizon scale are revealed by examining the time span related to role-specific 
responsibilities and the rate of intra-organisational mobility. As per Table 6.3, five 
managers conceive the long term as quarterly, five managers conceive the long term 
as six monthly, five managers conceive the long term as yearly, and twelve managers 
conceive the long term as beyond one year. Interestingly, three managers are unable 
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to fully conceive the long term, and this is an issue that will be returned to later in this 
sub-section. There is greater variation in managers’ descriptions of the type and 
purpose of the tasks that fall within this time period. This is, perhaps, because in this 
time period “it’s up to me to decide what I want to do” (Store Manager B9: 299). 
Specifically, “everybody has a different long-term goal” (Store Manager B1: 1396), 
which often is “more about the vision or strategy for the shop” (Store Manager B7: 
107-108). Since each store has slightly different characteristics (see Table 5.2), each 
manager has to tailor the long-term vision or strategy to the requirements of the store. 
Table 6.3 provides an overview of managers’ understanding about the long term, 
including different temporal reference points and illustrations of the inter-temporal 
tasks performed therein. Aspects of this table are discussed in detail below. 
 For twenty of the twenty-three store managers interviewed, the long term 
involves focusing mainly or exclusively on store or workgroup strategies. Regarding 
the four lossmaking and one delivery restricted store in the sample, minimising the 
effects of these characteristics is the ongoing strategy. Table 6.3 and the quotations 
below indicate that store managers attempt to translate this store-specific strategy into 
workable actions and thus demonstrate the core leadership capability of innovation. 
 
“We look at other areas in the store, whether they can make a difference to 
the profitability plan. And, I’ll give you an example on that, our direct desk 
has just closed. We used to have a direct desk offer at the back of store. But, 
trading twenty to thirty percent down each year, manning levels about one 
hundred hours a week so you’re looking at best part of eight to nine hundred 
pound a week in payroll—an offer that doesn’t make any money. So, the idea 
I came up with was to have a collection point from front of store instead. So, 
I asked the business to remove the direct offer and replace it with transactional 
units instead.” (Store Manager A5: 360-369) 
 
“When I talked about grocery home shopping and the fact that we have a 
delivery restriction and I have a huge fifteen van operation, I made a decision 
to move the vans from leaving at quarter past eight in the morning to quarter 
to nine. So, it’s only thirty minutes. But, what it does is it stops people, 
customers sorry, ordering shopping at half past eight, quarter to nine, and it 
makes that slot, or those slots, unavailable. So, I had to make a decision about 
actually the welfare of the team, availability versus the financial output.” 
(Store Manager A6: 1058-1065)   
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Table 6.3: Managers’ Understanding of the Long Term 
 
Temporal 
Reference Point 
Role Illustrative Quotes 
L
O
N
G
 T
E
R
M
 
Quarter 
4 Store 
Managers 
 
1 Group Support 
Manager 
 
“Long term is the store strategy. It’s quite easy for me at the moment because the store strategy is 
profitability. So, every call we make is around making the branch more profitable.” (Store Manager A5: 
355-357) 
 
“Continuing the customer loyalty and the customer shopping trip and continually trying to improve that. 
Long term is around capability within my team.” (Store Manager A9: 262-264) 
 
“To deliver the business plan on behalf of [Grocer]. So, the business plan will have particular strategies 
involved that I’m responsible for delivering.” (Store Manager A10: 181-183) 
 
“Long-term task is just putting the routines in place. So, even if this job finished now in the beginning of 
week one, the foundations we have put in place they would continue into the New Year.” (Group Loss 
Manager A: 149-151)   
 
Six Months 
4 Store 
Managers 
 
1 Group Support 
Manager 
“Changing figures and culture. So, you can’t change culture overnight.” (Store Manager A3: 561-562)  
 
“Trying to challenge the delivery restriction with the residents, which is a bit more I suppose of a longer 
game.” (Store Manager A6: 561-562)  
 
“My longer-term goals are around the culture in the store…What I would be focusing on long term is 
that vision and that everyone knows where we’re trying to get to.” (Store Manager B8: 142-148)   
 
“Back to eighty percent [customer satisfaction] and having no focus shops which we’re getting very close 
to…I’d put six months to get us out of no focus shops.” (Group Change Coach B: 192-201)  
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Year 
3 Store 
Managers 
 
2 Group Support 
Managers 
“I see my longer-term responsibilities as coaching and developing managers to, you know, provide for 
other stores and provide for this store in the future.” (Store Manager A11: 142-144)  
 
“Long term is about where I’m going to be career wise in twelve months.” (Group Loss Manager B: 
1188-1189) 
 
“I’ll have a new dot com opening in a whole store in [GroA store] next year so that is a long-term plan. 
Then, planning for growth, planning for new managers.” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 158-160)   
 
Beyond One Year 
10 Store 
Managers 
 
2 Store 
Directors 
“For customers to come to us because they love coming to us, not that we’re just on the end of the road 
and it’s easy.” (Store Manager A2: 71-72) 
 
“I have a vision for the shop and I can’t create that vision to come alive in a day. It will take me two 
years to create that vision and that’s about making the shop profitable.” (Store Manager B1: 122-125)  
 
“It would be stability. You tend to stay in a shop for two years as a store manager. So, my goal would be 
when I leave, the store still delivers everything that it delivers now.” (Store Manager B2: 108-110)  
 
“Half of my time is strategizing and looking at, what does [Grocer] look like in the next ten years? And, 
what am I doing to ready the business for that?” (Store Director A: 86-87) 
 
“What is this store going to look like? How will it evolve? What do we know of the local economy? 
What do we know of, you know, the houses that are being built down the road here? What’s that going 
to shape? How’s that going to change the dynamic of the store?” (Store Director B: 453-456)   
 
Not Specific 
2 Store 
Managers 
 
1 Group Support 
Manager 
“I look at my senior team so are they likely to be around and if so how do I stretch them, grow them, get 
them to move onto the next level of the vision…I don’t know whether there’s a timescale on it. But, I 
suppose, it’s always beyond the next medium whatever that looks like.” (Store Manager B6: 534-572) 
 
“Continue to improve the shopping trip. So, to move all stores within [GroA] to excellent as a measure 
of service…There isn’t a timescale.” (Group Change Coach A: 196-227)  
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 A further eight store managers appear to focus mainly or exclusively on the 
workgroup strategy set by the store director that aligns the stores with Grocer’s core 
purpose, which was outlined sub-section 5.1.3. The strategy is “to create a store 
where customers love to shop and colleagues love to work” (Store Manager B11: 
391). Thus, “the vision, in essence, for the shop is quite loose” (Store Manager B10: 
1107) so that how it is actioned is able to be shaped by the store’s characteristics. But 
this vision has close parallels with the more idiosyncratic accounts outlined by seven 
store managers that intend to gain customer loyalty and/or improve workplace culture 
over a longer period of time. It is of note that three store managers perceive the inter-
temporal activities that fall within such a time period to relate solely to building the 
operational and leadership capability of departmental managers (management level 
six) and deputy store managers (management level five). When sufficiently realised, 
these lower-level managers will be accepted for internal training targeted at career 
progression. While this may be an interpretation of translating the workgroup strategy 
into action, the explicated reasons for this longer-term objective are threefold: (1) to 
support the longevity of the store and workgroup; (2) to achieve BSC targets (as per 
the first quotation below); and (3) to outperform other stores on this measurable 
dimension (as per the second quotation below).   
 
“If I can get more people interested in wanting to develop into bigger jobs, 
that brings a feel good and a change of attitude with it, which then, hopefully, 
addresses absence problems, improves my sales because they want to keep on 
showing that they’re doing a better job.” (Store Manager B9: 357-362)  
 
“Conversation with [Store Manager A11] after the [Daily Meeting 2]: [Store 
Manager A11] says that some store managers are fixated with KPIs and are 
driven by wanting to be at the top of a league table. [Store Manager A11] says 
that he prefers developing more colleagues than other store managers.” 
(Daily Meeting 2: 98-105) 
 
 Nearly all the store managers interviewed define the long term as a period of 
two years or less (but greater than their recounted short- or, if applicable, medium-
term time horizon). This is, perhaps, because Grocer stipulates that the intended store 
or workgroup strategy should be realised within two years: “We know you are 
committed to the [Grocer] core purpose; you help translate this into a 1–2 year vision 
for your store” (Internal Company Documents, Group 3). This maximum cut of the 
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horizon scale also corresponds with the guidelines for the rate of internal-lateral 
transfers between stores. In combination, the inter-temporal activities and 
responsibilities that fall within this time period largely relate to the functioning of the 
store that the manager is situated (rather than the broader workgroup or business) and 
so store manager foresight is bound by the length of time that they will remain in situ. 
As store manager A1, who has been in situ for eighteen months, notes, “I might not 
be in this store in six months’ time so I wouldn’t plan that far” (Store Manager A1: 
640-641).79 However, as indicated in Table 6.3, the frequency of performance 
measure monitoring and performance evaluation contributes to the overall temporal 
pattern for many of these managers. For instance, employee satisfaction scores are 
seen to signify the type of workplace culture created. Employee satisfaction is 
measured on a six-monthly basis, which is the point of reference for those concerned 
about the concept of workplace culture (as shown in the previous sub-section). 
Moreover, whilst the profitability plans for the lossmaking stores can take two years 
to realise (see Table 6.3), progress against objectives are monitored quarterly due to 
Inspirational Performers. This can create different temporal perceptions which are 
sometimes seen as too short to attain, as the following quotation reveals:  
 
 “There will be times when actually, I suppose, I will question certain things 
back around perhaps timescales on achieving a certain part of the profitability 
work.” (Store Manager A5: 673-675) 
 
 The suggestion that managers’ time horizons (and inter-temporal trade-off 
decisions, as will be shown in sub-section 7.2.4) are bound up with intra-
organisational mobility is possible because managers have prior knowledge about 
internal-lateral transfers and so often anticipate or even initiate the move. The group 
online shopping manager who oversees the performance of stores in two workgroups 
also fits this line of reasoning. The group online shopping manager’s long-term 
responsibilities include planning for the opening of new online stores and the growth 
of online grocery shopping through training and recruitment. However, the long term 
is “also looking for my replacement. So, if I want to go on, developing people to come 
into my role” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 161-163). Thus, given that “I need 
to go onto store manager, I’ve done this a bit too long” (Group Online Shopping 
                                                          
79 See Appendix 10.6 for the biographical profile of each interviewee.   
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Manager: 1023), the group online shopping manager’s time horizon is bound by the 
length of time that she expects to remain in her current role (one year).  
 The group loss and group change coach roles are secondments that are 
intended to last for a maximum of eighteen months. Particularly prominent is the 
uncertainty experienced by these managers as to whether and when they will return to 
their original role or transfer to another role. This, coupled with the fact that time-
bound placements evoke a feeling of “obviously we’re judged on results now” (Group 
Loss Manager A: 152), provides the context for these managers’ longer-term 
activities. As highlighted below, the recounted activities and responsibilities relate 
solely to raising the workgroup’s average performance on the relevant BSC measures 
by drawing on relative performance information.   
 
“The long-term strategy for our group in terms of [customer satisfaction] is 
that every store starts with a seven—so, seventy percent—which would give us 
a net of around seventy-five to eighty as a group. I have a few stores that are 
focus stores. There’s six stores that I spend a larger proportion of my time in. 
And, going back to the eighty-twenty really. If I can fix those six stores it will 
give me the nets that I need for the overall.” (Group Change Coach A: 528-
534)  
 
  The point of reference for three of the four group loss and group change coach 
managers interviewed is up to one year. These managers have been in their roles for 
seven months, as documented in Appendix 10.6, and so their time horizons appear 
bound by the probable period of time left on the secondment (i.e., eleven months). 
The exception to this observation will be discussed shortly.  
 Store directors set the store-specific and workgroup strategies and then coach 
and support store managers to translate the strategy into workable actions. As the 
quotations below suggest, to perform this inter-temporal activity, store directors 
examine current and future trends in the retail industry, regional economy, local 
housing market, and so on. These trends enable the store director to identify value-
adding opportunities and discern skill gaps. Because store directors are essentially 
“trying to wonder up what the future might look like” (Store Director A: 862), the 
long term is seen as a period of four years or less (but greater than one quarter for 
store director B and greater than one year for store director A; see Table 6.2). This is 
also the upper limit on the optimum amount of time for a store director to oversee a 
particular workgroup. The quotations below also suggest a future-based rationality, 
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which is discussed with reference to hypermetropic decisions in the next section.  
 
“It comes under looking at trends. So, trends within the sector we work in—
within retail. Looking at capability gaps in terms of either managerial skills 
or leadership skills. Looking at information technology and how that’s going 
to adapt and change. And then, looking at what will [Grocer] look like in ten 
years’ time? And then, filling the gaps in-between.” (Store Director A: 94-98) 
 
“Planning better use of our space, understanding the profitability of our 
business. And, if we need to make any changes to the business, to the store, to 
the way we’ve set it up, then you know repurposes, refreshes…So, you’ve got 
one hundred and five thousand square foot in this shop, is the future of retail 
going to require, or is the future of [Grocer] necessarily going to require, such 
a big shop anymore? And, if not, what do you do with the space?” (Store 
Director B: 107-120) 
  
It was noted at the start of this sub-section that three managers—two store 
managers and one group support manager—were unable to define the period over 
which long-term activities and responsibilities are performed. The quotation below 
suggests that Grocer’s present financial difficulties creates hesitance about the future. 
This, in turn, prompts some of the managers to focus on the short term, which is 
discussed later in sub-section 6.2.1.1.  
  
“We used to be really good at it. The long term? The long term. I don’t know 
whether anybody knows what’s really going on at the minute. It’s quite 
uncertain.” (Store Manager B6: 1247-1256)  
 
To summarise this sub-section, the long term is perceived as four years or less 
(but greater than the manager’s recounted short- or, if applicable, medium-term time 
horizon) with three temporal reference points therein (one year, six months, and three 
months) linked to role-specific responsibilities and the rate of intra-organisational 
mobility. As illustrated in Figure 6.3, most of the group support managers interviewed 
consider the long term to be annual due to the length of time left on their secondment. 
Most of the store managers and both of the store directors interviewed understand the 
long term as a period of up to four years due to the rate of internal-lateral transfers 
between stores and workgroups. For store managers, the frequency of performance 
measure monitoring (six-monthly) and performance evaluation (three-monthly) 
continues to contribute to the overall temporal pattern.  
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Figure 6.3: Cuts of the Long-Term Horizon Scale as Defined by Role Holders 
 
 
Store Manager 
Group 
Support 
Manager 
Store Director Total 
Quarter 4 1 0 5 
Six Months 4 1 0 5 
Year 3 2 0 5 
Four Years 10 0 2 12 
Not Specific 2 1 0 3 
Total 23 5 2 30 
 
 Sub-section 6.1.4 discusses the findings presented so far in relation to the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2, particularly Section 2.2.  
 
6.1.4  Discussion: The Short Term as a Standardised Period Not 
Exceeding One Year  
  
As noted in Section 2.2, short-termism studies are normally premised on the 
assumption that the short term is a standardised period not exceeding one year. A one-
year reference point is consistent with the annual budgeting process (van der Stede, 
2000). There is thus a loose assumption in existing literature that one specific temporal 
structure of an organisation’s performance measurement practice shapes managers’ 
short-term time horizons. Two notable exceptions to using one year to distinguish the 
short term from the medium or long term are the Abernethy et al. (2013) and Aguiar 
et al. (2014) studies. Abernethy et al. (2013) and Aguiar et al. (2014) itemise the short 
term to be quarterly, the medium term to be annual, and the long term to be beyond 
one year. These researchers state that this grouping of accounting periods is 
appropriate due to the context of their study. Nonetheless, presumed homogeneity in 
the meanings of time horizons remains.  
Section 2.2 suggested that managers’ time horizons may be differentially 
shaped by three factors: (1) the situation within which an organisation’s performance 
measurement system operates, such as the nature of the industry (see Brochet et al., 
2015), organisational strategy (see Chenhall and Moers, 2007), environmental 
uncertainty (see Chakhovich et al., 2010), and organisational performance (see van 
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der Stede, 2000); (2) the temporal structuring of an organisation’s management 
control practices (see Becker and Messner, 2013); and (3) an organisation’s internal 
architecture, such as the responsibility time span of managerial roles (see Jaques, 
1990). It was concluded that existing research on short-termism may overlook the 
prevalence of inter-temporal decisions because the studies do not tend to account for 
how and why an organisation’s operating environment, management control 
practices, and internal architecture may shape managers’ time horizons and inter-
temporal activities and responsibilities. The present study addressed this gap in the 
literature through formulating and answering the following research question: how do 
managers understand the short, medium, and long term?  
 The short term is defined by the middle-level managers interviewed as a period 
of one quarter or less, consistent with Abernethy et al. (2013) and Aguiar et al. (2014). 
This cut of the horizon scale is partly due to the frequency of performance measure 
monitoring at Grocer. In support of this finding, Becker and Messner (2013) propose 
that the provision of performance information, including when and how often, may 
affect the temporal horizons of managers. Definitions of what constitute the temporal 
scale are also influenced by role-specific responsibilities in that managers who are 
assigned performance tasks that take longer to complete possess an elongated short-
term horizon. For instance, store directors at Grocer possess an extended short-term 
horizon because they are exposed to lengthened performance measures, that is, 
cumulative results for the workgroup are compiled on a quarterly basis. This stands 
in contrast to the reference point for store managers who receive most performance 
measure results daily or weekly to oversee the functioning of their store. These 
findings align with Jaques’ (1990) argument that managers’ time horizons may be 
influenced by the responsibility time span of their role. In combination, managers’ 
short-term time horizons are shaped by timing that is accounting-driven and timing 
that is operationally-driven.  
 Grocer’s middle-level managers perceive the medium term as a period of one 
year or less (but greater than their short-term time horizon), which corresponds with 
the cut of the horizon scale used in the Abernethy et al. (2013) and Aguiar et al. (2014) 
studies. This reference point is due not only to the frequency of performance measure 
monitoring (i.e., monitoring unknown product losses and employee satisfaction on a 
six-monthly basis), but also to how, when, and how often performance is formally 
evaluated. The Inspirational Performers evaluative process promotes foresight to the 
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extent that middle-level managers engage in a temporal horizon that is concerned with 
the implementation of business plans and improving BSC performance. Nonetheless, 
the three-monthly temporal structure inherent in this process limits the foresight 
efforts of most of these managers. This supports the contention of Becker and Messner 
(2013: 145) that both the incentives and information provided by an organisation’s 
performance measurement and management control system may influence managers’ 
time horizons.  
 The long term is usually conceived as an orientation beyond one year, namely 
one to five years (e.g., Merchant, 1990; van der Stede, 2000; Abernethy et al., 2013). 
The inter-temporal activities performed within this time period are usually viewed as 
relating to innovation and learning (e.g., Merchant, 1990; Chow et al., 1996; 
Marginson and McAulay, 2008). At Grocer, middle-level managers view the long 
term as a period of four years or less (but greater than their short- or medium-term 
time horizon) because of role-specific responsibilities and the rate of intra-
organisational mobility. More specifically, half of the managers interviewed view the 
long term as a period of one year or less (but greater than their short- or medium-term 
time horizon), which differs from the usual point of reference used in existing 
accounting research on short-termism.  
Grocer promulgates guidelines for the length of time that store managers 
should remain in one store. Because store managers’ responsibilities involve 
translating pre-set workgroup and store-specific strategies aimed at improving the 
business for customers into workable in-store actions, their personal gain from 
successfully implementing these strategies is linked to the functioning of that store. 
In consequence, store managers’ long-term horizon is constrained by the rate of 
internal-lateral transfers between stores (usually every two years). The issue of intra-
organisational mobility constraining managers’ time horizons is one which also 
applies to group support managers and store directors. This line of reasoning is not 
dissimilar to research that finds a high rate of inter-organisational mobility limits 
managerial foresight (see e.g., Narayanan, 1985; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Eccles, 
1991; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2011). These researchers contend that a high rate 
of inter-organisational mobility uncouples the manager’s personal gain from the long-
term performance of the organisation in which they are currently employed. In other 
words, the manager will not benefit from the future profits associated with their past 
decisions (Mannix and Loewenstein, 1994).  
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 To summarise, managers understand the short term to be quarterly, the 
medium term as annual, and the long term to be up to four years. However, a holistic 
examination of what constitutes managers’ time horizons reveals overlaps between 
these three cuts of the temporal scale, and highlights nuances that the traditional 
measurement approach obscures. Existing measurement instruments may thus 
overlook managers’ propensity to take short-termist actions. Consequently, future 
studies employing survey-based methods may benefit from including the time 
horizons of managers in their analysis through clustering (Everitt et al., 2001). As will 
be discussed in sub-section 6.2.3, this may be important when analysing the 
associations between performance measures and different inter-temporal decisions. In 
answering the first research question, this study contributes to the behavioural 
accounting literature by highlighting how an organisation’s internal architecture (store 
characteristics, specific roles, and intra-organisational mobility) and management 
control practices (performance measure monitoring and performance evaluation 
process) influence managers’ understanding of their time horizons. In doing so, the 
study calls into question the assumption that the short term is a standardised one-year 
period (e.g., van der Stede, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010).  
Of note, the present study highlights how changing the temporal dynamics of 
performance measurement practices changes the time horizons of managers. That is, 
Grocer’s decision to shorten the period over which customer satisfaction and customer 
knowledge about charity involvement are monitored, focuses managers’ attention on 
shorter timeframes and changes where the related performance tasks are situated with 
respect to a temporal reference point. This is, perhaps, because “the more frequently 
you measure an area of your business, the more attention you’ll pay to it” (Store 
Manager A10: 1926-1927). The findings from Grocer suggest that increasing the 
frequency of performance measure monitoring shortens managers’ perceptions of the 
temporal scale because increased monitoring implies shorter time periods between 
measurements. This extends previous findings that highlight that evaluation period 
length is positively associated with managers’ time horizons (van Rinsum and 
Hartmann, 2007), as a result of not treating performance evaluation as a standalone 
activity that is detached from other aspects of managers’ work (see Jordan and 
Messner, 2012). The findings also extend research that tests the capital market 
pressure hypothesis (e.g., Bhojraj and Libby, 2005), by suggesting that more frequent 
internal monitoring of non-financial measures, in addition to financial measures, 
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causes managers to possess shorter time horizons. To conclude, the existing literature 
does not appreciate enough how closely time horizons are linked to the frequency of 
measurement. There is a widely-accepted management adage ‘what gets measured 
gets done’ but, based on this study, a supplementary, cautionary maxim can be 
offered: ‘what gets measured frequently may get done frequently’.  
This section has presented findings about managers’ perceptions of their time 
horizons in relation to the context in which inter-temporal tasks are performed, and 
has then discussed these findings with reference to the broader literature. The 
following section presents and discusses the findings that relate to the nature of inter-
temporal decisions and, in so doing, addresses the second research question. 
 
6.2  Spectrum of Inter-Temporal Decisions  
 
This section links managers’ understanding about their time horizons to their 
involvement in different inter-temporal decisions.80 Four types of inter-temporal 
decisions are observed at Grocer. These are: (1) focusing on the short term (myopia); 
(2) focusing on the long term (hypermetropia); (3) sacrificing the short term for the 
long term (long-termism); and (4) sacrificing the long term for the short term (short-
termism). By covering the inter-temporal decision-making spectrum, it is possible to 
empirically observe the properties and boundaries of short-termist behaviour through 
noting points of similarity and difference between the four inter-temporal decisions. 
By this means, consideration is given to how and to what effect inter-temporal 
decisions are made to capture the variety in the ways in which trade-offs manifest. 
Because of the nature of managerial roles, the examples encountered concern 
operational, rather than investing, inter-temporal decisions.  
The present section is divided into four parts. Inter-temporal decisions that 
involve focusing on a time period and sacrificing one time period for another are 
disentangled in the first two sub-sections below. The third sub-section aggregates 
these findings by using a decision tree approach to model the differences between 
myopic and short-termist decisions, and diagrammatically shows which middle-level 
managers provide a first-person account of participating in the inter-temporal 
                                                          
80 For the most part, the discussions hereafter assume that the long term subsumes the medium 
term, unless an interviewees’ account explicitly refers to medium-term activities and 
responsibilities. In doing so, the presentation of findings can be simplified.  
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decisions observed. The final sub-section presents an aggregate analysis as a 
conclusion to this section. Taken together, this section attends to the study’s second 
research question: how do inter-temporal decisions manifest? By emplacing short-
termism within the spectrum of inter-temporal decisions and empirically 
demonstrating the nuances of the behaviour, the present study calls into question the 
assumption that short-termism is a relatively uncomplicated/un-nuanced, if undesired 
behaviour (see e.g., Merchant, 1990; Abernethy et al., 2013). This conclusion has 
implications for the way in which short-termism is conceptualised and operationalised 
in the behavioural accounting literature.  
  
6.2.1  Focusing on a Time Period: Myopic and Hypermetropic 
Decisions  
 
Focusing on a time period can be conceptualised as either focusing on the short term 
(myopia) or focusing on the long term (hypermetropia). Because the long term is an 
aggregation of short terms (Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015), focusing on a specific 
time period need not necessarily entail an inter-temporal trade-off decision. This 
contention necessitates accordance between inter-temporal tasks. Accordance occurs 
when short-term tasks coincide with longer-term tasks, and vice versa. However, 
focusing on a specific time period may result in managers’ unintentional trade-off 
decisions when tension between inter-temporal tasks prevails. Examples of myopic 
and hypermetropic decisions are given below. 
 
6.2.1.1  Examples of Myopic Decisions   
 
For store managers, the inability to assess the long term occurs “because when you’re 
in the four walls sometimes it’s easy to not see something that’s fairly obvious” 
(Group Change Coach B: 573-574). This may help to explain why the group support 
roles involve coaching and advising some or all of the store managers within a 
workgroup on improving a particular aspect of their BSC performance (store 
managers’ medium-term activity) and the store director roles involve coaching and 
supporting store managers within a workgroup on translating the pre-set vision and 
strategy into workable actions (store managers’ long-term activity). At the same time, 
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“we became so programmed to chase that number that we lost sight of what really 
mattered” (Group Change Coach A: 494-495). In other words, if middle-level 
managers cannot recognise the various performance dimensions and expectations 
associated with the role that they hold, they may be unaware of the possible longer-
term implications of their short-term actions. Inspirational Performers intends to 
resolve this matter through its five-stage framework. Limitations of foresight also 
relate to Grocer’s financial instability. As the following quotation suggests, focusing 
on the short term reduces the felt ambiguity.  
 
“I feel more confident that I’m doing the right things with the team in the now. 
Whereas two years ago, I probably wouldn’t have felt like that because we 
weren’t in such a turbulent time as a business” (Store Manager B7: 692-695) 
 
Nonetheless, middle-level managers report that their short-term activities and 
responsibilities should coincide with their longer-term activities and responsibilities 
for reasons which are twofold. Firstly, six managers note that, “when you’re looking 
at your short term you are gaging that really long term” (Store Manager A2: 259-
260). This means that short-term BSC performance measure results provide guidance 
for setting store-specific and workgroup strategies. Secondly, middle-level managers 
state that the short-term ‘reviewing’ and/or ‘delivering’ of BSC measures indicate 
progress in realising these strategies. For example, store managers that have on-target 
daily and weekly performance on product availability and absence are likely to have 
realised the workgroup strategy of creating “a store where customers love to shop and 
colleagues love to work” (Store Manager B11: 391). Another example concerns the 
lossmaking stores, where regular underspending on the daily and weekly cost targets 
(payroll, expenses, and product wastage) helps realise the ongoing store-specific 
strategy of minimising the monetary loss. From this standpoint, focusing on the short 
term need not necessarily be detrimental to longer-term activities and responsibilities 
because managers’ short-term actions may extrapolate into optimal long-term 
performance. These decisions demonstrate a present-based rationality.  
 A short-term focus is occasionally necessary because “there are elements of 
the job that obviously we’re required to be reactive about” (Store Manager A6: 1147-
1149). As noted previously, store managers are required to demonstrate 
responsiveness to unexpected absenteeism creating gaps in schedule requirements, 
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late deliveries impeding store routines, and power outages affecting perishable 
products. Here store managers embrace an event-based orientation to “deal with that 
situation by dropping everything else and attending to it—like you would a fire” 
(Store Manager A10: 1169-1170). ‘Fire-fighting’ practices are suggestive of spur-of-
the-moment behaviour, enacted to immediately suppress the symptoms caused by an 
unexpected event. The unexpected event is a source of tension between inter-temporal 
tasks leading to trade-off decisions. However, at least prior to the enactment of the 
fight-fighting practices, managers sometimes do not evaluate the expected longer-
term consequences of their short-term actions. Limitations of foresight may thus result 
in managers’ unintentional trade-offs when there is tension between inter-temporal 
tasks.  
 In the following illustration, unexpected absenteeism in the online shopping 
department created gaps in daily schedule requirements. To prevent online orders 
being capped or cancelled by Grocer’s Head Office, store manager A10 enforced 
temporary inter-departmental movement to meet the staffing requirements of the 
online shopping department. However, store manager A10 did not consider this fire-
fighting practice within a wider operational framework, namely, the consequent 
understaffing in other departments which would impact upon the operation of those 
departments. When an unexpected event is deliberated within a wider operational 
framework, long-termist decisions can result (see sub-section 6.2.2). 
 
“There’d been a couple of sick calls on our home delivery department and the 
orders, which are online, spiked by twenty percent. So, all of a sudden, the 
resource that was planned in for that department was nowhere near enough. 
So, in order for me to get orders out to customers, I’m going to have to make 
some decisions and put other resource in the store which could be my 
department manager population and other people into that department to 
firefight something that’s come up as an issue.” (Store Manager A10: 1072-
1079)  
 
 As will be shown in sub-section 6.2.3, all the middle-level managers 
interviewed for this research offered a first-person account of focusing on the short 
term. The next sub-section describes hypermetropic decisions.  
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6.2.1.2  Examples of Hypermetropic Decisions   
 
Middle-level managers state that they are encouraged to address the long term because 
of the objective-setting process in Inspirational Performers and ‘Plan, Do, Review’ 
documents that help them to structure the way that they complete their inter-temporal 
activities and responsibilities (Internal Company Documents, Group 5). ‘Plan, Do, 
Review’ documents are intended solely for the personal use of managers, and relate 
to BSC performance problems that are to be resolved over a few weeks. Completing 
a ‘Plan, Do, Review’ ensures that the manager has the right plan in place, knows how 
to complete the plan, understands how they are performing against the plan, and 
captures results to continuously improve performance. Managerial foresight may also 
be facilitated by highly achievable performance targets. As highlighted in the 
following quotations, managers report that short-term BSC targets must first be 
achieved to allow them to feel liberated enough to consider their medium- to longer-
term activities and responsibilities.  
 
“I like the short-term things to be delivered because they stop becoming a 
distraction then so allows you time and your mind to be free enough to think 
about the long term.” (Store Manager A8: 725-727)   
 
“The biggest part of our job is KPIs. They would say capability, leadership, 
inspiring people, and culture would be our job. But, to do that, to have time 
for that, you’ve got to be stable around your KPIs.” (Store Manager B2: 162-
164) 
 
 Examples of hypermetropic decisions relate to changing target levels. Most 
store managers used their increased payroll budget to support the process of picking, 
packing, and dispatching online orders to try to grow sales and/or support checkout 
service to improve customer satisfaction targets and so gain customer loyalty.81 
However, Chapter 5 noted that how (and if at all) the extra budgetary funds were 
utilised in store was at the discretion of the particular manager. Regarding the four 
lossmaking stores in the sample, these store managers decided not to utilise all the 
extra budgetary funds to help realise the store-specific strategy. In other words, the 
future was first planned (e.g., minimise the monetary loss), and only then were present 
                                                          
81 Increases in payroll budget occurred during the last quarter of 2014/15. For information 
about the allocation process, see sub-section 5.3.1.  
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actions implemented (e.g., do not utilise all the extra budgetary funds). Consequently, 
focusing on the long term does not generate a loss of concentration on short-term 
results when there is accordance between inter-temporal tasks. The following 
quotation illustrates this future-based rationality.  
 
“The company has given investment to all stores because they want to improve 
the service offer. So, the money is there for me to spend, but the conversation 
I’ve had with [Store Director A] is it’s not my expectation to be spending my 
investment because that’s not going to help my profitability plan. So, we only 
spend the investment we’re required to spend. So, provided I still deliver the 
expectation from the business, which is best at busiest, we improve our evening 
[queue length] and availability on the shelf actually improves. As long as I 
achieve those numbers, I’m okay not spending all of my investment.” (Store 
Manager A5: 173-180) 
 
 Focusing on the long term can also lead to the informal changing of cost 
targets. It was previously noted that, because targets set for some of the performance 
measures are store specific and influenced by store age, stores that have been open for 
less than three years are set more achievable financial targets than the best-guess 
forecast to protect managers against unforeseen circumstances. It was also noted that 
this budgetary slack is gradually removed over the three-year period to a level that is 
consistent with a ‘tight, but attainable’ budgeting philosophy. As highlighted below, 
one store manager decided to gradually remove this slack before it was formally done 
by Grocer’s Head Office in order to prepare her store team for the tighter targets. 
Again, a future-based rationality is implied.  
 
“So, for me, by doing it with payroll, I was getting them into a position where 
they were going to end up being anyway. So, it made perfect sense to gradually 
ease that in and didn’t seem like such a shock then. In the second year, figures 
are cut etcetera your budgets are cut slightly.” (Store Manager B1: 303-307)  
 
 As will be shown in sub-section 6.2.3, twenty-five of the thirty middle-level 
managers interviewed for this research offered a first-person account of focusing on 
the long term. Sub-section 6.2.2 now turns attention to inter-temporal decisions that 
involve sacrificing a time period.  
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6.2.2  Sacrificing a Time Period: Short-termist and Long-termist 
Decisions 
  
Making a sacrifice denotes the knowing act of giving up something valued for the 
sake of something else regarded as more important. Therefore, sacrificing a time 
period involves making an intentional inter-temporal trade-off decision. At Grocer, 
two sacrificing inter-temporal trade-off scenarios prevail: (1) the short term is 
sacrificed for the longer term (long-termism); and (2) the longer term is sacrificed for 
the short term (short-termism). Sacrificing a time period implies that there is tension 
between inter-temporal tasks. Tension occurs when short-term tasks are at odds with 
longer-term tasks, or vice versa. Whilst exploring the sources of tension that explain 
short-termist decisions is the purpose of Chapter 7, the notion of tension permeates 
this sub-section. Decisions that involve sacrificing a time period are described and 
unpicked in the remainder of this sub-section. 
 
6.2.2.1  Examples of Long-termist Decisions   
 
Sacrificing the short term indicates that middle-level managers’ inter-temporal trade-
off decisions favour the longer term. Perhaps, “we might have to take a bit of pain 
where you see waste go up for that to get the right process, but then it should deliver 
going forward” (Group Loss Manager A: 173-174). Behaviour that focuses on the 
longer term to the detriment of the short term, or long-termism, thus manifests itself 
at Grocer through managers favouring actions that will improve longer-term 
effectiveness. Such actions are colloquially referred to as ‘fixing it forever’. At 
Grocer, managers are aware that these inter-temporal decisions are harmful to the 
short term but nonetheless still make the decision. As will be demonstrated shortly, 
these decisions evoke the notion of sacrificing the here and now. Four examples of 
this inter-temporal trade-off decision are provided below.   
Chapter 5 indicated that payroll budgets comprise a store’s aggregate 
contracted hours and an overtime allowance. Below, store manager B4 describes that 
a store’s contracted hours are calculated based on turnover from the lowest predicted 
sales week.  
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“I might be given three thousand hours that I’m allowed to contract based on 
the lowest predicted sales week. And, as a company, week forty-nine is the 
quietest week of the year for us. So, we base our payroll cost on week forty-
nine…I can flex up with overtime, temporary contracts. I can do what I want. 
But, what the business, and you can understand why, the business has got to 
think of a worst-case scenario week. What if every week was like week forty-
nine?” (Store Manager B4: 1321-1331)  
 
However, “because [Grocer’s] sales have been falling” (Store Manager A4: 
539) and store managers “took on too many people and didn’t finish them off” (Store 
Manager B4: 1333-1334) many GroA and GroB stores are deemed to be over 
contracted. In consequence, these stores have little or no overtime to cover holidays 
and absenteeism. Two store managers thus decided to reduce their store’s contracted 
base to not only improve profitability but also regain flexibility. An overtime 
allowance provides flexibility insofar as planned and sporadic absenteeism that 
creates gaps in schedule requirements can be managed (thus preventing the fire-
fighting practices outlined in the previous section). Of course, because payroll was 
calculated as a percentage of the downward revised sales budgets, the working hours 
lost through reducing the store’s contracted base was not entirely recovered in the 
overtime allowance. So, whilst the stores adapted to having a smaller workforce to 
perform the day-to-day activities that are linked to the achievement of performance 
measures, this decision was to the detriment of short-term BSC performance, as 
highlighted below.  
 
“We had too many hours and got rid of five hundred hours of temps and 
anybody who wanted to drop hours we let them. And, that did damage the store 
short term. We’re only now coming out of the other side of that. But, 
absolutely, the long-term benefit is that we’re in a better position going 
forward.” (Store Manager A4: 541-545)   
 
 Second, two store managers (one of whom is now a group support manager) 
decided to change the working pattern of employees’ contracted hours. The purpose 
of this was to improve the customer shopping experience and thus realise the long-
term workgroup strategy of gaining customer loyalty (see sub-section 6.1.3). Both 
managers enforced this contractual change shortly before the six-monthly 
measurement point for employee satisfaction. As revealed below, this linguistically 
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compartmentalised medium- to long-term performance measure captured a short-term 
morale problem and disruption to ongoing performance.  
 
“We just fundamentally changed our cashiers’ working week, which was quite 
emotive if I’m honest. If you think about the [BSC], we have never been a poor 
[employee satisfaction] store. When we did the piece of work that we did this 
year, we actually became a red store because it was hugely unpopular with 
about eighty or ninety of our colleagues what we had done with regards to 
their hours. But, we needed to do that to balance the customer experience from 
a service perspective.” (Store Manager A8: 249-255) 
 
“So, in [GroB store], hours in [GroB store] this time last year, and in quarter 
three, beginning of quarter four last year, before [employee satisfaction], I 
decided we were going to change peoples’ hours for the right business needs 
not just because I wanted to upset people. But, we enforced a bit of change on 
the checkouts which I knew would affect my [employee satisfaction] in 
January.” (Group Loss Manager B: 1682-1687)  
 
This temporary below-target performance may account for group loss 
manager B’s suggestion that employee satisfaction should be monitored more 
frequently (see sub-section 5.3.1), because “if I had reviewed them in three months’ 
time, I would have been in a much better place” (Group Loss Manager B: 1699-1700). 
As the following quotation reveals, with hindsight, group loss manager B regrets the 
timing of the above decision because it negatively affected his performance evaluation 
rating which, in turn, influenced the rewards earned. To some extent, store directors 
(superiors) are thus discouraging inter-temporal trade-off decisions that favour the 
longer term.  
 
“I wouldn’t change hours in December again. So, I missed out on a blue 
review this year, sorry, the end of the financial year last year, because my 
[employee satisfaction] was seventy-seven percent and it needed to be eighty. 
So, I’d already said to [Store Director B] in the December I’m going to upset 
a load of staff now which is going to impact my [employee satisfaction]. 
However, this is the business decision behind it blah, blah, blah. Okay, fine, 
no problem at all. I said but it’s going to affect, ‘yeah, no problem’. So, when 
it got to my review, and I said right ‘I’m a blue performer’, ‘ah, you’re not a 
blue performer because your [employee satisfaction] is seventy-seven 
percent’.” (Group Loss Manager B: 2121-2129)  
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 Third, to realise the store-specific strategy associated with the lossmaking 
stores and support the broader workgroup, one store manager chose to close his store’s 
optician service. In the longer term, this decision contributed to the broader goal of 
minimising the store’s loss whilst also supporting the profitability of another store’s 
opticians through the relocation of customers within the workgroup. However, 
removing the store’s destination service damaged short-term BSC measures, such as 
sales.  
 
“We’ve got an optician at the front of store that was in place when the store 
was taking its one point one million… [GroA store] is a non-profit optician, 
we are a non-profit optician. We’re looking at our business moving to [GroA 
store], including the personnel in this store. It would turn [GroA store] 
profitable. So, the business would see a definite gain. Short term, we’d take a 
hit at this store, obviously because our customers we’re asking now to travel 
a mile and a half further down the road. But, long term, it supports this branch 
and it supports the overall optician business because it turns another branch 
profitable.” (Store Manager A5: 576-586) 
 
 Fourth, and finally, the group online shopping manager must successfully 
manage unforeseen day-to-day incidents, such as delivery driver shortages, to prevent 
online orders being capped or cancelled by Grocer’s Head Office. As indicated in the 
following quotation, the group online shopping manager makes decisions with a view 
to securing long-term customer loyalty but to the detriment of short-term financial 
performance. The difference between the group online shopping manager’s and store 
manager A10’s decision (see sub-section 6.2.2.1), is that the group online shopping 
manager deliberates her decision within a wider operational framework of long-term 
plans. 
 
“I had to get some drivers from there to go and support which meant putting 
them up in a hotel. So, expenses wise, and money wise, completely 
unproductive and costly, especially with [GroA store] being a seasonal area, 
the hotels we had to put them up in were expensive and it was just not to cap 
and not to be on a list of you know you’ve had to cancel all these orders…At 
that time, it was right we need to just not disappoint the customers, not cap. 
So I did that and it was costly. But, the other part of it is it’s annoying because 
of expenses but actually we might have lost those customers if we didn’t.” 
(Group Online Shopping Manager: 555-571)  
 
179 
 
These examples illustrate that middle-level managers sometimes make 
decisions that involve a short-term sacrifice for expected longer-term betterment. The 
managers are aware that these inter-temporal decisions are harmful to short-term BSC 
results but still make the decision. As will be shown in sub-section 6.2.3, eight of the 
thirty middle-level managers interviewed for this research offered a first-person 
account of sacrificing the short term for the longer term. Inter-temporal decisions that 
involve sacrificing the long term for the short term (short-termism) are discussed 
below.  
 
6.2.2.2  Examples of Short-termist Decisions   
 
Sacrificing the longer term indicates that middle-level managers’ inter-temporal trade-
off decisions favour the short term. It is, essentially, “where you’re trying to get to 
that long-term goal but can’t get over the short-term fixes” (Group Loss Manager A: 
298-300) because “people in general are blinded by the fact they have to deliver a 
number to be successful” (Store Manager A6: 871-872). A preference for short-term 
actions that have detrimental consequences for the longer term, or short-termism, thus 
manifests itself at Grocer through managers making decisions that will deliver short-
term BSC performance measures. These decisions are metaphorically known as 
‘plastering over the cracks’. At Grocer, managers are aware and able to evaluate that 
these inter-temporal decisions are potentially harmful to the longer term but, 
nonetheless, they still make the decision. As will be demonstrated shortly, these 
decisions are organisationally suboptimal because they evoke the notion of sacrificing 
the future. Four examples of this inter-temporal trade-off decision are provided below.  
 The pursuit of short-term success can manifest through favouring predictable 
goal achievement. Several managers explain that striving to achieve short-term BSC 
performance measures can militate against medium- to longer-term capability 
building responsibilities (see Table 6.2 and Table 6.3). This is because informal 
reviews of a subordinate’s BSC performance lowers the level of autonomy given to 
that subordinate to make their own decisions. The quotations below illustrate this 
point.  
 
“Sometimes I give the answers ‘oh, we need to do this. What do you think?’ 
But, people aren’t thinking for themselves then, are they? So, they’re always 
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looking to you for the answer and actually we want people to be thinking for 
themselves.” (Group Loss Manager B: 1278-1281) 
 
“In order for me to be able to hit that number, I generate a conference call 
daily. Eighteen store managers and then that generates results because they’re 
on a daily conference call with myself and then that is starting to bring about 
change because they don’t want to be on a conference with myself to answer 
how they’re doing things. What I will then start to notice, yes it’s giving me 
results; however, I’ve created an environment where they’ll deliver results 
based on me asking them on a daily basis. So, therefore, a system and a tool 
that has been set up in the last probably eighteen years is conference calls, 
which now I know don’t deliver and sustain in the long term and medium 
term.” (Store Director A: 129-138)  
 
 Second, delivering short-term BSC performance measures can occasionally be 
at odds with the actions that are required to improve BSC performance in the medium 
term and gain customer loyalty in the long term. For instance, in order to achieve the 
short-term product wastage target (see Table 6.1), a number of store managers decided 
to “decimate” (Store Manager A9: 788) their store’s product range. These managers 
had quite a simple rationale: “the quickest way we can reduce waste is to get rid of 
the lines that we believe cost us waste” (Store Manager A8: 565-567). The 
consequence of this, however, appears to be detrimental to long-standing customer 
relationships and improving sales levels. For example:   
 
“Stores have been happy to get rid of range without thinking about the long 
term—those customers are going to go somewhere else.” (Store Manager A4: 
764-766) 
 
“Look at my range downstairs, there’s six lines of [Grocer’s highest-quality] 
sandwiches on sale. Some of the [GroA stores] wouldn’t stock that…If you’re 
a [Grocer’s highest-quality] customer and you spend one hundred and twenty, 
one hundred and thirty, forty pounds in a shop every week and you can’t buy 
a [Grocer’s highest-quality] sandwich you may want to go and shop 
somewhere else. So I could lose, for the sake of a couple of pounds worth of 
waste a day, a customer who could spend over a year, if it’s two hundred 
pound a week, ten thousand pounds.” (Store Manager B5: 70-83) 
 
 These and other managers explain that such actions are often necessary to 
create a façade of competence in the short term and thus protect their managerial 
positions in the longer term (this point is returned to in sub-section 7.2.3). One 
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manager likens this inter-temporal tension to that faced by “a political party” because 
“if you want to be around in the long term to add value and make a difference then 
you better win in the short term to allow that to happen” (Store Director A: 843-845). 
Another manager more prosaically describes it as “cutting a few corners to get a 
result” (Group Loss Manager B: 469). Interestingly, as illustrated below, this specific 
inter-temporal trade-off decision is influenced by a store’s characteristics.  
 
“My last store, I managed [GroA store], which is a bloody big old shop. It’s 
a big old shop, but with probably a third less turnover than us. Incredibly 
difficult to maintain your range because their range is probably twenty-five 
percent bigger than ours, their turnover is thirty percent less than ours and, 
although their waste budget would be in percentage terms more generous, 
incredibly difficult.” (Store Manager A8: 580-585)   
 
 Third, middle-level managers may “actually look at gaining some short-term 
relief from not delivering a particular measure by manipulating the figures” (Store 
Manager A10: 1663-1664). As one store manager remarks, “an awful lot of the 
numbers can be manipulated” but this behaviour “doesn’t contribute necessarily to 
customer loyalty or profit” (Store Manager A4: 1585-1594). Internal company 
documents corroborate the occurrence of gamesmanship at Grocer. A PowerPoint 
presentation designed by store manager A8, and titled “Is It Really Only about the 
Number?”, includes in-depth illustrations of gaming practices that occur within GroA 
(Internal Company Documents, Group 10).82 
 For example, it has been noted that customer satisfaction is operationalised 
through a questionnaire survey, which customers can complete via the internet or by 
telephone. However:  
 
“Almost everything within that can be influenced by the store if you choose to. 
So, in whatever way you choose to do it, you could fill the forms in yourself, 
you could put your colleagues under so much pressure that they do things 
themselves, which will deliver you a number but doesn’t actually fix the 
shopping trip...And, if you do that, the real loss is the fact that you don’t use 
the valuable data that the customers are giving you to fix your shop.” (Store 
Manager A8: 193-203) 
 
                                                          
82 The researcher was provided with a hardcopy of the PowerPoint presentation one month 
before the interview with store manager A8. This allowed the content of the presentation to 
be referenced and probed during the interview.  
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The above quotation reveals that short-term results are ‘delivered’ but to the 
detriment of maintaining or improving actual customer satisfaction. In fact, customer 
satisfaction and future sales may diminish because of this decision. Table 6.4 shows 
further examples of the gaming of individual BSC measures. Examples include: 
gaming queue length by logging onto a checkout, ensuring no operator then sits at that 
checkout, and finally scanning one lemon; gaming expenses through collecting 
customers’ products left at the checkouts at the end of each day and then stating they 
were returned by customers due to a fault to claim money back off suppliers; and 
gaming employee satisfaction by completing questionnaires intended for 
subordinates. Reasons for managers’ gamesmanship are explored in the next chapter. 
Another form of gaming occurs because of the various interdependencies 
between the measures within and between each of the BSC quadrants. That is, there 
are some inappropriate linkages between the BSC measures that do not lead to the 
desired ends (see sub-section 7.1.3). For instance, the inverse relationship between the 
measures of product wastage and unknown product losses can result in an inter-
temporal trade-off because the measures have temporally spaced outcomes (i.e., 
weekly versus six monthly).83 Inaccurate recording is thus indicative of favouring the 
short term (product wastage) to the detriment of the longer term (unknown product 
losses). Basically, “you might end up with a bit more [unknown product losses] but if 
you were a good [unknown product losses] store you might sort of think well actually 
I can afford it” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 1576-1578). So, even though 
“you’d always have one that would be adverse” (Store Manager A6: 425-426) it is 
possible that there would be “somebody saying ‘oh well, my [unknown product losses] 
is red, what the hell, let’s not record waste now because [unknown product losses] is 
red anyway not to have a red and another red light on waste’” (Store Manager B5: 
1636-1638). To some extent, this rationale is reinforced by the equal weighting of the 
BSC measures (see Figure 5.2).  
                                                          
83 That is, if products in store are inaccurately recorded as missing then product wastage will 
decrease and unknown product losses will increase.  
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Table 6.4: Gaming of Individual BSC Performance Measures 
BSC Quadrant 
Performance 
Measure 
Illustrative Quotes 
Financial 
Expenses 
“Say this is a packet of Ariel and it comes back and it doesn’t work or washing up liquid and it doesn’t bubble. So, you 
bring it back and you complete an RP125 and then we should then get money back from the supplier. So, like everything, 
we’re then targeted to deliver a certain number of those a day, a week rather. So, I’ve got forty a week I’ve got to do. I 
know that stores started just scanning the stuff that was left behind at the tills at the end of the night.” (Store Manager A4: 
1548-1554)  
 
Product Wastage 
“Not declaring waste because you’ve got a waste target to achieve, and if you declare the waste you won’t hit the target.” 
(Store Manager A10: 900-901) 
 
Unknown 
Product Losses 
“In the past, loss was created through choice of the store manager to count something. If I’m supposed to have two spoons 
and I know I’ve only got one spoon, it’s my decision to count that line and create that loss.” (Store Director A: 180-183)  
 
Operational 
Product 
Availability 
“If they didn’t have one pack of tomatoes they can make a barcode or keep a barcode of that, scan that, and give the 
customer a better product. So, then they wouldn’t complain because the product is better or bigger. Then, it wouldn’t 
show on the KPI.” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 1537-1544)  
 
Pricing Errors 
“If the cashier behind the desk didn’t process it as a pricing error and just gave the customer their money back and refunded 
the item then it wouldn’t go through as a pricing error; which means the customer doesn’t get double the difference back 
so doesn’t go away as happy.” (Store Manager B8: 1181-1184)  
 
Stock Record 
Accuracy 
“Every gap that you scan, has it got a book stock? And, if it has, you then clear it down. So, stores can get around that. 
So, you scan a gap with one PDA. Just say it’s got a stock record, you then clear it, and you then scan the gap so it’s a 
zero-stock record.” (Store Manager A4: 1506-1509)  
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People 
Employee 
Satisfaction 
“It’s done online on a tablet or a computer. You don’t have to register your employee number because it’s confidential. 
So, if you want to skew a figure you could just get somebody to whack in four hundred surveys.” (Store Manager A6: 
779-781) 
 
Absence 
“You could code the absence as not absence. So, we’re measured at about three and a half percent I think the target is, 
four percent as a group or something like that. And, you could code them differently. You could code them as not absence, 
not sick but unpaid leave anything like that and fix that number.” (Group Loss Manager B: 545-549) 
 
Customer 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
(with quality of 
products, 
customer 
service, product 
availability)  
“We’d hear that they were in and then I’d make sure that every single person on the checkout bank knew that the mystery 
shopper person was in so make sure that they were nice.” (Store Manager A4: 1329-1331) 
  
“The way you can manipulate it is based on cards being handed in. So, you could have a close knit of friends or people 
you know outside of work and just ask them to fill in the cards for you and then the more positive comments you get it 
improves your number.” (Store Manager A5: 1389-1393) 
 
“You can phone in yourself. I’ve also heard that they only give out cards on the quiet days when it’s a more stress-free 
shopping experience. If you get a good score, you then take all the cards away so that they don’t get handed out to 
customers.” (Store Manager B9: 1210-1213) 
 
Queue Length 
“You could have a till signed on and you’d actually scan one item. What they used to do was put a lemon through and it 
would show that you had another till open. There’s nobody at that till but somebody is signed on. [Queue length] number 
is based on number of tills open against the number of tills required to be open. So, if you signed on a till but there’s 
nobody parked up on it, it’s helping your [queue length].” (Store Manager A5: 1521-1527) 
 
“[Queue length] is a measure of people queueing at main bank checkouts. Let’s say you’ve got ten main bank checkouts 
and four express checkouts. Your express checkouts are for baskets, your main bank checkouts are for trolleys. You’ve 
got ten cashiers, you open up all your main bank checkouts so you’ve now got no basket checkouts open. Your customer 
aren’t being served properly because if I’ve got a basket I can’t go through an express checkout. But, you get exclude on 
[queue length]. So, your [queue length] doesn’t measure properly.” (Store Manager B5: 970-979)  
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Drawing on this weighting system is especially evident with a trade-off that 
occurs between payroll and multiple BSC measures such as, for example, queue 
length, product wastage, product availability, and unknown product losses. One store 
manager poses the following rhetorical question: “You can buy anything in life, can’t 
you?” (Store Manager A11: 1796-1797). Therefore: 
 
“You could absolutely blow your payroll which means you’ve spent money 
you haven’t got, to achieve other KPIs but all you’ll get is a five percent hit 
on your payroll number. Whereas, you might be delivering five other measures 
as a result of overspending your payroll.” (Store Manager A5: 1202-1205) 
 
Further illustrations of inter-temporal trade-off decisions that relate to the 
linkages between BSC measures are provided in Table 6.5. These include: product 
wastage versus other BSC measures; unknown product losses versus product 
availability; and product availability versus other BSC measures.  
Fourth, and finally, the sanctioned practice of offsetting cost targets (prior to 
December 2014) is another example of sacrificing the long term insofar as it may 
cause more harm than good because the relationship between most of the performance 
measures is characterised by interdependence. Recalling that payroll is usually 
sacrificed, this practice can damage the customer shopping experience and customer 
loyalty because “if you’re saving loads of money on your payroll, then are you giving 
customers the number of colleagues they need for either replenishment or availability 
and checkout service?” (Store Manager A8: 130-133). For this reason, five managers 
note that they would not willingly underspend payroll to compensate for an overspend 
on another cost target (i.e., expenses, product wastage, or unknown product losses). 
This is because:  
 
“It makes everything a lot harder further down the road. So, where you had 
one red light so you might have had waste as a red light all of a sudden 
[unknown product losses] becomes a red light because you can’t pay for 
people to do their jobs because your payroll is under pressure and then your 
expenses are under pressure because everything else is under pressure. So, all 
of a sudden then, you become red. So you have four red lights instead of one.” 
(Group Change Coach B: 548-554)  
 
 These examples illustrate that managers take actions to achieve short-term 
BSC performance measures that can sometimes harm their medium- to long-term   
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Table 6.5: Gaming of BSC Performance Measures through Interdependencies 
Performance 
Measure 
Influences Illustrative Quotes 
Payroll 
Other BSC 
Measures 
“For a quarter, I could overspend my payroll by fifty thousand. That fifty thousand could buy me a fresh food waste 
team, it could buy me more night crew to fill my fresh food to ensure that my waste number comes through, I could 
employ a security team to protect my [unknown product losses] and protect my products around the store. I could put 
more bums on seats at the frontend to ensure I’m always passing my [queue length] number. So, there’s a direct 
correlation. You could spend that money there and you could pretty up your shop so your store standards number is 
always good, when the boss comes in he always sees this really nice-looking store. But, you’ve spent money to deliver 
that that you haven’t got.” (Store Manager A5: 1215-1223) 
 
Product Wastage 
Other BSC 
Measures 
“You can make your waste look good by throwing it in the bin and not booking it. And then, on the back end of that, 
you won’t see [unknown product losses] for a couple of months.” (Store Manager A1: 1361-1363) 
 
“We’ve had examples in our group where a stores been held up as, this store is delivering a great number on waste, 
and you all need to go there and understand what they’re doing. And, three months later, we found that the store wasn’t 
recording stuff and throwing it down the compactor.” (Store Manager A8: 1393-1397) 
 
“You have a lot of focus on waste—‘waste is a big problem guys’. So, what you get is people don’t record waste and 
it has an effect on [unknown product losses], which means when you get your stock result, which is perhaps every 
twenty-six weeks, you’ll lose twenty thousand pounds or something. Your waste is okay, but now you’ve got a bigger 
problem. If you’re not recording your waste properly, your availability isn’t right because the system doesn’t know 
what’s here until it gets fixed by doing the right routines on waste and [unknown product losses]. If your availability 
is a problem, your customers can’t get what they want, which means sales is a problem, which might affect payroll 
because, if you’re not getting high enough sales, your payroll comes down because it’s worked on a percent.” (Store 
Manager B5: 394-406) 
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“We had twenty cases of bananas in yesterday. We sold ten and they’re only one-day life. So, where are the other ten 
cases? Have they thrown them without booking the waste? The system still thinks they’re there so will not reorder 
until we correct that stock record.” (Group Loss Manager A: 590-594) 
 
“It’s important that we are clear on what is waste and what is [unknown product losses] because if we were to not 
waste a product and [unknown product losses] it—what I mean by that is we tell the system we haven’t got it here so 
we’d lose that money as far as [unknown product losses] is concerned—the ordering system will just reorder the stock. 
If we tell the ordering system that it was out-of-code, or it was damaged, or it was reduced, then it will reduce the 
orders going forward. So, we will have less waste in future.” (Group Loss Manager B: 193-199) 
 
Unknown Product 
Losses 
Product 
Availability 
“But, there has been times when someone will know that stock is not in the building and say ‘oh, I can’t write that off 
because I haven’t got that [unknown product losses] money to be able to write that off’ and never mind about the fifty 
customers coming behind that we’re going to disappoint that day because that stock is not in the building.” (Store 
Manager A2: 1244-1248) 
 
“So, I would tell our system we’ve still got ten even though there’s only two. So, when those two have been sold the 
system thinks I’ve got eight and then it doesn’t reorder it.” (Store Manager A3: 706-708) 
 
“It’s got a big impact on the customer as well because if you’re not counting that product it might not be on the shelf 
for a number of weeks because of that.” (Store Manager B11: 1243-1245) 
 
Product Availability 
Other BSC 
Measures 
“If they didn’t have one pack of tomatoes they can make a barcode or keep a barcode of that, scan that, and give the 
customer a better product. So, then they wouldn’t complain because the product is better or bigger. So, they might 
give them a bigger size of the same product. Then, it wouldn’t show on the KPI. You would affect your [unknown 
product losses] because that’s then gone out of the business without recording it. So, they would affect a different 
measure but they could keep their availability green.” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 1537-1546) 
 
“You’re trying to fix availability, but by fixing availability you’re picking later because you’re looking for stuff which 
means you’re spending more of your payroll. Your vans are going out late because you’re picking too late and you 
haven’t got people loading them because you’re overspending payroll. Your pick rate has gone down, so you’re taking 
people who should be on the shop floor to fill it. It’s a big circle of bad.” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 1557-
1562) 
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responsibilities. The managers are aware that these inter-temporal decisions are 
potentially harmful to the medium and long term, but they still make the decision. The 
examples indicate that a considered approach may underlie managers’ inter-temporal 
trade-off decisions. As will be shown in the next sub-section, eleven of the thirty 
middle-level managers interviewed for this research offered a first-person account of 
sacrificing the longer term for the short term. Incidentally, it is worth noting that 
several middle-level managers openly condemn these inter-temporal trade-off 
decisions—“it’s taking us away from our colleagues and customers, which is where 
we should be spending the time, just to chase numbers which last thirty seconds and 
then they’re gone” (Store Manager A8: 1907-1910). However, it was explained that 
“working in [Grocer] is about chasing targets all the time” (Store Manager B9: 480-
481). Before discussing these findings with reference to the broader literature, sub-
section 6.2.3 aggregates the data by using a decision tree approach to model the 
differences between myopic and short-termist decisions, and diagrammatically shows 
which middle-level managers provide a first-person account of participating in the 
inter-temporal decisions observed. 
  
6.2.3  Comparing Inter-Temporal Decisions: Myopia, 
Hypermetropia, Short-termism and Long-termism 
 
Table 6.6 provides an overview and synthesis of the findings from sub-section 6.2.1 
and sub-section 6.2.2 that relate to the four inter-temporal decisions observed at 
Grocer. The table indicates that focusing on the short term (myopia) or the long term 
(hypermetropia) may not necessarily entail an organisationally suboptimal inter-
temporal trade-off if there is accordance between managers’ inter-temporal tasks. In 
contrast, sacrificing the long term (short-termism) or the short term (long-termism) 
implies that there is tension between managers’ inter-temporal tasks. The sources of 
tension that account for short-termism are outlined in Chapter 7. Table 6.6 highlights 
that, when focusing on a time period, if an inter-temporal trade-off occurs, it is 
unintentional insofar as managers are unaware of and/or unable to evaluate the 
expected longer-term consequences of their short-term actions. In contrast, sacrificing 
a time period involves managers making an unambiguous and intentional inter-
temporal trade-off. The various manifestations of inter-temporal decisions perhaps 
reflect the messy reality of organisational life.  
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Table 6.6: Overview of Inter-temporal Decisions  
 
 SPECTRUM OF INTER-TEMPORAL DECISIONS 
Inter-temporal 
decision 
Myopia Hypermetropia Short-termism Long-termism 
Relationship 
between short term 
and long term 
Accordance/ 
Conflict 
Accordance Conflict Conflict  
Occurrence of inter-
temporal trade-off 
Not 
necessarily 
No Yes Yes 
Intentional inter-
temporal trade-off 
No, managers 
are unaware 
of and/or 
unable to 
evaluate the 
longer-term 
effects of 
short-term 
actions 
Not 
applicable, 
managers 
consider the 
future 
consequences 
of short-term 
actions  
Yes, 
managers are 
aware that the 
decision is 
harmful to the 
long term but 
still make the 
decision 
Yes, 
managers are 
aware that the 
decision is 
harmful to the 
short term but 
still make the 
decision  
Illustrative example 
Managing 
unforeseen 
daily events 
(mentioned 
by all 
managers) 
Informal 
stretching of 
cost targets 
(mentioned by 
one manager) 
Gaming 
individual 
BSC 
measures 
(mentioned 
by nineteen 
managers) 
Reducing 
store’s 
contracted 
base 
(mentioned 
by two 
managers) 
 
 
The key distinction between myopia and short-termism is that the inter-
temporal trade-off decision is knowledge-based and so purposive or intentional. With 
this in mind, a decision tree approach to model the differences between myopic and 
short-termist decisions is provided in Figure 6.4. To clarify the conceptual boundary 
between short-termism and myopia in the behavioural accounting literature, two 
questions are formulated: did the manager’s decision involve an inter-temporal trade-
off? Was the manager aware of the expected longer-term consequences of their short-
term actions before making the decision? Two successive ‘yes’ answers suggest the 
occurrence of short-termism, whilst a ‘no’ answer suggests the occurrence of myopia. 
However, except for unforeseen events, the shorter managers’ perceptions of the short 
term (e.g., daily), the easier it may be to foresee the longer-term consequences, 
implying unintentional trade-offs may be less likely.  
 
 
 
 
190 
 
Figure 6.4: Decision Tree of Short-termist and Myopic Decisions 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 shows which middle-level managers offered a first-person account 
of participating in these inter-temporal decisions. A first-person account denotes that 
the manager offered a first-person perspective of participating in the inter-temporal 
decision, as opposed to using the third-person narrative mode. This distinction 
qualifies a discussion about how personal time preferences may complicate the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism in sub-section 7.2.5.  
Figure 6.5 reveals that all thirty middle-level managers interviewed for this 
research focused on the short term, whilst twenty-five managers focused on the long 
term. Twenty-five managers were thus able to switch between myopic and 
hypermetropic decisions, depending on the decision-making situation. Importantly, 
this suggests that a short-term focus need not preclude a long-term focus. As can be 
seen in Figure 6.5, eleven middle-level managers sacrificed the long term for the short 
term, whilst eight sacrificed the short term for the long term. Interestingly, three 
managers engaged in short-termist and long-termist decisions, depending on the 
decision-making situation. Sub-section 6.2.4 discusses the findings presented in this 
section in relation to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, particularly Section 2.1 and 
Section 2.2. 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
Did the manager’s 
decision involve an 
inter-temporal trade-
off? 
Was the manager aware of 
the expected longer-term 
consequences of their 
short-term actions before 
making the decision? 
Myopia 
Short-termism Myopia 
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Figure 6.5: Inter-temporal Decisions by Manager 
 
 SPECTRUM OF INTER-TEMPORAL DECISIONS 
Interviewee Myopia Hypermetropia 
Short-
termism 
Long-
termism 
Store Manager A1 ✓  ✓  
Store Manager A2 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager A3 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager A4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Store Manager A5 ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Store Manager A6 ✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Manager A7 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager A8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Store Manager A9 ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Store Manager A10 ✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Manager A11 ✓ ✓ ✓  
Group Loss Manager A ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Group Change Coach A ✓  ✓  
Store Director A ✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Manager B1 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B2 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Manager B4 ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Store Manager B5 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B6 ✓    
Store Manager B7 ✓    
Store Manager B8 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B9 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B10 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B11 ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B12 ✓    
Group Change Coach B ✓ ✓ ✓  
Group Loss Manager B ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Group Online Shopping 
Manager ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Store Director ✓ ✓   
 
 
 
192 
 
6.2.4  Discussion: Short-Termism as a Relatively 
Uncomplicated/Un-Nuanced, If Undesired Behaviour 
 
As noted in Section 2.1, despite much research on short-termism, definitional 
inconsistency and conceptual ambiguity remains. This may partly be caused by the 
loose usage of the terms short-termism and myopia (see e.g., Marsh, 1990; Coates et 
al., 1995; Samuel, 2000; Chakhovich et al., 2010; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2011). 
This is problematic because, at least theoretically, there are differences between the 
behavioural phenomena. Short-termism can be viewed as managers’ intentional and 
organisationally suboptimal behaviour that focuses on securing short-term results that 
precludes longer-term achievement. This interpretation is based on the notion of 
sacrificing the future, and necessitates tension between inter-temporal tasks (Laverty, 
1996; Marginson and McAulay, 2008; Irving, 2009; Marginson et al., 2010). In 
contrast, myopia refers to managers’ limitations in the ability to foresee the future that 
may not necessarily entail a suboptimal inter-temporal trade-off when there is 
accordance between inter-temporal tasks. One interpretation of being short-sighted is 
that managers are generally unware of and/or unable to evaluate the expected longer-
term consequences of their short-term actions. From this standpoint, myopia does not 
involve an intentional trade-off between short-term results and longer-term 
achievement when inter-temporal tension prevails.  
Section 2.2 noted that this terminological and conceptual confusion has led to 
varying operationalisation endeavours (compare Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Merchant, 1990; Marginson and McAulay, 2008). Short-termism has been equated 
with devoting more time to activities that influence the firm’s annual profit position 
(e.g., Otley, 1978; Moers, 2000; van der Stede, 2000; Chakhovich et al., 2010; 
Abernethy et al., 2013), reducing discretionary expenditure (e.g., Merchant, 1990; 
Chow et al., 1996), and favouring predictable goal achievement (e.g., Marginson and 
McAulay, 2008; Marginson et al., 2010). Because existing research on short-termism 
does not link managers’ views about their time horizons to their involvement in inter-
temporal decisions, measurement instruments may not be broad enough in their 
consideration of how and to what effect inter-temporal trade-off decisions are made. 
The present study addressed this gap in the literature through formulating and 
answering the following research question: how do inter-temporal decisions 
manifest?  
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 Four types of inter-temporal decisions were observed at Grocer: (1) focusing 
on the short term (myopia); (2) focusing on the long term (hypermetropia); (3) 
sacrificing the short term for the long term (long-termism); and (4) sacrificing the long 
term for the short term (short-termism). Of the thirty middle-level managers 
interviewed: (1) thirty managers made myopic decisions; (2) twenty-five managers 
made hypermetropic decisions; (3) eight managers made long-termist decisions; and 
(4) eleven managers made short-termist decisions. As far as the researcher is aware, 
this is the first study of the spectrum of inter-temporal decisions in the behavioural 
accounting literature.  
At Grocer, middle-level managers are encouraged to focus on the short term 
due to the frequency of performance measure monitoring. Focusing on the short term 
may thus be, in part, an unintended consequence of the properties of a performance 
measurement system. Research that tests the capital market pressure hypothesis 
provides tangential evidence to support this finding. For example, Bhojraj and Libby 
(2005) find that, in conditions of market pressure, more frequent disclosure of 
earnings causes managers to make more myopic decisions. Likewise, Gigler et al.’s 
(2014) analytical model shows that, when an organisation’s shareholders are 
sufficiently impatient, the price pressure associated with increasing the frequency of 
financial reporting results in myopic decisions. Broadly speaking, organisations may 
thus need to carefully consider their choice of performance measures, given that some 
aspects of performance that are measured need to be monitored frequently. This 
practical implication is elaborated in Chapter 8.  
Nonetheless, focusing on the short term is not necessarily disadvantageous, 
supporting Marginson et al.’s (2010) assertion. First, achieving short-term results 
provides managers with the time and freedom to perform the various dimensions of 
their role. Second, decisive short-term actions are necessary when dealing with 
unforeseen daily events. In this case, if an inter-temporal trade-off decision occurs, it 
is unintentional insofar as the potential longer-term implications of short-term actions 
have not been considered. This emphasises disjunction in the literature about short-
termism: if myopia signifies limitations of foresight, the manager cannot have 
knowingly traded off the long term for the short term. Except for unforeseen daily 
events, perhaps the shorter a manager’s perception of the short term the less likely 
s/he will be unaware of and/or unable to evaluate the longer-term effects of their short-
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term actions; that is, organisationally suboptimal myopic decisions may become less 
relevant.  
At the other end of the temporal continuum, hypermetropia is encouraged at 
Grocer by the objective setting process in Inspirational Performers and ‘Plan, Do, 
Review’ documents. Because the long term is an aggregation of short terms 
(Mauboussin and Callahan, 2015), focusing on the long term does not necessarily 
cause a loss of concentration on short-term results. For example, store managers of 
loss-making stores focus on longer-term profitability plans and so carefully limit their 
use of additional budgetary funds in the short term. In this situation, inter-temporal 
trade-off decisions are not made. In sum, focusing on a time period is facilitated by 
accordance between managers’ inter-temporal tasks.  
 The findings from this study confirm that short-termism may manifest through 
reductions in budgetary expenditure (see e.g., Merchant, 1990) and favouring 
predictable goal achievement (see e.g., Marginson and McAulay, 2008; Marginson et 
al., 2010). Favouring predictable goal achievement appeared to lead to the gaming of 
BSC measures. This behaviour was consistent with managers’ intentional inter-
temporal trade-off and, as such, was viewed as symptomatic of short-termism. Whilst 
this treatment is consistent with Brochet et al.’s (2015) description that gaming is a 
‘symptom’ of short-termism, the manipulation of performance measures is often 
treated as a separate construct (see e.g., Merchant, 1990; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 
2011). At Grocer, gaming took two forms: the gaming of individual BSC measures in 
isolation of other BSC measures; and the simultaneous gaming of two or more BSC 
measures through drawing on interrelationships. The short-term actions taken were 
often akin to ‘hitting the target, but missing the point’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006), 
particularly regarding customer satisfaction. Thus, as the group online shopping 
manager suggests, “I just think we should welcome the negative feedback and be able 
to fix it. I don’t see why we need to put a light on it” (Group Online Shopping 
Manager: 1899-1900). Attaching a target to the performance measure creates 
perceived pressure to meet the target for reasons discussed in the next chapter.  
 The examples reveal managers are aware of and are able to evaluate the 
expected longer-term consequences of their short-term actions. In this regard, the 
expected longer-term consequences are driven by a manager’s perception of what 
constitutes the temporal scale and thus are manifold. The longer-term consequences 
most frequently impact on customer loyalty, employee capability, employee 
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satisfaction, and financial performance. This emphasises the importance of 
understanding managers’ time horizons prior to documenting inter-temporal trade-
offs to observe how the decisions manifest.  
 At the other end of the temporal continuum, long-termism, or decisions that 
sacrifice the short term for the long term, manifests itself at Grocer through managers 
favouring actions that will improve long-term effectiveness, rather than on actions 
that will produce good short-term BSC results. Managers are aware that these inter-
temporal decisions are harmful to the short term but, nonetheless, they still make the 
decision. For example, some store managers decide to reduce their store’s contracted 
base to not only improve profitability but also regain flexibility, even though this is to 
the detriment of short-term BSC performance. But, to some extent, superior’s use of 
the performance evaluation system and reward/penalty system discourages these 
types of decisions. In sum, sacrificing a time period is underpinned by tension between 
managers’ inter-temporal tasks. 
In answering the second research question, this study extends existing research 
by empirically demonstrating that any future definition of short-termism perhaps 
should not just emphasise the inter-temporal trade-off involved in actions, but also the 
intention that underpins those actions. This provides one way to distinguish between 
short-termism and myopia that has yet to be fully incorporated into short-termism 
research. The study demonstrates that the decisions and actions that are evident in the 
manager’s short-termist behaviour are driven by his/her perception of what constitutes 
the temporal scale. In doing so, the study calls into question the assumption that short-
termism can be viewed as a relatively uncomplicated/un-nuanced, if undesired 
behaviour (e.g., Merchant, 1990; Abernethy et al., 2013). Because short-termism 
studies do not link managers’ views about their time horizons (cognition) to their 
involvement in inter-temporal decisions (behaviour), they may overlook how and to 
what effect the behavioural phenomenon manifests. The findings also contribute to 
research in this area by offering a broader perspective on the inter-temporal decision-
making process, thereby highlighting points of similarity and difference between four 
inter-temporal decisions. Specifically, the present study highlights that a manager can 
make both myopic and hypermetropic decisions. Also, a manager who engages in 
short-termism may also engage in long-termism. This underlies the argument 
developed in Chapter 7 that short-termism may be a contingent decision behaviour.   
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6.3  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This research is concerned with the nature and extent of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. The purpose of this chapter was to describe, 
analyse, and explain the research findings pertaining to the first and second research 
questions:  
  
1. How do managers understand the short, medium, and long term?  
 
2. How do inter-temporal decisions manifest? 
 
The purpose of the research questions was to ascertain when and how 
managers may engage in short-termism. The chapter has outlined managers’ 
understanding of their time horizons in relation to the context in which inter-temporal 
tasks are performed. At the broadest level, managers understood the short term to be 
quarterly, the medium term to be annual, and the long term to be up to four years. 
Managers’ understanding of the temporal scale was shaped by Grocer’s internal 
architecture and management control practices, particularly the frequency of 
performance measure monitoring. These findings called into question the assumption 
that the short term is a standardised period not exceeding one year (see e.g., van der 
Stede, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010).  
The findings were then taken further by linking managers’ understanding of 
their time horizons to four types of inter-temporal decisions that manifest at Grocer. 
These were: (1) focusing on the short term (myopia); (2) focusing on the long term 
(hypermetropia); (3) sacrificing the short term for the long term (long-termism); and 
(4) sacrificing the long term for the short term (short-termism). The findings 
illustrated that short-termism may take many guises beyond the traditionally narrow 
view of the behavioural accounting literature, and that any future definition of short-
termism perhaps should not just emphasise the inter-temporal trade-off involved in 
actions, but also the intention that underpins those actions. These findings called into 
question the assumption that short-termism can be viewed as a relatively 
uncomplicated/un-nuanced, if undesired behaviour (e.g., Merchant, 1990; Abernethy 
et al., 2013). 
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Together, this chapter moved from cognition to behaviour to traverse the 
cognitive-behavioural link. In so doing, the present chapter highlighted the 
complexity of short-termism and what it means to engage in this behaviour, thereby 
questioning the appropriateness of two assumptions that tend to underpin conceptual 
arguments. In the ensuing chapter, attention turns to exploring short-termism with 
reference to underlying mechanisms (research questions 3 and 4). 
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7 UNPACKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND SHORT-
TERMISM  
 
Chapter 7 aims to unpack the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism by addressing the study’s third and fourth research questions. The third 
research question aims to identify the linkages between an organisation’s performance 
measurement system and short-termist decisions. The fourth research question asks 
whether there are factors that complicate this relationship. In other words, the purpose 
of the present chapter is to describe, analyse, and explain the research findings 
pertaining to the following research questions:  
  
3. What is the nature of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
4. What is the extent of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
In line with the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1, the present chapter 
provides an individual-level analysis of the relationship between an organisation’s 
performance measurement system and managerial short-termism (link between box a 
and box c in Figure 1.1) and empirically opens the black box of contingency factors 
(box b in Figure 1.1). The findings are presented in two sections, which move from 
the impact that the structure and operation of performance measures have on 
managers’ inter-temporal trade-off decisions (as per research question three) to the 
contingency factors that play key roles (as per research question four). Together, this 
highlights the nature and extent of the relationship between performance measures 
and short-termism. To conclude each section, the findings are discussed in relation to 
the published work reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. The empirical findings presented in 
this chapter are primarily drawn from responses to interview questions. During 
analysis, responses were cross-referenced with the observational notes from 
management meetings and internal company documents to uncover convergent and 
divergent accounts. To satisfy the quality criterion of methodological trustworthiness, 
an audit trail for each section is provided. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. The first section describes middle-level 
managers’ short-termist decisions in relation to financial performance measures, non-
financial performance measures, and the BSC. Attention is given to explaining the 
impact that the structure and operation of performance measures have on managers’ 
short-termist decisions, such as the weighting of performance measures, the perceived 
pressure to achieve targets, target level difficulty, the frequency of performance 
measurement, and causal linkages. The second section considers five contingencies 
that appear to complicate this relationship at the individual level. These include: 
relative performance information; the performance evaluation system; the 
reward/penalty system; intra-organisational mobility; and personal time preferences. 
The contingencies focus on how performance information is disseminated and used 
to evaluate and reward managers, whilst acknowledging the possible between-person 
variability in inter-temporal responses to performance measures. The chapter 
concludes by making general comments about the importance of this data.   
 
7.1  The Link Between an Organisation’s Performance 
Measurement System and Managerial Short-termism  
 
This section examines how, why, and in what ways a combination of financial and 
non-financial measures relates to the tendency for managers to engage in short-termist 
behaviour. In doing so, the study unpicks the general categories of financial versus 
non-financial measures to offer a more nuanced analysis of individual performance 
measures and their possible association with short-termism. The data presented are 
drawn from internal company documents (document groups 6 and 10; see Appendix 
10.9), observed management meetings (meeting numbers 1 to 10; see Appendix 10.8) 
and interview data (interview questions 9, 11, 12, 12a, 12b, and 13b with codes 2.5, 
2.7, 2.12, 2.13, 2.15, 2.22, and 2.23 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10). The section 
is divided into four parts. Financial measures, non-financial measures and 
combination-of-measures are explored in the first three sub-sections below. The 
fourth presents an aggregate analysis as a conclusion to this section. Together, the 
section addresses the third research question: what is the nature of the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism? By demonstrating that 
quantitative (financial and non-financial) measures may lead to limited foresight and 
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short-termist behaviour and qualitative (non-financial) measures may encourage a 
longer-term focus, the study calls into question the assumption that all ‘financial 
measures’ encourage short-termism, whilst all ‘non-financial measures’ engender a 
longer-term focus. 
 
7.1.1 Financial Performance Measures and Short-termism 
 
Twelve of the twenty-three store managers interviewed for this research perceived the 
financial quadrant of Grocer’s BSC—which comprises sales, payroll, expenses, 
product wastage, unknown product losses—to be the most important for reasons 
outlined below.84 A typical comment is that “the one that stands out the most is the 
finance quadrant” (Store Manager B8: 1009-1010). As the following two quotations 
suggest, this perception derives, at least in part, from superiors’ symptomatic 
behaviours that are perhaps not intended as messages but are nonetheless interpreted 
by subordinates.  
 
“If I was to count all my emails up and go: what am I judged on? What is he 
asking me to do? I would say finance.” (Store Manager B3: 1450-1451)  
 
“My boss probably wouldn’t say it but he will talk to us a lot more about 
finance than he will about any other area of the [BSC].” (Store Manager B4: 
1445-1446)   
 
 Considering the above, underperformance on financial measures was 
perceived to be “more alarming” (Store Manager B6: 1709) vis-à-vis non-financial 
measures, particularly given the recent closure of more than forty lossmaking stores. 
Furthermore, because Grocer faces mounting public pressure to reduce the amount of 
food waste from its stores, middle-level managers’ product wastage performance was 
“quite an emotional subject across the business” (Store Manager B2: 678-679). There 
was thus importance attached to financial measures at Grocer, which translated into 
frequent performance measure monitoring. As one manager points out, “if it’s being 
measured that frequently it’s because there’s a reason for it” (Store Manager A10: 
                                                          
84 Eleven store managers place emphasis on queue length for reasons detailed in the next sub-
section. The group loss managers, of course, focus solely on the financial performance 
measures of product wastage and unknown product losses.  
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1933). In this regard, Grocer increased the monitoring of unknown product losses 
from a six-monthly to a three-monthly basis when a manager exhibited 
underperformance. 
 In addition, when the financial measures are considered collectively, the 
financial quadrant jointly predominates with the customer quadrant due to its heavier 
weighting (see Figure 5.2). This creates an incentive to overachieve financial targets 
because “a blue performance on the quadrant can hide the poor performance within 
another” (Internal Company Document, Group 10).85 But, in view of Grocer’s 
external environment, this was a nearly impossible task because “the lower your sales 
become, the tighter all of your budgets become” (Store Manager B2: 1489-1490). 
That is, the twice-yearly sales target revision has a proportional effect on cost targets. 
A downward revised sales budget is a source of inter-temporal tension because “we’re 
thinking sales rather than size [of the store]” (Store Manager A5: 654). For instance, 
store managers must still incur approximately the same expense for staff uniforms, 
quality refunds, and carrier bags irrespective of fluctuating sales.86 Target level 
difficulty was thus, essentially, increased. This had a dual effect on inter-temporal 
trade-off decisions (see below).  
 On the one hand, nine store managers acknowledged that they mainly focused 
on ‘reviewing’ and/or ‘delivering’ sales (but see sub-section 7.1.3 for nuance). 
Reference was made to sales performance in each ‘Daily Meeting’ and ‘Store 
Meeting’ observed (see Appendix 10.8 for the meetings observed). For example, 
“sales were £126,000 yesterday which is down 12% on the previous week” (Daily 
Meeting 2: 26-27). However, doing so runs the risk of not performing all functions 
associated with the role. As one manager metaphorically notes: “You’ve got to spin 
all the plates all of the time otherwise if you just concentrate on spinning one set of 
plates then the others start to crash down to the floor” (Store Manager A10: 466-
469). On the other hand, some store managers purposely cut costs and/or game cost 
targets, which runs counter to the long-term workgroup strategy. For instance, it was 
illustrated in sub-section 6.2.2.2 that, in order to achieve the short-term product 
wastage target, several store managers decided to ‘decimate’ their store’s product 
                                                          
85 This is because the ‘traffic lights’ map onto a four-point scale (for details, see sub-section 
5.3.3.1). 
86 In other words, these are examples of fixed costs.  
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range. Table 6.4 also provides examples of store managers gaming expenses, product 
wastage, and unknown product losses.  
 Interestingly, it was noted in sub-section 5.3.1 that, during the latter stages of 
this investigation, each store’s payroll, product wastage, and unknown product losses 
budgets were increased. Setting targets that are highly achievable reduced the pressure 
to cut costs and/or game cost targets and allowed managers the freedom and the 
opportunity to perform the various dimensions of their role (see sub-section 6.2.1.2). 
Setting highly achievable financial targets is perhaps one condition for accordance 
between inter-temporal tasks. As one manager notes: “We haven’t got money to throw 
away or unnecessarily spend but, by allowing store managers the time to step back 
and view their business with less focus on chasing the numbers, will pay dividends in 
terms of service” (Group Change Coach A: 323-326).   
However, it will be discussed in the next sub-section that the importance 
accorded to particular non-financial measures influenced how the extra budgetary 
funds were used. In sum, there is particular importance attached to financial measures 
at Grocer which translated into frequent monitoring and top-down pressure to achieve 
on-target performance which was sometimes sent via informal signals. This, together 
with the heavier weighting of the financial quadrant, encouraged short-termist 
behaviour. But, the perceived pressure to deliver on-target performance was reduced 
by setting highly achievable financial targets. That is, the harmful inter-temporal 
decision-making effect of placing particular (formal and informal) emphasis on 
financial measures can be reduced by the broader design of the performance 
measurement system. Sub-section 7.1.2 now turns attention to non-financial 
measures.  
 
7.1.2 Non-financial Performance Measures and Short-termism 
 
At particular points in time, one or more non-financial measures in the BSC are 
labelled ‘hot potatoes’. A hot potato is an underlying measure of success that 
contributes to the achievement of the surface-level target. For instance: “Evening 
[queue length] would be one—that’s a really hot potato” (Store Manager A1: 1590). 
Evening queue length contributes to the achievement of the queue length target. Hot 
potatoes are strategically chosen by superiors as areas for improvement because they 
support the business priorities (see sub-section 5.1.4). Improving an underlying 
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measure of success causes performance to converge so that total workgroup 
performance is on-target or above-target. Store director A explains this process:  
 
“The purpose of doing that is to converge performance across a larger region. 
So, I may put stores under pressure to improve performance through that extra 
focus who, left to their own devices, wouldn’t look at it because their measure 
overall is green.” (Store Director A: 356-359)  
 
Because of the top-down pressure mentioned in the above quotation, eleven of 
the store managers interviewed acknowledged that they placed emphasis on evening 
queue length performance.87 Before the increase in each store’s payroll budget, 
emphasising evening queue length could potentially damage the functioning of the 
store and other BSC measures. As evidenced by the following quotation, this is 
because customer assistants, who normally would be performing other tasks such as 
shelf-stacking, were reassigned to the checkouts to ensure that there were no queues.  
 
“It would be a massive drain on the store if you’re calling relief cashiers the 
whole time—that’s people that aren’t working cages of fresh stock that then 
potentially will go out of date because it hasn’t been put on the shelf for 
customers to buy in the evening. That affects evening availability, sales, 
customer loyalty, everything.” (Store Manager A4: 1701-1705)  
 
When each store’s payroll budget increased, at least two store managers 
decided to ‘overinvest’ in checkout service for the sole purpose of ensuring on-target 
evening queue length performance. As revealed below, these managerial actions were 
purposive.   
 
“You feel you need to overinvest in that area with money that you didn’t, well 
you know, a couple of months ago we didn’t have that money to be able to 
invest. Now, we’re investing in it and now I most probably am overinvesting 
to make sure that light is a green light.” (Store Manager A3: 131-134)   
 
“I need to invest more sensibly. So, I’ve probably overinvested with the 
money.” (Store Manager A7: 313-314) 
 
                                                          
87 Of course, the group change coaches also placed emphasis on evening queue length because 
they are assigned ownership of the overall queue length measure.  
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 Though, BSC results indicate that many other store managers take a similar 
approach seeing as evening queue length performance often beats the 7.5% target 
(Internal Company Documents, Group 6).  For example, during one daily meeting, a 
store manager discussed the queue length performance for the previous day and broke 
the figure down into the morning (8%), afternoon (9.2%), and evening (5.2%) 
components (Daily Meeting 2: 41-43). This store manager achieved the surface-level 
target and overachieved the evening queue length target.88 However, queue length 
performance was inconsistent throughout the day, impacting on service quality and 
customer satisfaction which are said to be prerequisites of customer loyalty. Of 
course, here there is also the possibility that part of this overinvestment could have 
been more effectively allocated to other departments, namely to support the process 
of picking, packing, and dispatching online orders.   
Overall, eight of the eleven store managers note that the top-down pressure to 
achieve underlying measures of success was a source of inter-temporal tension insofar 
as they spend a larger proportion of their time ‘reviewing’ and/or ‘delivering’ them. 
As one manager notes, “the short term gets wavered a little bit when the company 
change their priorities because it changes your priorities” (Store Manager A3: 2204-
2207). Business priorities can change monthly to coincide with the company-wide 
release of information in business plans (see sub-section 6.1.2).  
But, unsurprisingly, the level of attention directed towards these measures was 
influenced by current performance. As one store manager who has on-target evening 
queue length performance points out, “it’s not my focus because we’re not one of the 
stores that continually fails in the evenings” (Store Manager B8: 156-158). 
Underperformance was one trigger of gaming queue length (see Table 6.4), as 
evidenced below. However, this relationship is complicated by a manager’s relative 
standing in the league table, which is discussed in sub-section 7.2.1.   
 
“I genuinely think it’s driven through underperforming the target that would 
get someone to do something untoward. Because, if they were doing well, I 
just don’t think they would be focusing on it because it wouldn’t be something 
to worry about.” (Store Manager B9: 1402-1405)  
 
                                                          
88 (8%+9.2%+5.2%)/3=7.47% 
205 
 
  More generally, sixteen store managers state that they want to spend more time 
focusing on improving customer satisfaction. The reasons for this are threefold. First, 
customer satisfaction encompasses three performance measures (see Figure 5.2), thus 
comprising 15% of a manager’s total BSC performance score. In other words, 
customer satisfaction is the most heavily weighted performance measure. Second, 
given that Grocer’s performance philosophy maintains that the causal chain begins 
with the customer quadrant, customer satisfaction is assumed to be a leading indicator 
of future financial performance (see sub-section 7.1.3). This, coupled with the 
suggestion that “it’s no good you trying to look at everything in one go” (Store 
Manager B12: 456-457), created a tendency for some managers to want to direct their 
attention to measures sequentially, rather than in parallel. Third, several managers 
believe that Grocer signalled the importance of achieving customer satisfaction targets 
when the frequency with which the measure was monitored was changed from 
monthly to daily.  
 Noticeably, except for the group loss managers and the group online shopping 
manager, interviewees mainly orientate their discussions about non-financial 
measures in the BSC around the customer quadrant. Indeed, “the small little bit of 
community” (Store Manager B8: 654) which “has only got two measures in it” (Store 
Director A: 956) was referenced by no more than ten managers without being 
prompted. Counter to Grocer’s performance philosophy (see sub-section 7.1.3), 
managers believe that “I’m great at raising money for charity but that doesn’t help 
deliver for our investors in the City” (Store Manager B4: 1149-1151). Within the 
people and operational quadrants, employee satisfaction and product availability were 
generally viewed as more important, despite the equal weighting of the measures. As 
indicated in sub-section 6.1.3, employee satisfaction is “a reflection of culture in the 
store” (Store Manager B3: 160), with below-target performance remaining on the 
BSC until the next six-monthly measurement point. As noted in sub-section 6.1.1, 
product availability is an “indicator of how well the store is set up” (Store Manager 
A4: 241-242), with below-target daily performance scrutinised by the group online 
shopping manager. The perceived saliency of these measures created pressure for on-
target performance and prompted short-termist decisions that are outlined in Table 
6.4.  
Grocer’s formal performance evaluation system includes qualitative non-
financial measures, such as personal development plans. It will be shown in sub-
206 
 
section 7.2.2 that qualitative measures move managers away from excessively 
focusing on short-term BSC results and discourage short-termist decisions. In sum, 
particular non-financial targets are prioritised by Grocer because they support the 
business priorities. Other non-financial targets are given particular attention because, 
for instance, they are monitored by a group support manager. This creates pressure to 
achieve these non-financial targets and encourages short-termist decisions (i.e., 
overinvesting to achieve the measure and/or gaming the measure), particularly if the 
manager has underperformance on these measures. Sub-section 7.1.3 considers the 
BSC, in particular the causal linkages. 
 
7.1.3 Balanced Scorecard and Short-termism: Are Appropriate 
Causal Linkages a Myth?   
 
Sub-section 5.3.1 stated that the intended purpose of Grocer’s BSC is to encourage a 
balanced performance. At Grocer, a balanced performance has two dimensions. The 
first dimension concerns a balanced view across performance measures so that no one 
performance measure is considered more important than the others. As evidenced by 
the findings presented in sub-section 7.1.1 and sub-section 7.1.2, this dimension to 
having a balanced performance is not strictly adhered to. At the broadest level, there 
is a consensus that by “trying to focus on everything, you don’t focus on anything” 
(Store Manager A4: 1999). In other words, “it’s almost like you have to prioritise 
some stuff to deliver” (Group Change Coach B: 1180-1181) because Grocer’s BSC 
has twenty performance measures. But, as store manager A10 indicated earlier, 
middle-level managers’ activities and responsibilities are “quite wide and various and 
we can’t afford to get distracted, over distracted, by one small area” (Store Manager 
A10: 348-350) because this may run counter to achieving Grocer’s strategic priority 
of restoring growth to the UK business. Recall also that managers compartmentalise 
performance measures as short or longer term due to their monitoring frequencies (see 
sub-section 6.1.2). That is, performance measures that are monitored daily or weekly 
are called short-term measures by managers. These measures receive more attention 
vis-à-vis measures that are deemed longer-term—namely, employee satisfaction and 
unknown product losses. Longer-term measures are put on the ‘backburner’ until their 
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six-monthly point of measurement approaches. Thus, the provision of more frequent 
performance measurement information prompts managers to focus on the short term.  
The second dimension concerns a balanced performance on each BSC 
measure so that above-target performance is scrutinised in a manner similar to below-
target performance. All middle-level managers interviewed for this research regard 
underperformance as a priority to address and resolve. Store managers focused on 
performing back in line with the BSC performance measure(s), whilst the store 
director and his/her group support team focused on coaching and advising the store 
managers who underperform their targets. Decisions about addressing and resolving 
underperformance focused on: (1) the degree to which underperformance was a store-
specific issue or a broader workgroup or format problem, which influenced the 
importance attached to reducing the variance (see third quotation below); (2) the 
extent to which the target was missed, which influenced the perceived urgency to 
correct the variance (see first quotation below); and (3) the speed with which the 
variance could be corrected, which highlighted where to direct attention when there 
were two or more performance measures showing underperformance (see second 
quotation below). If underperformance was a broader workgroup or format issue 
and/or the BSC target was marginally missed, managers felt less pressure to improve 
performance and had less inclination to engage in short-termism. 
 
“It’s talking about how red a light is. So, if you have a massively bad stock 
result and you lose the company, I don’t know, one hundred and fifty thousand 
pounds then that could be much worse than just being off-track like mine is.” 
(Store Manager B5: 1625-1628)   
 
“If I see a KPI as red that would be something I would focus on if I felt I could 
turn it whereas, if I felt there was an amber KPI that I could turn quickly, that 
would probably be there as well. So, reds that I could turn, ambers that I could 
turn. So, I’d probably be looking at the lights that I could turn.” (Store 
Manager B11: 1114-1118)  
 
“It hasn’t mattered that sales have been red for any store manager for the last 
five years because everyone is red. So, therefore, nobody is red. If everybody 
is red, then nobody is red.” (Store Director A: 972-974)  
 
 This contrasts with the situation for above-target performance. None of the 
middle-level managers interviewed for this research indicated that they were 
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concerned about above-target performance. For example: 
 
“A blue means I need to place attention here. A red means I need to place 
attention here. It’s the same thing. Is that what you do? No. I get a blue light 
and go woohoo.” (Store Director A: 1177-1192) 
 
Indeed, above-target performance was encouraged by the dissemination of 
relative performance information (see sub-section 7.2.1), the performance evaluation 
system (see sub-section 7.2.2) and the reward system (see sub-section 7.2.3). But, 
above-target performance is a source of inter-temporal tension because the payoff 
relationship between some of the performance measures is non-linear with an 
inflection point that is difficult to determine. 
Chapter 5 outlined that Grocer’s performance philosophy is as follows: if 
managers look after customers and stores operate efficiently and effectively, then 
sales and profits would grow. As such, the perceived causal chain begins with the 
measures in the community and customer quadrants, thereafter continuing through the 
people and operational quadrants and culminating in improved performance in the 
financial quadrant. But, some managers questioned whether the causal chain between 
each of the five quadrants holds (see sub-section 7.1.2). There were also causal chains 
within each of the five quadrants in the BSC. For example, within the people quadrant, 
absence is supposed to be a leading measure of employee satisfaction. As another 
example, within the customer quadrant, queue length is supposed to be a leading 
indicator of customer satisfaction (service). However, as indicated in the quotations 
below, four store managers note that this latter causal chain may not hold.  
 
“We had a patch through quarter two where we were around sort of eight or 
nine percent on [queue length] and our customer service on our [customer 
satisfaction] increased. So, I don’t necessarily think service and [queue 
length] are as linked as people believe. I think service is about the service you 
get when you’re served, not necessarily the two minutes you may wait on the 
till.” (Store Manager B2: 835-840)   
 
“On the [queue length] I’ve been consistently red but on the views of my 
customers I’m consistently blue. So, the computer is telling me I’m rubbish but 
my customers are telling me I’m okay.” (Store Manager B3: 920-922)  
 
There are also inappropriate causal linkages between measures that do not lead 
to desired ends. For example, managers’ actions to improve queue length (i.e., a 
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measure at the beginning of the causal chain) could sometimes entail a corresponding 
decline in payroll (i.e., a measure at the end of the causal chain) and so they take 
decisions which trade-off performance measures that had temporally spaced 
outcomes. As another example, managers’ actions to improve customer satisfaction 
(product availability) could sometimes entail a corresponding decline in the product 
wastage performance. And because the relationship between most of the performance 
measures was characterised by interdependence, this led to inter-temporal trade-off 
decisions between performance measures as evidenced in Table 6.5. In sum, both 
dimensions to having a balanced performance were disregarded at Grocer which could 
sometimes prompt short-termist decisions (i.e., prioritising certain measures and/or 
overachieving targets).89 This was problematic because Grocer’s BSC had 
inappropriate causal linkages among the performance measures within and between 
quadrants, which itself could lead to short-termist decisions.90 Sub-section 7.1.4 
discusses the findings presented in this section in relation to the broader literature.   
 
7.1.4 Discussion: All ‘Financial Measures’ Encourage Short-
Termism, Whilst All ‘Non-Financial Measures’ Engender a 
Longer-Term Focus  
 
The literature reviewed in Section 2.3 stated that financial measurement systems that 
comprise accounting measures of performance supposedly cause an excessive short-
term focus (e.g., Hayes and Abernathy, 1980; Hayes and Garvin, 1982; Kaplan, 1984), 
because the information focuses on the past, is derived from measurement rules that 
are often conservatively biased, and provides incomplete signals about managerial 
effort (Merchant, 2006; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2007; Merchant and van der 
Stede, 2012). On the other hand, non-financial measures are often described as leading 
indicators of future financial performance (e.g., Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; Banker et 
al., 2000; Said et al., 2003; Nagar and Rajan, 2005; Banker and Chen, 2006; Farrel et 
al., 2008) and are thus supposed to overcome short-termism by prompting actions that 
have longer-term consequences. These assumptions lead some authors to recommend 
the measurement combination approach to alleviating short-termism (e.g., Kaplan and 
                                                          
89 That is, a balanced view across performance measures and a balanced performance on each 
BSC measure.  
90 These include the potential inverse relationships and inter-dependent relationships. 
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Norton, 1992; Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; Sliwka, 2002; Ittner et al., 2003a; Ittner et 
al., 2003b). Kaplan and Norton’s (1992) BSC approach to performance measurement 
and management control is perhaps the most notable of this type of combination-of-
measures system.  
Despite the above arguments, empirical evidence regarding the effects of 
financial measures (compare Merchant, 1990; van der Stede, 2000) and non-financial 
measures (compare Moers, 2000; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2007) on short-termism 
has been mixed. Indeed, few studies have empirically examined the measurement 
combination approach on short-termism (e.g., Marginson et al., 2010; Abernethy et 
al., 2013), and none have been based on the BSC. The present study addressed the 
conflicts and gaps in the literature by formulating and answering the following 
research question: what is the nature of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism? 
 Notwithstanding the rhetoric regarding the pursuit of a balanced performance 
at Grocer, the present study finds that particular importance attached to financial 
measures at Grocer (namely residual measures; see Table 2.1) translates into frequent 
monitoring and perceived pressure to meet targets, particularly cost targets. This, 
together with the heavier weighting of the financial quadrant, encourages short-termist 
behaviour such as gaming expenses, product wastage, and unknown product losses. 
This aligns with Merchant’s (1990) finding that shows a positive correlation between 
the perceived pressure to meet financial measures and short-termism. The present 
study finds that the perceived pressure to meet financial measures is reduced by setting 
highly achievable cost targets. That is, setting highly achievable cost targets lessens 
the pressure for short-term results and allows managers the time and freedom to 
perform the various dimensions of their role. This coheres with Merchant and van der 
Stede’s (2012: 446-447) suggestion that “targets that are more highly achievable 
create some room for managers to be preoccupied by longer-term initiatives.” The 
finding also supports Merchant and Manzoni’s (1989) claim that budgetary slack may 
reduce the incentive for managers to engage in dysfunctional behaviour. In sum, the 
perceived pressure to meet sales and cost targets appears to encourage short-termism 
at Grocer. 
 High priority is accorded to particular non-financial targets at Grocer because 
they support the business priorities, which focus on the ways in which customers’ 
needs are changing and the level of customer service provided. Other non-financial 
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targets are perceived to be more important than others because, for instance, they are 
monitored by a group support manager (e.g., product availability) or reflect progress 
against the long-term workgroup strategy (e.g., employee satisfaction). But, because 
non-financial measures are emphasised within Grocer, this creates pressure to exhibit 
on-target performance and encourages short-termist decisions. The pressure for on-
target performance is perhaps felt more so for employee satisfaction because results 
would be evident on the BSC for six months and/or if the manager has significant 
underperformance that is a store-specific issue. This adds further substance to 
Marginson et al.’s (2010) finding that using non-financial measures diagnostically 
leads managers to make inter-temporal trade-off decisions that prioritise the short term 
to the detriment of the long term. In sum, the perceived pressure to meet quantitative 
non-financial measures appears to encourage short-termism at Grocer. 
Grocer’s BSC is supposed to have causal chains within each of the five 
quadrants and causal chains between each of the five quadrants. The perceived causal 
chain begins with the measures in the community and customer quadrants, thereafter 
continuing through the people and operational quadrants and culminating in improved 
performance in the financial quadrant. Each of the quadrants is supposed to combine 
lagging and leading measures. However, the causal linkages within and between the 
measurement areas either do not hold or are inappropriate because the payoff 
relationships are non-linear with an inflection point that is difficult to determine. Thus, 
managers’ actions to improve a performance measure at the beginning or middle of 
the causal chain (e.g., queue length) can entail a corresponding decline in the financial 
measures at the end of the causal chain (e.g., payroll). Supporting Banker et al.’s 
(2004) assertion, this leads to decisions which trade off performance measures that 
have temporally spaced outcomes. Moreover, the relationship between most of the 
BSC measures is characterised by interdependence, rather than causality. In line with 
Merchant and van der Stede’s (2012) postulation, interdependence leads to inter-
temporal trade-off decisions between performance measures. In sum, the claim that 
the BSC can remedy the short-termism caused by financial measures by 
systematically incorporating non-financial measures (e.g., Ittner et al., 2003a; 
Merchant and van der Stede, 2012) found little support at Grocer. Financial and 
(quantitative) non-financial measures appear to encourage short-termism, which is 
exacerbated by inappropriate causal linkages that do not lead to desired ends. This 
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contrasts with Malina et al.’s (2007) conclusion that statistically valid causal linkages 
may not be necessary to achieve desirable management behaviours. 
In answering the third research question, this study contributes to the 
behavioural accounting literature by examining the interplay between financial and 
non-financial measures in a BSC. The study goes beyond the general categories of 
financial versus non-financial (see Marginson et al., 2010) to offer nuanced 
information about the nature of the relationship between individual performance 
measures and short-termism. The findings indicate that quantitative (financial and 
non-financial) measures prompt limitations of foresight and can lead to inter-temporal 
trade-off decisions that sacrifice the long term for the short term. This is partly because 
of the way in which managers compartmentalise performance measures, namely 
performance measures are characterised as short term if monitored daily or weekly. 
As such, the interplay between quantitative and qualitative measures may be 
important to shaping managerial short-termism as against the interplay between 
financial and non-financial measures previously conceived (see sub-section 2.3.3). 
The present study also contributes to the behavioural accounting literature by 
highlighting that the inappropriate causal linkages within and between measurement 
areas in a BSC can lead to short-termist decisions. The following section presents and 
discusses the findings that relate to the extent of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism.   
 
7.2  An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box of Potential 
Contingencies: Towards a More Holistic Understanding   
  
Section 7.2 explains the contingencies that reinforce or weaken the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism at the individual level. This is done 
by establishing how, why, and in what ways relative performance information, 
performance evaluations, performance-based rewards, intra-organisational mobility, 
and individual time perspectives influence managers involvement in short-termist 
decisions. These five contingencies correspond with those detailed in Chapter 3, 
which have been linked to short-termism within different streams of academic 
literature. But, as Chapter 3 concluded, research into these factors is 
compartmentalised and often unclear or conflicting. This section is divided into six 
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parts. These contingencies are unpicked and explored in the first five subsections 
below. The sixth presents an aggregate analysis as a conclusion to this section. 
Together, the section addresses the fourth and final research question: what is the 
extent of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism? In 
demonstrating the dynamic, complex, and fluid interplay between these factors and 
their impact on the relationship between performance measures and short-termism 
within an integrated framework, the present study highlights that the inter-temporal 
decision-making effects of an organisation’s performance measurement system 
depends on the context within which that system operates. In other words, short-
termism may be a contingent decision behaviour.  
The first sub-section considers how relative performance information 
complicates the relationship between performance measures and short-termism. The 
information presented draws upon the descriptive overview provided in sub-section 
5.3.2 and the analysis of internal company documents (document group 11; see 
Appendix 10.9) and interview data (interview questions 11, 14a, and 14b with codes 
2.5, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).   
 
7.2.1 The Ups and Downs of Contrastive Social Comparisons  
 
“Before I came into retail, I thought it would be quite exciting. Naively, I 
thought looking at yourself and the competition of wanting not to be at the 
bottom would be quite healthy. But, having been in it awhile, and having seen 
ranked tables, it doesn’t create a team spirit. They talk a lot about how they 
want all of us within [Grocer] to collaborate and work together for the 
common good. But, what I find is, when you rank stuff in that way, it does 
anything other than that, and actually all you want to make sure is you’re not 
at the bottom. And, it’s a bit like you’re in a sea full of sharks—as long as 
somebody else is being eaten you’re alright.” (Store Manager B9: 1328-1336)  
 
 Nine of the twenty-three store managers are particularly critical of the 
dissemination of relative performance information. As stated by store manager B9 
above, the league tables encourage competitive and uncooperative behaviours that 
undermine the core leadership capability of collaboration. Because the league tables 
emphasise performance differences between workgroup members, the context primes 
differential thinking and contrastive social comparisons (‘that person is not me’). As 
will be illustrated below, making contrastive upward comparisons is potentially 
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demoralising, prompts an unfavourable self-image, and engenders negative emotions 
such as shame and jealousy. On the other hand, making contrastive downward 
comparisons appears liberating, enhances the manager’s self-image, and engenders 
positive emotions such as pride and arrogance. When verbalised by the manager, 
contrastive downward comparisons undermine the core leadership capability of 
empathy. Consequently, this emphasis on the self, and the desire to outperform 
workgroup colleagues on mutually important performance dimensions, seems to 
influence the prevalence of inter-temporal trade-off decisions. These findings are 
elaborated below.  
When a manager’s performance was in the lower quartile of a particular league 
table, s/he appeared to hold in mind a negative self-image and experienced feelings of 
shame and jealousy. As store manager B10 explains: “it affects your confidence, you 
know, with a bit of embarrassment” (Store Manager B10: 1101-1102). In this vein, 
when discussing the twice-weekly league table for customer satisfaction, group 
change coach A recounts: “I occasionally get store managers saying well, you know, 
what’s ‘Fred’ doing down the road to suddenly get eighty? And I think there’s an 
element of the green-eyed monster there” (Group Change Coach A: 999-1001). 
League tables for most of the financial and non-financial measures in the BSC are 
released daily or weekly. This regularity appeared to exacerbate the negative feelings 
because “if you sit at the bottom all the time, it can be really demoralising” (Store 
Director B: 426). League tables are also a source of anxiety because the information 
identifies who is to face the continual review of progress through regular and informal 
discussions. As a result, managers who have performance that falls in the lower 
quartile of a particular league table have to contend with top-down pressure to move 
up in the rankings. Incidentally, avoiding weak relative performance is perhaps easier 
said than done because there is a league table for each of the twenty BSC measures 
(see Figure 5.2), and the position held in each table is affected by factors that partly 
lie outside the manager’s control. Nonetheless, as stated in sub-section 5.3.2, league 
tables are a key reference point in decision-making for those with weak relative 
performance. 
 Managers with weak relative performance are considered poor performers by 
colleagues and sometimes superiors. In this regard, league tables are instruments of 
status anxiety because a manager’s reputation is, at least in part, derived from his/her 
relative standing. As one manager states, “we want the best [BSC] because that’s how 
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we judge everyone” (Group Loss Manager B: 658). With only one exception, all 
middle-level managers interviewed for this research care about their reputation and 
had a desire to protect or improve the reputation that they have created. A manager 
may gain a reputation for consistently overachieving on a certain aspect of his/her 
BSC performance. For example, “I’ve got a good reputation out there for having good 
[employee satisfactions]” (Store Manager A2: 1003-1004). Alternatively, a manager 
may gain a reputation for having the best overall BSC performance. Half of the 
managers interviewed sought to acquire the latter reputation because it facilitates 
career progression. But, for reasons detailed below, “sometimes that vanity, that 
pride, is not something we should aspire to” (Store Manager A8: 1466-1468). Overall, 
managers endeavoured to secure and retain a leading position in the league tables 
which influenced inter-temporal decisions. 
 When a manager outperformed other workgroup members, s/he appeared to 
hold in mind a positive self-image and experienced feelings of pride and arrogance. 
Eleven managers remark that they are driven by pride to achieve above-target 
performance. Because it is possible to earn so-called ‘bragging rights’, several 
managers appeared to take great delight in boasting about above-target achievements. 
For example, “you’ll email your colleagues or text your colleagues and say ‘ah, 
you’re not doing great this week, are you?’ It’s just a bit of fun” (Store Manager A9: 
713-715). This behaviour, however, undermined the core leadership capability of 
empathy because performance measure results could have been affected by 
occurrences outside of the manager’s control. In this regard, a manager’s relative 
standing was also partly determined by other managers’ BSC performance. Store 
manager A8 highlights this issue below.  
 
“If a delivery has come in late and your availability has dropped by two 
percent because that delivery is late, because someone else hasn’t had that 
problem and is now first and you’re tenth, does that drive an improvement? 
No, it doesn’t. It drives an emotion. It’s not helpful.” (Store Manager A8: 
1357-1361)  
 
 Store manager A8 continues to explain that “the emotion, if you like, drives 
the behaviour, and the behaviour can be damaging” (Store Manager A8: 1376-1377). 
That is, imposing relative performance information onto managers via league tables 
induced the aforementioned social comparison process and influenced the prevalence 
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of inter-temporal trade-off decisions. First, some managers acknowledge gaming BSC 
measures to improve or retain their league table position (see Table 6.4). This 
behaviour stemmed from “self-preservation” (Store Director A: 193). Along these 
lines, league tables encouraged managers to achieve above-target performance. But, 
given the various interdependencies among the measures within and between each of 
the BSC quadrants, intentionally overachieving one BSC target to maintain a certain 
position in the league table could be harmful to other performance measures. The 
following quotation reveals that one store manager attempted to overachieve product 
availability in order to retain his leading position in the league table. However, the 
detailed behaviour could compromise other performance measures, as evidenced in 
Table 6.5. Such behaviour was more likely to occur if a manager’s reputation was 
coupled to a particular BSC measure.  
 
“I’ve had a few stores that will try and stay top with availability. I went in one 
yesterday, and he would just carry on the pick a lot longer by sending labels 
back to keep the availability up because he hit ninety-nine one day.” (Group 
Online Shopping Manager: 1691-1694)  
 
Second, as noted at the beginning of this sub-section, league tables encouraged 
uncooperative behaviour which undermined the core leadership capability of 
collaboration. This is because league tables encouraged rivalry amongst workgroup 
members. The rivalry situation is revealed in participants’ descriptions of workgroup 
members, namely ‘they are a threat’ (see below).  
 
“The availability figure is 82%, which is not in the top three. We’ve done a 
good job but need to push to get to 85% next time. The quality figure is 82% 
and we are the third highest in the group—[GroB store] and [GroB store] are 
beating us. They are a threat.” (Store Meeting 5: 157-160) 
 
Consequently, some managers prefer to concentrate on actions to achieve BSC 
targets for their area of responsibility, rather than engaging in collaborations that may 
enhance overall performance of the broader workgroup. For example, as documented 
below, one store manager held surplus carrier bags, name badges, and product 
packaging. Rather than transferring these surplus items to store manager B7 (as the 
items have a limited usability period due to having a Christmas decorative theme), the 
store manager opted against this as s/he realises it would favourably impact store 
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manager B7’s figures. However, transferring the surplus items would have reduced 
the expenditure of the broader workgroup. As will be discussed in the next sub-
section, this is at odds with the contents of the formal performance evaluation system. 
 
“We also need to stop giving spare carrier bags, uniforms and packaging to 
[Store Manager B7] because it’s come out of this store’s expenses and not 
[Store Manager B7’s] budget” (Store Meeting 3: 161-162) 
 
To summarise this sub-section, information visibility is a relevant contingency 
factor in the relationship between performance measures and managerial short-
termism. Figure 7.1 illustrates the process by which relative performance information 
that is placed into publicly available league tables can reinforce the relationship in 
question: (1) a manager with high relative ranking appeared to make contrastive 
downward comparisons and attempted to retain their league table position which 
could prompt short-termist decisions; and (2) a manager with low relative ranking 
appeared to make contrastive upward comparisons and attempted to improve their 
league table position which could prompt short-termist decisions.  
 
Figure 7.1: The Social Comparison Process  
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Attention now turns to the extent to which formal and informal performance 
evaluations may influence the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism. The information presented draws upon the descriptive overview provided in 
sub-section 5.3.3 and the analysis of internal company documents (document group 
3; see Appendix 10.9) and interview data (interview question 15b with code 2.19 used; 
see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).    
 
7.2.2 Tensions and Disconnects in Performance Evaluations 
 
Inspirational Performers entails evaluating a subordinate’s BSC performance 
alongside his/her ability to implement business plans, maintain store standards, and 
demonstrate values-led leadership. As described in Chapter 5, Grocer stipulates that 
equal weightings are to be attached to ‘what’ the subordinate had achieved during the 
quarter and ‘how’ s/he has utilised the appropriate leadership and/or operational skills 
to achieve the results on each of the four performance dimensions. However, the 
weightings attached to each of the performance dimensions themselves are 
determined subjectively by the superior. Consequently, subordinates infer that the 
BSC most affects their performance evaluation rating. The reasons for this inference 
appear threefold: (1) superiors understood the ‘what’ of implementing business plans 
and demonstrating values-led leadership to be elements of BSC performance, namely 
customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction respectively; (2) superiors often drew 
on relative performance information when rating the subordinate’s level of 
performance, which covered only the financial and non-financial measures in the 
BSC; and (3) the manager’s ‘Inspirational Performers: Performance and Development 
Pack’ was private, whereas information about the manager’s relative performance 
rank on each of the financial and non-financial measures in the BSC was public. The 
discussion hereafter will thus be restricted to the inter-temporal decision-making 
effect of evaluating a subordinate’s BSC performance, namely the tensions and 
disconnects that occur in these evaluations. It is worth noting that the issues raised 
here lead to the perception that the receipt of the rewards and penalties is primarily 
tied to the achievement of targets, which is discussed in the next sub-section. 
The financial performance measure of unknown product losses could be 
achieved through innovation: “We looked at, instead of just product protecting the 
product, why not, not have it on sale in the first place? So, what we did was we 
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photocopied a picture of the product and we put the photo into a safer case and that 
was visible for the customers” (Store Manager A5: 1599-1602). As another example, 
product wastage could be achieved through responsiveness: “Set up cage count 
trackers in the warehouse, reviewed daily and celebrated backstock reduction with 
the team” (Internal Company Documents, Group 3). Accordingly, during the formal 
performance evaluation, superiors attribute underperformance on the BSC to 
ineffective use of leadership and/or operational skills. As store manager B2 explains:  
 
“If you’re off track he’s going to tie it into your leadership. So, he’s going to 
say the reason you’re off-track is because of your leadership…If you were 
drastically bad at waste he could say you’re not innovative enough. You’re 
not thinking enough about how to be different around waste. Or, you need to 
collaborate more. So, when you’ve got too much stock why haven’t you rung 
your five local stores giving them two cases each and alleviated your problem 
as a collaboration?” (Store Manager B2: 2034-2054)  
 
Subordinates remark that Inspirational Performers discouraged short-termist 
decisions insofar as elements of their BSC performance that could be quantified and 
elements that were not entirely amenable to quantification were assigned equal 
weighting. By assigning an equal weight, subordinates focused on the behavioural 
competencies underpinning the achievement of financial and non-financial targets. 
But, because effective use of these competencies was viewed as tantamount to target 
achievement, some subordinates concluded that “I do feel that you’re under a lot of 
pressure and I always think that if you deliver a good [BSC] everything else is 
negotiable” (Store Manager B9: 1449-1451). Linked to this, as noted in the previous 
sub-section, tensions between utilising some of the appropriate leadership skills to 
achieve BSC targets and managerial reactions to publicly available relative 
performance information prevailed. Only those managers who were critical of the 
dissemination of relative performance information appeared more likely to 
demonstrate the full spectrum of behavioural competencies, particularly collaborative 
behaviour that supported the broader workgroup.91  
                                                          
91 For example, store manager A5 is one of the nine store managers who is particularly critical 
of the dissemination of relative performance information. This may help to account for his 
long-termist decision that helps support the broader workgroup (see sub-section 6.2.2.1). 
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As outlined in sub-section 5.3.1, the annual target that was determined by 
Grocer’s Head Office for each performance measure was broken down into a quarterly 
target, a monthly target, a weekly target, and often a daily target. Consequently, “if 
you can’t deliver it on a daily basis, you won’t deliver it on a weekly basis, or a 
monthly basis, or a quarter, or a year” (Store Manager A10: 251-253). The 
cumulative nature of achievement created pressure for on-target BSC performance in 
the short term. Indeed, considering underperformance, “if you don’t change it quickly, 
you can reach a tipping point where you can no longer achieve the fantastic green 
colour that you want” (Store Manager B9: 322-326). One manager explains that the 
pressure for generating short-term results intensified when Grocer shortened the 
period over which performance was formally evaluated.  
   
“You had to deliver your payroll figure, and say that’s fifty grand a week 
because we’re talking some way back in the past. And, for the first six months 
you wrestle with it a bit and you’re a couple of grand over every week and 
there might be some pressure with you and your boss and some attention of 
where you’re at. And then, half way through the year, you manage to make 
some changes and you get it a little more in line and obviously it looks a bit 
more positive and you move to a position now where you’re maybe a couple 
of grand under each week and you get to the end of the year and you’re there, 
thank you, I’ve delivered my payroll figure. Now, each quarter is a kind of 
mini year.” (Store Manager A11: 675-684)   
 
 Store manager A11 continues to explain that “the business is shortening its 
measuring point and therefore we’re all getting much more focused on short-term 
performance” (Store Manager A11: 666-668). This was reinforced by the continual 
review of progress through regular and informal evaluations, which occurred when a 
subordinate had below-target performance and/or weak relative performance. Thus, 
“that pressure to deliver the whole suite of KPIs consistently each week” (Store 
Manager A11: 728-729) encouraged managers to make inter-temporal trade-off 
decisions that prioritised the short term over the longer term. This was especially 
because informal performance evaluations focused solely on the ‘what’ to the 
exclusion of the ‘how’, which undermined the objective and content of Inspirational 
Performers. This disconnect led some subordinates to conclude that “when it comes 
to the crunch, they don’t really care about the how as long as the what gets delivered” 
(Store Manager A4: 953-955).    
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Chapter 5 noted that the final part of Inspirational Performers required the 
subordinate to prepare a prospective narrative that outlined clear objectives and 
appropriate action plans on each of the performance dimensions, as well as personal 
goals. Chapter 6 highlighted that this objective-setting process helped subordinates to 
focus on the longer term and think about how to improve their BSC performance over 
a longer period of time. However, the prospective narrative did not influence the 
subordinate’s performance evaluation rating, and so was something of a redundant 
exercise. Moreover, the process required the subordinate to be open about his/her 
developmental needs, which was at odds with the retrospective part of Inspirational 
Performers that perhaps encouraged the subordinate to explain away performance 
concerns to receive a satisfactory rating. And, even though it was widely 
acknowledged that “it does get you to focus on, well, what is your plan for next year?” 
(Store Manager B9: 1464-1467), the objectives and plans were often not implemented 
because of issues relating to frequent intra-organisational mobility. 
To summarise this sub-section, the performance evaluation system was a 
relevant contingency factor in the relationship between performance measures and 
managerial short-termism. The formal performance evaluation system appeared to 
weaken the relationship between performance measures and short-termism insofar as 
elements of the subordinate’s BSC performance that could be quantified and elements 
that were not entirely amenable to quantification were assigned equal weighting. 
However, the tensions within this system, and the disconnects with other elements of 
Grocer’s management control system, such as informal performance evaluations, 
undermined this behavioural effect. The next sub-section considers how the 
reward/penalty system in place may influence the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. The information presented in the next sub-section draws 
upon the descriptive overview provided in sub-section 5.3.4 and the analysis of 
interview data (interview questions 11, 16c, and 16d with codes 2.5, 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, and 
4.7 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).    
 
7.2.3 Mixing Carrots with Sticks 
 
“And, you’ve got to bear in mind, there’s always personal interest. So, if 
you’re a manager who wants to be promoted to a bigger store, earn more 
money, have a bigger car, what does that look like? And, if we’ve gravitated 
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into a business where that looks like a great [BSC], all of you are going to 
have one of those aren’t you?” (Store Manager A11: 1133-1138)   
 
 Grocer operates a ‘carrot and stick’ policy of offering a combination of 
rewards and penalties to direct and induce middle-level managers’ effort. As per the 
opening quote above, the interviewees affirm that Grocer’s formal and informal 
reward/penalty system directs their attention and efforts towards the financial and 
non-financial measures in the BSC. Whilst performance-based rewards and penalties 
were regarded as motivational, the impact varied across managers and with regards to 
what the manager was motivated to do. Some managers report that they valued the 
opportunity to earn monetary rewards for meeting or exceeding performance 
expectations “because I’m probably a worrier and I want that pay rise at the end of 
the year” (Group Loss Manager A: 1795-1796), whereas others acknowledged that 
“keeping my job—it’s a pretty big motivator” (Store Manager A4: 1632-1633). At the 
same time, several managers considered social recognition and condemnation to be as 
important as the formal rewards and penalties in inducing and directing their inter-
temporal efforts. The interplay between the formal and informal reward/penalty 
system added a further level of complexity to this issue. These findings are elaborated 
below. 
 For the annual cost-of-living adjustment and bonus that are awarded based on 
the performance rating that the manager received in his/her year-end evaluation, the 
outcome of interest was the monetary reward. Because the receipt of the monetary 
reward was believed to be primarily tied to the achievement of targets, as per 
managers’ inferences about the formal performance evaluation system, “this is where 
the [BSC] has become too important because, actually, it affects your mortgage and 
affects the car you drive” (Store Manager A8: 1675-1676). Using Grocer’s monetary 
reward formula, defined in sub-section 5.3.4.1, the combined cost-of-living 
adjustment and bonus received by a level 4 manager, whose base salary was £90,000 
and was rated green in his/her year-end evaluation, was £5,400 (assuming Grocer had 
below-target performance).92 But if this manager was rated blue instead, the size of 
the monetary reward increased by £5,400 to £10,800.93 In either case, the key point is 
                                                          
92 £5,400 = (£90,000 x 2%) + (£90,000 x 40% x 50% x 20%)  
93 £10,800 = (£90,000 x 4%) + (£90,000 x 40% x 20%) 
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that this provides the context for managers to rationalise a mind-set that perpetuated 
self-interest and inter-temporal trade-off decisions.  
For example, five store managers interviewed acknowledged that they made 
changes to the steps that they took to perform in line with their financial targets at 
yearend, such as aggressively cost cutting on payroll and expenses. This increased the 
likelihood that the manager would receive a green performance rating in his/her year-
end evaluation, but produced results that were unsustainably high and militated 
against longer-term activities. As another example, two store managers report that 
they delayed verbally reprimanding employees for poor punctuality and/or non-
adherence to Grocer’s dress code policy until after employee satisfaction because 
“colleagues don’t remember the previous six months where everything was great. 
They’ll remember that their manager gave them a warning for repeatedly wearing 
trainers to work the week before. So, absolutely, people will move those to post 
[employee satisfaction]” (Store Manager A4: 505-509). This increased the likelihood 
that the manager would receive a blue performance rating in his/her year-end 
evaluation but allowed short-term problems to fester. An analogous example of this 
type of situation was provided in sub-section 6.2.2.1, where group loss manager B 
admits that he regretted changing the working pattern of employees’ contracted hours 
to improve the customer shopping experience just before the measurement point for 
employee satisfaction because the decision negatively affected his performance 
evaluation rating which, in turn, influenced the monetary reward received. 
 But nine of the managers interviewed for this research did not value monetary 
rewards, particularly the bonus that was paid partly in cash and partly in shares 
deferred for three years. These managers stressed that “the performance-related 
bonus is absolutely the last thing on my mind. I’m not going to say I’ll refuse it, but it 
doesn’t even come into my psyche” (Store Manager A10: 1484-1488). Of these nine 
managers, four considered the size of the likely bonus award to be too trivial to direct 
and induce their inter-temporal efforts (illustrative quotations are given below). A 
further three managers believed that the bonus award would be revoked for 2014/15 
because of Grocer’s financial difficulties. This, incidentally, turned out to be the case.  
 
“I think if you’d done the questioning five years ago when we were still 
receiving bonuses certainly I’d probably answer it differently. But we haven’t 
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really had a proper bonus for a number of years.” (Store Manager A4: 1851-
1853) 
 
“But, actually, when you have been paid up in shares, and the share price has 
devalued over three years, it literally means nothing anyway.” (Store Manager 
B5: 1954-1956)  
 
 Many of the middle-level managers thus maintain that the other types of 
formal rewards and penalties that Grocer uses were equally or more important to earn 
or avoid. For example, managers valued the prospect of career progression (albeit 
normally also linked to a base salary increase). GroB store managers who consistently 
exceeded performance expectations in their quarter-end reviews were often moved to 
the GroA format. Moreover, level 4 managers who were performing notably well 
relative to their colleagues were often moved to the ‘broken’ and/or ‘complex’ stores 
or offered group team roles.94 As one manager notes, “I absolutely make sure that I 
do everything that I can to deliver. I want to better myself. I want a more challenging 
shop” (Store Manager B1: 878-880). Because this reward was visible to others, the 
motivational impact was enhanced through the experience of social pride and 
recognition. For example, “[Band] nine is the biggest store we have in Wales and 
there are three of them. You’d be classed as one of the best managers in Wales if 
you’re in there” (Store Manager B2: 473-475). However, for reasons that will be 
documented in the next sub-section, intra-organisational mobility can motivate 
managers to sacrifice the long term for the short term.  
 At Grocer, ‘Supporting Your Performance’ is triggered when a manager has 
underperformance in his/her quarter-end review. This formal process stipulates a one-
quarter deadline for the manager to improve his/her performance or risk demotion or 
dismissal. Five of the managers interviewed indicate that the threat of demotion or 
dismissal for underperformance was enough to encourage them to disproportionately 
focus on delivering on-target BSC results in the short term. For example, “The thought 
of being performance managed, and losing my job and being put under that much 
pressure, is more of a driving factor to me than having a bonus” (Store Manager A1: 
1782-1784). It should be noted that none of the managers interviewed are currently 
going through ‘Supporting Your Performance’.  
                                                          
94 Without exception, this was, perhaps paradoxically, seen as a positive reward.  
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Grocer’s informal reward/penalty system appeared to reinforce the potential 
for the formal reward/penalty system to induce and direct managers’ inter-temporal 
efforts. As outlined in sub-section 7.2.1, managers endeavoured to secure and retain 
a leading position in the predominantly daily or weekly league tables to experience 
social pride and recognition which reinforced the value of internal-lateral movement. 
Additionally, being praised for good performance engendered long-lasting positive 
emotions which strengthened the effect of the formal rewards. For example:  
 
“If someone says to me well done, I feel absolutely over the moon.” (Store 
Manager A5: 1901-1902)  
 
“A [certificate given at a GroB meeting] gives you a great feeling because 
you’ve been recognised by somebody else or thanked by somebody else.” 
(Store Manager B1: 1325-1326)   
 
To summarise this sub-section, Grocer’s ‘carrot and stick’ incentive system is 
a relevant contingency factor in the relationship between performance measures and 
managerial short-termism. Monetary rewards that were believed to be primarily tied 
to the achievement of financial and non-financial targets prompted short-termist 
decisions, particularly if the reward was felt to be large enough and would be 
honoured. Career progression opportunities, as well as demotions or dismissals, also 
related to managers’ short-termist decisions. Informal rewards and penalties (such as 
social pride and humiliation) reinforced the inter-temporal decision-making impact of 
Grocer’s formal reward system. But, whilst some managers took short-termist actions 
out of desire to earn rewards (the carrot), others took actions out of fear of incurring 
penalties (the stick). The next sub-section explores how intra-organisational mobility 
may influence the relationship between performance measures and short-termism. 
The information presented draws upon the descriptive overview provided in sub-
section 5.2.5 and the analysis of interview data (interview questions 1 and 17 with 
code 5.5 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10). 
 
7.2.4 Intra-organisational Mobility: Should I Stay or Should I Go? 
 
All middle-level managers interviewed for this research exhibited a high rate of intra-
organisational mobility. Managers had been positioned at work level three or four for 
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an average of seven years (range, one to twenty years), but positioned in their current 
role for an average of two years (range, one month to four and a half years).95 Because 
Grocer promulgates the timescales for the different types of intra-organisational 
mobility, a manager’s expectation about the length of time that they will remain in 
their current role influenced his/her inter-temporal decision-making behaviour. On the 
one hand, managers who expect an imminent move focused heavily on overachieving 
short-term BSC measures often at the expense of setting or implementing workgroup 
or store-specific strategies. On the other hand, managers who expect to still be in their 
current role in the next target-setting period deliberately underachieved some of the 
BSC measures that were influenced by past performance. In general, there is a feeling 
among managers at Grocer that “you never get to the long term because you end up 
moving” (Store Manager A1: 1887-1888). A further level of complexity is added 
because the frequent movement of one’s superior also influenced the inter-temporal 
decision-making process. These findings are elaborated below. 
It has been previously noted that the group loss and group change coach roles 
are secondments, which are intended to last for a maximum of eighteen months. 
Therefore, “because I’m on a secondment role I probably want more results now” so 
that “if this role ever finished, I would have something to back up going for other 
roles that come out” (Group Loss Manager A: 770-786). Similarly, placements are 
intended to last for a minimum of twelve weeks and provide an opportunity for the 
manager to gain the essential skills and experiences for internal-upward mobility. 
Placement managers are thus driven to achieve on-target or above-target performance 
in the short term to demonstrate that they can meet the responsibilities of the role 
sought and so pass the trial period. To maximise the likelihood of this, two managers 
acknowledged taking forceful and directive actions that, while advantageous to short-
term BSC performance, were harmful to workplace culture over a longer period of 
time. The actions were taken because neither manager expected to stay in the 
placement setting after the trial period. The managers thus forego the long term 
because they did not expect to face the consequences of their short-term actions. That 
is, the measurement point for employee satisfaction did not fall within the placement 
period. So, because a manager is not held accountable for the store’s BSC results when 
s/he moves, “the performance of what they’re leaving behind is less relevant” (Store 
                                                          
95 Further details can be found in Appendix 10.6. 
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Manager B9: 1897-1898). Incidentally, both managers remained in the placement 
setting after passing the trial period. As the quotations below illustrate, if the managers 
had known that they were to remain in the placement setting then they may not have 
sacrificed the long-term interests of the store.  
 
“I was here on a placement—something you do before you get appointed or 
signed off as a store manager—and I was asked by the store director to deliver 
results straight away. So, when I came here, I damaged the long-term 
performance of the store and the store team because all I focused on was the 
short term. And, what I mean by that is that, when I came here, I literally 
reacted and acted upon everything that was broken at the time. So, yes, it did 
deliver a short-term output. And, when I say short term, it wasn’t a weekly it 
was eleven weeks, twelve weeks as an output. So, we delivered the KPIs, but 
at a consequence to the colleague...If I had known that I was going to stay 
here then maybe I would have played a longer game and done more about 
building relationships.” (Store Manager A6: 935-987)   
 
“I went in and, I suppose, focused heavily on short-term measures with very 
little thought for the long-term prosperity of the shop. Probably selfishly 
because it was a short term kind of get in there, fix it, and get out. So, I did it 
for three months. I fixed the shop to my short-term measures. When I was told 
I was staying there, my motivations changed to the long term.” (Group Change 
Coach B: 436-441)96 
 
Grocer also sanctions internal-lateral transfers of store managers among stores 
within and between workgroups. When a store manager transfers to a different store, 
the envisioned inter-temporal regime is as follows: (1) previous managerial actions 
that are equivalent to ‘plastering over the cracks’ are remedied in the first year; (2) the 
building blocks are put in place for improving BSC measures in the second year; and 
(3) sustainable BSC results are observed in the final three years. This progressive 
agenda is reinforced by Grocer’s policy, which prescribes that store managers remain 
in one store for a minimum of eighteen months. So, initially, “I could come into a 
shop after a store manager that has decided not to scan waste on a certain 
department” (Store Manager A2: 1476-1478) and, to remedy this practice, 
performance measure results will get worse before they get better. Clearly, however, 
Grocer’s reward system can negate the agenda because “say you went to a really hard 
                                                          
96 In this quotation, group change coach B is speaking retrospectively about his experience as 
a store manager. 
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shop that was broken and you couldn’t fix it quick enough you may not get a full pay 
rise” (Store Manager B2: 2210-2211). At the same time, a recurrent theme in 
interviewees’ accounts is that the guidelines for internal-lateral transfers are not 
always adhered to. For instance, some middle-level managers experience an internal-
lateral transfer biannually. Because the manager has to consistently exceed 
performance expectations in his/her quarter-end reviews to experience such frequent 
internal-lateral movement, it appears to create a perverse incentive to “manipulate 
data to deliver a great [BSC] to say ‘look, how great am I?’ and then move on” (Store 
Manager B9: 1273-1280). In this situation, the manager does not suffer the 
repercussions of any actions that s/he has taken in the short term that are detrimental 
in the longer term when s/he moves store (as per secondments). Quotations that link 
short-termism to this lack of accountability upon internal-lateral movement are given 
below.  
 
“How can you stand over longevity in terms of performance if you’re running 
the store six months? So, you know we talked about cutting corners, fudging 
figures, well how could you ever say who it was? You couldn’t prove it, could 
you? You couldn’t say, well it’s down to that person because they were in, well 
no, actually, was it them? Whose problem was it?” (Store Manager A6: 2462-
2466)   
 
“You always heard of situations where store managers would not count things 
properly to manipulate their [unknown product losses] position. And then, 
they would move stores and say look how well I’ve done. The new store 
manager would come in, the store would feel completely empty, and then they 
would count it all off and suddenly a huge [unknown product losses] bill would 
come in and they’d say well how come your [unknown product losses] is so 
bad? And, he’d say well because the last guy wasn’t counting anything.” 
(Store Manager B9: 1273-1279)  
 
In contrast, managers who expect to be in their current role in the next target-
setting period reduce their effort on some of the BSC measures that are influenced by 
past performance. In other words, managers have an incentive not to exceed some 
targets even if they could do because “if I achieve blue on waste then I know my 
budgets next year are going to be set at such a low level that I’d feel like, how the hell 
am I going to deliver that?” (Store Manager B9: 1140-1142). While BSC measures 
that have generic targets (e.g., customer and employee satisfaction) are not subject to 
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such practices, managers do not withhold effort to avoid difficult targets in the future 
on all BSC measures that are influenced by past performance. For example, managers 
do not reduce their sales activity in response to target ratcheting for reasons that are 
twofold. First, each of the cost targets (payroll, expenses, product wastage, and 
unknown product losses) are calculated as a percentage of the budgeted sales 
performance. Therefore, if next year’s sales target is lowered, then so also are each of 
the cost targets. Second, sales has an inverse relationship with product wastage. Thus, 
“if we improve our sales like-for-like position, waste is going to decrease because 
that product isn’t being left on our shelf and it’s not going in the bin” (Store Manager 
A9: 195-198).  
Store directors also experience frequent internal-lateral movement, which 
supposedly creates an outlook among store managers of “all I need to do is just 
survive my boss” (Store Director A: 1818). The frequent movement of one’s superior 
can thus influence inter-temporal trade-off decisions insofar as some subordinates are 
inclined to take actions that pacify their superior rather than focusing on actions that 
meet the needs of customers that shop at their store. This issue is illustrated below.  
 
“Let’s say, for example, that a particular issue in their store is standards but 
I’m putting loads of pressure on [unknown product losses] and waste. But 
their [unknown product losses] and waste is really strong. But I’m saying that 
I’m going out in stores, and I’m checking waste boards, and I’m checking 
[unknown product losses] boards, and I’m going to talk to colleagues. That 
puts them under pressure to be at their best. And that may draw their attention 
away from the two or three things that they really need to focus on.” (Store 
Director A: 556-562)   
 
To summarise this sub-section, intra-organisational mobility is a relevant 
contingency factor in the relationship between performance measures and managerial 
short-termism. Managers who expect an imminent move focus heavily on 
overachieving short-term BSC measures, often at the expense of setting or 
implementing workgroup or store-specific strategies. This is because there is no 
reporting mechanism at Grocer that allows the manager to benefit from the future 
gains associated with their past decisions when s/he experiences intra-organisational 
mobility, or suffer the repercussions of any actions that they have taken in the short 
term that are detrimental to the longer term. More frequent intra-organisational 
mobility of one’s superior can also prompt inter-temporal trade-off decisions. The 
230 
 
following sub-section presents the findings that relate to the role that individual time 
perspectives play in the inter-temporal decision-making process. Specifically, the sub-
section explores how a manager’s time perspective may influence the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism. The information presented draws 
upon the analysis of interview data (interview questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 with codes 
6.1 through to 6.7 used; see Appendix 10.7 and 10.10).    
 
7.2.5 Putting Time in Perspective: Between-Person Variability in 
Inter-Temporal Responses 
 
Middle-level managers participation in short-termism would perhaps occur, albeit to 
a lesser extent, irrespective of the structure and operation of Grocer’s performance 
measurement system. As one manager explains: “I think it’s definitely down to 
personality” (Group Online Shopping Manager: 1459-1460). Time perspective is the 
personal preference that is related to inter-temporal decisions in the workplace.97,98 
Managers with a past time perspective “use all of the learning experiences, all of the 
decisions I’ve made over the years, as reference points” (Store Director B: 778-779) 
for confirming their present-day actions and decisions. Managers with a present time 
perspective “like to see more immediate change in the here and now” (Group Change 
Coach A: 578-579) and sometimes have vaguely defined future goals. Managers with 
a future time perspective prefer to “work hard now to have a better time down the 
road” (Store Manager B2: 220-221) and are better able to abstract the implications of 
their present-day actions and decisions. Whilst all the middle-level managers 
interviewed for this research allocate varying degrees of attention across the time 
frames, thirteen tend to overemphasise the present time frame to the exclusion or 
minimisation of the past and future. In contrast, five of the middle-level managers 
tend to overemphasise the future time frame to the exclusion or minimisation of the 
past and present. Overemphasising one particular time frame appears to broadly map 
                                                          
97 See footnote 48 for information about forming interview questions to tap into an 
individual’s time perspective profile.  
98 To remind the reader, time perspective relates to the notion that individuals differ in their 
use of the three temporal frames: past, present, and future (Zimbardo and Boyd, 1999). When 
an individual develops a tendency to overemphasise one of the three temporal frames to the 
exclusion or minimisation of the other two, a dysfunctional cognitive temporal bias prevails. 
This temporal bias has been termed temporal orientation (Shipp et al., 2009). 
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onto a specific inter-temporal decision-making process. Table 7.1 presents each 
manager’s time perspective profile and highlights those who purport to predominately 
locate themselves in the present or future.99 Aspects of this table are discussed below.  
Table 7.1: Time Perspective Profiles 
 
 Time Perspective  
Time 
Orientation 
Interviewee Past  Present Future Present Future 
Store Manager A1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓  
Store Manager A2 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager A3 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager A4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓  
Store Manager A5 ✓  ✓   
Store Manager A6 ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Store Manager A7 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager A8 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager A9 ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓✓ 
Store Manager A10 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓  
Store Manager A11 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Group Loss Manager A ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Group Change Coach A ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓  
Store Director A ✓  ✓   
Store Manager B1 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B2 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B3 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B4 ✓  ✓  ✓✓ 
Store Manager B5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Manager B6 ✓ ✓  ✓  
Store Manager B7  ✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Manager B8 ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Store Manager B9 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Manager B10 ✓  ✓   
Store Manager B11 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Store Manager B12 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Group Change Coach B ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓  
                                                          
99 Table 7.1 considers all aspects of the individual’s life (i.e., both personal and work life), 
which is linked to the inter-temporal decisions that s/he makes in work outlined in Figure 6.5. 
Observed differences between the way an individual’s time perspective shapes the decisions 
that they make for themselves and those that they make within an organisation are explained. 
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Group Loss Manager B ✓ ✓  ✓✓  
Group Online Shopping 
Manager ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓  
Store Director ✓  ✓  ✓ 
  
 Except for one individual, all interviewees reported relating to the past. 
Regarding the workplace, the past helps the manager to set goals and devise plans to 
achieve them when previous actions and decisions are evaluated. Two store managers 
referred to past seasonal events: “I’ve already reflected on what went well and what 
didn’t go so well last Christmas…you need to reflect on what you captured from last 
year that went well that you would want to repeat and what didn’t go as well and 
you’d change this year given the opportunity and the allowance to do so” (Store 
Manager B6: 857-872). Regarding reducing in-store management roles (see sub-
section 5.1.5), one store manager had previously been through restructuring at Grocer 
and drew on this experience to confirm his present behaviour, as evidenced below.  
 
“When I was an accountant with [Grocer] in head office, I went through 
structure change. So, I was called into an office and told we’re moving this 
work to [Place] but there’s no change to your job at the moment etcetera. That 
process went on for two years. So my emotions and my state of mind really 
suffered and struggled. But, having been through it, now that the store is going 
through structure change, because I know what it feels like, I’m really 
conscious about how I communicate with the people that work in my store and 
how I want to keep them informed.” (Store Manager B9: 654-665)  
 
 Twenty-five interviewees reported holding a present time perspective. On a 
personal level, these individuals believed that “you have to live for the now” (Store 
Manager B2: 196) and “treat every day like it’s your last” (Store Manager B6: 813). 
The present time perspective manager attended to existing performance issues and 
had a strong preference for daily or weekly goals. Future goals tended to be vaguely 
defined because “if you give yourself something in a year’s time, it’s hard to feel that 
self-achievement” (Store Manager B7: 242-243). Aspects of Grocer’s performance 
measurement system appear to reinforce this time perspective, namely the frequency 
of performance measure monitoring and informal performance evaluations. Table 7.1 
shows that all the middle-level managers interviewed thought about the past and/or 
present. It is of note that all middle-level managers also provided a first-person 
account of focusing on the short term (see Figure 6.5). 
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 Twenty-eight interviewees reported holding a future-focused time frame. 
Regarding the workplace, these managers were committed to working towards 
monthly or yearly goals and their associated rewards, often making a temporary 
sacrifice. The most commonly mentioned work-related goal concerned career 
progression. Eight of the managers suggested that they work harder in the present to 
achieve this goal that is salient to them. For example:  
 
“It’s all about what I’m going to do next. I am pushing the profitability plan 
because I want to get out of [GroA store].” (Store Manager A5: 988-989)  
 
“I’ve travelled anything from half an hour to an hour and a half and almost 
your life can be overtaken by [Grocer] then because you’re sort of in work for 
seven and you leave work at half six in the night. If you’ve got an hour and a 
half either side, that’s a fair chunk of your day taken up. But I’m sort of 
thinking, actually, you know what when I get promoted and gradually get 
closer to home the reward will be then.” (Store Manager B2: 214-220)   
 
 Other well-defined future goals include, for example, improving employee 
satisfaction scores. The future time perspective manager abstracts the implications of 
their present-day actions and decisions, which is supported by the cumulative nature 
of achievement at Grocer. But, interestingly, not all those who think about the future 
provide a first-person account of focusing on the long term in work (compare Figure 
6.5 and Table 7.1). The inter-temporal issues associated with intra-organisational 
mobility (see sub-section 6.1.3 and sub-section 7.2.4) and Grocer’s present financial 
adversity (see sub-section 5.1.5 and sub-section 6.1.3) appeared to weaken four 
manager’s future time perspective.100 The manner in which an individual’s time 
perspective shapes the decisions they make for themselves can thus differ from those 
they make within an organisation.  
Managers who have the tendency to overemphasise one of the three time 
frames, to the exclusion or minimisation of the other two, appear to exhibit a specific 
inter-temporal decision-making process. Whilst none of the middle-level managers 
interviewed exhibited an excessive focus on the past, thirteen purported to 
overemphasise the present and so hold a present time orientation. Of the eleven 
managers who offered a first-person account of sacrificing the long term for the short 
                                                          
100 These are: store manager A1, store manager B7, store manager B12, and group change 
coach A.  
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term (see Figure 6.5), six fell into the present time orientation category (denoted by a 
double checkmark in Table 7.1). For example, store manager A4 had a present time 
orientation and games customer satisfaction (see Table 6.4). On the other hand, five 
of the middle-level managers interviewed tended to overemphasise the future time 
frame, and so held a future time orientation. Of the eight managers who provided a 
first-person account of sacrificing the short term for the long term (see Figure 6.5), 
two fell into the future time orientation category (denoted by a double checkmark in 
Table 7.1). For example, store manager B4 had a future time orientation and opted to 
reduce her store’s contracted base to improve long-term profitability and flexibility, 
but to the harm of short-term BSC performance (see sub-section 6.2.2.1).  
To summarise this sub-section, an individual’s time perspective appears to 
complicate the relationship between performance measures and short-termism. By 
matching each manager’s temporal foci with his/her inter-temporal decisions in work, 
the present study finds that a manager who relates to the past and/or present is likely 
to make short-term decisions in the workplace. Moreover, managers who have the 
tendency to overemphasise the present time frame, to the exclusion or minimisation 
of the past and future, seem likely to make short-termist decisions. However, aspects 
of the organisational context in which a manager’s time perspective surfaces may 
reinforce or weaken this preference. Sub-section 7.2.6 discusses the findings 
presented in this section in relation to the literature reviewed in Chapter 3.  
 
 
7.2.6 Discussion: Factors That Complicate the Relationship Between 
Performance Measures and Short-termism    
 
Chapter 3 outlined that a contingency perspective on the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism may prove useful in reconciling the 
conflicts evident in the management accounting literature. The chapter thus examined 
how performance information can be disseminated, how different rewards can be 
allocated, how managers’ employment horizons can be shaped, and how individuals 
can respond differently to performance information within an integrated framework 
of the relationship between an organisation’s performance measurement system and 
managerial short-termism. However, regarding each contingent factor, gaps in, and 
concerns about, the relevant literature emerged.  
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Section 3.1 documented that organisations commonly impose relative 
performance information onto managers, which may prompt social comparisons. 
However, little is known about the ways in which the design of an organisation’s 
performance measurement system may induce social comparisons and how the 
behavioural consequences then manifest. Section 3.2 indicated that rewards attached 
to financial measures likely encourage short-termism (e.g., Laverty, 2004), but it is 
difficult to untangle the joint influence of saliency of financial measures and 
incentives on managers’ inter-temporal decisions. Evidence regarding the impact that 
reprisals have on managers’ inter-temporal decisions is limited to a single study in the 
accounting literature (i.e., Mergenthaler et al., 2012), and accounting researchers have 
generally not investigated how rewards and/or reprisals attached to non-financial 
measures influence short-termist behaviour. Section 3.3 examined managers’ 
employment horizons, concluding that the extent to which intra-organisational 
mobility influences managers’ propensity to make short-termist decisions has 
received relatively little research attention. Finally, Section 3.4 outlined how an 
individual’s time perspective influences their current attitudes, decisions, and 
behaviours. However, few studies that deploy an inter-temporal choice framework 
engage with this issue, and so little is known of whether an organisation’s 
performance measurement system may reinforce or weaken a manager’s temporal 
preference. The present study addressed these issues by formulating and answering 
the following research question: what is the extent of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism? 
Regarding relative performance information, social comparisons are induced 
by the performance measurement system because the system publicises performance 
differences between workgroup members. Specifically, the system stimulates the 
underlying goals (i.e., self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and self-improvement) that 
drive the initiation of the social comparison process (Festinger, 1954; Wood et al., 
1994; Collins, 1996). Because the system emphasises performance differences 
between managers, the context primes differential thinking and prompts contrastive 
social comparisons (Stapel and Koomen, 2005). However, there are examples of 
managers assimilating (‘that person could be me’) with an upward target in order to 
try to enhance their current performance (see sub-section 5.3.2). In line with 
Greenberg et al. (2007) and Hannan et al. (2013; 2014), the findings reveal that 
making contrastive upward comparisons is demoralising, prompts an unfavourable 
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self-image, and engenders negative emotions such as shame and jealousy. On the 
other hand, making contrastive downward comparisons is liberating, enhances the 
manager’s self-image, and engenders positive emotions such as pride and arrogance 
(Greenberg et al., 2007; Hannan et al., 2013). The present findings add further 
substance to this literature by highlighting that the frequency with which relative 
performance information is prepared and disseminated influences the occurrence of 
social comparisons and exacerbates the emotional response thereafter.  
At Grocer, league tables encourage managers to compete for non-monetary 
rewards—namely autonomy, reputational benefits, and bragging rights—by trying to 
outperform others on mutually important performance dimensions. As noted in sub-
section 5.3.2, this can have a positive impact on effort exerted (see Tafkov, 2013). 
However, sub-section 7.2.1 demonstrated that this emphasis on the self, and a desire 
for one’s abilities to be slightly better than other managers, can lead to gaming and 
trading-off BSC measures. In support of this finding, Edelman and Larkin’s (2014) 
study reveals that feeling socially inferior to one’s peers can lead to deceptive 
behaviour amongst academics, namely downloading one’s own working paper in the 
SSRN repository. League tables also appear to make managers unwilling to 
collaborate and subsequently forgo maximising profitable joint gains, as per Garcia et 
al. (2006). These findings highlight the tensions between Grocer’s use of league tables 
and the contents of its formal performance evaluation system (e.g., to demonstrate 
collaboration and empathy). Together, short-termism appears to be an outcome of 
why, how, and to what affect managers socially compare. The behavioural corollaries 
of contrastive social comparisons manifest through financial and non-financial BSC 
measures because they are the valued dimensions for comparison. The findings 
presented in sub-section 7.2.1 contribute to the behavioural accounting literature by 
suggesting that the design of an organisation’s performance measurement system may 
induce social comparisons and so inter-temporal trade-off decisions.  
 Regarding performance evaluations, the weightings that are attached to the 
four dimensions (i.e., BSC, business plans, store standards, and values-led leadership) 
in a subordinate’s formal performance evaluation are determined subjectively by the 
superior; subordinates infer that the BSC most affects their performance evaluation 
rating. The system discourages short-termist decisions insofar as elements of the 
subordinate’s BSC performance that can be quantified and elements that are not 
entirely amenable to quantification are assigned equal weighting. By assigning an 
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equal weight, subordinates focus on the behaviours that underpin the achievement of 
financial and non-financial targets. Partial support for this finding is provided by 
Chow and van der Stede (2006), who find that subjective (qualitative) non-financial 
measures are more effective than objective (quantitative) non-financial measures and 
financial measures in curtailing managers’ short-term focus and inclination to engage 
in manipulation.  
Nonetheless, the findings here extend previous analyses by suggesting that the 
manner in which financial and non-financial BSC information is used in informal 
performance evaluations undermine, and even supersede, the inter-temporal effects of 
the formal system. The sometimes daily informal performance evaluations, which 
focus solely on elements of the subordinate’s performance that can be quantified, 
prompt subordinates (store managers) to focus on the short term to remedy 
underperformance. This ongoing pressure for short-term results leads to inter-
temporal trade-off decisions that prioritise the short term over the longer term. These 
findings partly align with a distinct group of RAPM studies, whose instrument focuses 
on the extent to which quantitative information is used to evaluate a subordinate’s 
performance, and may imply that dysfunctional outcomes follow from the extent to 
which particular non-financial measures are used for evaluating the performance of 
subordinates in certain contexts (e.g., Hirst, 1983). In combination, the findings 
presented in sub-section 7.2.2 contribute to the behavioural accounting literature by 
showing that tensions between an organisation’s formal and informal performance 
evaluation system can give rise to undesirable behavioural affects.  
The findings that relate to the impact that Grocer’s ‘carrot and stick’ 
performance-based incentive system has on managers’ inter-temporal trade-off 
decisions aligns with the arguments put forward by agency theorists (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Demski and Feltham, 1978; Baiman, 1990). At Grocer, managers 
often pursue short-term BSC results that serve their own interests at the expense of 
longer-term activities that would be optimal for their store or workgroup. Superior-
subordinate information asymmetries facilitate this behaviour, as per one of the main 
tenets of agency theory. That is: “Stores were just scanning random clothing to 
deliver this measure. But my boss would never know that” (Store Manager A4: 1561-
1562).  
The findings suggest that monetary rewards that are believed to be primarily 
tied to the achievement of financial and non-financial targets can prompt short-termist 
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decisions, particularly if the reward is felt to be large enough and will be honoured. 
This extends previous findings which indicate that it is the monetary incentives that 
are attached to financial targets that encourage short-termism (Hoskisson et al., 1993; 
Wallace, 1997; Murphy and Jensen, 2011), by proposing that the argument also 
applies to non-financial targets. Middle-level managers also value career progression 
opportunities, which are awarded if the manager consistently exceeds performance 
expectations in his/her quarter-end reviews and has strong relative performance. 
Relative performance information activates informal rewards and penalties (social 
pride and humiliation; see above), which reinforces the motivational impact of 
Grocer’s formal reward system. Formal penalties for underperformance also relate to 
managers’ short-termist decisions and actions, namely the demotions or dismissals 
that can occur if a manager does not successfully fulfil the requirements of 
‘Supporting Your Performance’. This finding aligns with Souder and Bromiley 
(2012), who explain that the threat of reprisal following poor performance is likely to 
motivate managers to trade off investments in assets with more delayed benefits to 
maintain short-term results. In summary, the impact that different forms of rewards 
and penalties have on inter-temporal trade-off decisions varies across managers. The 
present study contributes to the literature by highlighting that whilst some managers 
take short-termist actions out of desire to earn rewards (the carrot), others take actions 
out of fear of incurring penalties (the stick) that are attached to financial and non-
financial targets. The study also contributes to this literature by disentangling the 
reward and penalties attached to performance measures from the use of performance 
measures in the context of performance evaluation.  
Regarding intra-organisational mobility, the evidence from Grocer suggests 
that managers who expect an imminent move focus heavily on overachieving short-
term BSC measures, often at the expense of setting or implementing workgroup or 
store-specific strategies. In partial support of this finding, Campion et al. (1994) 
specify that job-rotation can be harmful insofar as it creates a short-term perspective 
with regards to problem solving by the rotated employee. Consistent with the insight 
offered by Mannix and Loewenstein (1993) and van Rinsum and Hartmann (2011), it 
is managers’ prior knowledge about future mobility that triggers inter-temporal trade-
off decisions. Overachieving BSC measures facilitates frequent internal-lateral 
transfers, which support the manager’s career progression. Managers thus attempt to 
overachieve BSC measures to create a façade of competence in the short term, which 
239 
 
can increase their likelihood of securing internal-upward mobility. This aligns with 
Graham et al. (2005), who report that managers may exercise accounting discretion 
to achieve desirable earnings goals when repeatedly failing to meet targets inhibits 
their internal-upward mobility.  
Interestingly, though, internal-lateral transfers uncouple middle-level 
managers’ personal gain from the longer-term performance of the store/workgroup in 
which they are currently positioned for at least two reasons. First, there is no reporting 
mechanism at Grocer that allows the manager to benefit from the future gains 
associated with their past decisions when s/he experiences intra-organisational 
mobility. Second, a manager who moves to a different store/workgroup does not 
suffer the repercussions of any actions that they have taken in the short term that are 
detrimental to the longer term. Whilst this mirrors the findings of research that 
examines the relationship between inter-organisational mobility and managers’ 
temporality (e.g., Mannix and Loewenstein, 1994), it extends research that examines 
intra-organisational mobility and inter-temporal decisions by suggesting that it is not 
just the manager’s expectation about mobility that is a trigger, but also his/her 
knowledge about a lack of accountability for past decisions. As such, managers who 
expect to still be in their current role in the next target-setting period deliberately 
underachieve some of the BSC measures that are influenced by past performance (see 
Bevan and Hood, 2006; Bouwens and Kroos, 2011). The findings presented in sub-
section 7.2.4 also extend research in this area by suggesting that more frequent intra-
organisational mobility of one’s superior can prompt inter-temporal trade-off 
decisions.  
The evidence presented in sub-section 7.2.5 illustrates that a past time 
perspective can help individuals set goals and devise plans to achieve them when 
previous actions are evaluated in order to confirm behaviour or provide lessons for 
improvement which is consistent with Karniol and Ross (1996). The findings also 
indicate that individuals with a present time perspective are heavily influenced by 
short-range goals and attend to the relatively more certain reality of the immediate 
present, as per Zimbardo and Boyd (1999; 2008). By matching each manager’s 
temporal foci with his/her inter-temporal decisions in work, the present study finds 
that a manager who is cognitively involved with the past and/or present is likely to 
take short-term actions and decisions in the workplace. Moreover, managers who have 
the tendency to overemphasise the present time frame, to the exclusion or 
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minimisation of the past and future, seem likely to make short-termist decisions. The 
findings indicate that managers with a future time perspective are committed to 
working towards distant goals and their associated rewards, often at the expense of 
immediate gratification, because they are better able to abstract the implications of 
their current actions. This supports Zimbardo and Boyd’s (1999) study, which finds 
that individuals with a future time perspective are more likely to have well-defined 
future goals and consider the distant outcomes of their present behaviour. In support 
of Das’ (1987; 1991) observation, the present study suggests that a manager who 
relates to the future is likely to take long-term actions and decisions. The findings 
presented in sub-section 7.2.5 extend previous research by suggesting that aspects of 
the organisational context in which a manager’s time perspective surfaces may 
reinforce or weaken this personal preference. For example, the frequency of 
performance measure monitoring appears to reinforce a present time perspective 
profile whilst the issues associated with intra-organisational mobility appear to 
weaken some managers’ future time perspective profile in work.  
In answering the last research question, the present study contributes to the 
behavioural accounting literature by demonstrating the dynamic, complex, and fluid 
interplay between several contingency factors and their impact on the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism. By using an integrated approach, 
the study shows that these contingency factors may not be correlated, giving rise to 
conflicting contingences. Specifically: (1) the dissemination of relative performance 
information appears to prompt social comparisons and short-termism, with more 
frequent dissemination exacerbating the felt emotions; (2) the tensions between an 
organisation’s formal and informal performance evaluation system can give rise to 
short-termism; (3) rewards and penalties attached to financial and non-financial 
measures encourage short-termism, but the impact can vary across managers; (4) 
knowledge about frequent intra-organisational mobility (of either oneself or one’s 
superior) and a lack of accountability for past decisions upon internal movement 
appears to encourage short-termism; and (5) a present time orientation appears to be 
linked to short-termism, but a manager’s time perspective can be reinforced or 
weakened by elements of the organisational setting.     
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7.3  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This research is concerned with the nature and extent of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. The purpose of this chapter was to describe, 
analyse, and explain the research findings pertaining to the third and fourth research 
questions:  
 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
4. What is the extent of the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
 
Captured in the term ‘nature’, the chapter has outlined middle-level managers’ 
short-termist decisions in relation to the structure and operation of an organisation’s 
performance measurement system. At the broadest level, financial measures and non-
financial measures that are quantitative in nature encourage an excessive short-term 
focus and short-termism. Reasons for this include the high importance accorded to 
performance targets, target level difficultly, and underperformance. The occurrence 
of short-termism also linked to inappropriate causal linkages between performance 
measures within and between measurement areas. Captured in the term ‘extent’, these 
findings were then taken further by explaining the factors that appear particularly 
active in complicating the relationship between performance measures and short-
termism. Namely, the way performance measurement information is disseminated, 
evaluated, and then rewarded, and personal time perspectives influence middle-level 
managers’ involvement in short-termist decisions. Together, this chapter has 
highlighted the nature and extent of the relationship between performance measures 
and short-termism. The implications of the findings from this chapter and Chapter 6 
are evaluated and presented in Chapter 8. In addition to considering the implications 
of the findings and presenting recommendations on that basis, Chapter 8 also reflects 
on the whole research process, highlighting the central features of the research and 
examining the research design.  
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8 CONCLUSION  
 
  
This concluding chapter provides a summary of the thesis, presents the main 
conclusions, and discusses the contributions (theoretical and methodological) that 
have been made. Implications for practice from the research will also be outlined. The 
chapter ends with a description of the study’s limitations and suggestions for further 
research.  
  
8.1 A Study of Performance Measures and Short-termism   
 
The research topic addressed in the thesis was the nature and extent of the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism. The study began by explaining the 
nature of the research topic. Essentially, although research into the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism has been undertaken previously, 
empirical evidence is inconclusive as to the role played by financial measures 
(compare Merchant, 1990; van der Stede, 2000) and non-financial measures (compare 
Moers, 2000; van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2011) on short-termism. Specifically, 
several studies are unsupportive of the literature’s conceptual arguments that financial 
measures encourage short-termism (see e.g., Marginson and McAulay, 2008) and 
non-financial measures prompt actions and decisions that have beneficial longer-term 
consequences (see e.g., Marginson et al., 2010). One explanation for the mixed results 
is that, apart from differentiating between financial and non-financial measures, 
studies tend not to differentiate further in terms of performance measures and their 
relationship with short-termist behaviour. There is also little or no evidence regarding 
the role played by a systematic or formalised arrangement of performance measures 
on short-termism. Moreover, those studies that have taken place are potentially 
problematic, insofar as they have often been premised on the assumption that the short 
term is a standardised period of one year, and have used proxies such as time 
allocation for measuring short-termist behaviour. The appropriateness of these 
assumptions has yet to be examined empirically. Chapter 2 concluded, therefore, that 
better understanding may likely derive from drilling down further into the nuances of 
both short-termism and performance measurement. 
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Considering the aforementioned conflicting findings evident in the 
behavioural accounting literature, the case for broadening the investigation of the 
performance measure-short-termism relationship was identified and discussed in 
Chapter 3. Adopting a contingency approach, the study employed ‘method theories’ 
imported from economics (i.e., agency theory) and psychology (i.e., social 
comparison theory, time perspective) as a meta-level conceptual system for exploring 
various contingencies that may determine the extent of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. Developing an integrated framework that 
focused on the management control system package (see Figure 3.1), the 
contingencies considered include the following: how performance measurement 
information is disseminated; how different rewards are allocated; how managers’ 
employment horizons are shaped; and how individual managers respond to a 
performance measurement system. These factors reflect the context-embedded and 
messy reality of organisational life. 
Following the literature review of Chapters 2 and 3, an account of the 
methodological strategy was provided in Chapter 4, in part, to demonstrate that the 
research design was appropriate to the research topic. Critical realism was considered 
the most appropriate paradigm through which to conceptualise and conduct a piece of 
research such as this, essentially for two reasons: (a) its stratified ontology could 
question assumptions underpinning conceptual arguments; and (b) the perspective 
offered a medium to get beneath surface-level observations in a bid to understand and 
explain why short-termism occurred. It was argued that critical realism could endorse 
the case study method due to its in-depth, progressive, and context-dependent nature. 
The methodological possibilities of critical realism for the case study approach were 
then explained. The methodological possibilities comprised the approach to 
generating data, the analysis and interpretation of the data, and the criteria used to 
judge research within the critical realist paradigm. The theoretical writings 
underpinning these directives were linked to the present study to demonstrate what is 
entailed in conceptualising and conducting a research project based on critical realism.  
Having discussed the methodological strategy of the thesis in some depth, 
Chapter 5 introduced the case study company, describing its history, domestic and 
international businesses, core values, strategic priorities, and external environment. 
Essentially, it was observed that part of the organisation’s strategy was to restore 
growth to the UK business as a result of revenues falling in recent years. This part of 
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the strategy was mapped onto the organisation’s performance measurement system 
(the BSC). Ferreira and Otley’s (2009) performance management systems framework 
was used for guidance for describing the performance measurement system in detail, 
with attention given to the supposed causal relationships, the frequency of 
performance measure monitoring, and changes that were observed during the 
investigation. The main aspects of the situation that influenced managers’ time 
horizons and inter-temporal decision-making were also identified and described in 
Chapter 5. The relevant issues included the characteristics of stores, the 
responsibilities and remits of middle-level managers, and the nature and frequency of 
intra-organisational mobility. Other relevant factors were the nature and frequency of 
relative performance information, the performance evaluation systems, and the 
reward/penalty systems.  
Chapter 6 built upon this evidence by describing, analysing, and explaining 
the research findings pertaining to the conceptualisation of short-termism. The data 
revealed that managers understood the short term to be quarterly, the medium term as 
annual, and the long term to be up to four years. Of interest were the nuances within, 
and overlaps between, these three cuts of the temporal scale. The complicated, fluid, 
and somewhat individualised accounts were because the organisation’s internal 
architecture (store characteristics, specific roles, and intra-organisational mobility) 
and management control practices (performance measure monitoring and 
performance evaluation process) influenced managers’ understanding of their time 
horizons.  
The latter sections of Chapter 6 linked managers’ views about their time 
horizons to their involvement in inter-temporal decisions. Four types of inter-temporal 
decisions were observed (myopic, hypermetropic, short-termist, and long-termist). 
Underpinning the whole gamut of inter-temporal decisions was the relationship 
between inter-temporal tasks. It was found that accordance between inter-temporal 
tasks underpinned myopic and hypermetropic decisions, whilst tension between inter-
temporal tasks underpinned short-termist and long-termist decisions. Short-termist 
decisions manifest through reductions in budgetary expenditure and favouring 
predictable goal achievement. It was evident from the discussions that managers were 
aware of, and able to evaluate, the expected longer-term consequences of their short-
term actions. One of the main observations thus concerned the notion of intention 
being one way to distinguish short-termism from myopia.   
245 
 
Chapter 7 described, analysed, and explained the research findings pertaining 
to the nature (i.e., the structure and operation of individual performance measures) and 
extent (i.e., individual-level contingency factors that play key roles) of the relationship 
between performance measures and short-termism. It was evident that there was 
importance attached to financial and non-financial BSC targets at the case 
organisation. Among other things, it was observed that this translated into frequent 
monitoring and perceived pressure to exhibit on-target performance. This, together 
with inappropriate cause-and-effect relationships, was found to encourage short-
termist behaviour.  
The remainder of Chapter 7 considered five contingent factors that appeared to 
complicate the relationship between performance measures and short-termism at the 
individual level. The factors include: relative performance information, the 
performance evaluation systems, the reward/penalty systems, intra-organisational 
mobility, and personal time perspectives. Evidence from the case study suggests that: 
(1) the dissemination of relative performance information prompted social 
comparisons and short-termism, with more frequent dissemination exacerbating the 
felt emotions; (2) the tension between a formal and informal performance evaluation 
system can lead to short-termism; (3) rewards and penalties attached to financial and 
non-financial measures encouraged short-termism, but the impact varied across 
managers; (4) knowledge about frequent intra-organisational mobility (of either 
oneself or one’s superior) and a lack of accountability for past decisions upon internal 
movement encouraged short-termism; and (5) a present time orientation appeared to 
be linked to short-termism, but a manager’s time perspective was reinforced or 
weakened by elements of the organisational context. The main conclusions, 
contributions, and implications to be drawn from the study’s findings are discussed in 
the next section. 
  
8.2 Conclusions, Contributions, and Implications   
  
The present section comprises three parts: theoretical, methodological, and practical. 
Each part will outline the main conclusions, contributions, and implications that 
emerge from the study.  
 
246 
 
8.2.1 Theoretical 
 
In Chapter 1, the conceptual framework for the study was outlined. This sub-section 
will return to that framework, demonstrating how the analysis of empirical data has 
introduced nuance and broadened its scope. The study contributes to the behavioural 
accounting literature by highlighting that the initial conceptual framework failed to 
capture the dynamic, fluid, and bidirectional relationships at play. In other words, a 
comprehensive contingency-based framework has been developed; the framework 
provides individual-level explanations about when, how, and why managers engage 
in short-termism. Table 8.1 provides a summary overview of these contributions by 
tracing the gaps identified in the literature reviewed to the findings outlined in the 
empirical chapters. 
In line with the first research question, the study explored managers’ 
understanding of their time horizons. Managers’ time horizons were differentially 
shaped by an organisation’s internal architecture (see Jaques, 1990) and management 
control practices (see Becker and Messner, 2013). Findings thus suggest that the short, 
medium, and long term are empirically messy and possibly context dependent 
concepts. This contributes to the literature on short-termism by highlighting that a 
standardised definition of the time horizons involved in short-termist behaviour may 
be difficult to establish (see e.g., van der Stede, 2000; Marginson et al., 2010). The 
findings also highlight that the association between short-termism and previously used 
control variables may not be straightforward, namely hierarchy (see e.g., Marginson 
et al., 2010). This is because managers situated at the same hierarchical level can hold 
different understandings about points on the temporal scale. Considering the different 
temporal structures inherent within an organisation’s management control system (see 
Becker and Messner, 2013), managers’ time horizons appeared to be 
disproportionately shaped by shorter measurement and reporting intervals. In light of 
this, future research may need to acquire a contextualised understanding of what 
constitutes a manager’s short, medium, and long term through a micro-level analysis 
so as to not overlook when inter-temporal decisions are made. 
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Table 8.1: Overview of Theoretical Contributions 
RESEARCH QUESTION RESEARCH FINDINGS  THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
Section 2.2 suggested that there was a need to 
explore managers’ understanding of their time 
horizons given that short-termism indicates that 
there is a time-based motive for behaviour. The 
first research question was thus: how do managers 
understand the short, medium, and long term? 
Section 6.1 showed that managers understood the 
short term to be quarterly, the medium term as 
annual, and the long term to be up to four years. 
However, there were nuances within, and overlaps 
between, these three cuts of the temporal scale. 
The short, medium, and long term are 
empirically messy and context 
dependent concepts. A standardised 
definition of the time horizons involved 
in short-termist behaviour is difficult to 
establish. 
Refined and 
elaborated what 
it means to 
engage in short-
termism. 
Section 2.2 suggested that there was a need to 
explore how and to what effect managers make 
inter-temporal trade-off decisions, as extant 
research had been restrictive in its consideration of 
the manifestation of short-termism. This led to the 
second research question: how do inter-temporal 
decisions manifest? 
Section 6.2 showed that accordance between inter-
temporal tasks underpinned myopic and 
hypermetropic decisions, whilst tension between 
inter-temporal tasks underpinned short-termist and 
long-termist decisions. Regarding short-termism, 
managers were aware of, and able to evaluate, the 
expected longer-term consequences of their short-
term actions. 
Short-termism is a relatively 
complicated and contingent behaviour. 
Any future definition of short-termism 
perhaps should not just emphasise the 
inter-temporal trade-off involved in 
actions, but also the intention that 
underpins those actions.  
 
Section 2.3 highlighted that there was a need to 
explore the relationship between individual 
financial and non-financial measures in a BSC 
system and short-termism to address a gap in extant 
literature. This led to the third research question: 
what is the nature of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism? 
Section 7.1 showed that the importance attached to 
financial and non-financial BSC targets at the case 
organisation translated into frequent monitoring 
and perceived pressure to exhibit on-target 
performance. This, together with inappropriate 
cause-and-effect relationships, was found to 
encourage short-termist behaviour. 
The interplay between financial and 
non-financial measures may not be of 
prime importance in shaping managerial 
short-termism. Rather, quantitative 
(financial and non-financial) measures 
may lead to limited foresight and short-
termist behaviour, whilst qualitative 
(non-financial) measures may 
encourage a longer-term focus.  
Unpacked the 
relationship 
between 
performance 
measures and 
short-termism, 
thereby 
revealing the 
dynamic nature 
and complex 
extent of the 
relationship.  
 
Chapter 3 highlighted that there was a need to 
explore the contingencies that may complicate the 
relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism in order to perhaps address 
disparities in the findings of extant literature. This 
led to the research question: what is the extent of 
the relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism? 
Section 7.2 showed that the manner in which 
performance measurement information is made 
public within an organisation and used to evaluate 
and reward managers, as well as the nature of 
managers’ mobility within an organisation and 
personal time perspective profile, complicates the 
relationship between performance measures and 
short-termism. 
The relationship between an 
organisation’s performance 
measurement system and its context 
complicates the inter-temporal decision-
making process.  
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Short-termism has been operationalised in three main ways: (1) devoting more 
time to activities that influence the firm’s annual profit position (e.g., Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967), (2) reducing discretionary expenditure (e.g., Merchant, 1990), and (3) 
favouring predictable goal achievement (e.g., Marginson and McAulay, 2008). Given 
the potential narrowness of these instruments, the second research question elaborated 
on how and to what effect managers make inter-temporal decisions.101 The findings 
demonstrate that the decisions and actions that are evident in the managers’ short-
termist behaviour are driven by his/her perception of the temporal scale. For example, 
decimating a store’s product range to minimise product wastage enables the short-
term product wastage target to be achieved; however, this is to the detriment of the 
longer-term workgroup strategy of securing customer loyalty. Similarly, inaccurately 
recording stock to achieve the short-term product wastage target is detrimental to the 
longer term unknown product losses target. The findings illustrate the various 
manifestations of operational inter-temporal trade-offs which empirically 
complements Merchant and van der Stede’s (2012) description and adds nuance to the 
existing instruments outlined above. 
When managers are aware of the expected trade-off in such decisions, it may 
be said that an intention underpins their behaviour. Consequently, any future 
definition of short-termism perhaps should not just emphasise the inter-temporal 
trade-off involved in actions, but also the intention that underpins those actions. The 
notion of intentional decision-making provides one way to differentiate short-termism 
from myopia. This refines Marginson and McAulay’s (2008) use of the ‘detrimental 
inter-temporal trade-off’ to distinguish between short-termism and myopia. Taken 
together, the first two research questions refine and elaborate what it means to engage 
in short-termism, thus cautioning that failure to appreciate the subtleties and nuances 
associated with the temporal reference points may limit a researcher’s ability to 
empirically observe inter-temporal trade-off decisions.  
  The third research question focused on the nature of the relationship between 
individual financial and non-financial measures in a BSC and short-termism. The 
findings highlight that the interplay between financial and non-financial measures 
                                                          
101 The instruments are potentially narrow insofar as it is not always evident that an inter-
temporal trade-off is captured and they do not appear to capture the theoretically manifold 
nature of inter-temporal trade-offs, particularly operating trade-offs (see Section 2.2).   
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may not be of prime importance in shaping managerial short-termism. Rather, 
evidence suggests that quantitative (financial and non-financial) measures may lead 
to limited foresight and short-termist behaviour, whilst qualitative (non-financial) 
measures may encourage a longer-term focus. Whilst indirect support for this 
conclusion is provided by Marginson et al. (2010), the study contributes to the existing 
literature by explicitly reshaping the financial/non-financial dichotomy. Taking this 
into account, future research may thus benefit from examining the interplay between 
quantitative and qualitative measures to further explore how, why, and in what ways 
short-termism may be offset by using qualitative performance measures.  
In line with the fourth and final research question, the study explored the 
extent of the relationship between performance measures and short-termism. The 
findings start to fill in the black box of contingencies and highlight that the inter-
temporal decision-making effects of an organisation’s performance measurement 
system depend on the context within which that system operates. That is, the way 
performance measurement information is made public within the organisation and 
used to evaluate and reward managers can either strengthen or weaken managers’ 
inclination to engage in short-termism. Also, an individual’s time perspective further 
complicates the relationship between performance measures and short-termist 
behaviour. This highlights a problem with existing research, which has tended to focus 
only on specific aspects of the control system, such as rewards and compensation (e.g., 
Laverty, 2004) or standalone activities, such as performance evaluation (e.g., 
Merchant, 1990), as opposed to adopting a more comprehensive and integrated 
approach. Consequently, it is important to study the components of the management 
control system package (see e.g., Malmi and Brown, 2008) not only in isolation, but 
also recognise their links (Ferreira and Otley, 2009). The study thus contributes to the 
short-termism literature by highlighting the dynamic interplay between a performance 
measurement system and its context in shaping the inter-temporal decision-making 
process. Together, this study illustrates when, how, and why managers may engage in 
short-termism, which is important if the objective is to try to avoid this 
organisationally dysfunctional behaviour. This point is returned to in sub-section 
8.2.3.  
Whilst recognising the different meta-theoretical commitments of researchers 
and so the ways in which short-termism has been studied, the above conclusions call 
into question the appropriateness of assumptions that tend to underpin conceptual 
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arguments in the behavioural accounting literature. To reiterate, the data suggest that: 
(1) temporal reference points may be non-standard (as against the short term being a 
standardised period not exceeding one year); (2) short-termism may manifest through 
various guises and be underpinned by a well-thought-out approach (as against short-
termism being a relatively uncomplicated/un-nuanced behaviour); and (3) the 
interplay between quantitative and qualitative measures may be important in shaping 
managerial short-termism (as against the interplay between financial and non-
financial measures). The next sub-section considers the methodological contributions 
that have been made by this study. 
  
8.2.2 Methodological  
 
Through adopting a qualitative approach to generating data, the study contributes to 
the behavioural accounting literature that investigates the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism. A qualitative approach to data generation 
stands in contrast to prior research that has primarily used surveys (see e.g., van der 
Stede, 2000; Laverty, 2004; Marginson et al., 2010; Abernethy et al., 2013) and 
experiments (see e.g., van Rinsum and Hartmann, 2007) to investigate short-termism. 
Moreover, except for Marginson and McAulay (2008) and Marginson et al. (2010), 
researchers have tended to avoid direct measures of short-termism due to the difficulty 
of getting honest responses in this potentially sensitive area. Through building and 
establishing a rapport with participants, the present study offers rich insight into the 
time horizons of, and inter-temporal trade-off decisions made by, middle-level 
managers. The detailed, nuanced, and individualised accounts reveal a broad 
perspective on inter-temporal decision-making, thereby capturing the process through 
which short-termism manifests.  
The study also makes methodological contributions to the broader 
management accounting literature through adopting a critical realist philosophical 
approach. As noted in Chapter 1, critical realism is an approach that has not yet been 
widely adopted in empirical management accounting studies and, as a result, there 
remains little published work in this area discussing what it entails to adopt such an 
approach to research. The limited guidance available considers the methodological 
consequences of committing to critical realism’s stratified ontology for case study 
research (Llewellyn, 2007) and mixed methods research (Brown and Brignall, 2007; 
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Modell, 2009). By discussing the possibilities and practicalities of a critical realist 
research project in Chapter 4, the present study sought to add to this emerging area of 
interest. Chapter 4 outlined how critical realism’s ontology and epistemology 
influence the research methods, techniques, and analyses that can be employed, as 
well as the tactics that should be used to improve the quality of research. The content 
of the chapter thus has scope to aid those contemplating research of this nature, 
particularly those who seek to use critical realism as an explanatory and linguistic 
device.  
Building on Modell’s (2017) discussion of retroduction and retrodiction, the 
study also introduced Bhaskar’s (2010; 2014) DREI model for analysing data to the 
management accounting literature. Chapter 4 explained that, in critical realist 
research, retroduction and retrodiction should be understood as only one part of the 
data analysis process. That is, the process should also comprise the description of 
surface-level events, the elaboration and elimination of alternative explanations, and 
the identification of generative mechanisms. By describing and implementing 
Bhaskar’s (2010) four-stage data analysis strategy, the study offers an original 
contribution to the management accounting literature. Notwithstanding these 
contributions, there are also several methodological limitations that deserve to be 
recognised. The next section discusses these limitations together with more general 
limitations of this study and future directions for research. First, however, the practical 
contributions will be derived. 
 
8.2.3 Practical   
 
The findings from the present study have at least four implications for the design and 
implementation of performance measurement systems in particular, and of 
management control systems in general. In the circumstances encountered, managers 
sacrificed the long term for the short term due to the pressures to continually achieve 
financial measures. The argument that managers forgo longer-term betterment for 
shorter-term success due to financial controls appeared to also apply to non-financial 
measures that were quantitative in nature. The main influences on their time horizons 
and inter-temporal trade-off decisions in this respect were the frequency of 
performance measure monitoring and target tightness. More frequent performance 
measure monitoring shortened managers’ perceptions of the temporal scale and led to 
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an excessive short-term focus, while less frequent performance measure monitoring 
lengthened managers’ perceptions of the temporal scale. Consequently, it might be 
possible to synchronise the frequency with which performance measures are 
monitored with desired managerial time horizons. However, this means that 
organisations would need to carefully consider their choice of performance measures, 
given that some aspects of performance that are measured need to be monitored 
frequently. For example, in retail organisations, queue length needs to be monitored 
frequently to provide relevant information for managers. When frequent monitoring 
is required, organisations may need to compromise on target tightness to lessen the 
pressure for short-term results and circumvent short-termism. Furthermore, it is 
potentially important for organisations to ensure that there is consistent monitoring 
frequencies across, and appropriate causal linkages between, performance measures 
in a systematic or formalised arrangement in order to deter trading off performance 
measures with temporally spaced outcomes.   
 Second, performance evaluation and reward/penalty systems play 
important roles in shaping the relationship between performance measures and 
managers’ time horizons and inter-temporal decisions. In terms of counterbalancing 
an excessive short-term focus, the use of non-financial measures that were qualitative 
in nature and derived from subjective judgement in formal performance evaluations 
proved pivotal. To promote managerial foresight, an organisation perhaps should thus 
consider incorporating measures such as developmental progress reports and 
subjective assessments of achievement of personal objectives into the formal 
evaluative process. However, there existed within the case organisation an informal 
process whereby subordinate managers were subject to frequent appraisals by their 
superior about aspects of their performance that could be quantified. These appraisals 
took the form of informal dialogue. By and large, subordinate managers believed that 
the organisation’s informal system superseded the more formal system due to its 
timing, framing, and content. Consequently, superiors maybe should be aware of the 
influence exerted by signals which they emit through their actions and behaviours. 
Evidence from the case study indicates that misalignment between the nature of 
formal and informal performance evaluation systems leads to tension between inter-
temporal tasks and short-termist decisions.  
 Furthermore, managers inferred that formal and informal rewards/penalties 
were primarily tied to individual target achievement/non-achievement. Despite this 
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inference, there existed within the case organisation a system for providing rewards 
based on collective achievement. Namely, bonuses were awarded on the basis of 
personal performance and corporate performance. In addition, managers were 
rewarded based on the degree of their conformity to Grocer’s values, which 
emphasised group interested behaviour (e.g., collaboration). However, overall 
corporate underperformance and the overriding influence of other management 
control practices negated the potential positive effects of group rewards on managers’ 
inter-temporal decisions. That is, a balance between self-interested and group-
interested behaviour was not achieved. Thus, implementing group rewards without 
understanding the interplay between different components of a management control 
system may result in failure to avoid excessive self-interested behaviour and short-
termism. 
Third, one of the most striking features of the case study was the mobility of 
managers throughout the organisation. However, a high degree of intra-organisational 
mobility constrained managers’ long-term horizons. Knowledge about mobility also 
encouraged short-termism because there was no reporting mechanism to hold 
managers accountable for their past decisions. Consequently, to mitigate short-
termism in these circumstances, it may be necessary for organisations to not only 
emphasise an appropriate values system but also ensure that superiors’ statements, 
actions, and behaviours are consistent with those values (Merchant and van der Stede, 
2012). Broadly speaking, such cultural controls may also be necessary when an 
organisation disseminates relative performance information. In the circumstances 
encountered, the dissemination of relative performance information encouraged, 
among other things, uncooperative and impulsive behaviour that prompted short-
termist decisions.  
Fourth, an individual’s time perspective was found to complicate the 
relationship between performance measures and short-termism. Whilst managers who 
held a present time orientation seemed more likely to make short-termist decisions, 
those who held a future-focused time frame were committed to working towards 
distant goals and their associated rewards. Consequently, personnel controls may be 
important to select and place managers with desired time horizons in appropriate jobs 
(Merchant and van der Stede, 2012), so that a manager’s time perspective profile is a 
‘good fit’ for the responsibility time span of the role (Jaques, 1990). The next section 
outlines the study’s limitations and makes suggestions for further research. 
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8.3 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities  
 
The following caveats should be considered when interpreting the findings. First, the 
arguments in this thesis are based on empirical data obtained from a single case 
organisation. Even though critical realism provides an epistemological justification 
for using one case (Easton, 2000) and the case organisation was purposefully selected 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b), there is an opportunity for other researchers to confirm and build 
upon this study’s findings in other contexts in order to identify other contingent 
factors. The case study of Grocer was conducted during a period in which the 
performance measurement system became central to the organisation realigning itself 
in the marketplace. Consequently, high priority was accorded to performance targets. 
Furthermore, overall corporate underperformance negated any potential effects of 
group rewards on managers’ inter-temporal decisions. Studies where an organisation 
is experiencing a period of steady growth or stability would be particularly important 
in exploring the relationship between performance measures and short-termism in this 
regard. Alternatively, comparative case studies across organisations may consider the 
impact of industry type; especially due to a limitation of the present study in pursuing 
an organisation based within the retail industry, where the temporal structures inherent 
within the management control practices may be a feature of the industry being 
dynamic and fast paced. Equally, a more longitudinal study would have been 
advantageous in order to appreciate the process of intra-organisational mobility in 
more depth, rather than within a specific timeframe. Linked to these points, more 
attention was paid to describing and analysing how Grocer’s present internal situation 
may complicate the relationship between performance measures and short-termism 
than the organisation’s historical background and industry context. As these 
contextual factors may have affected performance measurement choices (see 
Chenhall, 2003), this is another limitation of this study. 
Second is the choice of interviewees, in particular the choice of middle-level 
operational managers. Lower-level managers, as well as those situated at the apex of 
the organisation, could have been approached to widen the scope of the interviews 
and allow more exploration of any similarities and differences regarding inter-
temporal decisions across hierarchical levels, given that role specific responsibilities 
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influenced managers’ perceptions of the temporal scale and their involvement in inter-
temporal decisions. Moreover, Merchant (1990) highlights that some amount of 
management myopia may be present even in optimally designed management control 
systems. Thus, interviews with top-level managers would have been helpful for 
separating the unintended control system side effects from those that top management 
tolerates or even encourages. Given the nature of the middle-level managers’ roles, 
the examples of inter-temporal decisions encountered were operational. Another 
limitation of this study is that it does not capture investing inter-temporal trade-off 
decisions.  
Third, the present analysis of the nature and extent of the relationship between 
performance measures and short-termism represents a first exploratory effort. Thus, 
as noted above, the study does not exhaustively cover all factors that may complicate 
the relationship between performance measures and short-termism.102 In this regard, 
the study did not explore, for instance, issues such as the cultural origin of the manager 
(see Coates et al., 1995; Chow et al., 1996) and capital market pressures (see Jacobs, 
1991; Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998), which have been shown to influence the 
occurrence of short-termism. Future research may, therefore, consider exploring a 
broader set of contingencies that may lead to short-termism on a case level, identify 
emergent cross-case patterns concerning the role and relevance of these contingencies, 
and, in particular, gauge their interplay with performance measures. 
Fourth, the study focused on short-termism, or managers’ intentional and 
organisationally suboptimal behaviour that focuses on securing short-term results that 
precludes longer-term achievement—which was differentiated from myopia, defined 
as managers’ limitations in the ability to foresee the future that may not necessarily 
entail a suboptimal inter-temporal trade-off. These definitions were entangled with 
performance measures, which perhaps made the subsequent analyses self-limiting. 
Attempts may be made to broaden the concepts so that the short term is disentangled 
from short-term results. Moreover, short-termism and myopia can be differentiated, 
and yet remain interlinked, so that the nature and interrelationships between these 
behavioural phenomena may benefit from future research. 
                                                          
102 The contingencies explored in this thesis focus on the design of the performance 
measurement and reward systems (elements of results controls and cultural controls), as well 
as personal factors (which can be influenced by elements of personnel controls) that affect 
managers’ inter-temporal reactions to a performance measurement system. 
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The case of Grocer also contains some intriguing issues that are not fully 
addressed in this study. For example, how the application (or non-application) of the 
controllability principle complicates the relationship between performance measures 
and short-termism was not fully explored. In this regard, there were different levels 
of application and different types of less controllable factors at Grocer (see Section 
5.2 and Section 5.3). With regard to the different levels of application, nearly all of 
the managers interviewed acknowledged having only partial control over the 
achievement of several BSC performance measures. In reference to the different types 
of less controllable factors, managers’ lack of controllability could stem from 
decisions made by predecessors or from decisions made by other managers within the 
same workgroup. Thus, investigating the inter-temporal decision-making effects that 
result from the interplay between different levels of application of the controllability 
principle and different types of less controllable factors may be an interesting future 
direction of the research.  
Research opportunities also stem from this study. One avenue for further 
research involves exploring the process through which managerial behaviours are 
influenced by the presence of other managers and, furthermore, its link to inter-
temporal decisions. In particular, there were examples of interviewees justifying the 
manner in which they performed their inter-temporal tasks through notions of 
conforming to conventional practices or to the behaviour of other workgroup 
members. Investigating the experience of social influence, how it is formed, and how 
it comes to influence inter-temporal decisions may thus be an intriguing research 
project.103 Such a project would complement Marginson and McAulay’s (2008) study 
on the relationship between the level of social influence and short-termism, as well as 
align with Hall’s (2016) suggestion of how to develop the use of psychology theories 
in contingency-based management accounting research.  
Future research would also greatly benefit from exploring other personal 
orientations when considering the extent of the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism. Interviews with middle-level managers reveal that other 
personal orientations, such as competitiveness, influenced the manner in which inter-
                                                          
103 Social influence theory suggests that information from social referents, such as workgroup 
members, can be at least as important as objective information in guiding judgments of 
difficult perceptual tasks, leading to conformity of views, beliefs, and behaviours (see Asch, 
1955; Turner, 1991; Lucas et al., 2006). 
257 
 
temporal tasks were performed. In the circumstances encountered, individual 
competitiveness was reinforced by the dissemination of relative performance 
information which fostered a competitive situation. Thus, exploring the extent to 
which other personal orientations complicate the relationship between performance 
measures and short-termism, as well as how aspects of the context may reinforce or 
weaken them, seems worthy of further investigation.  
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10.2 Information Sheet 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
Title of research project:  
Performance Measurement and Managers’ Work Time Horizons  
 
Name and position of researcher:   
Emma Pugh, Ph.D. student, Cardiff University 
 
 
Thank you for the interest you have shown towards my Ph.D. study on performance 
measurement and managers’ work time horizons. The following information provides 
an overview of the research and gives reassurance about participant involvement.    
 
What is the purpose of the research?  
The purpose of this research project is to understand the nature and extent of the 
relationship between performance measures (e.g., sales, customer satisfaction, etc.) 
and work time horizons.  
 
Why have you been invited to take part in the research? 
You have been invited to take part in the research because you either occupy a store 
manager position within [GroA] or [GroB], or you occupy a store director position. It 
should be noted that, while your contribution is greatly valued, participation in this 
research project is voluntary. This means that you are also free to withdraw from the 
research at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
What will you have to do? 
Participation will involve an approximately one-hour interview that covers the 
following themes: (1) the role that you hold within [Grocer]; (2) your main tasks and 
responsibilities; (3) how your performance is monitored and assessed; and (4) the 
thoughts you have about your own time perspective (e.g., short/long term). Interviews 
will be conducted in store at a time that is most convenient for you. For practical 
reasons, it would be preferable if the interviews could be audio recorded. This 
possibility will, however, be governed by your preference. 
 
Will everything you say remain confidential?  
All data associated with this research will be treated with the utmost confidentiality 
and anonymity. Ethical and legal procedures will be followed with regards to handling 
and storing the interview data. This means that the audio recordings and the 
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anonymised transcripts will only be accessible to me and will only be discussed with 
my supervisor. You are also welcome to view a copy of your interview transcript.   
 
What will happen to the information collected? 
The information collected as a result of your participation will directly contribute to 
the completion of my Ph.D. thesis. An anonymised summary report on the study’s 
findings will also be produced for [Grocer], and circulated to all participants at the 
end of the research project.  
 
Who is funding and organising the research? 
The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (if you would 
like to view my ESRC profile, go to: 
http://www.walesdtc.ac.uk/profiles/pathway/management-and-business-
studies/#pugh-emma). The research will be managed and conducted by myself, 
independently of [Grocer] plc.  
 
What if you need more information?  
If you require more information about my research, or if you have any unanswered 
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me by email. My email address is: 
PughE1@cardiff.ac.uk. 
 
 
Once again, I would like to thank you for supporting my research project. 
I look forward to meeting you. 
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10.3 Consent Form 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Please initial box                               
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information  
sheet (INT) July 2014 D1 for the above study.  
 
2. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have  
had these questions answered satisfactorily. 
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I  
am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
4. I agree to take part in the study. 
 
                                   
                                                                                                      Please tick box  
                   Yes          No 
5. I agree to the interview being audio recorded. 
 
6. I would like to receive a copy of my interview transcript.  
 
7. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications. 
 
Name of participant:        Date:                    Signature:                .                         
Name of researcher:                 Date:                       Signature:                . 
Title of research project:  
Performance Measurement and Managers’  Work Time Horizons   
Name and position of researcher:  
Emma Pugh, Ph.D. student, Cardiff University 
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10.4 Participant Profile  
 
PARTICIPANT PROFILE 
 
Title of research project:  
Performance Measurement and Managers’ Work Time Horizons  
Name and position of researcher:  
Emma Pugh, Ph.D. student, Cardiff University 
 
 
 
 
Name: 
(Not to be disclosed in transcripts and analysis  
just for any future communication) 
                                                              
.                                                                                                                                   
Age:                                                               
.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Job title:                                                               
.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Length of time employed by [Grocer] plc:                                                               
.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Length of time in a managerial position: 
(i.e., department manager and above) 
                                                              
.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
. 
Length of time in your current role:                                                               
.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Number of employees in your area of  duty:  
(approximately)  
                                                              
.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
. 
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10.5 Interviews Conducted  
 
Track 
number 
Interviewee (coded) Date and time of interview Place of interview Duration (minutes) 
1   Store Manager B1 13th August 2014, 6pm Store  77 
2 Store Manager B2 3rd September 2014, 2.30pm Store 88 
3 Store Manager B3 4th September 2014, 11am 
McDonald’s 
Restaurant 
99 
4 Store Manager B4 5th September 2014, 1pm Store 102 
5 Group Change Coach B 1st October 2014, 2pm Store 103 
6 Store Manager B5 2nd October 2014, 11am Store 116 
7 Store Manager B6 7th October 2014, 10.30am Store 110 
8 Store Manager B7 17th October 2014, 11am Store 60 
9 Store Manager B8 18th October 2014, 10.30am Store 82 
10 Group Loss Manager B 21st October 2014, 2.30pm Store 120 
11 Store Manager A1 6th November 2014, 10am Store 103 
12 Store Manager A2 7th November 2014, 11am Store 60 
13 Store Manager A3 18th November 2014, 3pm Store 94 
14 Group Loss Manager A 19th November 2014, 1pm Costa Coffee 73 
15 Store Manager A4 20th November 2014, 11am Store 77 
16 Store Manager A5 
27th November 2014, 
12.30pm 
Store 96 
17 Store Manager A6 2nd December 2014, 2pm Store 118 
18 Store Director A 8th December 2014, 6pm Costa Coffee 84 
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19 Group Online Shopping Manager 17th December 2014, 9am Store 92 
20 Group Change Coach A 13th January 2015, 9am Costa Coffee 96 
21 Store Manager A7 20th January 2015, 11am Store 66 
22 Store Manager A8 23rd January 2015, 2pm Store 116 
23 Store Manager A9 26th January 2015, 1pm Store 50 
24 Store Manager B9 3rd February 2015, 10am Store 63 
25 Store Manager B10 10th February 2015, 9.30am Store 84 
26 Store Manager A10 13th February 2015, 9.30am Store 63 
27 Store Manager A11 17th February 2015, 11am Store 90 
28 Store Manager A10 5th March 2015, 11am Store 69 
29 Store Manager B11 5th March 2015, 2pm Store 81 
30 Store Manager B12 20th May 2015, 12pm Store 87 
31 Store Director B 24th November 2015, 9am Store 66 
TOTAL HOURS 45 1/4 
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10.6 Biographic Information   
 
Interviewee (coded) Age Gender 
Length 
of 
service 
(years) 
Length of time 
in a 
managerial 
position (years) 
Length of time 
at current 
work level 
(years) 
Length of time 
in current role 
(years) 
Number of 
employees in area 
of responsibility 
Store Manager A1 35 Male 13 13 7 1.5 300 
Store Manager A2 39 Female 18 14 6 0.3 310 
Store Manager A3 44 Male 28 23 5 0.4 410 
Store Manager A4 43 Male 11 11 11 3 620 
Store Manager A5 45 Male 26 24 3 3 290 
Store Manager A6 36 Male 11 11 3 3 468 
Store Manager A7 31 Male 15 10 6 0.5 500 
Store Manager A8 46 Male 30 24 17 4 480 
Store Manager A9 33 Female 14 10 2 2 233 
Store Manager A10 60 Male 42 30 20 4 500 
Store Manager A11 52 Male 33 29 20 4 550 
Group Loss Manager A 35 Male 18 8 8 0.6 18 
Group Change Coach A 42 Male 11 11 11 2 18 
Store Director A 38 Male 22 20 3 0.8 7000 
Store Manager B1 36 Female 20 14 1.5 1.5 145  
Store Manager B2 31 Male 16 13 3 1.5 186 
Store Manager B3 31 Male 9 8 0.9 0.9 120 
Store Manager B4 42 Female 25 22 7 1.5 200 
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Store Manager B5 53 Male 36 34 20 3 190 
Store Manager B6 38 Female 22 19 7 3 215 
Store Manager B7 41 Male 13 13 4 2 142 
Store Manager B8 36 Male 10 4 4 2 196 
Store Manager B9 46 Male 20 11 10 4.5 270 
Store Manager B10 38 Male 21 14 1 0.3 170 
Store Manager B11 31 Female 13 10 5 1 220 
Store Manager B12 55 Female 30 15 1 0.1 159 
Group Change Coach B 37 Male 19 12 5 0.6 23  
Group Loss Manager B 46 Male 17 17 5 0.6 23 
Group Online Shopping 
Manager 
30 Female 15 7 2.5 2.5 28 
Store Director B 40 Male 13 13 1.5 0.75 7500 
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10.7 Interview Schedule  
 
Questions added to the original interview schedule are highlighted by an asterisk.  
 
Role Description  
1. Can you tell me about your role within [Grocer]?  
(a) How long have you held this role? 
 
Time Conception 
2. What are your short-, medium-, and long-term tasks and responsibilities? 
(a) Prompt re timescales. 
 
3. What is the relationship between your short-term and long-term tasks and 
responsibilities? 
(a) Do your short-term and long-term tasks and responsibilities ever compete?  
(b) How do you balance the demands of your short-term and long-term tasks 
and responsibilities? 
 
Personal Orientations  
4. Considering all aspects of your life (i.e., both your personal and work life), do 
you tend to focus on achieving near (i.e., a matter of days or weeks) outcomes, 
or do you prefer to focus on achieving more distant (i.e., a matter of months 
or years) outcomes?  
 
5. Does the past influence the decisions that you make in your personal and work 
life?   
 
6. What is the most important goal that you have recently set for yourself?  
(a) How are you working towards achieving your goal?  
(b) What sacrifices have you made and/or are willing to make in order to 
achieve your goal?   
(c) When do you hope to achieve your goal? 
(d) Why is this goal important to you? 
 
7. Do you mainly focus on the past, present, or future? 
(a) Does this apply to both your personal and work life? If required, prompt 
re differences.   
 
8. Do you think that your personality traits affect your focus on the short term 
and/or long term in your role within [Grocer]?  
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Performance Measures 
9. What performance targets are you responsible for achieving in your role? 
Please describe. 
 
10. What do you do to ensure that you perform in line with your targets? 
(a) Prompt re examples or rephrase as ‘Does the store’s/group’s [BSC] 
currently have any red lights? If so, what steps are you taking to change 
the colour?’  
 
11. What motivates you to work towards achieving your performance targets?  
 
12. Do you prioritise any of these performance targets? If so, which? 
(a) What are your reasons for prioritising these performance targets? 
(b) Does this prioritisation influence the way in which you carry out your 
short-term and long-term tasks and responsibilities? Prompt re how.  
 
13. How frequently do you receive the results for the performance measures?  
(a) What are your views about this?   
(b) Does this influence the way in which you carry out your short-term and 
long-term tasks and responsibilities? Prompt re how.  
 
14. * How are you performing in comparison to your colleagues?  
(a) How do you feel about this? 
(b) Does this have any impact on the way in which you perform your short-
term and long-term tasks and responsibilities? Prompt re how.  
 
15. How is your performance monitored and assessed? 
(a) What measures are used to monitor and assess your performance? 
(b) What level of importance does your manager place on achieving 
performance targets? Prompt re does your manager prioritise any of these 
performance targets? If so, which and why? How do you respond to this 
level of importance? 
 
Other Factors 
16. Can you describe the performance-related reward scheme currently in place?   
(a) Can you give me examples of the formal (e.g., monetary) and informal 
(e.g., values awards) rewards that are allocated?  
(b) How do these formal and informal rewards get allocated?  
(c) What do you consider the advantages and disadvantages of this reward 
scheme?  
(d) Does the reward scheme have any effect on the way in which you perform 
your short-term and long-term tasks and responsibilities? If so, how? 
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17. Has your role within [Grocer] changed in the past five years?   
(a) In what way has your role changed? 
(b) Why did your role change? 
(c) Has this role change had any effect on your short-term and/or long-term 
focus? If so, how? 
(d) Do you think that your role change has affected how your colleagues who 
report to you perform their short-term and long-term tasks and 
responsibilities? Please explain. 
 
18. What aspects of your job role, how you are managed, or other organisational 
factors affect your focus on the short term and/or long term? 
 
Interview Closure 
19. Is there anything I’ve not asked you about in the course of our conversation 
which you think is important? 
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10.8 Meetings Observed  
 
Track 
number 
Meeting 
(coded) 
Nature of meeting 
Frequency 
of meeting 
Place of 
meeting 
Date and time 
of meeting 
Number of 
participants 
Duration 
(minutes) 
1 Store Meeting 
Store management review the 
store’s performance on all 
measures for the previous week 
and discuss the current week’s 
agenda 
Weekly 
Store 
19th January 
2015, 2pm 
7 120 
2 Store Meeting  
26th January 
2015, 2pm 
14 105 
3 Store Meeting  
16th February 
2015, 2.30pm 
11 90 
4 Store Meeting  
16th March 
2015, 2.30pm 
16 75 
5 Store Meeting  
11th May     
2015, 2pm 
9 90 
6 Senior Meeting  
Senior store management 
review the store’s overall 
position  
16th March 
2015, 1pm 
6 30 
7 Daily Meeting  Store management review 
yesterday’s (a.m. meeting) and 
the current day’s (p.m. 
meeting) performance on daily 
measures  
Daily 
19th January 
2015, 4m 
7 10 
8 Daily Meeting  
16th March 
2015, 9.30am 
17 20 
9 Daily Meeting 
16th March 
2015, 3.45pm 
16 15 
10 Process Meeting  
Store management review the 
store’s daily performance on 
internal process measures  
16th March 
2015, 11.15am 
12 45 
TOTAL HOURS 10 
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10.9 Internal Company Documents Accumulated 
 
Track 
number 
Type of document 
(coded) 
Nature of document 
Pages of 
document 
Times 
collected  
Percentage 
of total 
1 
Internal Company 
Newspaper 
Monthly newspaper that contains business-related 
content (e.g., organisational changes, updates on 
current initiatives within the company, messages 
from the CEO and leadership team, etc.), as well as 
non-business-related content (e.g., employee stories 
about rowing the Atlantic, competitions, special 
offers, etc.) 
11a 15 28% 
2 
‘Inspirational Performers’ 
Implementation 
Workbook 
Roll out plan for the ‘Inspirational Performers’ 
evaluation process. The workbook includes 
information on: setting meaningful objectives; 
developing a personal development plan; coaching 
performance; providing feedback; and the criteria for 
rating performance and contribution. Hypothetical 
examples are provided throughout the workbook  
55 1 9% 
3 
‘Inspirational Performers’ 
Evaluation Pack 
Performance and development pack that describes 
what is expected of a manager in their role. The 
manager outlines their objectives, how and when 
they are going to achieve their objectives, and how 
they plan to keep learning and improving. In 
principle, the pack evaluates a manager’s 
18 5b 15% 
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contribution towards helping the company achieve its 
vision 
4 Company Vision 
The 2014-2015 vision for stores is to be a customer- 
and employee-focused business. There are five ways 
managers can achieve this vision (e.g., improving the 
customer shopping experience, developing 
employees). Achieving the vision should result in 
greater sales, profit, and employee ability 
1 1 0.2% 
5 Manager Information 
Material about strategies, organisational changes, 
and company processes that were made available to 
managers (e.g., in manager handbooks, supporting 
poor performance manuals, action planning guides, 
quarterly business plans, management structure 
changes, etc.) 
11a 12 23% 
6 Performance Results  
Information on stores absolute and relative 
performance on all measures on a daily, weekly, 
monthly, quarterly, and six-monthly basis  
6a 16 16% 
7 
Employee Satisfaction 
Success Stories 
Issued stories about stores that have improved their 
employee satisfaction score, and information on how 
they have achieved this 
1 2 0.3% 
8 
Tips for Improving 
Employee Satisfaction 
Information about understanding, acting upon, and 
sustaining an employee satisfaction score  
5 2 2% 
9 Store Memoranda  
Information about the events and activities occurring 
in a store in any given week 
3a 4 2% 
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10 PowerPoint Slides  
Hard copy of a presentation given by Store Manager 
A8 entitled “Is it really only about the numbers?”  
23 1 4% 
11 Internal Emails 
Hard copy of an email from the Group Online 
Shopping Manager to Store Managers about their 
store’s weekly performance on an internal process 
measure 
1 1 0.2% 
TOTAL 135 587 100% 
 
Notes: a This is the average number of pages in the document; b this includes four completed copies and one blank copy of the ‘Inspirational Performers’ 
evaluation pack. 
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10.10 Codes and Definitions 
 
Deductive codes are indicated by an entry in the third column. When the third column 
is left blank, the code is inductive and derived from the data.  
 
Code Definition 
Interview 
Question 
1. Inter-temporal decisions Instances of inter-temporal 
decision-making events at 
Grocer, comprising 
descriptions of what 
constitutes the short, 
medium, and long term and 
the nature of the relationship 
between these temporal 
reference points 
 
1.1. Short-term tasks Description of the manager’s 
short-term activities and 
responsibilities  
2 
1.2. Short-term definition  The time period over which the 
short-term tasks are performed 
2a 
1.3. Medium-term tasks Description of the manager’s 
medium-term activities and 
responsibilities 
2 
1.4. Medium-term 
definition  
The time period over which the 
medium-term tasks are 
performed 
2a 
1.5. Long-term tasks Description of the manager’s 
long-term activities and 
responsibilities 
2 
1.6. Long-term definition  The time period over which the 
long-term tasks are performed 
2a 
1.7. Conflict  Evidence of conflict or tension 
between the inter-temporal 
tasks (i.e., the short-term tasks 
conflict with the longer-term 
tasks, or vice versa) 
3, 3a 
1.8. Accordance  Evidence of accordance 
between the inter-temporal 
tasks (i.e., the short-term tasks 
coincide with the longer-term 
tasks, and vice versa) 
3, 3a 
1.9. Focusing on the short 
term 
Evidence of short-sighted inter-
temporal decisions. The 
manager makes short-term 
decisions, but without being 
aware of and/or unable to 
3b 
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evaluate the longer-term harm 
(if any—the short-term 
decision may extrapolate into 
optimal long-term 
consequences). The decision 
evokes the notion of 
‘limitations in the ability to 
foresee the future’ 
1.10. Focusing on the long 
term  
Evidence of far-sighted inter-
temporal decisions. The long-
term decision may not cause a 
loss of concentration on short-
term results.  
 
1.11. Sacrificing the long 
term 
Evidence of inter-temporal 
trade-off decisions that favour 
the short term. The manager is 
aware and able to evaluate that 
the inter-temporal decision is 
harmful to the longer term and 
intentionally makes the 
decision. The decision is 
demonstrably suboptimal and 
evokes the notion of 
‘sacrificing the future’  
3b 
1.12. Sacrificing the short 
term 
Evidence of inter-temporal 
trade-off decisions that favour 
the long term. The manager is 
aware that the inter-temporal 
decision is harmful to the short 
term and intentionally makes 
the decision. The decision is 
demonstrably suboptimal and 
evokes the notion of 
‘sacrificing the here and now’ 
 
2. Performance measurement 
system 
The composition and usage of 
Grocer’s performance 
measurement system, 
including causal beliefs about 
its linkage to inter-temporal 
decisions 
 
2.1. Financial targets Discussions about the financial 
targets to be achieved. The 
measures are denominated in 
currency, and either expressed 
as a ratio of financial numbers 
or as a change in financial 
numbers (e.g., sales growth, 
return on investment, net 
income after taxes, market-to-
book value ratio, etc.) 
9 
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2.2. Non-financial targets  Discussions about the non-
financial targets to be achieved. 
The measures are numerically 
based and objectively measured 
(e.g., employee satisfaction 
scores, absenteeism rate, etc.)  
9 
2.3. Non-financial measures 
(qualitative) 
Discussions about the non-
financial measures to be 
achieved. The measures are 
qualitative in nature, and 
derived from subjective 
judgement (e.g., subjective 
assessment of achievement in 
personal objectives, progress 
against Personal Development 
Plan, etc.)  
15a 
2.4. Limited controllability  Aspects of the financial and/or 
non-financial target are largely 
outside the control of the 
manager  
 
2.5. Motives The reasons and motivations to 
achieve the financial and non-
financial targets. Included here 
are also the reasons and 
motivations for wanting to 
overachieve or underachieve 
the financial and non-financial 
targets 
11 
2.6. Achieving the target  Discussions about the steps that 
managers take to perform in 
line with their financial and 
non-financial targets 
10, 10a 
2.6.1 ‘Plastering over 
the crack’ 
Instances of managers taking a 
shortcut to perform back in line 
with their financial and/or non-
financial target(s). The action 
enables the manager to achieve 
their financial and/or non-
financial target(s), but does not 
bring to light the reasons for 
the former underperformance 
and the current performance 
may not be sustainable in the 
longer term 
 
2.6.2 ‘Fixing it forever’  Instances of managers not 
taking a shortcut to perform 
back in line with their financial 
and/or non-financial target(s). 
The action enables the manager 
to achieve their financial and/or 
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non-financial target(s), whilst 
understanding the reasons for 
the former underperformance 
so that the current performance 
can be maintained in the longer 
term 
2.6.3 Yearend tactics  Changes to the steps that 
managers take to perform in 
line with their financial and/or 
non-financial targets at yearend 
 
2.7. Causality among targets Evidence of cause-and-effect 
relations among the financial 
and non-financial targets, as 
recounted by managers 
9 
2.8. Offsetting financial 
targets 
Evidence of offsetting two or 
more financial targets (i.e., 
compensating for an overspend 
on one financial target by 
underspending on another 
financial target), and the 
consequences of this offsetting 
 
2.9. Gaming  Instances of managerial 
behaviour (own or others) that 
entails the manipulation or 
biasing of financial and/or non-
financial targets. The behaviour 
occurs before performance 
measurement 
10, 10a 
2.10. Manipulating 
information  
Instances of managerial 
behaviour (own or others) that 
has an effect on the outputs of 
the performance measurement 
system (e.g., filtering, 
smoothing, falsification of 
information). The data 
produced by the system, and 
not the process per se, is 
influenced 
10, 10a 
2.11. Changing the target 
levels 
Evidence of the financial 
and/or non-financial target 
levels being formally or 
informally amended, and the 
reasons for, and consequences 
of, this amendment  
 
2.12. Prioritising  The prioritisation of one or 
more financial and/or non-
financial target(s), and the 
reason(s) for this prioritisation 
12, 12a 
2.12.1.  ‘Hot potatoes’  A measure of success (e.g., 
evening queue length), which 
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constitutes a financial and/or 
non-financial target (e.g., queue 
length), that is prioritised by 
the manager’s superior  
2.13. Prioritising > inter-
temporal decisions 
Discussions about whether, 
how, and why the prioritisation 
of one or more financial and/or 
non-financial target influences 
the manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed  
12b 
2.14. Frequency of 
measurement  
The frequency with which the 
financial and non-financial 
targets are monitored, and 
managers views about this  
13, 13a 
2.15. Frequency of 
measurement > inter-
temporal decisions 
Discussions about whether, 
how, and why the frequency of 
measurement influences the 
manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed 
13b 
2.16. Performance evaluation 
(process) 
Discussions about the formal 
performance evaluation 
process, including the grading 
criteria/thresholds, how 
frequently the evaluations take 
place, and in what manner they 
are conducted  
15 
2.17. Performance evaluation 
(measures) 
Discussions about the measures 
that are used to formally assess 
the performance of managers  
15a 
2.18. Performance evaluation 
(weight) 
The weight (actual and 
perceived) accorded to the 
different performance measures 
in the formal performance 
evaluation and the felt 
appropriateness of this 
weighting   
15b 
2.19. Performance evaluation 
> inter-temporal 
decisions 
Discussions about whether the 
nature of the formal 
performance evaluation 
influences the manner in which 
the inter-temporal tasks are 
performed 
15b 
2.20. Informal performance 
evaluation  
Discussions about the 
informal/ongoing performance 
evaluations, including how 
frequently these evaluations 
take place and in what manner 
they are conducted 
 
2.21. Superior’s behaviour  Discussions about a superior’s 
behaviour and attitude (both the 
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manager’s superior and the 
manager themselves in their 
capacity as a superior) towards 
achieving performance 
measures (e.g., financial 
targets, non-financial targets, 
and non-financial measures) 
2.22. Advantages of having 
targets 
The perceived benefits of 
having the financial and non-
financial targets, as recounted 
by managers   
 
2.23. Disadvantages of 
having targets 
The perceived drawbacks of 
having the financial and non-
financial targets and any 
potential remedies to these 
drawbacks, as recounted by 
managers   
 
2.23.1. ‘Chasing the 
number’  
Instances of managerial 
behaviour (own or others) that 
entails an excessive 
preoccupation with achieving a 
financial and/or non-financial 
target  
 
3. Social comparisons  Incidents of managers 
measuring their own 
performance against the 
performance of others, and 
its link to inter-temporal 
decisions 
 
3.1. Relative performance  The performance measure (e.g., 
financial target, non-financial 
target, and/or non-financial 
measure) is used to evaluate the 
managers relative to each other. 
This benchmarking information 
can be private (i.e., when the 
manager’s relative performance 
is known only by the manager 
and their line manager) or 
public (i.e., when the 
manager’s relative performance 
is known by the manager and 
all their colleagues) 
9, 15 
3.2. Upward comparison The manager compares 
him/herself to a colleague who 
is performing better on a 
performance measure (e.g., 
financial target, non-financial 
target, and/or non-financial 
measure) 
14 
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3.3. Downward comparison The manager compares 
him/herself to a colleague who 
is performing worse on a 
performance measure (e.g., 
financial target, non-financial 
target, and/or non-financial 
measure) 
14 
3.4. Relative standing  The manager’s performance 
(e.g., on the financial target, 
non-financial target, and/or 
non-financial measure) vis-à-
vis their colleagues, and how 
they feel about this  
14, 14a 
3.5. Competing  Evidence of a competitive work 
group climate. The manager is 
focused on outperforming their 
colleagues  
 
3.6. Judging a book by its 
cover 
Evidence of the manager 
judging their colleagues’ 
capability by their relative 
standing on a performance 
measure (e.g., financial target, 
non-financial target and/or non-
financial measure) alone 
 
3.7. Social comparisons > 
inter-temporal decisions 
Discussions about whether, 
how, and why social 
comparisons influence the 
manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed 
14b 
4. Reward/Penalty system  Descriptions of Grocer’s 
reward/penalty system, and 
its association with inter-
temporal decisions 
 
4.1. Rewards  The reward system within 
Grocer, including descriptions 
of the formal (e.g., monetary, 
promotion) and informal (e.g., 
recognition) performance-
related rewards  
16, 16a 
4.2. Reward allocation  Discussions about the 
performance criteria/thresholds 
that must be met in order to 
receive the formal (e.g., 
monetary, promotion) and 
informal (e.g., recognition) 
rewards 
16b 
4.3. Rewards > inter-
temporal decisions 
Discussions about whether, 
how, and why the reward 
system influences the manner 
16d 
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in which the inter-temporal 
tasks are performed 
4.4. Penalties  The formal penalties (e.g., 
reduced bonus, demotion) and 
informal reprisals (e.g., stigma) 
that follow from poor 
performance  
 
4.5. Penalties > inter-
temporal decisions 
Discussions about whether, 
how, and why the penalty 
system influences the manner 
in which the inter-temporal 
tasks are performed 
 
4.6. Advantages of system The perceived benefits of the 
reward/penalty system, as 
recounted by managers   
16c 
4.7. Disadvantages of 
system 
The perceived drawbacks of the 
reward/penalty system, as 
recounted by managers   
16c 
5. Intra-organisational mobility  Incidents of job mobility 
within Grocer, including the 
type and context to any role 
change and its linkage to 
inter-temporal decisions 
 
5.1. Current role How the manager defines 
his/her current role within 
Grocer 
1 
5.1.1. Level of 
experience 
How long the manager has 
been in his/her current role 
within Grocer 
1a 
5.2. Role change (function)  Discussions about whether the 
manager has experienced any 
changes in role function within 
Grocer in the past five years 
1a, 17, 
17a 
5.3. Role change (status) Discussions about whether the 
manager has experienced any 
changes in status within Grocer 
in the past five years (i.e., 
upward, lateral, or downward 
movement) 
1a, 17, 
17a 
5.4. Context to change Discussions about the context 
in which the role change 
occurred (e.g., the extent of the 
manager’s prior knowledge 
about the role change, who 
initiated the role change, the 
manager’s performance prior to 
the role change, etc.) 
17b 
5.5. Intra-organisational 
mobility > inter-
temporal decisions 
Discussions about whether, 
how, and why intra-
organisational mobility 
17c, 17d 
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influences the manner in which 
the inter-temporal tasks are 
performed 
6. Personal preferences  The personal preferences of 
managers and their linkage to 
inter-temporal decisions 
made in Grocer 
 
6.1. Past time perspective The past influences the 
manager’s decisions by means 
of confirming their current 
behaviour or providing lessons 
for improvement  
5 
6.2. Present time 
perspective 
The manager attends to the 
relatively more certain and 
concrete reality of the present 
(i.e., a matter of days or 
weeks), and does not typically 
consider possible future 
consequences or reflect on past 
actions. The manager has 
vaguely defined future goals  
4, 5, 6 
6.3. Future time perspective The manager is committed to 
working towards distant goals 
(i.e., a matter of months or 
years) and their associated 
rewards, often at the expense of 
immediate gratification. The 
manager is able to abstract 
mental representations of the 
implications of their current 
actions 
4, 6 
6.4. Temporal balance The manager has the ability to 
switch flexibly among the three 
time frames (i.e., past, present, 
future) as most appropriate to 
the demands of the situation 
7 
6.5. Temporal orientation The manager has the tendency 
to overemphasise one of the 
three temporal frames (i.e., 
past, present or future) to the 
exclusion or minimisation of 
the other two 
7 
6.6. Time perspective > 
inter-temporal decisions  
Discussions about whether, 
how, and why the manager’s 
temporal preference influences 
the manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed in 
the workplace 
7 
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6.7. Other personal 
orientations > inter-
temporal decisions 
References to other personal 
orientations (own or others) 
and whether, how, and why 
these orientations influence the 
manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed in 
the workplace 
8 
7. Broader context to inter-
temporal decisions 
Descriptions of the broader 
context in which the inter-
temporal decisions are made  
 
7.1. Stores  References to the 
characteristics of stores (e.g., 
size, location, departments, 
etc.), and how these 
characteristics may influence 
the manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed 
 
7.2. Investments into stores  References to the financial 
investments made by Grocer 
into stores (e.g., 
refurbishments, reducing 
product prices, increasing 
financial budgets, etc.) 
 
7.3. Attitude towards Grocer  The manager’s thoughts and 
feelings about Grocer, 
including Grocer’s UK-level 
performance and any broader 
corporate issues 
 
7.4. Cost efficiency  Grocer’s approach to cost 
efficiency, and how this 
approach may influence the 
manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed 
 
7.5. Impacts and issues Impacts and issues (store 
specific, role specific, and/or 
generic) that may influence the 
manner in which the inter-
temporal tasks are performed 
 
7.6. Training  The formal training that Grocer 
has provided to the manager for 
them to be able to perform the 
inter-temporal tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
